Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 61
Question 600
During a scheduled validation at the Tacoma warehouse network, a standard ACL intended to block one branch source subnet inadvertently blocks access to several unrelated destinations. Engineers must restore a monitored campus segment without disturbing unrelated production services. The attempted fix creates a regression. Which scoped recovery action is most appropriate?
- Restore prior ACL placement if unrelated production flows become blocked.
- Remove the new exception if it allows unauthorized management probes.
- Remove the maintenance permit if clocks or schedules cannot be trusted.
- Reinstate the old management exception if remote administration is lost.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Restore prior ACL placement if unrelated production flows become blocked. Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
Incorrect Answers
B:Remove the new exception if it allows unauthorized management probes. This is a rollback for a different component (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
C:Remove the maintenance permit if clocks or schedules cannot be trusted. This is a rollback for a different component (Time-based ACL), where Time-based ACL entries depend on correct local time and an actively applied time-range definition. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
D:Reinstate the old management exception if remote administration is lost. This is a rollback for a different component (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
Question 601
During a scheduled validation at the Frisco service-provider handoff, a summarizing edge advertises 10.60.0.0/16 although one component /24 has been withdrawn, and traffic to that /24 is discarded. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Check whether the EIGRP redistribution policy supplies a usable seed metric.
- Inspect the route's selected source, prefix length, and administrative distance in the routing table.
- Compare the destination's matching prefixes and their lengths, not merely route-source preference.
- Compare summary reachability with the actual set of component subnets and the summary discard route.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Compare summary reachability with the actual set of component subnets and the summary discard route. An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
Incorrect Answers
A:Check whether the EIGRP redistribution policy supplies a usable seed metric. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (EIGRP redistribution seed metric), where EIGRP redistribution generally needs an appropriate seed metric for external routes. Here the evidence instead concerns summary route black hole: An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
B:Inspect the route's selected source, prefix length, and administrative distance in the routing table. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Administrative distance), where For the same destination prefix, the router prefers the eligible route with the lower administrative distance after longest-prefix selection. Here the evidence instead concerns summary route black hole: An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
C:Compare the destination's matching prefixes and their lengths, not merely route-source preference. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Longest-prefix selection), where A longer matching prefix is selected before administrative distance is compared among equal-length routes. Here the evidence instead concerns summary route black hole: An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
Question 602
During a scheduled validation at the Frisco service-provider handoff, a summarizing edge advertises 10.60.0.0/16 although one component /24 has been withdrawn, and traffic to that /24 is discarded. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Set a higher local preference for the preferred egress using a scoped inbound policy at the edge.
- Correct the BGP neighbor remote-as and related peer policy for the intended eBGP or iBGP relationship.
- Refine the aggregate or restore specific reachable routes so the advertisement does not imply missing coverage.
- Tag routes on first redistribution and deny that tag when importing them back into the source domain.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Refine the aggregate or restore specific reachable routes so the advertisement does not imply missing coverage. An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
Incorrect Answers
A:Set a higher local preference for the preferred egress using a scoped inbound policy at the edge. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP outbound path local preference), where Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED. Here the evidence instead concerns summary route black hole: An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
B:Correct the BGP neighbor remote-as and related peer policy for the intended eBGP or iBGP relationship. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP peer remote AS), where BGP neighbors must agree on configured peer AS identity and establish a TCP session. Here the evidence instead concerns summary route black hole: An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
D:Tag routes on first redistribution and deny that tag when importing them back into the source domain. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Redistribution loop prevention tags), where Consistent route tagging and inbound redistribution filters help prevent feedback loops across routing domains. Here the evidence instead concerns summary route black hole: An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
Question 603
During a scheduled validation at the Frisco service-provider handoff, a summarizing edge advertises 10.60.0.0/16 although one component /24 has been withdrawn, and traffic to that /24 is discarded. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Confirm a Type 5 or appropriate Type 7 external LSA represents only the authorized prefix.
- Verify the external EIGRP route and plausible composite metric appear in neighbor tables.
- Use a destination-specific forwarding lookup to confirm which most-specific route is selected.
- Probe each component prefix and examine forwarding to ensure the summary does not attract unreachable traffic.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Probe each component prefix and examine forwarding to ensure the summary does not attract unreachable traffic. An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
Incorrect Answers
A:Confirm a Type 5 or appropriate Type 7 external LSA represents only the authorized prefix. This is a validation for another mechanism (OSPF classless redistribution), where Redistribution must explicitly cover intended classless networks while avoiding uncontrolled route leakage. Here the evidence instead concerns summary route black hole: An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
B:Verify the external EIGRP route and plausible composite metric appear in neighbor tables. This is a validation for another mechanism (EIGRP redistribution seed metric), where EIGRP redistribution generally needs an appropriate seed metric for external routes. Here the evidence instead concerns summary route black hole: An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
C:Use a destination-specific forwarding lookup to confirm which most-specific route is selected. This is a validation for another mechanism (Longest-prefix selection), where A longer matching prefix is selected before administrative distance is compared among equal-length routes. Here the evidence instead concerns summary route black hole: An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
Question 604
During a scheduled validation at the Frisco service-provider handoff, a summarizing edge advertises 10.60.0.0/16 although one component /24 has been withdrawn, and traffic to that /24 is discarded. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. Select TWO actions: one investigation and one targeted remediation that belong together for this incident.
- Raise the static route's distance above the intended OSPF route or remove the unwanted override.
- Check whether the EIGRP redistribution policy supplies a usable seed metric.
- Compare summary reachability with the actual set of component subnets and the summary discard route.
- Refine the aggregate or restore specific reachable routes so the advertisement does not imply missing coverage.
Explanation
Correct Answers
C:Compare summary reachability with the actual set of component subnets and the summary discard route. An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
D:Refine the aggregate or restore specific reachable routes so the advertisement does not imply missing coverage. An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
Incorrect Answers
A:Raise the static route's distance above the intended OSPF route or remove the unwanted override. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Administrative distance), where For the same destination prefix, the router prefers the eligible route with the lower administrative distance after longest-prefix selection. Here the evidence instead concerns summary route black hole: An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
B:Check whether the EIGRP redistribution policy supplies a usable seed metric. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (EIGRP redistribution seed metric), where EIGRP redistribution generally needs an appropriate seed metric for external routes. Here the evidence instead concerns summary route black hole: An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks.
Question 605
Following a production change at the Columbus distribution campus, two border routers learn the same prefix, but most internal routers prefer the wrong upstream exit. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Check the client's reflector-client configuration, session state, and cluster metadata.
- Inspect the received BGP next-hop address and its reachability in the IGP or VRF.
- Compare AS paths as seen by external peers and inspect outbound route policy for each eBGP neighbor.
- Inspect local preference distributed in iBGP along with route selection results.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Inspect local preference distributed in iBGP along with route selection results. Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
Incorrect Answers
A:Check the client's reflector-client configuration, session state, and cluster metadata. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (BGP route reflector clients), where Route reflectors relax iBGP split-horizon for configured clients while using loop-prevention attributes. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
B:Inspect the received BGP next-hop address and its reachability in the IGP or VRF. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (BGP iBGP next-hop reachability), where An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
C:Compare AS paths as seen by external peers and inspect outbound route policy for each eBGP neighbor. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (BGP inbound traffic engineering), where AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
Question 606
Following a production change at the Columbus distribution campus, two border routers learn the same prefix, but most internal routers prefer the wrong upstream exit. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Set a higher local preference for the preferred egress using a scoped inbound policy at the edge.
- Use next-hop-self at the correct iBGP advertising boundary or repair the actual next-hop reachability.
- Configure a consistent loopback update source and sufficient eBGP multihop hop limit.
- Prepend the local AS on selected backup advertisements if permitted by upstream routing policy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Set a higher local preference for the preferred egress using a scoped inbound policy at the edge. Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
Incorrect Answers
B:Use next-hop-self at the correct iBGP advertising boundary or repair the actual next-hop reachability. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP iBGP next-hop reachability), where An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
C:Configure a consistent loopback update source and sufficient eBGP multihop hop limit. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Loopback-sourced eBGP session), where Default eBGP TTL and packet source are designed for directly connected peers; loopback peering needs explicit settings. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
D:Prepend the local AS on selected backup advertisements if permitted by upstream routing policy. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP inbound traffic engineering), where AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
Question 607
Following a production change at the Columbus distribution campus, two border routers learn the same prefix, but most internal routers prefer the wrong upstream exit. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?
- Verify client-learned routes are reflected to other clients with correct originator and cluster attributes.
- Verify only authorized aggregate prefixes are advertised and the private/internal prefixes are absent.
- Confirm internal BGP speakers consistently choose the preferred exit while backup remains available.
- Verify TCP 179 establishment using the loopback source and an Established BGP session.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Confirm internal BGP speakers consistently choose the preferred exit while backup remains available. Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
Incorrect Answers
A:Verify client-learned routes are reflected to other clients with correct originator and cluster attributes. This is a validation for another mechanism (BGP route reflector clients), where Route reflectors relax iBGP split-horizon for configured clients while using loop-prevention attributes. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
B:Verify only authorized aggregate prefixes are advertised and the private/internal prefixes are absent. This is a validation for another mechanism (BGP prefix leak prevention), where BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
D:Verify TCP 179 establishment using the loopback source and an Established BGP session. This is a validation for another mechanism (Loopback-sourced eBGP session), where Default eBGP TTL and packet source are designed for directly connected peers; loopback peering needs explicit settings. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
Question 608
Following a production change at the Columbus distribution campus, two border routers learn the same prefix, but most internal routers prefer the wrong upstream exit. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. Which TWO complementary steps provide both relevant fault isolation and a controlled correction?
- Inspect local preference distributed in iBGP along with route selection results.
- Compare AS paths as seen by external peers and inspect outbound route policy for each eBGP neighbor.
- Set a higher local preference for the preferred egress using a scoped inbound policy at the edge.
- Use next-hop-self at the correct iBGP advertising boundary or repair the actual next-hop reachability.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Inspect local preference distributed in iBGP along with route selection results. Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
C:Set a higher local preference for the preferred egress using a scoped inbound policy at the edge. Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
Incorrect Answers
B:Compare AS paths as seen by external peers and inspect outbound route policy for each eBGP neighbor. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (BGP inbound traffic engineering), where AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
D:Use next-hop-self at the correct iBGP advertising boundary or repair the actual next-hop reachability. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP iBGP next-hop reachability), where An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.
Question 609
Following a production change at the Fargo manufacturing plant, routers produce correct syslog messages but timestamps differ by several minutes, making incident correlation unreliable. The incident is affecting a voice service path; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Inspect line-specific login method lists, transport settings, and source filters separately for console and VTY.
- Inspect HTTPS service status and certificate subject or SAN against the accessed DNS name.
- Compare SNMPv3 user's group, security level, auth algorithm, privacy algorithm, and credentials.
- Inspect NTP synchronization, time zone representation, and logging timestamp precision.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Inspect NTP synchronization, time zone representation, and logging timestamp precision. Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect line-specific login method lists, transport settings, and source filters separately for console and VTY. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Console versus VTY authentication), where Console and VTY lines can use different authentication and authorization methods. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
B:Inspect HTTPS service status and certificate subject or SAN against the accessed DNS name. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (HTTPS device management), where HTTPS management depends on TLS trust and correct certificate identity, not just an enabled port. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
C:Compare SNMPv3 user's group, security level, auth algorithm, privacy algorithm, and credentials. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (SNMPv3 security level), where SNMPv3 authPriv requires both authentication and privacy protection to match the client's requirements. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
Question 610
Following a production change at the Fargo manufacturing plant, routers produce correct syslog messages but timestamps differ by several minutes, making incident correlation unreliable. The incident is affecting a voice service path; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Correct the exporter's receiver, source, and transport settings without changing the flow record unnecessarily.
- Configure matching SNMPv3 authPriv user/group security parameters for the approved monitoring client.
- Repair synchronization to approved NTP sources and use consistent timestamp settings.
- Align the authorized read-only community and NMS source list without adding public write access.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Repair synchronization to approved NTP sources and use consistent timestamp settings. Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
Incorrect Answers
A:Correct the exporter's receiver, source, and transport settings without changing the flow record unnecessarily. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (NetFlow exporter destination), where Flow collection and export are distinct: valid local cache entries do not imply successful export transport. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
B:Configure matching SNMPv3 authPriv user/group security parameters for the approved monitoring client. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (SNMPv3 security level), where SNMPv3 authPriv requires both authentication and privacy protection to match the client's requirements. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
D:Align the authorized read-only community and NMS source list without adding public write access. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (SNMPv2c read access), where SNMPv2c community matching and ACL restrictions determine polling access, but v2c itself lacks modern encryption. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.