Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 60
Question 590
During a scheduled validation at the Irvine branch site, dynamic routing neighbors fail on a DMVPN spoke even though unicast ping to the hub's tunnel IP succeeds. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Enable the intended hub NHRP redirect and spoke NHRP shortcut behavior with a compatible routing design.
- Repair the NHRP multicast map or dynamic mapping appropriate to hub/spoke roles.
- Correct the spoke's NHRP next-hop server and hub tunnel-to-NBMA map for its reachable hub.
- Bind the tunnel to the correct reachable underlay source and update dependent NBMA mapping as needed.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Repair the NHRP multicast map or dynamic mapping appropriate to hub/spoke roles. Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic.
Incorrect Answers
A:Enable the intended hub NHRP redirect and spoke NHRP shortcut behavior with a compatible routing design. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN phase 3 shortcut), where DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn multicast neighbor discovery: Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic.
C:Correct the spoke's NHRP next-hop server and hub tunnel-to-NBMA map for its reachable hub. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN NHS mapping), where A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn multicast neighbor discovery: Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic.
D:Bind the tunnel to the correct reachable underlay source and update dependent NBMA mapping as needed. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN tunnel source), where DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn multicast neighbor discovery: Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic.
Question 591
During a scheduled validation at the Irvine branch site, dynamic routing neighbors fail on a DMVPN spoke even though unicast ping to the hub's tunnel IP succeeds. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Check tunnel counters and NHRP registration after restoring matched encapsulation settings.
- Verify the spoke reaches the hub's NBMA endpoint and NHRP registration succeeds.
- Observe multicast routing hello exchange and stable protocol neighbors across the overlay.
- Confirm only approved VPN routes appear in the destination VRF with expected next-hop reachability.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Observe multicast routing hello exchange and stable protocol neighbors across the overlay. Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic.
Incorrect Answers
A:Check tunnel counters and NHRP registration after restoring matched encapsulation settings. This is a validation for another mechanism (DMVPN tunnel key consistency), where A GRE tunnel key mismatch can prevent compatible overlay traffic from being accepted. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn multicast neighbor discovery: Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic.
B:Verify the spoke reaches the hub's NBMA endpoint and NHRP registration succeeds. This is a validation for another mechanism (DMVPN tunnel source), where DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn multicast neighbor discovery: Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic.
D:Confirm only approved VPN routes appear in the destination VRF with expected next-hop reachability. This is a validation for another mechanism (MPLS VPN route target import), where Route targets control which VPNv4 routes a VRF imports and exports; an RD provides uniqueness rather than membership. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn multicast neighbor discovery: Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic.
Question 592
During a scheduled validation at the Irvine branch site, dynamic routing neighbors fail on a DMVPN spoke even though unicast ping to the hub's tunnel IP succeeds. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. The attempted fix creates a regression. Which scoped recovery action is most appropriate?
- Restore the former NHS mapping if the hub migration was incomplete.
- Revert the new peer identity mapping if it unexpectedly permits an unknown spoke.
- Restore the prior multicast map if the change floods routing hellos to unintended endpoints.
- Restore the previous hub route propagation policy if spoke reachability regresses.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Restore the prior multicast map if the change floods routing hellos to unintended endpoints. Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic.
Incorrect Answers
A:Restore the former NHS mapping if the hub migration was incomplete. This is a rollback for a different component (DMVPN NHS mapping), where A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn multicast neighbor discovery: Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic.
B:Revert the new peer identity mapping if it unexpectedly permits an unknown spoke. This is a rollback for a different component (IKE peer authentication), where IKE peer authentication is independent of NHRP and must match the correct endpoint identity and credentials. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn multicast neighbor discovery: Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic.
D:Restore the previous hub route propagation policy if spoke reachability regresses. This is a rollback for a different component (EIGRP on DMVPN hub), where DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn multicast neighbor discovery: Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic.
Question 593
Following a production change at the Reno branch site, a newly deployed spoke sends NHRP resolution queries but never learns the hub's tunnel-to-NBMA mapping. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Compare IKE/IPsec negotiation output, transform proposals, key lifetimes, and peer reachability.
- Inspect NHRP redirect generation on the hub and shortcut handling on spokes.
- Inspect the static NHRP map and NHS configuration on the spoke and the hub's tunnel identity.
- Compare GRE tunnel keys and tunnel modes between the affected DMVPN endpoints.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Inspect the static NHRP map and NHS configuration on the spoke and the hub's tunnel identity. A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
Incorrect Answers
A:Compare IKE/IPsec negotiation output, transform proposals, key lifetimes, and peer reachability. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DMVPN IPsec protection mismatch), where DMVPN tunnel protection requires compatible IPsec/IKE parameters for a successful protected GRE overlay. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn nhs mapping: A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
B:Inspect NHRP redirect generation on the hub and shortcut handling on spokes. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DMVPN phase 3 shortcut), where DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn nhs mapping: A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
D:Compare GRE tunnel keys and tunnel modes between the affected DMVPN endpoints. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DMVPN tunnel key consistency), where A GRE tunnel key mismatch can prevent compatible overlay traffic from being accepted. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn nhs mapping: A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
Question 594
Following a production change at the Reno branch site, a newly deployed spoke sends NHRP resolution queries but never learns the hub's tunnel-to-NBMA mapping. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Update the authorized peer authentication mapping or identity policy to match the new underlay endpoint.
- Align supported IPsec proposals and tunnel protection profiles on both endpoints without downgrading policy.
- Correct the spoke's NHRP next-hop server and hub tunnel-to-NBMA map for its reachable hub.
- Align the tunnel key and compatible mGRE mode for all peers in the same DMVPN cloud.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Correct the spoke's NHRP next-hop server and hub tunnel-to-NBMA map for its reachable hub. A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
Incorrect Answers
A:Update the authorized peer authentication mapping or identity policy to match the new underlay endpoint. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IKE peer authentication), where IKE peer authentication is independent of NHRP and must match the correct endpoint identity and credentials. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn nhs mapping: A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
B:Align supported IPsec proposals and tunnel protection profiles on both endpoints without downgrading policy. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN IPsec protection mismatch), where DMVPN tunnel protection requires compatible IPsec/IKE parameters for a successful protected GRE overlay. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn nhs mapping: A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
D:Align the tunnel key and compatible mGRE mode for all peers in the same DMVPN cloud. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN tunnel key consistency), where A GRE tunnel key mismatch can prevent compatible overlay traffic from being accepted. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn nhs mapping: A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
Question 595
Following a production change at the Reno branch site, a newly deployed spoke sends NHRP resolution queries but never learns the hub's tunnel-to-NBMA mapping. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?
- Check show ip nhrp and tunnel state for successful registration after the correction.
- Verify a spoke obtains a shortcut mapping and subsequent traffic uses a direct spoke-to-spoke tunnel.
- Verify the spoke registers with the intended NHS and can resolve hub tunnel reachability.
- Verify secure IKE and IPsec associations form with the expected peer identity.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Verify the spoke registers with the intended NHS and can resolve hub tunnel reachability. A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
Incorrect Answers
A:Check show ip nhrp and tunnel state for successful registration after the correction. This is a validation for another mechanism (DMVPN NHRP network ID), where NHRP network identifiers help distinguish DMVPN clouds and must match the intended overlay design. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn nhs mapping: A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
B:Verify a spoke obtains a shortcut mapping and subsequent traffic uses a direct spoke-to-spoke tunnel. This is a validation for another mechanism (DMVPN phase 3 shortcut), where DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn nhs mapping: A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
D:Verify secure IKE and IPsec associations form with the expected peer identity. This is a validation for another mechanism (IKE peer authentication), where IKE peer authentication is independent of NHRP and must match the correct endpoint identity and credentials. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn nhs mapping: A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
Question 596
Following a production change at the Reno branch site, a newly deployed spoke sends NHRP resolution queries but never learns the hub's tunnel-to-NBMA mapping. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?
- Reapply the last common tunnel key if multiple peers lose overlay connectivity.
- Restore the original network ID if the change merges previously separated DMVPN clouds.
- Restore the former NHS mapping if the hub migration was incomplete.
- Restore the prior multicast map if the change floods routing hellos to unintended endpoints.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Restore the former NHS mapping if the hub migration was incomplete. A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
Incorrect Answers
A:Reapply the last common tunnel key if multiple peers lose overlay connectivity. This is a rollback for a different component (DMVPN tunnel key consistency), where A GRE tunnel key mismatch can prevent compatible overlay traffic from being accepted. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn nhs mapping: A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
B:Restore the original network ID if the change merges previously separated DMVPN clouds. This is a rollback for a different component (DMVPN NHRP network ID), where NHRP network identifiers help distinguish DMVPN clouds and must match the intended overlay design. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn nhs mapping: A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
D:Restore the prior multicast map if the change floods routing hellos to unintended endpoints. This is a rollback for a different component (DMVPN multicast neighbor discovery), where Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn nhs mapping: A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration.
Question 597
During a scheduled validation at the Tacoma warehouse network, a standard ACL intended to block one branch source subnet inadvertently blocks access to several unrelated destinations. Engineers must restore a monitored campus segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Check ACL type, source-only matching, direction, and placement relative to branch and destination.
- Inspect the AAA login method-list order and the distinction between RADIUS timeout and explicit Access-Reject.
- Inspect DHCPv6 Guard policy role and identify which port is sourcing server replies.
- Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Check ACL type, source-only matching, direction, and placement relative to branch and destination. Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
Incorrect Answers
B:Inspect the AAA login method-list order and the distinction between RADIUS timeout and explicit Access-Reject. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (RADIUS AAA fallback), where AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
C:Inspect DHCPv6 Guard policy role and identify which port is sourcing server replies. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DHCPv6 server guard), where DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
D:Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
Question 598
During a scheduled validation at the Tacoma warehouse network, a standard ACL intended to block one branch source subnet inadvertently blocks access to several unrelated destinations. Engineers must restore a monitored campus segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Place the standard ACL nearer the intended destination or use a scoped extended ACL when destination precision is required.
- Enable supported ND inspection and guard policies on the affected access segment with proper trust boundaries.
- Block RAs on untrusted access ports while allowing approved router-facing ports to send them.
- Tie the SSH permit to a correctly defined time range and synchronize device time.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Place the standard ACL nearer the intended destination or use a scoped extended ACL when destination precision is required. Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
Incorrect Answers
B:Enable supported ND inspection and guard policies on the affected access segment with proper trust boundaries. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 Neighbor Discovery inspection), where IPv6 ND inspection uses neighbor state and filtering to mitigate neighbor-discovery spoofing. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
C:Block RAs on untrusted access ports while allowing approved router-facing ports to send them. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard), where RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
D:Tie the SSH permit to a correctly defined time range and synchronize device time. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Time-based ACL), where Time-based ACL entries depend on correct local time and an actively applied time-range definition. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
Question 599
During a scheduled validation at the Tacoma warehouse network, a standard ACL intended to block one branch source subnet inadvertently blocks access to several unrelated destinations. Engineers must restore a monitored campus segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Test the blocked source against the target and unrelated destinations to ensure only intended traffic is affected.
- Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters.
- Validate forged neighbor advertisements are blocked and legitimate NS/NA traffic continues normally.
- Confirm the current binding exists and legitimate IPv6 packets pass the guard.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Test the blocked source against the target and unrelated destinations to ensure only intended traffic is affected. Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
Incorrect Answers
B:Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
C:Validate forged neighbor advertisements are blocked and legitimate NS/NA traffic continues normally. This is a validation for another mechanism (IPv6 Neighbor Discovery inspection), where IPv6 ND inspection uses neighbor state and filtering to mitigate neighbor-discovery spoofing. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
D:Confirm the current binding exists and legitimate IPv6 packets pass the guard. This is a validation for another mechanism (IPv6 address binding table), where Several IPv6 first-hop security features rely on accurate host address and port bindings. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
Question 600
During a scheduled validation at the Tacoma warehouse network, a standard ACL intended to block one branch source subnet inadvertently blocks access to several unrelated destinations. Engineers must restore a monitored campus segment without disturbing unrelated production services. The attempted fix creates a regression. Which scoped recovery action is most appropriate?
- Restore prior ACL placement if unrelated production flows become blocked.
- Remove the new exception if it allows unauthorized management probes.
- Remove the maintenance permit if clocks or schedules cannot be trusted.
- Reinstate the old management exception if remote administration is lost.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Restore prior ACL placement if unrelated production flows become blocked. Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
Incorrect Answers
B:Remove the new exception if it allows unauthorized management probes. This is a rollback for a different component (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
C:Remove the maintenance permit if clocks or schedules cannot be trusted. This is a rollback for a different component (Time-based ACL), where Time-based ACL entries depend on correct local time and an actively applied time-range definition. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.
D:Reinstate the old management exception if remote administration is lost. This is a rollback for a different component (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns standard ipv4 acl placement: Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering.