Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 62
Question 610
Following a production change at the Fargo manufacturing plant, routers produce correct syslog messages but timestamps differ by several minutes, making incident correlation unreliable. The incident is affecting a voice service path; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Correct the exporter's receiver, source, and transport settings without changing the flow record unnecessarily.
- Configure matching SNMPv3 authPriv user/group security parameters for the approved monitoring client.
- Repair synchronization to approved NTP sources and use consistent timestamp settings.
- Align the authorized read-only community and NMS source list without adding public write access.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Repair synchronization to approved NTP sources and use consistent timestamp settings. Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
Incorrect Answers
A:Correct the exporter's receiver, source, and transport settings without changing the flow record unnecessarily. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (NetFlow exporter destination), where Flow collection and export are distinct: valid local cache entries do not imply successful export transport. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
B:Configure matching SNMPv3 authPriv user/group security parameters for the approved monitoring client. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (SNMPv3 security level), where SNMPv3 authPriv requires both authentication and privacy protection to match the client's requirements. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
D:Align the authorized read-only community and NMS source list without adding public write access. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (SNMPv2c read access), where SNMPv2c community matching and ACL restrictions determine polling access, but v2c itself lacks modern encryption. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
Question 611
Following a production change at the Fargo manufacturing plant, routers produce correct syslog messages but timestamps differ by several minutes, making incident correlation unreliable. The incident is affecting a voice service path; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?
- Verify the collector receives decoded flows and the router's export success counter increments.
- Capture a relay-generated request and verify the server replies with a lease for the client's subnet.
- Compare event timestamps across devices after a known simultaneous test event.
- Verify authenticated encrypted SNMP operations succeed and insecure requests are denied.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Compare event timestamps across devices after a known simultaneous test event. Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
Incorrect Answers
A:Verify the collector receives decoded flows and the router's export success counter increments. This is a validation for another mechanism (NetFlow exporter destination), where Flow collection and export are distinct: valid local cache entries do not imply successful export transport. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
B:Capture a relay-generated request and verify the server replies with a lease for the client's subnet. This is a validation for another mechanism (IPv4 DHCP relay), where IPv4 DHCP Discover broadcasts require a relay when the DHCP server resides beyond a Layer 3 boundary. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
D:Verify authenticated encrypted SNMP operations succeed and insecure requests are denied. This is a validation for another mechanism (SNMPv3 security level), where SNMPv3 authPriv requires both authentication and privacy protection to match the client's requirements. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
Question 612
Following a production change at the Fargo manufacturing plant, routers produce correct syslog messages but timestamps differ by several minutes, making incident correlation unreliable. The incident is affecting a voice service path; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?
- Restore the previous exporter path if exports accidentally reach an external untrusted collector.
- Restore the previous policy or route on the affected hop if the trace exposes a regression.
- Restore approved NTP peers if a replacement time source produces unstable clock shifts.
- Restore the prior trusted key configuration if rotating device keys breaks automated management.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Restore approved NTP peers if a replacement time source produces unstable clock shifts. Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
Incorrect Answers
A:Restore the previous exporter path if exports accidentally reach an external untrusted collector. This is a rollback for a different component (NetFlow exporter destination), where Flow collection and export are distinct: valid local cache entries do not imply successful export transport. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
B:Restore the previous policy or route on the affected hop if the trace exposes a regression. This is a rollback for a different component (Catalyst Center path trace), where Assurance path-trace capabilities can isolate the segment traversed by traffic and support focused troubleshooting. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
D:Restore the prior trusted key configuration if rotating device keys breaks automated management. This is a rollback for a different component (SSH prerequisites), where A Cisco IOS SSH server needs valid crypto key material and compatible session settings. Here the evidence instead concerns time synchronization for logs: Reliable timestamps depend on synchronized device clocks and appropriately configured log timestamps.
Question 613
Following a production change at the Wichita data center, a router ACL permits two known application networks, but new monitoring probes fail despite no explicit deny entry. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Check ACL type, source-only matching, direction, and placement relative to branch and destination.
- Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction.
- Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list.
- Read ACL entries in sequence and review hit counts for the relevant source, destination, protocol, and port.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list. IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Incorrect Answers
A:Check ACL type, source-only matching, direction, and placement relative to branch and destination. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Standard IPv4 ACL placement), where Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
B:Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
D:Read ACL entries in sequence and review hit counts for the relevant source, destination, protocol, and port. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Question 614
Following a production change at the Wichita data center, a router ACL permits two known application networks, but new monitoring probes fail despite no explicit deny entry. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Apply DHCPv6 guard to untrusted client ports and permit only the authorized server-facing path.
- Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit.
- Configure a controlled local fallback method for server unavailability on the intended lines.
- Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit. IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Incorrect Answers
A:Apply DHCPv6 guard to untrusted client ports and permit only the authorized server-facing path. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DHCPv6 server guard), where DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
C:Configure a controlled local fallback method for server unavailability on the intended lines. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (RADIUS AAA fallback), where AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
D:Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Question 615
Following a production change at the Wichita data center, a router ACL permits two known application networks, but new monitoring probes fail despite no explicit deny entry. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?
- Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence.
- Test the matching IPv6 flows and required neighbor discovery traffic after deployment.
- Verify monitoring traffic is permitted and nonapproved sources remain blocked.
- Confirm a controlled test login uses local authentication only under the designed fallback condition.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Verify monitoring traffic is permitted and nonapproved sources remain blocked. IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Incorrect Answers
A:Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
B:Test the matching IPv6 flows and required neighbor discovery traffic after deployment. This is a validation for another mechanism (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
D:Confirm a controlled test login uses local authentication only under the designed fallback condition. This is a validation for another mechanism (AAA local user authentication), where A local fallback requires valid local users and an AAA login method list that actually references the local database. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Question 616
Following a production change at the Wichita data center, a router ACL permits two known application networks, but new monitoring probes fail despite no explicit deny entry. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?
- Remove the new IPv6 filter if it unexpectedly prevents necessary IPv6 control-plane exchanges.
- Restore the former ACL order if the specific permit unintentionally opens additional sources.
- Remove the new exception if it allows unauthorized management probes.
- Remove the maintenance permit if clocks or schedules cannot be trusted.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Remove the new exception if it allows unauthorized management probes. IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Incorrect Answers
A:Remove the new IPv6 filter if it unexpectedly prevents necessary IPv6 control-plane exchanges. This is a rollback for a different component (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
B:Restore the former ACL order if the specific permit unintentionally opens additional sources. This is a rollback for a different component (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
D:Remove the maintenance permit if clocks or schedules cannot be trusted. This is a rollback for a different component (Time-based ACL), where Time-based ACL entries depend on correct local time and an actively applied time-range definition. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Question 617
During a scheduled validation at the Plano remote operations location, a DMVPN spoke's tunnel interface remains up/up, but NHRP never registers after its ISP-facing interface was changed. Engineers must restore an operations uplink without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Inspect NHRP redirect generation on the hub and shortcut handling on spokes.
- Check the tunnel source IP/interface, NBMA reachability, and NHRP peer mapping toward the hub.
- Compare NHRP network-ID configuration and DMVPN cloud membership on the tunnel interfaces.
- Inspect the IKE peer identity, key selection, and authentication failure logs for the changed NBMA address.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Check the tunnel source IP/interface, NBMA reachability, and NHRP peer mapping toward the hub. DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect NHRP redirect generation on the hub and shortcut handling on spokes. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DMVPN phase 3 shortcut), where DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn tunnel source: DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
C:Compare NHRP network-ID configuration and DMVPN cloud membership on the tunnel interfaces. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DMVPN NHRP network ID), where NHRP network identifiers help distinguish DMVPN clouds and must match the intended overlay design. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn tunnel source: DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
D:Inspect the IKE peer identity, key selection, and authentication failure logs for the changed NBMA address. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IKE peer authentication), where IKE peer authentication is independent of NHRP and must match the correct endpoint identity and credentials. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn tunnel source: DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
Question 618
During a scheduled validation at the Plano remote operations location, a DMVPN spoke's tunnel interface remains up/up, but NHRP never registers after its ISP-facing interface was changed. Engineers must restore an operations uplink without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Correct the spoke's NHRP next-hop server and hub tunnel-to-NBMA map for its reachable hub.
- Align the intended NHRP authentication values without disabling authentication globally.
- Update the authorized peer authentication mapping or identity policy to match the new underlay endpoint.
- Bind the tunnel to the correct reachable underlay source and update dependent NBMA mapping as needed.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Bind the tunnel to the correct reachable underlay source and update dependent NBMA mapping as needed. DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
Incorrect Answers
A:Correct the spoke's NHRP next-hop server and hub tunnel-to-NBMA map for its reachable hub. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN NHS mapping), where A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn tunnel source: DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
B:Align the intended NHRP authentication values without disabling authentication globally. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN NHRP authentication), where NHRP authentication mismatch can stop a spoke from registering even when tunnel connectivity exists. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn tunnel source: DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
C:Update the authorized peer authentication mapping or identity policy to match the new underlay endpoint. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IKE peer authentication), where IKE peer authentication is independent of NHRP and must match the correct endpoint identity and credentials. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn tunnel source: DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
Question 619
During a scheduled validation at the Plano remote operations location, a DMVPN spoke's tunnel interface remains up/up, but NHRP never registers after its ISP-facing interface was changed. Engineers must restore an operations uplink without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Verify accepted registrations appear at the hub and authorized spokes can resolve tunnel addresses.
- Observe multicast routing hello exchange and stable protocol neighbors across the overlay.
- Verify the spoke reaches the hub's NBMA endpoint and NHRP registration succeeds.
- Check show ip nhrp and tunnel state for successful registration after the correction.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Verify the spoke reaches the hub's NBMA endpoint and NHRP registration succeeds. DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
Incorrect Answers
A:Verify accepted registrations appear at the hub and authorized spokes can resolve tunnel addresses. This is a validation for another mechanism (DMVPN NHRP authentication), where NHRP authentication mismatch can stop a spoke from registering even when tunnel connectivity exists. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn tunnel source: DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
B:Observe multicast routing hello exchange and stable protocol neighbors across the overlay. This is a validation for another mechanism (DMVPN multicast neighbor discovery), where Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn tunnel source: DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
D:Check show ip nhrp and tunnel state for successful registration after the correction. This is a validation for another mechanism (DMVPN NHRP network ID), where NHRP network identifiers help distinguish DMVPN clouds and must match the intended overlay design. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn tunnel source: DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
Question 620
During a scheduled validation at the Plano remote operations location, a DMVPN spoke's tunnel interface remains up/up, but NHRP never registers after its ISP-facing interface was changed. Engineers must restore an operations uplink without disturbing unrelated production services. The attempted fix creates a regression. Which scoped recovery action is most appropriate?
- Restore the prior tunnel source if the new ISP path cannot support the overlay.
- Restore the prior multicast map if the change floods routing hellos to unintended endpoints.
- Restore the previous valid secret pair if the rotation prevents registration.
- Restore the former NHS mapping if the hub migration was incomplete.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Restore the prior tunnel source if the new ISP path cannot support the overlay. DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
Incorrect Answers
B:Restore the prior multicast map if the change floods routing hellos to unintended endpoints. This is a rollback for a different component (DMVPN multicast neighbor discovery), where Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn tunnel source: DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
C:Restore the previous valid secret pair if the rotation prevents registration. This is a rollback for a different component (DMVPN NHRP authentication), where NHRP authentication mismatch can stop a spoke from registering even when tunnel connectivity exists. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn tunnel source: DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.
D:Restore the former NHS mapping if the hub migration was incomplete. This is a rollback for a different component (DMVPN NHS mapping), where A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn tunnel source: DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association.