Cisco 350-601 Practice Test 114
Question 1130
A new UCS Manager domain has TACACS+ reachability, yet operator groups are not assigned the correct UCS management roles. The observed failure is: a successful directory lookup without UCS role mapping may not grant the intended management operations. Which remediation most directly restores the intended behavior?
- The controlled remediation is to assume Nexus NX-OS switch roles automatically apply unchanged to UCS Manager.
- The controlled remediation is to repair provider and role policy and test both approved login and local recovery access.
- The controlled remediation is to give all directory users full UCS administrator rights by default.
- The controlled remediation is to delete the local recovery admin before validating remote AAA.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:This addresses the observable fault while preserving a check of the expected result. Validate against UCS authentication realms, provider status, group-to-role mappings and successful role-specific login.
Incorrect Answers
A:Assume Nexus NX-OS switch roles automatically apply unchanged to UCS Manager. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. A successful directory lookup without UCS role mapping may not grant the intended management operations. The controlled recovery is to repair provider and role policy and test both approved login and local recovery access.
C:Give all directory users full UCS administrator rights by default. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. A successful directory lookup without UCS role mapping may not grant the intended management operations. The controlled recovery is to repair provider and role policy and test both approved login and local recovery access.
D:Delete the local recovery admin before validating remote AAA. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. A successful directory lookup without UCS role mapping may not grant the intended management operations. The controlled recovery is to repair provider and role policy and test both approved login and local recovery access.
Question 1131
A monitoring analyst is assigned the UCS admin role even though the job requires read-only chassis health access. Which configuration decision MOST directly resolves the issue?
- Share one UCS administrator account across all audit and operation teams.
- Treat hardware serial numbers as substitutes for user authorization policy.
- Use UCS management roles and organizations to restrict administrative access to necessary resources.
- Disable UCS user accounting to simplify least-privilege testing.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:This directly addresses UCS server administration RBAC separation because UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions. Confirm the change against UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
Incorrect Answers
A:Share one UCS administrator account across all audit and operation teams. This is not a valid substitute for the specified fix. Overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption. The relevant correction is to use UCS management roles and organizations to restrict administrative access to necessary resources.
B:Treat hardware serial numbers as substitutes for user authorization policy. The proposed change targets the wrong mechanism or lacks essential validation. UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions. Relevant evidence is UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
D:Disable UCS user accounting to simplify least-privilege testing. This would leave the diagnosed requirement unresolved. Overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption. The appropriate action remains to use UCS management roles and organizations to restrict administrative access to necessary resources.
Question 1132
A monitoring analyst is assigned the UCS admin role even though the job requires read-only chassis health access. What should the engineer inspect to confirm the actual state?
- A signed design diagram that lacks current access-policy or violation counters.
- An old role mapping that ignores the observed denial or unwanted permission.
- One successful management ping without validating the applicable policy.
- UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:These observations test the actual UCS server administration RBAC separation mechanism rather than a superficial management status. UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions.
Incorrect Answers
A:A signed design diagram that lacks current access-policy or violation counters. This information cannot independently verify UCS server administration RBAC separation. The decisive records instead include UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions. UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions.
B:An old role mapping that ignores the observed denial or unwanted permission. This information cannot independently verify UCS server administration RBAC separation. The decisive records instead include UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions. UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions.
C:One successful management ping without validating the applicable policy. This information cannot independently verify UCS server administration RBAC separation. The decisive records instead include UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions. UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions.
Question 1133
A monitoring analyst is assigned the UCS admin role even though the job requires read-only chassis health access. What technical behavior underlies the correct decision?
- UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions.
- A recognized device name establishes authentication and trust without checking keys.
- Physical connectivity makes all ACI contract and security policies optional.
- All traffic within a VLAN is necessarily authorized regardless of identity or policy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Validation depends on UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions. This explains why the most appropriate response is to use UCS management roles and organizations to restrict administrative access to necessary resources.
Incorrect Answers
B:A recognized device name establishes authentication and trust without checking keys. This is an incorrect generalization for UCS server administration RBAC separation. The applicable technical behavior is that UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions. The operator should verify UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
C:Physical connectivity makes all ACI contract and security policies optional. This is an incorrect generalization for UCS server administration RBAC separation. The applicable technical behavior is that UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions. The operator should verify UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
D:All traffic within a VLAN is necessarily authorized regardless of identity or policy. This is an incorrect generalization for UCS server administration RBAC separation. The applicable technical behavior is that UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions. The operator should verify UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
Question 1134
A monitoring analyst is assigned the UCS admin role even though the job requires read-only chassis health access. Assume an engineer instead chooses to share one UCS administrator account across all audit and operation teams. Which resulting risk or fault should the reviewer identify?
- Keeping valid key rotation records automatically disables the correct peer trust.
- Overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption.
- Reviewing an ACI contract causes the pre-existing permit rule to vanish.
- Testing one denied unauthorized connection proves the policy was absent.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The proper corrective action is to use UCS management roles and organizations to restrict administrative access to necessary resources. UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions.
Incorrect Answers
A:This does not explain the actual UCS server administration RBAC separation defect after the shortcut. The meaningful failure is that overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption.
C:This does not explain the actual UCS server administration RBAC separation defect after the shortcut. The relevant evidence is UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
D:This does not explain the actual UCS server administration RBAC separation defect after the shortcut. In the given case, a monitoring analyst is assigned the UCS admin role even though the job requires read-only chassis health access.
Question 1135
A monitoring analyst is assigned the UCS admin role even though the job requires read-only chassis health access. The observed failure is: overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption. Which remediation most directly restores the intended behavior?
- Treat hardware serial numbers as substitutes for user authorization policy.
- Disable UCS user accounting to simplify least-privilege testing.
- Constrain the role and organization rights and verify practical permissions after login.
- Share one UCS administrator account across all audit and operation teams.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Validate against UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions. This addresses the observable fault while preserving a check of the expected result.
Incorrect Answers
A:Treat hardware serial numbers as substitutes for user authorization policy. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption. The controlled recovery is to constrain the role and organization rights and verify practical permissions after login.
B:Disable UCS user accounting to simplify least-privilege testing. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption. The controlled recovery is to constrain the role and organization rights and verify practical permissions after login.
D:Share one UCS administrator account across all audit and operation teams. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption. The controlled recovery is to constrain the role and organization rights and verify practical permissions after login.
Question 1136
A UCS service desk account unexpectedly can modify compute boot and firmware policy through excess role permissions. Which operator action best meets this technical requirement?
- On this affected device, the engineer should treat hardware serial numbers as substitutes for user authorization policy.
- On this affected device, the engineer should disable UCS user accounting to simplify least-privilege testing.
- On this affected device, the engineer should share one UCS administrator account across all audit and operation teams.
- On this affected device, the engineer should use UCS management roles and organizations to restrict administrative access to necessary resources.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:This directly addresses UCS server administration RBAC separation because UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions.
Incorrect Answers
A:Treat hardware serial numbers as substitutes for user authorization policy. The proposed change targets the wrong mechanism or lacks essential validation. UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions. Relevant evidence is UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
B:Disable UCS user accounting to simplify least-privilege testing. This would leave the diagnosed requirement unresolved. Overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption. The appropriate action remains to use UCS management roles and organizations to restrict administrative access to necessary resources.
C:Share one UCS administrator account across all audit and operation teams. This is not a valid substitute for the specified fix. Overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption. The relevant correction is to use UCS management roles and organizations to restrict administrative access to necessary resources.
Question 1137
A UCS service desk account unexpectedly can modify compute boot and firmware policy through excess role permissions. Which collection of observations most directly tests the suspected cause?
- For this deployment, examine UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
- For this deployment, examine a green link LED without confirming authentication, inspection or encryption state.
- For this deployment, examine a signed design diagram that lacks current access-policy or violation counters.
- For this deployment, examine an old role mapping that ignores the observed denial or unwanted permission.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:These observations test the actual UCS server administration RBAC separation mechanism rather than a superficial management status. They should be checked after use UCS management roles and organizations to restrict administrative access to necessary resources.
Incorrect Answers
B:A green link LED without confirming authentication, inspection or encryption state. This information cannot independently verify UCS server administration RBAC separation. The decisive records instead include UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions. UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions.
C:A signed design diagram that lacks current access-policy or violation counters. This information cannot independently verify UCS server administration RBAC separation. The decisive records instead include UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions. UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions.
D:An old role mapping that ignores the observed denial or unwanted permission. This information cannot independently verify UCS server administration RBAC separation. The decisive records instead include UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions. UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions.
Question 1138
A UCS service desk account unexpectedly can modify compute boot and firmware policy through excess role permissions. Which statement most accurately explains this scenario?
- For this condition, the applicable principle is that all traffic within a VLAN is necessarily authorized regardless of identity or policy.
- For this condition, the applicable principle is that UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions.
- For this condition, the applicable principle is that a recognized device name establishes authentication and trust without checking keys.
- For this condition, the applicable principle is that one security mechanism always replaces all other layer-specific access controls.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Validation depends on UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
Incorrect Answers
A:All traffic within a VLAN is necessarily authorized regardless of identity or policy. This is an incorrect generalization for UCS server administration RBAC separation. The applicable technical behavior is that UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions. The operator should verify UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
C:A recognized device name establishes authentication and trust without checking keys. This is an incorrect generalization for UCS server administration RBAC separation. The applicable technical behavior is that UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions. The operator should verify UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
D:One security mechanism always replaces all other layer-specific access controls. This is an incorrect generalization for UCS server administration RBAC separation. The applicable technical behavior is that UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions. The operator should verify UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions.
Question 1139
A UCS service desk account unexpectedly can modify compute boot and firmware policy through excess role permissions. Assume an engineer instead chooses to share one UCS administrator account across all audit and operation teams. What is the principal technical consequence of the mistaken choice?
- The resulting defect is that testing one denied unauthorized connection proves the policy was absent.
- The resulting defect is that a correctly scoped role assignment is the source of the earlier over-privilege.
- The resulting defect is that overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption.
- The resulting defect is that reviewing an ACI contract causes the pre-existing permit rule to vanish.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The proper corrective action is to use UCS management roles and organizations to restrict administrative access to necessary resources. That is the direct consequence of choosing the misleading shortcut.
Incorrect Answers
A:This does not explain the actual UCS server administration RBAC separation defect after the shortcut. In the given case, a UCS service desk account unexpectedly can modify compute boot and firmware policy through excess role permissions.
B:This does not explain the actual UCS server administration RBAC separation defect after the shortcut. A correctly scoped role assignment is the source of the earlier over-privilege.
D:This does not explain the actual UCS server administration RBAC separation defect after the shortcut. Reviewing an ACI contract causes the pre-existing permit rule to vanish.
Question 1140
A UCS service desk account unexpectedly can modify compute boot and firmware policy through excess role permissions. The observed failure is: overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption. What should the engineer do to recover and validate the service?
- The controlled remediation is to disable UCS user accounting to simplify least-privilege testing.
- The controlled remediation is to share one UCS administrator account across all audit and operation teams.
- The controlled remediation is to treat hardware serial numbers as substitutes for user authorization policy.
- The controlled remediation is to constrain the role and organization rights and verify practical permissions after login.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Validate against UCS user roles, role privileges, organization assignment and permitted or denied command actions. UCS RBAC can separate server operations from monitoring and administrative functions.
Incorrect Answers
A:Disable UCS user accounting to simplify least-privilege testing. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption. The controlled recovery is to constrain the role and organization rights and verify practical permissions after login.
B:Share one UCS administrator account across all audit and operation teams. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption. The controlled recovery is to constrain the role and organization rights and verify practical permissions after login.
C:Treat hardware serial numbers as substitutes for user authorization policy. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Overprivileged accounts increase the chance of accidental or malicious workload disruption. The controlled recovery is to constrain the role and organization rights and verify practical permissions after login.