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Cisco 350-601 Practice Test 107

Question 1060

A compromised VM and a healthy peer use one application subnet and the team needs more granular endpoint policy. The observed failure is: relying only on a shared VLAN cannot express all desired per-VM security boundaries. What should the engineer do to recover and validate the service?

  1. The controlled remediation is to assume EPG membership cannot differ within one bridge domain.
  2. The controlled remediation is to disable all enforcement between VMs because their IP addresses are in the same subnet.
  3. The controlled remediation is to use an MDS zoneset as the only microsegmentation control for Ethernet VMs.
  4. The controlled remediation is to define accurate endpoint selectors and contracts, then test allowed and denied east-west flows.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Validate against uSeg EPG match criteria, VM attributes, endpoint group classification and permitted flow tests. ACI microsegmentation can apply endpoint-specific policy below a coarse subnet or VLAN boundary.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Assume EPG membership cannot differ within one bridge domain. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Relying only on a shared VLAN cannot express all desired per-VM security boundaries. The controlled recovery is to define accurate endpoint selectors and contracts, then test allowed and denied east-west flows.

B:

Disable all enforcement between VMs because their IP addresses are in the same subnet. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Relying only on a shared VLAN cannot express all desired per-VM security boundaries. The controlled recovery is to define accurate endpoint selectors and contracts, then test allowed and denied east-west flows.

C:

Use an MDS zoneset as the only microsegmentation control for Ethernet VMs. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Relying only on a shared VLAN cannot express all desired per-VM security boundaries. The controlled recovery is to define accurate endpoint selectors and contracts, then test allowed and denied east-west flows.

Question 1061

A rogue server on an access port sends DHCP offers to compute hosts and the switch passes them as legitimate. Which operator action best meets this technical requirement?

  1. Enable DHCP snooping and trust only verified infrastructure-facing DHCP paths.
  2. Trust every server-facing interface so DHCP requests complete faster.
  3. Disable snooping for all VLANs after a single false alert.
  4. Create unrelated BGP policies instead of controlling access-port DHCP messages.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This directly addresses dHCP snooping trusted ports because dHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses. Confirm the change against trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. The relevant correction is to enable DHCP snooping and trust only verified infrastructure-facing DHCP paths.

C:

Disable snooping for all VLANs after a single false alert. The proposed change targets the wrong mechanism or lacks essential validation. DHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses. Relevant evidence is trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.

D:

Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. The appropriate action remains to enable DHCP snooping and trust only verified infrastructure-facing DHCP paths.

Question 1062

A rogue server on an access port sends DHCP offers to compute hosts and the switch passes them as legitimate. Which collection of observations most directly tests the suspected cause?

  1. An old role mapping that ignores the observed denial or unwanted permission.
  2. Trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.
  3. A green link LED without confirming authentication, inspection or encryption state.
  4. A signed design diagram that lacks current access-policy or violation counters.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

These observations test the actual dHCP snooping trusted ports mechanism rather than a superficial management status. DHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This information cannot independently verify dHCP snooping trusted ports. The decisive records instead include trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.

C:

This information cannot independently verify dHCP snooping trusted ports. DHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses.

D:

This information cannot independently verify dHCP snooping trusted ports. A signed design diagram that lacks current access-policy or violation counters.

Question 1063

A rogue server on an access port sends DHCP offers to compute hosts and the switch passes them as legitimate. Which statement most accurately explains this scenario?

  1. One security mechanism always replaces all other layer-specific access controls.
  2. All traffic within a VLAN is necessarily authorized regardless of identity or policy.
  3. DHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses.
  4. A recognized device name establishes authentication and trust without checking keys.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This explains why the most appropriate response is to enable DHCP snooping and trust only verified infrastructure-facing DHCP paths. Validation depends on trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.

Incorrect Answers

A:

One security mechanism always replaces all other layer-specific access controls. This is an incorrect generalization for dHCP snooping trusted ports. The applicable technical behavior is that dHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses. The operator should verify trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.

B:

All traffic within a VLAN is necessarily authorized regardless of identity or policy. This is an incorrect generalization for dHCP snooping trusted ports. The applicable technical behavior is that dHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses. The operator should verify trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.

D:

A recognized device name establishes authentication and trust without checking keys. This is an incorrect generalization for dHCP snooping trusted ports. The applicable technical behavior is that dHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses. The operator should verify trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.

Question 1064

A rogue server on an access port sends DHCP offers to compute hosts and the switch passes them as legitimate. Assume an engineer instead chooses to trust every server-facing interface so DHCP requests complete faster. What is the principal technical consequence of the mistaken choice?

  1. Reviewing an ACI contract causes the pre-existing permit rule to vanish.
  2. Testing one denied unauthorized connection proves the policy was absent.
  3. A correctly scoped role assignment is the source of the earlier over-privilege.
  4. Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The proper corrective action is to enable DHCP snooping and trust only verified infrastructure-facing DHCP paths. DHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This does not explain the actual dHCP snooping trusted ports defect after the shortcut. The meaningful failure is that trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers.

B:

This does not explain the actual dHCP snooping trusted ports defect after the shortcut. The relevant evidence is trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.

C:

This does not explain the actual dHCP snooping trusted ports defect after the shortcut. A correctly scoped role assignment is the source of the earlier over-privilege.

Question 1065

A rogue server on an access port sends DHCP offers to compute hosts and the switch passes them as legitimate. The observed failure is: trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. What should the engineer do to recover and validate the service?

  1. Restrict trust to required uplinks and verify rogue offers are dropped while valid DHCP works.
  2. Disable snooping for all VLANs after a single false alert.
  3. Create unrelated BGP policies instead of controlling access-port DHCP messages.
  4. Trust every server-facing interface so DHCP requests complete faster.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Validate against trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters. This addresses the observable fault while preserving a check of the expected result.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Disable snooping for all VLANs after a single false alert. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. The controlled recovery is to restrict trust to required uplinks and verify rogue offers are dropped while valid DHCP works.

C:

Create unrelated BGP policies instead of controlling access-port DHCP messages. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. The controlled recovery is to restrict trust to required uplinks and verify rogue offers are dropped while valid DHCP works.

D:

Trust every server-facing interface so DHCP requests complete faster. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. The controlled recovery is to restrict trust to required uplinks and verify rogue offers are dropped while valid DHCP works.

Question 1066

A Nexus host-facing port is accidentally trusted for DHCP snooping, enabling unauthorized lease responses. Which next step should the data center engineer select?

  1. On this affected device, the engineer should disable snooping for all VLANs after a single false alert.
  2. On this affected device, the engineer should enable DHCP snooping and trust only verified infrastructure-facing DHCP paths.
  3. On this affected device, the engineer should create unrelated BGP policies instead of controlling access-port DHCP messages.
  4. On this affected device, the engineer should trust every server-facing interface so DHCP requests complete faster.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This directly addresses dHCP snooping trusted ports because dHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses. Enable DHCP snooping and trust only verified infrastructure-facing DHCP paths.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Disable snooping for all VLANs after a single false alert. The proposed change targets the wrong mechanism or lacks essential validation. DHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses. Relevant evidence is trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.

C:

Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. Create unrelated BGP policies instead of controlling access-port DHCP messages.

D:

Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. Trust every server-facing interface so DHCP requests complete faster.

Question 1067

A Nexus host-facing port is accidentally trusted for DHCP snooping, enabling unauthorized lease responses. Which diagnostic record would most strongly confirm the result?

  1. For this deployment, examine a user account name without the effective role or security enforcement record.
  2. For this deployment, examine an old role mapping that ignores the observed denial or unwanted permission.
  3. For this deployment, examine trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.
  4. For this deployment, examine a green link LED without confirming authentication, inspection or encryption state.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

These observations test the actual dHCP snooping trusted ports mechanism rather than a superficial management status. They should be checked after enable DHCP snooping and trust only verified infrastructure-facing DHCP paths.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This information cannot independently verify dHCP snooping trusted ports. A user account name without the effective role or security enforcement record.

B:

This information cannot independently verify dHCP snooping trusted ports. An old role mapping that ignores the observed denial or unwanted permission.

D:

This information cannot independently verify dHCP snooping trusted ports. A green link LED without confirming authentication, inspection or encryption state.

Question 1068

A Nexus host-facing port is accidentally trusted for DHCP snooping, enabling unauthorized lease responses. Which platform concept should guide the engineer’s assessment?

  1. For this condition, the applicable principle is that a recognized device name establishes authentication and trust without checking keys.
  2. For this condition, the applicable principle is that one security mechanism always replaces all other layer-specific access controls.
  3. For this condition, the applicable principle is that successful login automatically grants every management privilege.
  4. For this condition, the applicable principle is that dHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This explains why the most appropriate response is to enable DHCP snooping and trust only verified infrastructure-facing DHCP paths. DHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A recognized device name establishes authentication and trust without checking keys. This is an incorrect generalization for dHCP snooping trusted ports. The applicable technical behavior is that dHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses. The operator should verify trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.

B:

One security mechanism always replaces all other layer-specific access controls. This is an incorrect generalization for dHCP snooping trusted ports. The applicable technical behavior is that dHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses. The operator should verify trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.

C:

Successful login automatically grants every management privilege. This is an incorrect generalization for dHCP snooping trusted ports. The applicable technical behavior is that dHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses. The operator should verify trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters.

Question 1069

A Nexus host-facing port is accidentally trusted for DHCP snooping, enabling unauthorized lease responses. Assume an engineer instead chooses to trust every server-facing interface so DHCP requests complete faster. Which root-cause observation follows from that incorrect change?

  1. The resulting defect is that trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers.
  2. The resulting defect is that a correctly scoped role assignment is the source of the earlier over-privilege.
  3. The resulting defect is that auditing administrative actions is the cause of the initial unauthorized access.
  4. The resulting defect is that testing one denied unauthorized connection proves the policy was absent.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The proper corrective action is to enable DHCP snooping and trust only verified infrastructure-facing DHCP paths. That is the direct consequence of choosing the misleading shortcut.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This does not explain the actual dHCP snooping trusted ports defect after the shortcut. In the given case, a Nexus host-facing port is accidentally trusted for DHCP snooping, enabling unauthorized lease responses.

C:

This does not explain the actual dHCP snooping trusted ports defect after the shortcut. Auditing administrative actions is the cause of the initial unauthorized access.

D:

This does not explain the actual dHCP snooping trusted ports defect after the shortcut. Testing one denied unauthorized connection proves the policy was absent.

Question 1070

A Nexus host-facing port is accidentally trusted for DHCP snooping, enabling unauthorized lease responses. The observed failure is: trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. Which recovery action addresses the underlying technical fault?

  1. The controlled remediation is to create unrelated BGP policies instead of controlling access-port DHCP messages.
  2. The controlled remediation is to restrict trust to required uplinks and verify rogue offers are dropped while valid DHCP works.
  3. The controlled remediation is to trust every server-facing interface so DHCP requests complete faster.
  4. The controlled remediation is to disable snooping for all VLANs after a single false alert.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Validate against trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters. DHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Create unrelated BGP policies instead of controlling access-port DHCP messages. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. The controlled recovery is to restrict trust to required uplinks and verify rogue offers are dropped while valid DHCP works.

C:

Trust every server-facing interface so DHCP requests complete faster. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. The controlled recovery is to restrict trust to required uplinks and verify rogue offers are dropped while valid DHCP works.

D:

Disable snooping for all VLANs after a single false alert. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. The controlled recovery is to restrict trust to required uplinks and verify rogue offers are dropped while valid DHCP works.

Implementing and Operating Cisco Data Center Core Technologies (DCCOR) (350-601) Practice Tests