Cisco 350-601 Practice Test 108
Question 1070
A Nexus host-facing port is accidentally trusted for DHCP snooping, enabling unauthorized lease responses. The observed failure is: trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. Which recovery action addresses the underlying technical fault?
- The controlled remediation is to create unrelated BGP policies instead of controlling access-port DHCP messages.
- The controlled remediation is to restrict trust to required uplinks and verify rogue offers are dropped while valid DHCP works.
- The controlled remediation is to trust every server-facing interface so DHCP requests complete faster.
- The controlled remediation is to disable snooping for all VLANs after a single false alert.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Validate against trusted interface settings, DHCP offer captures, snooping binding table and blocked rogue-server counters. DHCP snooping can prevent untrusted access ports from sending DHCP server responses.
Incorrect Answers
A:Create unrelated BGP policies instead of controlling access-port DHCP messages. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. The controlled recovery is to restrict trust to required uplinks and verify rogue offers are dropped while valid DHCP works.
C:Trust every server-facing interface so DHCP requests complete faster. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. The controlled recovery is to restrict trust to required uplinks and verify rogue offers are dropped while valid DHCP works.
D:Disable snooping for all VLANs after a single false alert. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Trusting every edge port removes protection against unauthorized DHCP offers. The controlled recovery is to restrict trust to required uplinks and verify rogue offers are dropped while valid DHCP works.
Question 1071
A host on an access VLAN injects forged ARP replies that redirect peer traffic through an attacker system. Which next step should the data center engineer select?
- Trust all edge ports for ARP inspection permanently.
- Disable DHCP snooping data collection and assume DAI still has valid dynamic bindings.
- Use DHCP snooping bindings or approved static ARP ACLs to validate DAI on untrusted ports.
- Change IP routing protocol metrics to authorize ARP senders.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:This directly addresses dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust because dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces. Confirm the change against aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
Incorrect Answers
A:DAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled. The relevant correction is to use DHCP snooping bindings or approved static ARP ACLs to validate DAI on untrusted ports.
B:Disable DHCP snooping data collection and assume DAI still has valid dynamic bindings. The proposed change targets the wrong mechanism or lacks essential validation. Dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces. Relevant evidence is aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
D:DAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled. The appropriate action remains to use DHCP snooping bindings or approved static ARP ACLs to validate DAI on untrusted ports.
Question 1072
A host on an access VLAN injects forged ARP replies that redirect peer traffic through an attacker system. Which diagnostic record would most strongly confirm the result?
- A user account name without the effective role or security enforcement record.
- One successful management ping without validating the applicable policy.
- A green link LED without confirming authentication, inspection or encryption state.
- ARP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:These observations test the actual dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust mechanism rather than a superficial management status. Dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces.
Incorrect Answers
A:A user account name without the effective role or security enforcement record. This information cannot independently verify dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust. The decisive records instead include aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures. Dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces.
B:One successful management ping without validating the applicable policy. This information cannot independently verify dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust. The decisive records instead include aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures. Dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces.
C:A green link LED without confirming authentication, inspection or encryption state. This information cannot independently verify dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust. The decisive records instead include aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures. Dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces.
Question 1073
A host on an access VLAN injects forged ARP replies that redirect peer traffic through an attacker system. Which platform concept should guide the engineer’s assessment?
- Dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces.
- Physical connectivity makes all ACI contract and security policies optional.
- One security mechanism always replaces all other layer-specific access controls.
- Successful login automatically grants every management privilege.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:This explains why the most appropriate response is to use DHCP snooping bindings or approved static ARP ACLs to validate DAI on untrusted ports.
Incorrect Answers
B:Physical connectivity makes all ACI contract and security policies optional. This is an incorrect generalization for dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust. The applicable technical behavior is that dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces. The operator should verify aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
C:One security mechanism always replaces all other layer-specific access controls. This is an incorrect generalization for dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust. The applicable technical behavior is that dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces. The operator should verify aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
D:Successful login automatically grants every management privilege. This is an incorrect generalization for dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust. The applicable technical behavior is that dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces. The operator should verify aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
Question 1074
A host on an access VLAN injects forged ARP replies that redirect peer traffic through an attacker system. Assume an engineer instead chooses to trust all edge ports for ARP inspection permanently. Which root-cause observation follows from that incorrect change?
- A correctly scoped role assignment is the source of the earlier over-privilege.
- DAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled.
- Auditing administrative actions is the cause of the initial unauthorized access.
- Keeping valid key rotation records automatically disables the correct peer trust.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The proper corrective action is to use DHCP snooping bindings or approved static ARP ACLs to validate DAI on untrusted ports. Dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces.
Incorrect Answers
A:This does not explain the actual dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust defect after the shortcut. The meaningful failure is that dAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled.
C:This does not explain the actual dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust defect after the shortcut. The relevant evidence is aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
D:This does not explain the actual dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust defect after the shortcut. Keeping valid key rotation records automatically disables the correct peer trust.
Question 1075
A host on an access VLAN injects forged ARP replies that redirect peer traffic through an attacker system. The observed failure is: dAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled. Which recovery action addresses the underlying technical fault?
- Disable DHCP snooping data collection and assume DAI still has valid dynamic bindings.
- Change IP routing protocol metrics to authorize ARP senders.
- Correct binding sources and trust policy, then validate normal ARP and blocked forgery.
- Trust all edge ports for ARP inspection permanently.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:This addresses the observable fault while preserving a check of the expected result. Dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces.
Incorrect Answers
A:Disable DHCP snooping data collection and assume DAI still has valid dynamic bindings. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. DAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled. The controlled recovery is to correct binding sources and trust policy, then validate normal ARP and blocked forgery.
B:Change IP routing protocol metrics to authorize ARP senders. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. DAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled. The controlled recovery is to correct binding sources and trust policy, then validate normal ARP and blocked forgery.
D:Trust all edge ports for ARP inspection permanently. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. DAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled. The controlled recovery is to correct binding sources and trust policy, then validate normal ARP and blocked forgery.
Question 1076
A Nexus DAI rule drops legitimate ARP after DHCP snooping bindings fail to reflect a statically addressed host. What is the BEST supported implementation or corrective action?
- On this affected device, the engineer should disable DHCP snooping data collection and assume DAI still has valid dynamic bindings.
- On this affected device, the engineer should change IP routing protocol metrics to authorize ARP senders.
- On this affected device, the engineer should trust all edge ports for ARP inspection permanently.
- On this affected device, the engineer should use DHCP snooping bindings or approved static ARP ACLs to validate DAI on untrusted ports.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:This directly addresses dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust because dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces.
Incorrect Answers
A:Disable DHCP snooping data collection and assume DAI still has valid dynamic bindings. The proposed change targets the wrong mechanism or lacks essential validation. Dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces. Relevant evidence is aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
B:DAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled. Change IP routing protocol metrics to authorize ARP senders.
C:DAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled. In the given case, a Nexus DAI rule drops legitimate ARP after DHCP snooping bindings fail to reflect a statically addressed host.
Question 1077
A Nexus DAI rule drops legitimate ARP after DHCP snooping bindings fail to reflect a statically addressed host. Which evidence BEST verifies the intended technical behavior?
- For this deployment, examine aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
- For this deployment, examine a signed design diagram that lacks current access-policy or violation counters.
- For this deployment, examine a user account name without the effective role or security enforcement record.
- For this deployment, examine one successful management ping without validating the applicable policy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:These observations test the actual dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust mechanism rather than a superficial management status. They should be checked after use DHCP snooping bindings or approved static ARP ACLs to validate DAI on untrusted ports.
Incorrect Answers
B:A signed design diagram that lacks current access-policy or violation counters. This information cannot independently verify dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust. The decisive records instead include aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures. Dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces.
C:A user account name without the effective role or security enforcement record. This information cannot independently verify dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust. The decisive records instead include aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures. Dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces.
D:One successful management ping without validating the applicable policy. This information cannot independently verify dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust. The decisive records instead include aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures. Dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces.
Question 1078
A Nexus DAI rule drops legitimate ARP after DHCP snooping bindings fail to reflect a statically addressed host. Which principle BEST explains why the recommended solution is appropriate?
- For this condition, the applicable principle is that successful login automatically grants every management privilege.
- For this condition, the applicable principle is that dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces.
- For this condition, the applicable principle is that physical connectivity makes all ACI contract and security policies optional.
- For this condition, the applicable principle is that all traffic within a VLAN is necessarily authorized regardless of identity or policy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Validation depends on aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
Incorrect Answers
A:Successful login automatically grants every management privilege. This is an incorrect generalization for dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust. The applicable technical behavior is that dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces. The operator should verify aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
C:Physical connectivity makes all ACI contract and security policies optional. This is an incorrect generalization for dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust. The applicable technical behavior is that dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces. The operator should verify aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
D:All traffic within a VLAN is necessarily authorized regardless of identity or policy. This is an incorrect generalization for dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust. The applicable technical behavior is that dynamic ARP Inspection checks ARP sender bindings to restrict spoofing on untrusted interfaces. The operator should verify aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
Question 1079
A Nexus DAI rule drops legitimate ARP after DHCP snooping bindings fail to reflect a statically addressed host. Assume an engineer instead chooses to trust all edge ports for ARP inspection permanently. What is the MOST significant failure introduced by that shortcut?
- The resulting defect is that keeping valid key rotation records automatically disables the correct peer trust.
- The resulting defect is that reviewing an ACI contract causes the pre-existing permit rule to vanish.
- The resulting defect is that dAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled.
- The resulting defect is that auditing administrative actions is the cause of the initial unauthorized access.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The proper corrective action is to use DHCP snooping bindings or approved static ARP ACLs to validate DAI on untrusted ports. That is the direct consequence of choosing the misleading shortcut.
Incorrect Answers
A:This does not explain the actual dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust defect after the shortcut. In the given case, a Nexus DAI rule drops legitimate ARP after DHCP snooping bindings fail to reflect a statically addressed host.
B:This does not explain the actual dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust defect after the shortcut. Reviewing an ACI contract causes the pre-existing permit rule to vanish.
D:This does not explain the actual dynamic ARP Inspection binding trust defect after the shortcut. Auditing administrative actions is the cause of the initial unauthorized access.
Question 1080
A Nexus DAI rule drops legitimate ARP after DHCP snooping bindings fail to reflect a statically addressed host. The observed failure is: dAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled. What is the BEST controlled recovery once this failure is recognized?
- The controlled remediation is to change IP routing protocol metrics to authorize ARP senders.
- The controlled remediation is to trust all edge ports for ARP inspection permanently.
- The controlled remediation is to disable DHCP snooping data collection and assume DAI still has valid dynamic bindings.
- The controlled remediation is to correct binding sources and trust policy, then validate normal ARP and blocked forgery.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:This addresses the observable fault while preserving a check of the expected result. Validate against aRP inspection drops, binding database, static host records and packet captures.
Incorrect Answers
A:Change IP routing protocol metrics to authorize ARP senders. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. DAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled. The controlled recovery is to correct binding sources and trust policy, then validate normal ARP and blocked forgery.
B:Trust all edge ports for ARP inspection permanently. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. DAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled. The controlled recovery is to correct binding sources and trust policy, then validate normal ARP and blocked forgery.
C:Disable DHCP snooping data collection and assume DAI still has valid dynamic bindings. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. DAI without accurate bindings can drop legitimate static hosts or allow spoofing if disabled. The controlled recovery is to correct binding sources and trust policy, then validate normal ARP and blocked forgery.