Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 29
Question 280
Following a production change at the Albany manufacturing plant, a remote OSPF site chooses an unexpectedly distant exit for an external prefix because multiple ASBRs advertise it. The incident is affecting a business-critical application; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?
- Restore the last valid area configuration if routes leak across unintended boundaries.
- Reinstate the former configuration only after selecting a nonconflicting replacement ID.
- Restore earlier external metric policy if traffic shifts to a constrained circuit.
- Restore previous timers if the change disrupts other point-to-point peers.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Restore earlier external metric policy if traffic shifts to a constrained circuit. OSPF E1 considers internal path cost with external cost, while E2 primarily compares the external metric.
Incorrect Answers
A:Restore the last valid area configuration if routes leak across unintended boundaries. This is a rollback for a different component (OSPF area mismatch), where OSPF neighbors must agree on the local link's area ID. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf external route type: OSPF E1 considers internal path cost with external cost, while E2 primarily compares the external metric.
B:Reinstate the former configuration only after selecting a nonconflicting replacement ID. This is a rollback for a different component (OSPF duplicate router ID), where OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf external route type: OSPF E1 considers internal path cost with external cost, while E2 primarily compares the external metric.
D:Restore previous timers if the change disrupts other point-to-point peers. This is a rollback for a different component (OSPF hello and dead timers), where OSPF timer compatibility is necessary for adjacency formation on a common segment. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf external route type: OSPF E1 considers internal path cost with external cost, while E2 primarily compares the external metric.
Question 281
During a scheduled validation at the Tempe data center, client IPv6 hosts start selecting a malicious default gateway after a user plugs in a small rogue router. Engineers must restore a tenant service without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops.
- Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic.
- Identify the ingress port carrying unauthorized Router Advertisements and inspect RA Guard trust role.
- Inspect local username/secret presence and effective AAA method list applied to the VTY lines.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Identify the ingress port carrying unauthorized Router Advertisements and inspect RA Guard trust role. RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 router advertisement guard: RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
B:Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 router advertisement guard: RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
D:Inspect local username/secret presence and effective AAA method list applied to the VTY lines. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (AAA local user authentication), where A local fallback requires valid local users and an AAA login method list that actually references the local database. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 router advertisement guard: RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
Question 282
During a scheduled validation at the Tempe data center, client IPv6 hosts start selecting a malicious default gateway after a user plugs in a small rogue router. Engineers must restore a tenant service without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class.
- Enable appropriate source-reachability validation with an explicit exception policy if required by design.
- Block RAs on untrusted access ports while allowing approved router-facing ports to send them.
- Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Block RAs on untrusted access ports while allowing approved router-facing ports to send them. RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
Incorrect Answers
A:Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 router advertisement guard: RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
B:Enable appropriate source-reachability validation with an explicit exception policy if required by design. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Loose uRPF source validation), where Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 router advertisement guard: RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
D:Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 router advertisement guard: RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
Question 283
During a scheduled validation at the Tempe data center, client IPv6 hosts start selecting a malicious default gateway after a user plugs in a small rogue router. Engineers must restore a tenant service without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Send test RAs from both authorized and unauthorized ports and verify only the authorized default gateway is learned.
- Validate known legitimate asymmetric flows pass while spoofed invalid-source packets remain denied.
- Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence.
- Verify authorized source addresses pass and unbound spoofed addresses are dropped.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Send test RAs from both authorized and unauthorized ports and verify only the authorized default gateway is learned. RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
Incorrect Answers
B:Validate known legitimate asymmetric flows pass while spoofed invalid-source packets remain denied. This is a validation for another mechanism (Strict uRPF asymmetric routing), where Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 router advertisement guard: RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
C:Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 router advertisement guard: RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
D:Verify authorized source addresses pass and unbound spoofed addresses are dropped. This is a validation for another mechanism (IPv6 source guard), where IPv6 source guard can filter source addresses against approved binding information. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 router advertisement guard: RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
Question 284
During a scheduled validation at the Tempe data center, client IPv6 hosts start selecting a malicious default gateway after a user plugs in a small rogue router. Engineers must restore a tenant service without disturbing unrelated production services. Select TWO actions: one investigation and one targeted remediation that belong together for this incident.
- Inspect AAA command-authorization method lists, server response attributes, and privilege level for the operator.
- Identify the ingress port carrying unauthorized Router Advertisements and inspect RA Guard trust role.
- Block RAs on untrusted access ports while allowing approved router-facing ports to send them.
- Install a secure locally defined fallback credential with the correct AAA authentication binding.
Explanation
Correct Answers
B:Identify the ingress port carrying unauthorized Router Advertisements and inspect RA Guard trust role. RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
C:Block RAs on untrusted access ports while allowing approved router-facing ports to send them. RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect AAA command-authorization method lists, server response attributes, and privilege level for the operator. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (TACACS+ command authorization), where TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 router advertisement guard: RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
D:Install a secure locally defined fallback credential with the correct AAA authentication binding. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (AAA local user authentication), where A local fallback requires valid local users and an AAA login method list that actually references the local database. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 router advertisement guard: RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments.
Question 285
During a scheduled validation at the Albany service-provider handoff, monitoring shows SSH management packet drops after a control-plane policy change despite free interface bandwidth. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops.
- Inspect IPv6 ND inspection logs and source validation against learned neighbor bindings.
- Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic.
- Check the CoPP class map matching SSH traffic and corresponding exceed/drop counters.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Check the CoPP class map matching SSH traffic and corresponding exceed/drop counters. Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
B:Inspect IPv6 ND inspection logs and source validation against learned neighbor bindings. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 Neighbor Discovery inspection), where IPv6 ND inspection uses neighbor state and filtering to mitigate neighbor-discovery spoofing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
C:Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
Question 286
During a scheduled validation at the Albany service-provider handoff, monitoring shows SSH management packet drops after a control-plane policy change despite free interface bandwidth. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections.
- Refresh supported binding learning or correct static bindings before enforcing dependent guard policies.
- Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access.
- Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class. Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
Incorrect Answers
A:Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
B:Refresh supported binding learning or correct static bindings before enforcing dependent guard policies. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 address binding table), where Several IPv6 first-hop security features rely on accurate host address and port bindings. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
C:Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
Question 287
During a scheduled validation at the Albany service-provider handoff, monitoring shows SSH management packet drops after a control-plane policy change despite free interface bandwidth. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Verify monitoring traffic is permitted and nonapproved sources remain blocked.
- Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence.
- Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters.
- Confirm BGP keepalives and updates remain stable while excess unsolicited control traffic is limited.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters. Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
Incorrect Answers
A:Verify monitoring traffic is permitted and nonapproved sources remain blocked. This is a validation for another mechanism (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
B:Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
D:Confirm BGP keepalives and updates remain stable while excess unsolicited control traffic is limited. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
Question 288
During a scheduled validation at the Albany service-provider handoff, monitoring shows SSH management packet drops after a control-plane policy change despite free interface bandwidth. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Select TWO actions: one investigation and one targeted remediation that belong together for this incident.
- Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access.
- Check the CoPP class map matching SSH traffic and corresponding exceed/drop counters.
- Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class.
- Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops.
Explanation
Correct Answers
B:Check the CoPP class map matching SSH traffic and corresponding exceed/drop counters. Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
C:Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class. Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
Incorrect Answers
A:Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
D:Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.
Question 289
Following a production change at the Salem regional hub, a classless /27 connected subnet fails to appear as an external OSPF route after a broad redistribution change. The incident is affecting a tenant service; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Inspect the redistribution source, subnets handling, and whether a match or prefix filter excludes /27.
- Inspect route-map sequence order, each match condition, and hit counts against the missing prefixes.
- Check whether the EIGRP redistribution policy supplies a usable seed metric.
- Trace route tags and redistribution points to identify reintroduction of the same route.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Inspect the redistribution source, subnets handling, and whether a match or prefix filter excludes /27. Redistribution must explicitly cover intended classless networks while avoiding uncontrolled route leakage.
Incorrect Answers
B:Inspect route-map sequence order, each match condition, and hit counts against the missing prefixes. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Route-map permit sequence), where Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf classless redistribution: Redistribution must explicitly cover intended classless networks while avoiding uncontrolled route leakage.
C:Check whether the EIGRP redistribution policy supplies a usable seed metric. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (EIGRP redistribution seed metric), where EIGRP redistribution generally needs an appropriate seed metric for external routes. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf classless redistribution: Redistribution must explicitly cover intended classless networks while avoiding uncontrolled route leakage.
D:Trace route tags and redistribution points to identify reintroduction of the same route. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Redistribution loop prevention tags), where Consistent route tagging and inbound redistribution filters help prevent feedback loops across routing domains. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf classless redistribution: Redistribution must explicitly cover intended classless networks while avoiding uncontrolled route leakage.
Question 290
Following a production change at the Salem regional hub, a classless /27 connected subnet fails to appear as an external OSPF route after a broad redistribution change. The incident is affecting a tenant service; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Allow the intended subnet with classless redistribution and a scoped route map instead of exporting everything.
- Align the EIGRP process or named address-family AS number across the peers.
- Use a topology that supplies a loop-free reported-distance candidate rather than forcing an ineligible alternate.
- Configure a consistent loopback update source and sufficient eBGP multihop hop limit.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Allow the intended subnet with classless redistribution and a scoped route map instead of exporting everything. Redistribution must explicitly cover intended classless networks while avoiding uncontrolled route leakage.
Incorrect Answers
B:Align the EIGRP process or named address-family AS number across the peers. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (EIGRP AS mismatch), where EIGRP neighbors for an address family need compatible autonomous-system association and interface settings. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf classless redistribution: Redistribution must explicitly cover intended classless networks while avoiding uncontrolled route leakage.
C:Use a topology that supplies a loop-free reported-distance candidate rather than forcing an ineligible alternate. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (EIGRP feasible successor), where The EIGRP feasibility condition requires a neighbor's reported distance below the local feasible distance. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf classless redistribution: Redistribution must explicitly cover intended classless networks while avoiding uncontrolled route leakage.
D:Configure a consistent loopback update source and sufficient eBGP multihop hop limit. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Loopback-sourced eBGP session), where Default eBGP TTL and packet source are designed for directly connected peers; loopback peering needs explicit settings. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf classless redistribution: Redistribution must explicitly cover intended classless networks while avoiding uncontrolled route leakage.