Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 27
Question 260
During a scheduled validation at the Norman remote operations location, a network operator can log in to a router but receives authorization failures for permitted show commands after a TACACS+ policy update. Engineers must restore remote-site route stability without disturbing unrelated production services. The attempted fix creates a regression. Which scoped recovery action is most appropriate?
- Restore the former ACL order if the specific permit unintentionally opens additional sources.
- Restore the previous server command set if the change unintentionally expands administrator access.
- Restore the prior accounting configuration if new statements overwhelm the server or expose secrets.
- Reinstate the old management exception if remote administration is lost.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Restore the previous server command set if the change unintentionally expands administrator access. TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication.
Incorrect Answers
A:Restore the former ACL order if the specific permit unintentionally opens additional sources. This is a rollback for a different component (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns tacacs+ command authorization: TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication.
C:Restore the prior accounting configuration if new statements overwhelm the server or expose secrets. This is a rollback for a different component (AAA accounting records), where AAA accounting is distinct from authentication and authorization and must be explicitly configured for required events. Here the evidence instead concerns tacacs+ command authorization: TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication.
D:Reinstate the old management exception if remote administration is lost. This is a rollback for a different component (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns tacacs+ command authorization: TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication.
Question 261
During a scheduled validation at the Roanoke regional hub, an IOS DHCP server assigns IP addresses reserved for printers, producing intermittent duplicate-address alerts. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Inspect the client VLAN gateway's helper address, routed path to server, and DHCP relay forwarding.
- Inspect the lease's default-router option and compare it with the actual VLAN gateway.
- Inspect the VTY access-class, source subnet permit entries, and applied inbound direction.
- Inspect the DHCP pool range and configured excluded-address entries against reservations.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Inspect the DHCP pool range and configured excluded-address entries against reservations. IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect the client VLAN gateway's helper address, routed path to server, and DHCP relay forwarding. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv4 DHCP relay), where IPv4 DHCP Discover broadcasts require a relay when the DHCP server resides beyond a Layer 3 boundary. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcp address exclusions: IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
B:Inspect the lease's default-router option and compare it with the actual VLAN gateway. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DHCP default-router option), where DHCP option 3/default-router tells IPv4 clients which gateway to use; leases can be valid despite a wrong option. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcp address exclusions: IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
C:Inspect the VTY access-class, source subnet permit entries, and applied inbound direction. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (VTY access-class), where A VTY access-class restricts which source addresses can open remote terminal sessions to the router. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcp address exclusions: IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
Question 262
During a scheduled validation at the Roanoke regional hub, an IOS DHCP server assigns IP addresses reserved for printers, producing intermittent duplicate-address alerts. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Enable the appropriate SCP service and narrowly scoped permissions for the backup account.
- Exclude the reserved range from automatic assignment and correct affected leases.
- Correct the IOS DHCP pool default-router option and renew affected leases.
- Configure the correct ip helper-address on the client-facing routed interface.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Exclude the reserved range from automatic assignment and correct affected leases. IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Enable the appropriate SCP service and narrowly scoped permissions for the backup account. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (SCP configuration backup), where SCP uses SSH transport but requires appropriate service support and file privileges. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcp address exclusions: IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
C:Correct the IOS DHCP pool default-router option and renew affected leases. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DHCP default-router option), where DHCP option 3/default-router tells IPv4 clients which gateway to use; leases can be valid despite a wrong option. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcp address exclusions: IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
D:Configure the correct ip helper-address on the client-facing routed interface. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv4 DHCP relay), where IPv4 DHCP Discover broadcasts require a relay when the DHCP server resides beyond a Layer 3 boundary. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcp address exclusions: IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
Question 263
During a scheduled validation at the Roanoke regional hub, an IOS DHCP server assigns IP addresses reserved for printers, producing intermittent duplicate-address alerts. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Request new test leases and confirm no protected printer address is offered.
- Verify a test client receives the correct gateway and can reach a remote subnet.
- Validate console and VTY logins with their intended distinct credentials and restrictions.
- Capture a relay-generated request and verify the server replies with a lease for the client's subnet.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Request new test leases and confirm no protected printer address is offered. IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
Incorrect Answers
B:Verify a test client receives the correct gateway and can reach a remote subnet. This is a validation for another mechanism (DHCP default-router option), where DHCP option 3/default-router tells IPv4 clients which gateway to use; leases can be valid despite a wrong option. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcp address exclusions: IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
C:Validate console and VTY logins with their intended distinct credentials and restrictions. This is a validation for another mechanism (Console versus VTY authentication), where Console and VTY lines can use different authentication and authorization methods. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcp address exclusions: IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
D:Capture a relay-generated request and verify the server replies with a lease for the client's subnet. This is a validation for another mechanism (IPv4 DHCP relay), where IPv4 DHCP Discover broadcasts require a relay when the DHCP server resides beyond a Layer 3 boundary. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcp address exclusions: IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
Question 264
During a scheduled validation at the Roanoke regional hub, an IOS DHCP server assigns IP addresses reserved for printers, producing intermittent duplicate-address alerts. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Select TWO actions: one investigation and one targeted remediation that belong together for this incident.
- Inspect the DHCP pool range and configured excluded-address entries against reservations.
- Inspect the lease's default-router option and compare it with the actual VLAN gateway.
- Configure the correct ip helper-address on the client-facing routed interface.
- Exclude the reserved range from automatic assignment and correct affected leases.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Inspect the DHCP pool range and configured excluded-address entries against reservations. IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
D:Exclude the reserved range from automatic assignment and correct affected leases. IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
Incorrect Answers
B:Inspect the lease's default-router option and compare it with the actual VLAN gateway. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DHCP default-router option), where DHCP option 3/default-router tells IPv4 clients which gateway to use; leases can be valid despite a wrong option. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcp address exclusions: IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
C:Configure the correct ip helper-address on the client-facing routed interface. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv4 DHCP relay), where IPv4 DHCP Discover broadcasts require a relay when the DHCP server resides beyond a Layer 3 boundary. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcp address exclusions: IOS DHCP address exclusions keep reserved addresses out of automatic lease allocation.
Question 265
Following a production change at the Toledo data center, legitimate packets are dropped at a dual-homed WAN ingress even though a return path to the source prefix exists through another interface. The incident is affecting a voice service path; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode.
- Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list.
- Inspect uRPF drop counters and the reverse lookup's selected egress interface for the source address.
- Inspect the AAA login method-list order and the distinction between RADIUS timeout and explicit Access-Reject.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Inspect uRPF drop counters and the reverse lookup's selected egress interface for the source address. Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Loose uRPF source validation), where Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface. Here the evidence instead concerns strict urpf asymmetric routing: Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
B:Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns strict urpf asymmetric routing: Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
D:Inspect the AAA login method-list order and the distinction between RADIUS timeout and explicit Access-Reject. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (RADIUS AAA fallback), where AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection. Here the evidence instead concerns strict urpf asymmetric routing: Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
Question 266
Following a production change at the Toledo data center, legitimate packets are dropped at a dual-homed WAN ingress even though a return path to the source prefix exists through another interface. The incident is affecting a voice service path; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Enable IPv6 source guard with accurate address bindings from the permitted learning mechanisms.
- Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior.
- Use a policy or feasible uRPF mode appropriate for intentional asymmetry, or correct source routing where possible.
- Enable appropriate source-reachability validation with an explicit exception policy if required by design.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Use a policy or feasible uRPF mode appropriate for intentional asymmetry, or correct source routing where possible. Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
Incorrect Answers
A:Enable IPv6 source guard with accurate address bindings from the permitted learning mechanisms. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 source guard), where IPv6 source guard can filter source addresses against approved binding information. Here the evidence instead concerns strict urpf asymmetric routing: Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
B:Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns strict urpf asymmetric routing: Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
D:Enable appropriate source-reachability validation with an explicit exception policy if required by design. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Loose uRPF source validation), where Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface. Here the evidence instead concerns strict urpf asymmetric routing: Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
Question 267
Following a production change at the Toledo data center, legitimate packets are dropped at a dual-homed WAN ingress even though a return path to the source prefix exists through another interface. The incident is affecting a voice service path; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?
- Test unroutable spoofed sources and valid externally routed sources with counters.
- Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters.
- Test the blocked source against the target and unrelated destinations to ensure only intended traffic is affected.
- Validate known legitimate asymmetric flows pass while spoofed invalid-source packets remain denied.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Validate known legitimate asymmetric flows pass while spoofed invalid-source packets remain denied. Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
Incorrect Answers
A:Test unroutable spoofed sources and valid externally routed sources with counters. This is a validation for another mechanism (Loose uRPF source validation), where Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface. Here the evidence instead concerns strict urpf asymmetric routing: Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
B:Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns strict urpf asymmetric routing: Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
C:Test the blocked source against the target and unrelated destinations to ensure only intended traffic is affected. This is a validation for another mechanism (Standard IPv4 ACL placement), where Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering. Here the evidence instead concerns strict urpf asymmetric routing: Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
Question 268
Following a production change at the Toledo data center, legitimate packets are dropped at a dual-homed WAN ingress even though a return path to the source prefix exists through another interface. The incident is affecting a voice service path; the response team has a rollback window. Which TWO complementary steps provide both relevant fault isolation and a controlled correction?
- Configure a controlled local fallback method for server unavailability on the intended lines.
- Use a policy or feasible uRPF mode appropriate for intentional asymmetry, or correct source routing where possible.
- Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode.
- Inspect uRPF drop counters and the reverse lookup's selected egress interface for the source address.
Explanation
Correct Answers
B:Use a policy or feasible uRPF mode appropriate for intentional asymmetry, or correct source routing where possible. Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
D:Inspect uRPF drop counters and the reverse lookup's selected egress interface for the source address. Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
Incorrect Answers
A:Configure a controlled local fallback method for server unavailability on the intended lines. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (RADIUS AAA fallback), where AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection. Here the evidence instead concerns strict urpf asymmetric routing: Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
C:Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Loose uRPF source validation), where Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface. Here the evidence instead concerns strict urpf asymmetric routing: Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress.
Question 269
Following a production change at the Plano enterprise edge, a WAN outage makes the configured RADIUS service unreachable, and local emergency access to network devices also fails. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic.
- Inspect the AAA login method-list order and the distinction between RADIUS timeout and explicit Access-Reject.
- Inspect the endpoint's learned IPv6 binding and whether source guard is applied to the untrusted port.
- Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Inspect the AAA login method-list order and the distinction between RADIUS timeout and explicit Access-Reject. AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns radius aaa fallback: AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection.
C:Inspect the endpoint's learned IPv6 binding and whether source guard is applied to the untrusted port. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 source guard), where IPv6 source guard can filter source addresses against approved binding information. Here the evidence instead concerns radius aaa fallback: AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection.
D:Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns radius aaa fallback: AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection.
Question 270
Following a production change at the Plano enterprise edge, a WAN outage makes the configured RADIUS service unreachable, and local emergency access to network devices also fails. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior.
- Refresh supported binding learning or correct static bindings before enforcing dependent guard policies.
- Configure a controlled local fallback method for server unavailability on the intended lines.
- Correct the scoped TACACS+ command set or method-list binding without granting unrestricted administrative privilege.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Configure a controlled local fallback method for server unavailability on the intended lines. AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection.
Incorrect Answers
A:Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns radius aaa fallback: AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection.
B:Refresh supported binding learning or correct static bindings before enforcing dependent guard policies. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 address binding table), where Several IPv6 first-hop security features rely on accurate host address and port bindings. Here the evidence instead concerns radius aaa fallback: AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection.
D:Correct the scoped TACACS+ command set or method-list binding without granting unrestricted administrative privilege. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (TACACS+ command authorization), where TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication. Here the evidence instead concerns radius aaa fallback: AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection.