Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 31
Question 300
Following a production change at the Peoria enterprise edge, syslog messages from a router stop arriving after a management VRF change although the collector remains reachable from the correct source. The incident is affecting an operations uplink; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?
- Restore earlier remote logging limits if the new level floods the collector.
- Revert the source-interface change if network policy rejects the replacement source address.
- Detach the monitor if it consumes excessive resources on an unsupported interface.
- Restore the previous exporter path if exports accidentally reach an external untrusted collector.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Revert the source-interface change if network policy rejects the replacement source address. Syslog transport can fail when its source or VRF does not match collector reachability and access rules.
Incorrect Answers
A:Restore earlier remote logging limits if the new level floods the collector. This is a rollback for a different component (Syslog severity filtering), where Local logging and remote syslog use separate targets and severity thresholds. Here the evidence instead concerns syslog source interface: Syslog transport can fail when its source or VRF does not match collector reachability and access rules.
C:Detach the monitor if it consumes excessive resources on an unsupported interface. This is a rollback for a different component (Flexible NetFlow monitor attachment), where Flexible NetFlow requires a record/monitor and an appropriate interface or platform attachment to observe flows. Here the evidence instead concerns syslog source interface: Syslog transport can fail when its source or VRF does not match collector reachability and access rules.
D:Restore the previous exporter path if exports accidentally reach an external untrusted collector. This is a rollback for a different component (NetFlow exporter destination), where Flow collection and export are distinct: valid local cache entries do not imply successful export transport. Here the evidence instead concerns syslog source interface: Syslog transport can fail when its source or VRF does not match collector reachability and access rules.
Question 301
Following a production change at the Mesa service-provider handoff, two isolated VRFs require one shared services subnet, but inter-VRF reachability is absent by design. The incident is affecting a business-critical application; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Inspect the interface's VRF forwarding assignment and the tenant VRF route table.
- Compare summary reachability with the actual set of component subnets and the summary discard route.
- Compare the alternate neighbor's reported distance with the current successor's feasible distance.
- Check each VRF routing table and the approved shared-subnet route-leak policy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Check each VRF routing table and the approved shared-subnet route-leak policy. VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect the interface's VRF forwarding assignment and the tenant VRF route table. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (VRF-Lite interface isolation), where VRF-Lite uses separate routing tables, and assigning VRF forwarding to an interface can reset its IP address. Here the evidence instead concerns vrf-lite controlled route leaking: VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
B:Compare summary reachability with the actual set of component subnets and the summary discard route. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Summary route black hole), where An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks. Here the evidence instead concerns vrf-lite controlled route leaking: VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
C:Compare the alternate neighbor's reported distance with the current successor's feasible distance. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (EIGRP feasible successor), where The EIGRP feasibility condition requires a neighbor's reported distance below the local feasible distance. Here the evidence instead concerns vrf-lite controlled route leaking: VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
Question 302
Following a production change at the Mesa service-provider handoff, two isolated VRFs require one shared services subnet, but inter-VRF reachability is absent by design. The incident is affecting a business-critical application; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Align the OSPF timer pair and compatible network type for the shared segment.
- Mark the intended iBGP neighbors as route-reflector clients under the correct address family.
- Associate the interface with the intended VRF, then restore its IP configuration as required by the platform.
- Install narrowly scoped inter-VRF routes through an approved leaking method without joining the routing tables wholesale.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Install narrowly scoped inter-VRF routes through an approved leaking method without joining the routing tables wholesale. VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
Incorrect Answers
A:Align the OSPF timer pair and compatible network type for the shared segment. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (OSPF hello and dead timers), where OSPF timer compatibility is necessary for adjacency formation on a common segment. Here the evidence instead concerns vrf-lite controlled route leaking: VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
B:Mark the intended iBGP neighbors as route-reflector clients under the correct address family. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP route reflector clients), where Route reflectors relax iBGP split-horizon for configured clients while using loop-prevention attributes. Here the evidence instead concerns vrf-lite controlled route leaking: VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
C:Associate the interface with the intended VRF, then restore its IP configuration as required by the platform. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (VRF-Lite interface isolation), where VRF-Lite uses separate routing tables, and assigning VRF forwarding to an interface can reset its IP address. Here the evidence instead concerns vrf-lite controlled route leaking: VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
Question 303
Following a production change at the Mesa service-provider handoff, two isolated VRFs require one shared services subnet, but inter-VRF reachability is absent by design. The incident is affecting a business-critical application; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?
- Confirm a stable adjacency and consistent successor selection after the correction.
- Confirm database exchange completes and the neighbor progresses to Full without dropped DBD packets.
- Confirm only the shared-services prefix is reachable between VRFs and other tenant prefixes remain isolated.
- Confirm the route appears only in the selected VRF and end-to-end tenant probes work.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Confirm only the shared-services prefix is reachable between VRFs and other tenant prefixes remain isolated. VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
Incorrect Answers
A:Confirm a stable adjacency and consistent successor selection after the correction. This is a validation for another mechanism (EIGRP K-value mismatch), where Traditional EIGRP neighbor adjacency requires compatible metric K-values. Here the evidence instead concerns vrf-lite controlled route leaking: VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
B:Confirm database exchange completes and the neighbor progresses to Full without dropped DBD packets. This is a validation for another mechanism (OSPF database exchange MTU), where An MTU mismatch can prevent OSPF database description exchange from completing. Here the evidence instead concerns vrf-lite controlled route leaking: VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
D:Confirm the route appears only in the selected VRF and end-to-end tenant probes work. This is a validation for another mechanism (VRF-Lite interface isolation), where VRF-Lite uses separate routing tables, and assigning VRF forwarding to an interface can reset its IP address. Here the evidence instead concerns vrf-lite controlled route leaking: VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
Question 304
Following a production change at the Mesa service-provider handoff, two isolated VRFs require one shared services subnet, but inter-VRF reachability is absent by design. The incident is affecting a business-critical application; the response team has a rollback window. Which TWO complementary steps provide both relevant fault isolation and a controlled correction?
- Align the EIGRP process or named address-family AS number across the peers.
- Install narrowly scoped inter-VRF routes through an approved leaking method without joining the routing tables wholesale.
- Check each VRF routing table and the approved shared-subnet route-leak policy.
- Inspect the interface's VRF forwarding assignment and the tenant VRF route table.
Explanation
Correct Answers
B:Install narrowly scoped inter-VRF routes through an approved leaking method without joining the routing tables wholesale. VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
C:Check each VRF routing table and the approved shared-subnet route-leak policy. VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
Incorrect Answers
A:Align the EIGRP process or named address-family AS number across the peers. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (EIGRP AS mismatch), where EIGRP neighbors for an address family need compatible autonomous-system association and interface settings. Here the evidence instead concerns vrf-lite controlled route leaking: VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
D:Inspect the interface's VRF forwarding assignment and the tenant VRF route table. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (VRF-Lite interface isolation), where VRF-Lite uses separate routing tables, and assigning VRF forwarding to an interface can reset its IP address. Here the evidence instead concerns vrf-lite controlled route leaking: VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained.
Question 305
Following a production change at the Fresno branch site, iPv6 clients receive DNS options from an unauthorized DHCPv6 responder on a user access switch port. The incident is affecting a tenant service; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Inspect DHCPv6 Guard policy role and identify which port is sourcing server replies.
- Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode.
- Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction.
- Inspect the AAA login method-list order and the distinction between RADIUS timeout and explicit Access-Reject.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Inspect DHCPv6 Guard policy role and identify which port is sourcing server replies. DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
Incorrect Answers
B:Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Loose uRPF source validation), where Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcpv6 server guard: DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
C:Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcpv6 server guard: DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
D:Inspect the AAA login method-list order and the distinction between RADIUS timeout and explicit Access-Reject. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (RADIUS AAA fallback), where AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcpv6 server guard: DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
Question 306
Following a production change at the Fresno branch site, iPv6 clients receive DNS options from an unauthorized DHCPv6 responder on a user access switch port. The incident is affecting a tenant service; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Correct the scoped TACACS+ command set or method-list binding without granting unrestricted administrative privilege.
- Refresh supported binding learning or correct static bindings before enforcing dependent guard policies.
- Apply DHCPv6 guard to untrusted client ports and permit only the authorized server-facing path.
- Enable supported ND inspection and guard policies on the affected access segment with proper trust boundaries.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Apply DHCPv6 guard to untrusted client ports and permit only the authorized server-facing path. DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
Incorrect Answers
A:Correct the scoped TACACS+ command set or method-list binding without granting unrestricted administrative privilege. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (TACACS+ command authorization), where TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcpv6 server guard: DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
B:Refresh supported binding learning or correct static bindings before enforcing dependent guard policies. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 address binding table), where Several IPv6 first-hop security features rely on accurate host address and port bindings. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcpv6 server guard: DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
D:Enable supported ND inspection and guard policies on the affected access segment with proper trust boundaries. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 Neighbor Discovery inspection), where IPv6 ND inspection uses neighbor state and filtering to mitigate neighbor-discovery spoofing. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcpv6 server guard: DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
Question 307
Following a production change at the Fresno branch site, iPv6 clients receive DNS options from an unauthorized DHCPv6 responder on a user access switch port. The incident is affecting a tenant service; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?
- Verify authorized source addresses pass and unbound spoofed addresses are dropped.
- Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters.
- Verify clients retain legitimate DHCPv6 configuration and reject responses from the unauthorized access port.
- Send test RAs from both authorized and unauthorized ports and verify only the authorized default gateway is learned.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Verify clients retain legitimate DHCPv6 configuration and reject responses from the unauthorized access port. DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
Incorrect Answers
A:Verify authorized source addresses pass and unbound spoofed addresses are dropped. This is a validation for another mechanism (IPv6 source guard), where IPv6 source guard can filter source addresses against approved binding information. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcpv6 server guard: DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
B:Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcpv6 server guard: DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
D:Send test RAs from both authorized and unauthorized ports and verify only the authorized default gateway is learned. This is a validation for another mechanism (IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard), where RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcpv6 server guard: DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
Question 308
Following a production change at the Fresno branch site, iPv6 clients receive DNS options from an unauthorized DHCPv6 responder on a user access switch port. The incident is affecting a tenant service; the response team has a rollback window. Which TWO complementary steps provide both relevant fault isolation and a controlled correction?
- Block RAs on untrusted access ports while allowing approved router-facing ports to send them.
- Apply DHCPv6 guard to untrusted client ports and permit only the authorized server-facing path.
- Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops.
- Inspect DHCPv6 Guard policy role and identify which port is sourcing server replies.
Explanation
Correct Answers
B:Apply DHCPv6 guard to untrusted client ports and permit only the authorized server-facing path. DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
D:Inspect DHCPv6 Guard policy role and identify which port is sourcing server replies. DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
Incorrect Answers
A:Block RAs on untrusted access ports while allowing approved router-facing ports to send them. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard), where RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcpv6 server guard: DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
C:Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns dhcpv6 server guard: DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports.
Question 309
During a scheduled validation at the Lansing hospital campus, return traffic from the Internet keeps entering the backup edge although the network advertises both paths. Engineers must restore management access without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Inspect the received BGP next-hop address and its reachability in the IGP or VRF.
- Check update-source, neighbor IP, and ebgp-multihop TTL against the actual topology.
- Compare AS paths as seen by external peers and inspect outbound route policy for each eBGP neighbor.
- Inspect local preference distributed in iBGP along with route selection results.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Compare AS paths as seen by external peers and inspect outbound route policy for each eBGP neighbor. AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect the received BGP next-hop address and its reachability in the IGP or VRF. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (BGP iBGP next-hop reachability), where An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.
B:Check update-source, neighbor IP, and ebgp-multihop TTL against the actual topology. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Loopback-sourced eBGP session), where Default eBGP TTL and packet source are designed for directly connected peers; loopback peering needs explicit settings. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.
D:Inspect local preference distributed in iBGP along with route selection results. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (BGP outbound path local preference), where Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.
Question 310
During a scheduled validation at the Lansing hospital campus, return traffic from the Internet keeps entering the backup edge although the network advertises both paths. Engineers must restore management access without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Mark the intended iBGP neighbors as route-reflector clients under the correct address family.
- Use next-hop-self at the correct iBGP advertising boundary or repair the actual next-hop reachability.
- Set a higher local preference for the preferred egress using a scoped inbound policy at the edge.
- Prepend the local AS on selected backup advertisements if permitted by upstream routing policy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Prepend the local AS on selected backup advertisements if permitted by upstream routing policy. AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.
Incorrect Answers
A:Mark the intended iBGP neighbors as route-reflector clients under the correct address family. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP route reflector clients), where Route reflectors relax iBGP split-horizon for configured clients while using loop-prevention attributes. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.
B:Use next-hop-self at the correct iBGP advertising boundary or repair the actual next-hop reachability. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP iBGP next-hop reachability), where An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.
C:Set a higher local preference for the preferred egress using a scoped inbound policy at the edge. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP outbound path local preference), where Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.