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WPA2-Personal normally uses a shared pre-shared key or passphrase for access to a WLAN. Although it encrypts traffic when properly configured, one common PSK does not independently authenticate each employee against a backend identity database. Revoking one user's access may require changing the shared credential for everyone, which is operationally awkward. The scenario specifically calls for distinct employee identities and central authentication, making an enterprise EAP/802.1X design more appropriate.

An open WLAN can allow associations without link-layer user authentication, depending on access policy, and cannot satisfy the stated requirement to validate individual corporate employee accounts through a backend authentication service. A captive portal may add a separate application-layer step, but that is not equivalent to WPA2-Enterprise 802.1X integration. The requirement is for a managed corporate wireless security model, so choosing no link-layer authentication would weaken the expected assurance.

WEP uses outdated encryption and weak keying mechanisms that are unsuitable for a modern managed corporate WLAN. Static shared keys also do not provide the required individual employee identity checks through a central authentication service. Its historical presence in legacy wireless standards is not a reason to deploy it when WPA2-Enterprise is available. Use enterprise 802.1X/EAP with modern supported ciphers and appropriate certificate-based trust instead.

A correctly configured floating static route is intended to provide reachability when a more-preferred dynamic route disappears. The router does not need to wait for OSPF to recover before using a valid backup with a reachable next hop. If both the primary and backup failed, traffic could still be lost, but the question explicitly says the alternate path is healthy. Holding traffic until the original neighbor returns would defeat the purpose of the floating static.

A floating static route keeps the destination prefix defined in its configuration; IOS does not automatically broaden 172.22.0.0/16 into 0.0.0.0/0 when OSPF fails. A /0 default would match many unrelated destinations and is a separate routing intent. The backup is for the identical /16, so only destinations matching that prefix should use the alternate next hop. Prefix length and administrative distance are independent aspects of route selection.

A static route remains in the router's configured state until an operator or management system removes it; OSPF failure does not automatically delete the backup command. Its high administrative distance previously kept it less preferred than the dynamic route, but does not make it temporary configuration. Once the primary prefix is withdrawn, the static can become active. Assuming deletion on failure would invert the intended redundancy mechanism and leave the router without backup reachability.

no cdp run is a global Cisco Discovery Protocol disable command, which suppresses CDP across the entire device where applicable. The security team wants to stop advertisements on only the lobby-facing interface while keeping discovery on internal uplinks. A global disable would meet a broader exposure-reduction objective but discard useful internal topology visibility unnecessarily. Apply the per-interface control so the change is restricted to the untrusted jack.

no lldp run is the global disable command for Link Layer Discovery Protocol, a different standards-based neighbor-discovery mechanism. It neither targets only the public lobby interface nor specifically suppresses Cisco CDP information when CDP remains enabled. A secure design may also review LLDP on untrusted ports, but the stated requirement is to retain CDP internally while stopping it on one jack. Use CDP's interface-specific command rather than an LLDP global setting.

shutdown administratively disables the Ethernet interface and prevents all user traffic, not only discovery advertisements. That may be appropriate for a decommissioned port, but the scenario implies a lobby jack that should remain available for its intended service. The operator wants to suppress Cisco discovery details while retaining other connectivity. A targeted no cdp enable configuration addresses the information disclosure without disabling the entire physical access port.

Flooding unknown-unicast traffic within a VLAN is normal when a switch has not learned the destination MAC address. Here the destination MAC is already learned on Gi1/0/10, so the switch has a specific egress port and should not replicate the frame to every eligible interface. Unnecessary flooding would waste bandwidth and expose traffic more broadly than required. The correct behavior uses the existing forwarding database entry for this VLAN.

The ingress port Gi1/0/4 identifies where the frame arrived and typically helps the switch learn its source MAC. It is not automatically the appropriate egress for a different known destination. Sending the frame back toward the sender without a matching destination lookup would fail normal unicast switching. The MAC table already maps the destination to Gi1/0/10, so the switch has no reason to reflexively use the arrival port.

A known destination MAC is precisely what allows a switch to make a targeted unicast forwarding decision. It is not a forbidden destination merely because an entry exists in the forwarding table. A frame could still be discarded by security, VLAN mismatch or other policy, but no such restriction is described. The stated normal path is to send toward Gi1/0/10 rather than drop a valid frame with a learned recipient.

show ip route displays installed IPv4 destination prefixes, route sources and next-hop information. It can confirm whether OSPF learned a network, but usually does not present one interface's OSPF network type, Hello/Dead timers or designated-router election data. The question asks for detailed adjacency-environment parameters on Gi0/0 rather than just a learned route. The route table is a useful secondary check, not the most direct interface diagnostic.

show vlan brief summarizes Layer 2 VLAN IDs and assigned access ports on supported Catalyst switches. It does not describe OSPF timers, interface network type or DR/BDR state on a routed router interface. VLAN membership can affect Ethernet connectivity but does not replace OSPF protocol inspection. The operator has already identified the OSPF process and interface, so an OSPF-specific show command provides much more direct evidence for the requested fields.

show ip arp displays IPv4-to-MAC neighbor entries used to encapsulate traffic on attached Ethernet segments. That can reveal whether an OSPF peer's next-hop address resolves at Layer 2, but ARP output does not report the OSPF network type or neighbor election timers. A healthy ARP entry alone cannot prove matching OSPF Hello or Dead intervals. The required information is maintained by the OSPF process and should be retrieved through its interface diagnostics.

Automatically reversing every change on a second playbook run would make the network oscillate between desired and undesired configurations. Idempotence means repeated application of the same intent produces the same final state, not that it alternates outcomes. Rollback is a separate explicitly requested operation. A second execution should normally confirm compliance and leave correct settings in place, allowing operators to run remediation safely without unexpected reversals.

Ansible inventory identifies managed hosts and their connection details or group membership. Idempotent module behavior does not require deleting that inventory after configuration; it remains necessary for future verification and safe repeat runs. Removing entries would instead reduce management visibility and could prevent subsequent playbooks from reaching the devices. The goal is stability of configured state, not destruction of the set of devices being managed.

Randomizing interface IPv4 addresses every time a playbook executes would destroy repeatability and can break routing, ACLs or neighbor reachability. Idempotence demands convergence to one specified intended address configuration rather than generation of new values on each run. Security should be achieved through controlled access, configuration review and appropriate segmentation, not nondeterministic network identity changes. The second run should recognize that already-compliant interfaces need no changes.

show ip route displays IPv4 forwarding prefixes and their next hops. It may help troubleshoot whether an NTP server's address is reachable, but it does not report if the device clock has synchronized to that server. A route to the NTP address is only one prerequisite. The question asks for the current time-protocol state, which is presented by the NTP-specific status command rather than the IP route table.

show logging reports stored or buffered system messages, possibly including timestamped NTP events. Those messages can provide clues about previous synchronization failures, but the log is not the primary current-state display showing whether the router considers itself synchronized now. Old messages may remain after conditions change. Use show ntp status for the present operational condition, and then consult logs as supporting historical evidence.

show interfaces status reports Ethernet link and port characteristics on platforms that support it. It can confirm a physical path used to reach a time server, but does not evaluate the router's NTP clock-selection algorithm or synchronization state. A port can be up while UDP 123 traffic is filtered or the time source is invalid. The operator must inspect NTP status directly rather than equating network link health with correct system time.

NTP stratum reflects the time-source hierarchy for clock synchronization; it does not assign successful WLAN clients to an IPv4 broadcast domain. The APs can have perfectly synchronized clocks while a controller policy maps guest users into the employee VLAN. The reported issue is successful authentication followed by an incorrect data-path VLAN, not a timestamp problem. Inspect the WLAN policy/interface mapping and associated wired VLAN transport instead of changing time service settings.

Browser software versions are application-layer properties of client devices and are not normally what determines their VLAN assignment after WPA2-Personal authentication. A mobile phone or laptop can join the same SSID regardless of which web browser is installed. The problem consistently affects the selected network segment, pointing to the controller's wireless-to-wired policy mapping. Browser compatibility becomes relevant only after basic IP connectivity and correct client VLAN placement exist.

The WPA2-PSK passphrase participates in client authentication and key derivation for the Visitors WLAN. The prompt states clients authenticate correctly, which reduces suspicion of a credential mismatch. Passphrase length alone cannot instruct the controller to place user traffic into guest versus employee VLANs. A wrong password would typically block association rather than produce a valid connection with an incorrect IP pool. Review the client's assigned VLAN or dynamic interface after successful authentication.

An EtherChannel groups multiple physical Ethernet links into one logical interface and does not require each member to have a different default gateway. For a Layer 2 channel, IP gateways are unrelated to individual physical member ports. For a routed channel, any IP address belongs on the logical Port-channel interface rather than different gateways on every member. The actual incompatibility in the question is access versus trunk switchport mode and associated VLAN settings.

LACP can negotiate aggregation over compatible Ethernet media, including copper Gigabit interfaces when both devices and ports support the necessary mode. It is not a fiber-only protocol. Copper pair quality and interface negotiation still matter, but the fact that the links are Gigabit Ethernet does not prohibit an LACP bundle. The mismatch described is in software switchport characteristics, so correct the access/trunk configuration before blaming the physical medium.

VLAN 10 can be carried on an 802.1Q trunk through the configured allowed-VLAN list and matching peer settings without enabling OSPF. OSPF computes Layer 3 routes and has no role in whether a trunk can transport a tagged VLAN. The problem is that two prospective EtherChannel members have inconsistent Layer 2 roles. Aligning those roles is necessary; starting a routing protocol would not correct the bundle compatibility failure.

A basic Layer 3/4 ACL that blocks every TCP connection to destination port 443 cannot distinguish malicious applications from permitted business services that share HTTPS transport. It would deny the entire port class and potentially disrupt legitimate users. ACLs remain useful for source, destination and port-based controls, but the requirement is application category recognition even when the transport number matches. That requires a security engine with more detailed flow identification and policy capabilities.

A Layer 2 switch can filter on MAC addresses in certain supported access-control designs, but a source MAC identifies the sending interface or endpoint, not the specific application inside an encrypted TCP 443 session. One laptop may run many allowed and forbidden applications with the same MAC. MAC-based filtering therefore cannot reliably make the requested per-application decision. The appropriate control needs application-aware inspection and policy enforcement above simple Ethernet addressing.

A switch MAC-address table records where destination Ethernet addresses were learned so frames can be delivered within the proper VLAN. Increasing its capacity can help a large Layer 2 network avoid excessive unknown-unicast flooding, but does not classify HTTPS application categories. Multiple applications on the same host do not receive separate MAC entries merely because they use different services. The security team needs traffic classification at the application layer rather than a larger forwarding database.

If an HSRP active router remains powered on and its LAN interface is operational, an upstream WAN outage may not automatically make it surrender its virtual gateway role. Without appropriate tracking, clients could continue sending to a gateway whose outside path is broken. Treating every WAN fault as an automatic chassis failure is unsafe. The design needs an explicit health signal and role preference changes tied to that upstream failure condition.

Shutting down the backup router's client-facing LAN interface would prevent it from receiving or forwarding traffic for the shared virtual gateway when takeover is needed. That directly undermines the purpose of gateway redundancy. The backup should maintain a healthy client-side interface and upstream path, with group role changes controlled by tracking and priority policy. A standby role does not require disabling its physical VLAN attachment or severing access to the client subnet.

Increasing the failed active router's HSRP priority would make it more likely to retain the virtual gateway role despite having lost its WAN path. That reverses the intended reaction and could blackhole client traffic. Tracking should cause an appropriate reduction in active preference when upstream health deteriorates. Priority values and preemption need to be coordinated across peers so the healthy backup can assume service rather than the impaired router continuing to win the election.