Question 630
A network controller reaches NETCONF over SSH but uses a shared administrative credential for all developers. Which TWO complementary steps provide the most defensible remediation and its supporting assessment? Select TWO.
Explanation
Correct Answers
Protect programmable device management with authenticated endpoints, transport encryption, role authorization, and change transaction logging. This control addresses the failure mechanism and narrows the enforcement boundary. Programmable interfaces are management planes with security obligations comparable to CLI access; enabling RESTCONF does not itself validate an automation request. Confirm pre-change conditions using: Inspect SSH/HTTPS management services, NETCONF or RESTCONF configuration, model schema, access roles, and operation results. This is the implementation portion of the complementary pair. Situation: A network controller reaches NETCONF over SSH but uses a shared administrative credential for all developers.
Inspect SSH/HTTPS management services, NETCONF or RESTCONF configuration, model schema, access roles, and operation results. This checks the relevant condition before an engineer modifies production access or detection behavior. Programmable interfaces are management planes with security obligations comparable to CLI access; enabling RESTCONF does not itself validate an automation request. The controlled response would be: Protect programmable device management with authenticated endpoints, transport encryption, role authorization, and change transaction logging. This supplies the diagnostic evidence needed for the complementary action. Situation: A network controller reaches NETCONF over SSH but uses a shared administrative credential for all developers.
Incorrect Answers
Inspect device version, benchmark applicability, privileged account policies, enabled services, management exposure, and exception approvals. This step could matter for CIS device configuration baseline assessment but is not part of the required complementary pair for this case. The paired steps are: Protect programmable device management with authenticated endpoints, transport encryption, role authorization, and change transaction logging. and Inspect SSH/HTTPS management services, NETCONF or RESTCONF configuration, model schema, access roles, and operation results. Situation: A network controller reaches NETCONF over SSH but uses a shared administrative credential for all developers.
The corrected handshake establishes valid security associations without weakening approved encryption or authentication standards. This step could matter for FTD IKE negotiation failure isolation but is not part of the required complementary pair for this case. The paired steps are: Protect programmable device management with authenticated endpoints, transport encryption, role authorization, and change transaction logging. and Inspect SSH/HTTPS management services, NETCONF or RESTCONF configuration, model schema, access roles, and operation results. Situation: A network controller reaches NETCONF over SSH but uses a shared administrative credential for all developers.
Use SNMPv3 with authentication and privacy where appropriate and restrict agents to approved management sources and read views. This step could matter for SNMPv3 authenticated encrypted polling but is not part of the required complementary pair for this case. The paired steps are: Protect programmable device management with authenticated endpoints, transport encryption, role authorization, and change transaction logging. and Inspect SSH/HTTPS management services, NETCONF or RESTCONF configuration, model schema, access roles, and operation results. Situation: A network controller reaches NETCONF over SSH but uses a shared administrative credential for all developers.


