Cisco 350-601 Practice Test 118
Question 1170
A planned MDS switch replacement fails to form an ISL because fabric binding still references the old peer WWN. The observed failure is: outdated authorized-peer records block legitimate replacements, while missing restrictions can admit unknown peers. Which remediation most directly restores the intended behavior?
- The controlled remediation is to enter a random user-friendly switch name without verifying the peer WWN.
- The controlled remediation is to update validated peer identity and verify accepted sanctioned ISLs and rejected unknown switches.
- The controlled remediation is to use a server's DHCP snooping binding to authorize an MDS E-port.
- The controlled remediation is to disable switch peer validation because all devices are in one rack.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Validate against fabric binding database, neighboring switch WWN, E-port login and allowed or denied ISL records. Fabric binding restricts which peer switches may join a protected Fibre Channel fabric.
Incorrect Answers
A:Enter a random user-friendly switch name without verifying the peer WWN. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Outdated authorized-peer records block legitimate replacements, while missing restrictions can admit unknown peers. The controlled recovery is to update validated peer identity and verify accepted sanctioned ISLs and rejected unknown switches.
C:Use a server's DHCP snooping binding to authorize an MDS E-port. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Outdated authorized-peer records block legitimate replacements, while missing restrictions can admit unknown peers. The controlled recovery is to update validated peer identity and verify accepted sanctioned ISLs and rejected unknown switches.
D:Disable switch peer validation because all devices are in one rack. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Outdated authorized-peer records block legitimate replacements, while missing restrictions can admit unknown peers. The controlled recovery is to update validated peer identity and verify accepted sanctioned ISLs and rejected unknown switches.
Question 1171
A shared-services EPG must provide DNS to two tenants, but the administrator proposes exposing every port between all tenants. Which configuration decision MOST directly resolves the issue?
- Attach an any-any contract across all tenants because the provider is shared.
- Remove VRF boundaries to share one service.
- Use approved inter-tenant contract export and import with explicit narrow service filters.
- Rely only on switch interface labels to restrict cross-tenant TCP flows.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:This directly addresses ACI inter-tenant contract scope because ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation. Confirm the change against contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
Incorrect Answers
A:Attach an any-any contract across all tenants because the provider is shared. This is not a valid substitute for the specified fix. Overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries. The relevant correction is to use approved inter-tenant contract export and import with explicit narrow service filters.
B:Remove VRF boundaries to share one service. The proposed change targets the wrong mechanism or lacks essential validation. ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation. Relevant evidence is contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
D:Rely only on switch interface labels to restrict cross-tenant TCP flows. This would leave the diagnosed requirement unresolved. Overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries. The appropriate action remains to use approved inter-tenant contract export and import with explicit narrow service filters.
Question 1172
A shared-services EPG must provide DNS to two tenants, but the administrator proposes exposing every port between all tenants. What should the engineer inspect to confirm the actual state?
- A user account name without the effective role or security enforcement record.
- One successful management ping without validating the applicable policy.
- A green link LED without confirming authentication, inspection or encryption state.
- Contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:These observations test the actual ACI inter-tenant contract scope mechanism rather than a superficial management status. ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation.
Incorrect Answers
A:This information cannot independently verify ACI inter-tenant contract scope. The decisive records instead include contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
B:This information cannot independently verify ACI inter-tenant contract scope. ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation.
C:This information cannot independently verify ACI inter-tenant contract scope. A green link LED without confirming authentication, inspection or encryption state.
Question 1173
A shared-services EPG must provide DNS to two tenants, but the administrator proposes exposing every port between all tenants. What technical behavior underlies the correct decision?
- ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation.
- Physical connectivity makes all ACI contract and security policies optional.
- One security mechanism always replaces all other layer-specific access controls.
- Successful login automatically grants every management privilege.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Validation depends on contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows. This explains why the most appropriate response is to use approved inter-tenant contract export and import with explicit narrow service filters.
Incorrect Answers
B:Physical connectivity makes all ACI contract and security policies optional. This is an incorrect generalization for ACI inter-tenant contract scope. The applicable technical behavior is that ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation. The operator should verify contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
C:One security mechanism always replaces all other layer-specific access controls. This is an incorrect generalization for ACI inter-tenant contract scope. The applicable technical behavior is that ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation. The operator should verify contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
D:Successful login automatically grants every management privilege. This is an incorrect generalization for ACI inter-tenant contract scope. The applicable technical behavior is that ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation. The operator should verify contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
Question 1174
A shared-services EPG must provide DNS to two tenants, but the administrator proposes exposing every port between all tenants. Assume an engineer instead chooses to attach an any-any contract across all tenants because the provider is shared. Which resulting risk or fault should the reviewer identify?
- A correctly scoped role assignment is the source of the earlier over-privilege.
- Overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries.
- Auditing administrative actions is the cause of the initial unauthorized access.
- Keeping valid key rotation records automatically disables the correct peer trust.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The proper corrective action is to use approved inter-tenant contract export and import with explicit narrow service filters. ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation.
Incorrect Answers
A:This does not explain the actual ACI inter-tenant contract scope defect after the shortcut. The meaningful failure is that overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries.
C:This does not explain the actual ACI inter-tenant contract scope defect after the shortcut. The relevant evidence is contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
D:This does not explain the actual ACI inter-tenant contract scope defect after the shortcut. Keeping valid key rotation records automatically disables the correct peer trust.
Question 1175
A shared-services EPG must provide DNS to two tenants, but the administrator proposes exposing every port between all tenants. The observed failure is: overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries. Which remediation most directly restores the intended behavior?
- Remove VRF boundaries to share one service.
- Rely only on switch interface labels to restrict cross-tenant TCP flows.
- Restrict contract subject and service filters and verify intended DNS or application flows only.
- Attach an any-any contract across all tenants because the provider is shared.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:This addresses the observable fault while preserving a check of the expected result. ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Remove VRF boundaries to share one service. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries. The controlled recovery is to restrict contract subject and service filters and verify intended DNS or application flows only.
B:Rely only on switch interface labels to restrict cross-tenant TCP flows. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries. The controlled recovery is to restrict contract subject and service filters and verify intended DNS or application flows only.
D:Attach an any-any contract across all tenants because the provider is shared. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries. The controlled recovery is to restrict contract subject and service filters and verify intended DNS or application flows only.
Question 1176
An APIC security review finds a contract allows broad inter-tenant traffic when only a small service filter is needed. Which operator action best meets this technical requirement?
- On this affected device, the engineer should remove VRF boundaries to share one service.
- On this affected device, the engineer should rely only on switch interface labels to restrict cross-tenant TCP flows.
- On this affected device, the engineer should attach an any-any contract across all tenants because the provider is shared.
- On this affected device, the engineer should use approved inter-tenant contract export and import with explicit narrow service filters.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:This directly addresses ACI inter-tenant contract scope because ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Remove VRF boundaries to share one service. The proposed change targets the wrong mechanism or lacks essential validation. ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation. Relevant evidence is contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
B:Rely only on switch interface labels to restrict cross-tenant TCP flows. This would leave the diagnosed requirement unresolved. Overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries. The appropriate action remains to use approved inter-tenant contract export and import with explicit narrow service filters.
C:Attach an any-any contract across all tenants because the provider is shared. This is not a valid substitute for the specified fix. Overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries. The relevant correction is to use approved inter-tenant contract export and import with explicit narrow service filters.
Question 1177
An APIC security review finds a contract allows broad inter-tenant traffic when only a small service filter is needed. Which collection of observations most directly tests the suspected cause?
- For this deployment, examine contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
- For this deployment, examine a signed design diagram that lacks current access-policy or violation counters.
- For this deployment, examine a user account name without the effective role or security enforcement record.
- For this deployment, examine one successful management ping without validating the applicable policy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:These observations test the actual ACI inter-tenant contract scope mechanism rather than a superficial management status. They should be checked after use approved inter-tenant contract export and import with explicit narrow service filters.
Incorrect Answers
B:This information cannot independently verify ACI inter-tenant contract scope. A signed design diagram that lacks current access-policy or violation counters.
C:This information cannot independently verify ACI inter-tenant contract scope. A user account name without the effective role or security enforcement record.
D:This information cannot independently verify ACI inter-tenant contract scope. One successful management ping without validating the applicable policy.
Question 1178
An APIC security review finds a contract allows broad inter-tenant traffic when only a small service filter is needed. Which statement most accurately explains this scenario?
- For this condition, the applicable principle is that successful login automatically grants every management privilege.
- For this condition, the applicable principle is that ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation.
- For this condition, the applicable principle is that physical connectivity makes all ACI contract and security policies optional.
- For this condition, the applicable principle is that all traffic within a VLAN is necessarily authorized regardless of identity or policy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Validation depends on contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
Incorrect Answers
A:Successful login automatically grants every management privilege. This is an incorrect generalization for ACI inter-tenant contract scope. The applicable technical behavior is that ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation. The operator should verify contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
C:Physical connectivity makes all ACI contract and security policies optional. This is an incorrect generalization for ACI inter-tenant contract scope. The applicable technical behavior is that ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation. The operator should verify contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
D:All traffic within a VLAN is necessarily authorized regardless of identity or policy. This is an incorrect generalization for ACI inter-tenant contract scope. The applicable technical behavior is that ACI permits controlled cross-tenant service sharing, but scope and filter policy must preserve isolation. The operator should verify contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
Question 1179
An APIC security review finds a contract allows broad inter-tenant traffic when only a small service filter is needed. Assume an engineer instead chooses to attach an any-any contract across all tenants because the provider is shared. What is the principal technical consequence of the mistaken choice?
- The resulting defect is that keeping valid key rotation records automatically disables the correct peer trust.
- The resulting defect is that reviewing an ACI contract causes the pre-existing permit rule to vanish.
- The resulting defect is that overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries.
- The resulting defect is that auditing administrative actions is the cause of the initial unauthorized access.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The proper corrective action is to use approved inter-tenant contract export and import with explicit narrow service filters. That is the direct consequence of choosing the misleading shortcut.
Incorrect Answers
A:This does not explain the actual ACI inter-tenant contract scope defect after the shortcut. In the given case, an APIC security review finds a contract allows broad inter-tenant traffic when only a small service filter is needed.
B:This does not explain the actual ACI inter-tenant contract scope defect after the shortcut. Reviewing an ACI contract causes the pre-existing permit rule to vanish.
D:This does not explain the actual ACI inter-tenant contract scope defect after the shortcut. Auditing administrative actions is the cause of the initial unauthorized access.
Question 1180
An APIC security review finds a contract allows broad inter-tenant traffic when only a small service filter is needed. The observed failure is: overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries. What should the engineer do to recover and validate the service?
- The controlled remediation is to rely only on switch interface labels to restrict cross-tenant TCP flows.
- The controlled remediation is to attach an any-any contract across all tenants because the provider is shared.
- The controlled remediation is to remove VRF boundaries to share one service.
- The controlled remediation is to restrict contract subject and service filters and verify intended DNS or application flows only.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:This addresses the observable fault while preserving a check of the expected result. Validate against contract scope, provider and consumer identities, filter entries and tested cross-tenant flows.
Incorrect Answers
A:Rely only on switch interface labels to restrict cross-tenant TCP flows. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries. The controlled recovery is to restrict contract subject and service filters and verify intended DNS or application flows only.
B:Attach an any-any contract across all tenants because the provider is shared. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries. The controlled recovery is to restrict contract subject and service filters and verify intended DNS or application flows only.
C:Remove VRF boundaries to share one service. This would not reliably restore service after the stated fault. Overly permissive inter-tenant contracts enlarge the attack surface across administrative boundaries. The controlled recovery is to restrict contract subject and service filters and verify intended DNS or application flows only.