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Cisco 300-610 Practice Test 22

Question 210

At a virtualized application data center, after correction, the team wants to prevent recurrence of: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. The team needs a defensible design decision rather than a vendor feature checklist. Which continuing design control best prevents the same problem from recurring?

  1. Alert on missing telemetry sources and timestamp skew.
  2. Drill management-plane recovery independently from production routing.
  3. Maintain a layered failure-domain map beyond hardware module counts.
  4. Review controller topology when physical hosts are consolidated.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The most relevant ongoing safeguard is: Review controller topology when physical hosts are consolidated. The risk it addresses is: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. This check is tied to the technical principle: Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy. The immediate correction remains: Distribute supported controller nodes across independent compute and network failure domains. Periodically validate the safeguard through two different observations. Map each controller VM to actual host and rack Simulate an approved node or host outage and inspect cluster service health. The continuing acceptance target is: Management services remain within their supported availability goal after one host fails.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is a continuing control for monitoring telemetry collection loss; its underlying principle is: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation. The recurring risk here is different: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Management services remain within their supported availability goal after one host fails.

B:

This is a continuing control for in-band versus out-of-band management; its underlying principle is: Out-of-band management uses an independent access path that can remain reachable when production data-plane routing fails. The recurring risk here is different: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A fabric outage leaves operators unable to reach its network management devices because all management addresses use the affected production VRF. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Management services remain within their supported availability goal after one host fails.

C:

This is a continuing control for redundant supervisor versus fabric failure; its underlying principle is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains. The recurring risk here is different: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Management services remain within their supported availability goal after one host fails.

Question 211

At an AI-training data-center pod, a design review reports the following issue: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The maintenance plan must not disrupt unrelated tenants. Which design correction most directly addresses this specific failure or requirement?

  1. Distribute supported controller nodes across independent compute and network failure domains.
  2. Validate collector reachability, subscription scope and time synchronization before trusting network visibility dashboards.
  3. Select active-active or active-standby based on application write-consistency, RPO, RTO and failure domain evidence.
  4. Design device, power and path resiliency as separate requirements and validate actual shared dependencies.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The relevant failure is: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The technical distinction is: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time. The targeted correction is: Select active-active or active-standby based on application write-consistency, RPO, RTO and failure domain evidence. Before changing the design, check two independent observations. Measure replication delay and write conflict behavior Test site isolation and resulting application leadership. Accept the change only if: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This action targets nexus dashboard cluster fault domain, where the mechanism is: Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.

B:

This action targets monitoring telemetry collection loss, where the mechanism is: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.

D:

This action targets redundant supervisor versus fabric failure, where the mechanism is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.

Question 212

At a regulated private-cloud campus, two engineers propose competing diagnoses for this condition: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. Acceptance requires evidence from the running system, not just the saved design. Which pair of observations most directly tests the proposed diagnosis before a change?

  1. Map each controller VM to actual host and rack; simulate an approved node or host outage and inspect cluster service health.
  2. Measure replication delay and write conflict behavior; test site isolation and resulting application leadership.
  3. Compare device-reported interface state against ingested telemetry series; inspect collector subscription and transport errors.
  4. Trace management traffic under normal and simulated underlay outage; inspect management VRF and console access controls.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The first observation is: Measure replication delay and write conflict behavior The independent second observation is: Test site isolation and resulting application leadership. Together they test the proposed diagnosis of this incident: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The underlying technical principle is: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time. If those checks confirm it, the appropriate next action is: Select active-active or active-standby based on application write-consistency, RPO, RTO and failure domain evidence. The expected measurable result is: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements.

Incorrect Answers

A:

These observations investigate nexus dashboard cluster fault domain; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. That alternative rests on the principle: Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy. The question instead asks for evidence about: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The discriminating observations here are: Measure replication delay and write conflict behavior Test site isolation and resulting application leadership.

C:

These observations investigate monitoring telemetry collection loss; they would be useful if the symptoms were: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. That alternative rests on the principle: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation. The question instead asks for evidence about: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The discriminating observations here are: Measure replication delay and write conflict behavior Test site isolation and resulting application leadership.

D:

These observations investigate in-band versus out-of-band management; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A fabric outage leaves operators unable to reach its network management devices because all management addresses use the affected production VRF. That alternative rests on the principle: Out-of-band management uses an independent access path that can remain reachable when production data-plane routing fails. The question instead asks for evidence about: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The discriminating observations here are: Measure replication delay and write conflict behavior Test site isolation and resulting application leadership.

Question 213

At a dual-spine infrastructure project, the design group challenges an assumption behind this issue: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. One component outage must remain inside the agreed availability budget. Which engineering principle best explains the observed behavior?

  1. Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy.
  2. Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains.
  3. Out-of-band management uses an independent access path that can remain reachable when production data-plane routing fails.
  4. Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The controlling technical principle is: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time. This matters because the reported design failure is: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The first diagnostic check is: Measure replication delay and write conflict behavior The independent check is: Test site isolation and resulting application leadership. These facts support the targeted intervention: Select active-active or active-standby based on application write-consistency, RPO, RTO and failure domain evidence. Confirm that the resulting design meets this condition: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered principle describes nexus dashboard cluster fault domain: Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. It does not account for the reported failure: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The governing principle in this situation is: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time.

B:

The offered principle describes redundant supervisor versus fabric failure: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. It does not account for the reported failure: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The governing principle in this situation is: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time.

C:

The offered principle describes in-band versus out-of-band management: Out-of-band management uses an independent access path that can remain reachable when production data-plane routing fails. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A fabric outage leaves operators unable to reach its network management devices because all management addresses use the affected production VRF. It does not account for the reported failure: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The governing principle in this situation is: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time.

Question 214

At a low-latency GPU workload fabric, a change has been proposed for the following condition: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The architect must preserve the intended failure domains. Which measured result most directly proves the original requirement is satisfied?

  1. The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.
  2. A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy.
  3. Management services remain within their supported availability goal after one host fails.
  4. The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The relevant measurable success criterion is: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements. It addresses the original reported defect: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. A saved design or configuration command alone does not establish that outcome. Observe the affected system in two independent ways: Measure replication delay and write conflict behavior Test site isolation and resulting application leadership. The correction being evaluated is: Select active-active or active-standby based on application write-consistency, RPO, RTO and failure domain evidence. The underlying reason that correction matters is: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This metric would help validate a correction to monitoring telemetry collection loss, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. Here the defect to be resolved is: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.

B:

This metric would help validate a correction to redundant supervisor versus fabric failure, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. Here the defect to be resolved is: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.

C:

This metric would help validate a correction to nexus dashboard cluster fault domain, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. Here the defect to be resolved is: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.

Question 215

At a two-region enterprise VXLAN fabric, a post-incident design review focuses on preventing: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The team needs a defensible design decision rather than a vendor feature checklist. Which continuing design control best prevents the same problem from recurring?

  1. Drill management-plane recovery independently from production routing.
  2. Retest split-brain and failback after site topology changes.
  3. Alert on missing telemetry sources and timestamp skew.
  4. Maintain a layered failure-domain map beyond hardware module counts.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The most relevant ongoing safeguard is: Retest split-brain and failback after site topology changes. The risk it addresses is: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. This check is tied to the technical principle: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time. The immediate correction remains: Select active-active or active-standby based on application write-consistency, RPO, RTO and failure domain evidence. Periodically validate the safeguard through two different observations. Measure replication delay and write conflict behavior Test site isolation and resulting application leadership. The continuing acceptance target is: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is a continuing control for in-band versus out-of-band management; its underlying principle is: Out-of-band management uses an independent access path that can remain reachable when production data-plane routing fails. The recurring risk here is different: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A fabric outage leaves operators unable to reach its network management devices because all management addresses use the affected production VRF. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements.

C:

This is a continuing control for monitoring telemetry collection loss; its underlying principle is: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation. The recurring risk here is different: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements.

D:

This is a continuing control for redundant supervisor versus fabric failure; its underlying principle is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains. The recurring risk here is different: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements.

Question 216

At a 60-rack compute cluster, during a controlled design review, the team discovers: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The maintenance plan must not disrupt unrelated tenants. Which design correction most directly addresses this specific failure or requirement?

  1. Select active-active or active-standby based on application write-consistency, RPO, RTO and failure domain evidence.
  2. Provide an isolated management plane with validated power, connectivity and authentication dependencies.
  3. Design device, power and path resiliency as separate requirements and validate actual shared dependencies.
  4. Validate collector reachability, subscription scope and time synchronization before trusting network visibility dashboards.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The relevant failure is: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The technical distinction is: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation. The targeted correction is: Validate collector reachability, subscription scope and time synchronization before trusting network visibility dashboards. Before changing the design, check two independent observations. Compare device-reported interface state against ingested telemetry series Inspect collector subscription and transport errors. Accept the change only if: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This action targets active-active versus dr site objectives, where the mechanism is: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.

B:

This action targets in-band versus out-of-band management, where the mechanism is: Out-of-band management uses an independent access path that can remain reachable when production data-plane routing fails. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.

C:

This action targets redundant supervisor versus fabric failure, where the mechanism is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.

Question 217

At a virtualized application data center, before changing the fabric, the team observes: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. Acceptance requires evidence from the running system, not just the saved design. Which pair of observations most directly tests the proposed diagnosis before a change?

  1. Trace management traffic under normal and simulated underlay outage; inspect management VRF and console access controls.
  2. Compare device-reported interface state against ingested telemetry series; inspect collector subscription and transport errors.
  3. Map each controller VM to actual host and rack; simulate an approved node or host outage and inspect cluster service health.
  4. Trace SUP, power and uplink infrastructure to independent sources; test an approved single-path failure under load.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The first observation is: Compare device-reported interface state against ingested telemetry series The independent second observation is: Inspect collector subscription and transport errors. Together they test the proposed diagnosis of this incident: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The underlying technical principle is: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation. If those checks confirm it, the appropriate next action is: Validate collector reachability, subscription scope and time synchronization before trusting network visibility dashboards. The expected measurable result is: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.

Incorrect Answers

A:

These observations investigate in-band versus out-of-band management; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A fabric outage leaves operators unable to reach its network management devices because all management addresses use the affected production VRF. That alternative rests on the principle: Out-of-band management uses an independent access path that can remain reachable when production data-plane routing fails. The question instead asks for evidence about: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The discriminating observations here are: Compare device-reported interface state against ingested telemetry series Inspect collector subscription and transport errors.

C:

These observations investigate nexus dashboard cluster fault domain; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. That alternative rests on the principle: Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy. The question instead asks for evidence about: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The discriminating observations here are: Compare device-reported interface state against ingested telemetry series Inspect collector subscription and transport errors.

D:

These observations investigate redundant supervisor versus fabric failure; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. That alternative rests on the principle: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains. The question instead asks for evidence about: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The discriminating observations here are: Compare device-reported interface state against ingested telemetry series Inspect collector subscription and transport errors.

Question 218

At an AI-training data-center pod, the data-center team needs to explain this behavior: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. One component outage must remain inside the agreed availability budget. Which engineering principle best explains the observed behavior?

  1. Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation.
  2. Out-of-band management uses an independent access path that can remain reachable when production data-plane routing fails.
  3. Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy.
  4. Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The controlling technical principle is: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation. This matters because the reported design failure is: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The first diagnostic check is: Compare device-reported interface state against ingested telemetry series The independent check is: Inspect collector subscription and transport errors. These facts support the targeted intervention: Validate collector reachability, subscription scope and time synchronization before trusting network visibility dashboards. Confirm that the resulting design meets this condition: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The offered principle describes in-band versus out-of-band management: Out-of-band management uses an independent access path that can remain reachable when production data-plane routing fails. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A fabric outage leaves operators unable to reach its network management devices because all management addresses use the affected production VRF. It does not account for the reported failure: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The governing principle in this situation is: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation.

C:

The offered principle describes nexus dashboard cluster fault domain: Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. It does not account for the reported failure: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The governing principle in this situation is: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation.

D:

The offered principle describes active-active versus dr site objectives: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. It does not account for the reported failure: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The governing principle in this situation is: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation.

Question 219

At a regulated private-cloud campus, the team completed an authorized repair for: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The architect must preserve the intended failure domains. Which measured result most directly proves the original requirement is satisfied?

  1. The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.
  2. Operators retain authorized diagnostic access after loss of the production fabric.
  3. The selected site strategy satisfies actual data integrity and recovery requirements.
  4. A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The relevant measurable success criterion is: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps. It addresses the original reported defect: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. A saved design or configuration command alone does not establish that outcome. Observe the affected system in two independent ways: Compare device-reported interface state against ingested telemetry series Inspect collector subscription and transport errors. The correction being evaluated is: Validate collector reachability, subscription scope and time synchronization before trusting network visibility dashboards. The underlying reason that correction matters is: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This metric would help validate a correction to in-band versus out-of-band management, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: A fabric outage leaves operators unable to reach its network management devices because all management addresses use the affected production VRF. Here the defect to be resolved is: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.

C:

This metric would help validate a correction to active-active versus dr site objectives, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. Here the defect to be resolved is: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.

D:

This metric would help validate a correction to redundant supervisor versus fabric failure, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. Here the defect to be resolved is: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.

Question 220

At a dual-spine infrastructure project, the architecture standards group considers the recurring risk: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The team needs a defensible design decision rather than a vendor feature checklist. Which continuing design control best prevents the same problem from recurring?

  1. Maintain a layered failure-domain map beyond hardware module counts.
  2. Review controller topology when physical hosts are consolidated.
  3. Alert on missing telemetry sources and timestamp skew.
  4. Retest split-brain and failback after site topology changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The most relevant ongoing safeguard is: Alert on missing telemetry sources and timestamp skew. The risk it addresses is: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. This check is tied to the technical principle: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation. The immediate correction remains: Validate collector reachability, subscription scope and time synchronization before trusting network visibility dashboards. Periodically validate the safeguard through two different observations. Compare device-reported interface state against ingested telemetry series Inspect collector subscription and transport errors. The continuing acceptance target is: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is a continuing control for redundant supervisor versus fabric failure; its underlying principle is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains. The recurring risk here is different: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.

B:

This is a continuing control for nexus dashboard cluster fault domain; its underlying principle is: Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy. The recurring risk here is different: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.

D:

This is a continuing control for active-active versus dr site objectives; its underlying principle is: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time. The recurring risk here is different: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.

Designing Cisco Data Center Infrastructure for Traditional and AI Workloads (300-610) Practice Tests