Cisco 300-610 Practice Test 20
Question 190
At an AI-training data-center pod, the architecture standards group considers the recurring risk: A single tenant bridge domain spans hundreds of VTEPs and unicast traffic is healthy but BUM bursts saturate leaf uplinks. The team needs a defensible design decision rather than a vendor feature checklist. Which continuing design control best prevents the same problem from recurring?
- Audit route exchange on every inter-DC EVPN policy change.
- Check RT uniqueness and import symmetry on each tenant rollout.
- Track EVI peer counts and BUM rates as tenant topology grows.
- Validate L2-to-L3 VNI mapping with each new tenant network.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The most relevant ongoing safeguard is: Track EVI peer counts and BUM rates as tenant topology grows. The risk it addresses is: A single tenant bridge domain spans hundreds of VTEPs and unicast traffic is healthy but BUM bursts saturate leaf uplinks. This check is tied to the technical principle: VXLAN ingress replication can multiply BUM frames across many tunnel peers and must be sized for the membership scale. The immediate correction remains: Evaluate supported multicast or replication options and constrain EVI membership before expanding L2 reach. Periodically validate the safeguard through two different observations. Measure BUM fan-out and replication traffic per VTEP Compare expected receiver count and actual overlay flood list. The continuing acceptance target is: Broadcast discovery remains functional without excessive cross-fabric replication.
Incorrect Answers
A:This is a continuing control for inter-dc evpn route policy; its underlying principle is: Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements. The recurring risk here is different: A single tenant bridge domain spans hundreds of VTEPs and unicast traffic is healthy but BUM bursts saturate leaf uplinks. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Broadcast discovery remains functional without excessive cross-fabric replication.
B:This is a continuing control for evpn rt import for tenant vni; its underlying principle is: Route targets control import of EVPN routes into relevant Ethernet VPN instances, distinct from the presence of BGP advertisements. The recurring risk here is different: A single tenant bridge domain spans hundreds of VTEPs and unicast traffic is healthy but BUM bursts saturate leaf uplinks. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: An EVPN MAC route is visible in the global BGP table but not installed in the remote tenant EVI. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Broadcast discovery remains functional without excessive cross-fabric replication.
D:This is a continuing control for vxlan l3vni design for routed services; its underlying principle is: Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership. The recurring risk here is different: A single tenant bridge domain spans hundreds of VTEPs and unicast traffic is healthy but BUM bursts saturate leaf uplinks. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Broadcast discovery remains functional without excessive cross-fabric replication.
Question 191
At a regulated private-cloud campus, a proposed deployment has this failure mode: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The maintenance plan must not disrupt unrelated tenants. Which design correction most directly addresses this specific failure or requirement?
- Extend only segments with justified mobility requirements and prefer routed boundaries for other workloads.
- Define eligible service routes, border gateway behavior, and route import filters for inter-DC connectivity.
- Correct only the authorized EVI route-target import/export policy and preserve other tenant separation.
- Map each routed subnet and anycast gateway to the right tenant VRF and Layer 3 VNI.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The relevant failure is: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The technical distinction is: Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership. The targeted correction is: Map each routed subnet and anycast gateway to the right tenant VRF and Layer 3 VNI. Before changing the design, check two independent observations. Inspect gateway SVI/VRF bindings and L3VNI routes Trace a test packet from one tenant subnet to another across the fabric. Accept the change only if: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context.
Incorrect Answers
A:This action targets evpn vxlan l2 extension scope, where the mechanism is: VXLAN EVPN can extend a broadcast domain, but a stretched fault domain increases MAC, flood and failure exposure. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.
B:This action targets inter-dc evpn route policy, where the mechanism is: Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.
C:This action targets evpn rt import for tenant vni, where the mechanism is: Route targets control import of EVPN routes into relevant Ethernet VPN instances, distinct from the presence of BGP advertisements. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.
Question 192
At a dual-spine infrastructure project, the cause remains unconfirmed for this reported issue: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. Acceptance requires evidence from the running system, not just the saved design. Which pair of observations most directly tests the proposed diagnosis before a change?
- Inspect gateway SVI/VRF bindings and L3VNI routes; trace a test packet from one tenant subnet to another across the fabric.
- Compare gateway MAC and subnet settings on both leaves; inspect EVPN MAC/IP routes and moved-host neighbor resolution.
- Map which applications need IP preservation across sites; estimate BUM replication and failure domains for each proposed extension.
- Measure BUM fan-out and replication traffic per VTEP; compare expected receiver count and actual overlay flood list.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The first observation is: Inspect gateway SVI/VRF bindings and L3VNI routes The independent second observation is: Trace a test packet from one tenant subnet to another across the fabric. Together they test the proposed diagnosis of this incident: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The underlying technical principle is: Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership. If those checks confirm it, the appropriate next action is: Map each routed subnet and anycast gateway to the right tenant VRF and Layer 3 VNI. The expected measurable result is: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context.
Incorrect Answers
B:These observations investigate anycast gateway consistency in vxlan; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A virtual machine moves between two leafs and loses reachability because its default gateway differs between VTEPs. That alternative rests on the principle: Distributed anycast gateway designs require aligned gateway IP/MAC semantics and consistent tenant VNIs across eligible leaves. The question instead asks for evidence about: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The discriminating observations here are: Inspect gateway SVI/VRF bindings and L3VNI routes Trace a test packet from one tenant subnet to another across the fabric.
C:These observations investigate evpn vxlan l2 extension scope; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A proposal stretches every application VLAN between two sites simply because the VXLAN overlay supports it. That alternative rests on the principle: VXLAN EVPN can extend a broadcast domain, but a stretched fault domain increases MAC, flood and failure exposure. The question instead asks for evidence about: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The discriminating observations here are: Inspect gateway SVI/VRF bindings and L3VNI routes Trace a test packet from one tenant subnet to another across the fabric.
D:These observations investigate vxlan head-end replication capacity; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A single tenant bridge domain spans hundreds of VTEPs and unicast traffic is healthy but BUM bursts saturate leaf uplinks. That alternative rests on the principle: VXLAN ingress replication can multiply BUM frames across many tunnel peers and must be sized for the membership scale. The question instead asks for evidence about: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The discriminating observations here are: Inspect gateway SVI/VRF bindings and L3VNI routes Trace a test packet from one tenant subnet to another across the fabric.
Question 193
At a low-latency GPU workload fabric, a failure review must identify the central technical cause of: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. One component outage must remain inside the agreed availability budget. Which engineering principle best explains the observed behavior?
- Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership.
- Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements.
- VXLAN ingress replication can multiply BUM frames across many tunnel peers and must be sized for the membership scale.
- VXLAN EVPN can extend a broadcast domain, but a stretched fault domain increases MAC, flood and failure exposure.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The controlling technical principle is: Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership. This matters because the reported design failure is: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The first diagnostic check is: Inspect gateway SVI/VRF bindings and L3VNI routes The independent check is: Trace a test packet from one tenant subnet to another across the fabric. These facts support the targeted intervention: Map each routed subnet and anycast gateway to the right tenant VRF and Layer 3 VNI. Confirm that the resulting design meets this condition: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context.
Incorrect Answers
B:The offered principle describes inter-dc evpn route policy: Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. It does not account for the reported failure: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The governing principle in this situation is: Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership.
C:The offered principle describes vxlan head-end replication capacity: VXLAN ingress replication can multiply BUM frames across many tunnel peers and must be sized for the membership scale. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A single tenant bridge domain spans hundreds of VTEPs and unicast traffic is healthy but BUM bursts saturate leaf uplinks. It does not account for the reported failure: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The governing principle in this situation is: Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership.
D:The offered principle describes evpn vxlan l2 extension scope: VXLAN EVPN can extend a broadcast domain, but a stretched fault domain increases MAC, flood and failure exposure. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A proposal stretches every application VLAN between two sites simply because the VXLAN overlay supports it. It does not account for the reported failure: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The governing principle in this situation is: Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership.
Question 194
At a two-region enterprise VXLAN fabric, the service owner needs evidence of resolution for: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The architect must preserve the intended failure domains. Which measured result most directly proves the original requirement is satisfied?
- Only required networks span sites while other traffic remains routed and isolated.
- Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context.
- Tenant MACs import into the right EVI without cross-tenant MAC learning.
- Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The relevant measurable success criterion is: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context. It addresses the original reported defect: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. A saved design or configuration command alone does not establish that outcome. Observe the affected system in two independent ways: Inspect gateway SVI/VRF bindings and L3VNI routes Trace a test packet from one tenant subnet to another across the fabric. The correction being evaluated is: Map each routed subnet and anycast gateway to the right tenant VRF and Layer 3 VNI. The underlying reason that correction matters is: Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership.
Incorrect Answers
A:This metric would help validate a correction to evpn vxlan l2 extension scope, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: A proposal stretches every application VLAN between two sites simply because the VXLAN overlay supports it. Here the defect to be resolved is: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.
C:This metric would help validate a correction to evpn rt import for tenant vni, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: An EVPN MAC route is visible in the global BGP table but not installed in the remote tenant EVI. Here the defect to be resolved is: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.
D:This metric would help validate a correction to inter-dc evpn route policy, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. Here the defect to be resolved is: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.
Question 195
At a 60-rack compute cluster, after correction, the team wants to prevent recurrence of: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The team needs a defensible design decision rather than a vendor feature checklist. Which continuing design control best prevents the same problem from recurring?
- Audit route exchange on every inter-DC EVPN policy change.
- Revisit stretched-subnet membership when application mobility requirements end.
- Validate L2-to-L3 VNI mapping with each new tenant network.
- Audit gateway and VNI templates across leaf additions.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The most relevant ongoing safeguard is: Validate L2-to-L3 VNI mapping with each new tenant network. The risk it addresses is: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. This check is tied to the technical principle: Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership. The immediate correction remains: Map each routed subnet and anycast gateway to the right tenant VRF and Layer 3 VNI. Periodically validate the safeguard through two different observations. Inspect gateway SVI/VRF bindings and L3VNI routes Trace a test packet from one tenant subnet to another across the fabric. The continuing acceptance target is: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context.
Incorrect Answers
A:This is a continuing control for inter-dc evpn route policy; its underlying principle is: Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements. The recurring risk here is different: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context.
B:This is a continuing control for evpn vxlan l2 extension scope; its underlying principle is: VXLAN EVPN can extend a broadcast domain, but a stretched fault domain increases MAC, flood and failure exposure. The recurring risk here is different: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A proposal stretches every application VLAN between two sites simply because the VXLAN overlay supports it. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context.
D:This is a continuing control for anycast gateway consistency in vxlan; its underlying principle is: Distributed anycast gateway designs require aligned gateway IP/MAC semantics and consistent tenant VNIs across eligible leaves. The recurring risk here is different: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A virtual machine moves between two leafs and loses reachability because its default gateway differs between VTEPs. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context.
Question 196
At a virtualized application data center, a design review reports the following issue: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The maintenance plan must not disrupt unrelated tenants. Which design correction most directly addresses this specific failure or requirement?
- Map each routed subnet and anycast gateway to the right tenant VRF and Layer 3 VNI.
- Define eligible service routes, border gateway behavior, and route import filters for inter-DC connectivity.
- Correct only the authorized EVI route-target import/export policy and preserve other tenant separation.
- Align supported anycast gateway identities and VNIs throughout the intended VXLAN EVPN fabric.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The relevant failure is: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The technical distinction is: Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements. The targeted correction is: Define eligible service routes, border gateway behavior, and route import filters for inter-DC connectivity. Before changing the design, check two independent observations. Inspect EVPN route types and RTs crossing the border Test a legitimate mobile endpoint and a prohibited tenant prefix. Accept the change only if: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated.
Incorrect Answers
A:This action targets vxlan l3vni design for routed services, where the mechanism is: Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.
C:This action targets evpn rt import for tenant vni, where the mechanism is: Route targets control import of EVPN routes into relevant Ethernet VPN instances, distinct from the presence of BGP advertisements. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.
D:This action targets anycast gateway consistency in vxlan, where the mechanism is: Distributed anycast gateway designs require aligned gateway IP/MAC semantics and consistent tenant VNIs across eligible leaves. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.
Question 197
At an AI-training data-center pod, two engineers propose competing diagnoses for this condition: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. Acceptance requires evidence from the running system, not just the saved design. Which pair of observations most directly tests the proposed diagnosis before a change?
- Compare gateway MAC and subnet settings on both leaves; inspect EVPN MAC/IP routes and moved-host neighbor resolution.
- Inspect EVPN route types and RTs crossing the border; test a legitimate mobile endpoint and a prohibited tenant prefix.
- Map which applications need IP preservation across sites; estimate BUM replication and failure domains for each proposed extension.
- Inspect received route-target extended communities; compare receiving EVI import targets and local MAC installation.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The first observation is: Inspect EVPN route types and RTs crossing the border The independent second observation is: Test a legitimate mobile endpoint and a prohibited tenant prefix. Together they test the proposed diagnosis of this incident: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The underlying technical principle is: Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements. If those checks confirm it, the appropriate next action is: Define eligible service routes, border gateway behavior, and route import filters for inter-DC connectivity. The expected measurable result is: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated.
Incorrect Answers
A:These observations investigate anycast gateway consistency in vxlan; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A virtual machine moves between two leafs and loses reachability because its default gateway differs between VTEPs. That alternative rests on the principle: Distributed anycast gateway designs require aligned gateway IP/MAC semantics and consistent tenant VNIs across eligible leaves. The question instead asks for evidence about: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The discriminating observations here are: Inspect EVPN route types and RTs crossing the border Test a legitimate mobile endpoint and a prohibited tenant prefix.
C:These observations investigate evpn vxlan l2 extension scope; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A proposal stretches every application VLAN between two sites simply because the VXLAN overlay supports it. That alternative rests on the principle: VXLAN EVPN can extend a broadcast domain, but a stretched fault domain increases MAC, flood and failure exposure. The question instead asks for evidence about: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The discriminating observations here are: Inspect EVPN route types and RTs crossing the border Test a legitimate mobile endpoint and a prohibited tenant prefix.
D:These observations investigate evpn rt import for tenant vni; they would be useful if the symptoms were: An EVPN MAC route is visible in the global BGP table but not installed in the remote tenant EVI. That alternative rests on the principle: Route targets control import of EVPN routes into relevant Ethernet VPN instances, distinct from the presence of BGP advertisements. The question instead asks for evidence about: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The discriminating observations here are: Inspect EVPN route types and RTs crossing the border Test a legitimate mobile endpoint and a prohibited tenant prefix.
Question 198
At a regulated private-cloud campus, the design group challenges an assumption behind this issue: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. One component outage must remain inside the agreed availability budget. Which engineering principle best explains the observed behavior?
- Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements.
- Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership.
- VXLAN ingress replication can multiply BUM frames across many tunnel peers and must be sized for the membership scale.
- Route targets control import of EVPN routes into relevant Ethernet VPN instances, distinct from the presence of BGP advertisements.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The controlling technical principle is: Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements. This matters because the reported design failure is: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The first diagnostic check is: Inspect EVPN route types and RTs crossing the border The independent check is: Test a legitimate mobile endpoint and a prohibited tenant prefix. These facts support the targeted intervention: Define eligible service routes, border gateway behavior, and route import filters for inter-DC connectivity. Confirm that the resulting design meets this condition: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated.
Incorrect Answers
B:The offered principle describes vxlan l3vni design for routed services: Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. It does not account for the reported failure: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The governing principle in this situation is: Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements.
C:The offered principle describes vxlan head-end replication capacity: VXLAN ingress replication can multiply BUM frames across many tunnel peers and must be sized for the membership scale. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A single tenant bridge domain spans hundreds of VTEPs and unicast traffic is healthy but BUM bursts saturate leaf uplinks. It does not account for the reported failure: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The governing principle in this situation is: Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements.
D:The offered principle describes evpn rt import for tenant vni: Route targets control import of EVPN routes into relevant Ethernet VPN instances, distinct from the presence of BGP advertisements. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: An EVPN MAC route is visible in the global BGP table but not installed in the remote tenant EVI. It does not account for the reported failure: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The governing principle in this situation is: Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements.
Question 199
At a dual-spine infrastructure project, a change has been proposed for the following condition: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The architect must preserve the intended failure domains. Which measured result most directly proves the original requirement is satisfied?
- Inter-subnet forwarding stays within the approved tenant context.
- Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated.
- Only required networks span sites while other traffic remains routed and isolated.
- Broadcast discovery remains functional without excessive cross-fabric replication.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The relevant measurable success criterion is: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated. It addresses the original reported defect: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. A saved design or configuration command alone does not establish that outcome. Observe the affected system in two independent ways: Inspect EVPN route types and RTs crossing the border Test a legitimate mobile endpoint and a prohibited tenant prefix. The correction being evaluated is: Define eligible service routes, border gateway behavior, and route import filters for inter-DC connectivity. The underlying reason that correction matters is: Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements.
Incorrect Answers
A:This metric would help validate a correction to vxlan l3vni design for routed services, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. Here the defect to be resolved is: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.
C:This metric would help validate a correction to evpn vxlan l2 extension scope, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: A proposal stretches every application VLAN between two sites simply because the VXLAN overlay supports it. Here the defect to be resolved is: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.
D:This metric would help validate a correction to vxlan head-end replication capacity, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: A single tenant bridge domain spans hundreds of VTEPs and unicast traffic is healthy but BUM bursts saturate leaf uplinks. Here the defect to be resolved is: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.
Question 200
At a low-latency GPU workload fabric, a post-incident design review focuses on preventing: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The team needs a defensible design decision rather than a vendor feature checklist. Which continuing design control best prevents the same problem from recurring?
- Validate L2-to-L3 VNI mapping with each new tenant network.
- Audit route exchange on every inter-DC EVPN policy change.
- Track EVI peer counts and BUM rates as tenant topology grows.
- Revisit stretched-subnet membership when application mobility requirements end.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The most relevant ongoing safeguard is: Audit route exchange on every inter-DC EVPN policy change. The risk it addresses is: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. This check is tied to the technical principle: Inter-site EVPN design needs deliberate RT, route type, and gateway boundary policy, not unconditional exchange of all advertisements. The immediate correction remains: Define eligible service routes, border gateway behavior, and route import filters for inter-DC connectivity. Periodically validate the safeguard through two different observations. Inspect EVPN route types and RTs crossing the border Test a legitimate mobile endpoint and a prohibited tenant prefix. The continuing acceptance target is: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated.
Incorrect Answers
A:This is a continuing control for vxlan l3vni design for routed services; its underlying principle is: Inter-subnet EVPN routing needs a tenant VRF and supported L3VNI/IRB relationship, not only L2VNI membership. The recurring risk here is different: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: Two tenant subnets are bridged by EVPN but routed inter-subnet traffic falls back to an unintended global route table. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated.
C:This is a continuing control for vxlan head-end replication capacity; its underlying principle is: VXLAN ingress replication can multiply BUM frames across many tunnel peers and must be sized for the membership scale. The recurring risk here is different: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A single tenant bridge domain spans hundreds of VTEPs and unicast traffic is healthy but BUM bursts saturate leaf uplinks. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated.
D:This is a continuing control for evpn vxlan l2 extension scope; its underlying principle is: VXLAN EVPN can extend a broadcast domain, but a stretched fault domain increases MAC, flood and failure exposure. The recurring risk here is different: Two data centers exchange all EVPN MAC routes without filtering and accidentally reveal one site's private tenant routes to another tenant. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A proposal stretches every application VLAN between two sites simply because the VXLAN overlay supports it. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Allowed mobility works while unrelated route and MAC information stays isolated.