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Cisco 300-610 Practice Test 23

Question 220

At a dual-spine infrastructure project, the architecture standards group considers the recurring risk: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The team needs a defensible design decision rather than a vendor feature checklist. Which continuing design control best prevents the same problem from recurring?

  1. Maintain a layered failure-domain map beyond hardware module counts.
  2. Review controller topology when physical hosts are consolidated.
  3. Alert on missing telemetry sources and timestamp skew.
  4. Retest split-brain and failback after site topology changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The most relevant ongoing safeguard is: Alert on missing telemetry sources and timestamp skew. The risk it addresses is: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. This check is tied to the technical principle: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation. The immediate correction remains: Validate collector reachability, subscription scope and time synchronization before trusting network visibility dashboards. Periodically validate the safeguard through two different observations. Compare device-reported interface state against ingested telemetry series Inspect collector subscription and transport errors. The continuing acceptance target is: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is a continuing control for redundant supervisor versus fabric failure; its underlying principle is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains. The recurring risk here is different: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.

B:

This is a continuing control for nexus dashboard cluster fault domain; its underlying principle is: Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy. The recurring risk here is different: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.

D:

This is a continuing control for active-active versus dr site objectives; its underlying principle is: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time. The recurring risk here is different: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.

Question 221

At a low-latency GPU workload fabric, a proposed deployment has this failure mode: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The maintenance plan must not disrupt unrelated tenants. Which design correction most directly addresses this specific failure or requirement?

  1. Distribute supported controller nodes across independent compute and network failure domains.
  2. Select active-active or active-standby based on application write-consistency, RPO, RTO and failure domain evidence.
  3. Provide an isolated management plane with validated power, connectivity and authentication dependencies.
  4. Design device, power and path resiliency as separate requirements and validate actual shared dependencies.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The relevant failure is: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The technical distinction is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains. The targeted correction is: Design device, power and path resiliency as separate requirements and validate actual shared dependencies. Before changing the design, check two independent observations. Trace SUP, power and uplink infrastructure to independent sources Test an approved single-path failure under load. Accept the change only if: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This action targets nexus dashboard cluster fault domain, where the mechanism is: Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.

B:

This action targets active-active versus dr site objectives, where the mechanism is: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.

C:

This action targets in-band versus out-of-band management, where the mechanism is: Out-of-band management uses an independent access path that can remain reachable when production data-plane routing fails. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.

Question 222

At a two-region enterprise VXLAN fabric, the cause remains unconfirmed for this reported issue: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. Acceptance requires evidence from the running system, not just the saved design. Which pair of observations most directly tests the proposed diagnosis before a change?

  1. Measure replication delay and write conflict behavior; test site isolation and resulting application leadership.
  2. Trace SUP, power and uplink infrastructure to independent sources; test an approved single-path failure under load.
  3. Trace management traffic under normal and simulated underlay outage; inspect management VRF and console access controls.
  4. Map each controller VM to actual host and rack; simulate an approved node or host outage and inspect cluster service health.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The first observation is: Trace SUP, power and uplink infrastructure to independent sources The independent second observation is: Test an approved single-path failure under load. Together they test the proposed diagnosis of this incident: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The underlying technical principle is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains. If those checks confirm it, the appropriate next action is: Design device, power and path resiliency as separate requirements and validate actual shared dependencies. The expected measurable result is: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

These observations investigate active-active versus dr site objectives; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. That alternative rests on the principle: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time. The question instead asks for evidence about: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The discriminating observations here are: Trace SUP, power and uplink infrastructure to independent sources Test an approved single-path failure under load.

C:

These observations investigate in-band versus out-of-band management; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A fabric outage leaves operators unable to reach its network management devices because all management addresses use the affected production VRF. That alternative rests on the principle: Out-of-band management uses an independent access path that can remain reachable when production data-plane routing fails. The question instead asks for evidence about: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The discriminating observations here are: Trace SUP, power and uplink infrastructure to independent sources Test an approved single-path failure under load.

D:

These observations investigate nexus dashboard cluster fault domain; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. That alternative rests on the principle: Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy. The question instead asks for evidence about: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The discriminating observations here are: Trace SUP, power and uplink infrastructure to independent sources Test an approved single-path failure under load.

Question 223

At a 60-rack compute cluster, a failure review must identify the central technical cause of: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. One component outage must remain inside the agreed availability budget. Which engineering principle best explains the observed behavior?

  1. Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy.
  2. Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains.
  3. Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time.
  4. Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The controlling technical principle is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains. This matters because the reported design failure is: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The first diagnostic check is: Trace SUP, power and uplink infrastructure to independent sources The independent check is: Test an approved single-path failure under load. These facts support the targeted intervention: Design device, power and path resiliency as separate requirements and validate actual shared dependencies. Confirm that the resulting design meets this condition: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered principle describes nexus dashboard cluster fault domain: Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. It does not account for the reported failure: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The governing principle in this situation is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains.

C:

The offered principle describes active-active versus dr site objectives: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. It does not account for the reported failure: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The governing principle in this situation is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains.

D:

The offered principle describes monitoring telemetry collection loss: Controller availability and telemetry collection are independent; missing device streams can hide fabric degradation. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. It does not account for the reported failure: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The governing principle in this situation is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains.

Question 224

At a virtualized application data center, the service owner needs evidence of resolution for: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The architect must preserve the intended failure domains. Which measured result most directly proves the original requirement is satisfied?

  1. A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy.
  2. Management services remain within their supported availability goal after one host fails.
  3. The dashboard reflects supported current device signals without silent monitoring gaps.
  4. Operators retain authorized diagnostic access after loss of the production fabric.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The relevant measurable success criterion is: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy. It addresses the original reported defect: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. A saved design or configuration command alone does not establish that outcome. Observe the affected system in two independent ways: Trace SUP, power and uplink infrastructure to independent sources Test an approved single-path failure under load. The correction being evaluated is: Design device, power and path resiliency as separate requirements and validate actual shared dependencies. The underlying reason that correction matters is: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This metric would help validate a correction to nexus dashboard cluster fault domain, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. Here the defect to be resolved is: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.

C:

This metric would help validate a correction to monitoring telemetry collection loss, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: Nexus Dashboard remains available but an operator assumes that means every spine and leaf is delivering complete telemetry. Here the defect to be resolved is: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.

D:

This metric would help validate a correction to in-band versus out-of-band management, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: A fabric outage leaves operators unable to reach its network management devices because all management addresses use the affected production VRF. Here the defect to be resolved is: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.

Question 225

At an AI-training data-center pod, after correction, the team wants to prevent recurrence of: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The team needs a defensible design decision rather than a vendor feature checklist. Which continuing design control best prevents the same problem from recurring?

  1. Review controller topology when physical hosts are consolidated.
  2. Retest split-brain and failback after site topology changes.
  3. Drill management-plane recovery independently from production routing.
  4. Maintain a layered failure-domain map beyond hardware module counts.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The most relevant ongoing safeguard is: Maintain a layered failure-domain map beyond hardware module counts. The risk it addresses is: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. This check is tied to the technical principle: Control-plane redundancy inside one chassis does not eliminate separate power, uplink and distribution-layer failure domains. The immediate correction remains: Design device, power and path resiliency as separate requirements and validate actual shared dependencies. Periodically validate the safeguard through two different observations. Trace SUP, power and uplink infrastructure to independent sources Test an approved single-path failure under load. The continuing acceptance target is: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is a continuing control for nexus dashboard cluster fault domain; its underlying principle is: Control and observability planes require appropriately distributed cluster failure domains; multiple logical nodes on one host are not hardware redundancy. The recurring risk here is different: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A centralized fabric management deployment places all controller nodes on one physical host and calls it highly available. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy.

B:

This is a continuing control for active-active versus dr site objectives; its underlying principle is: Active-active availability can introduce replication latency and split-brain complexity, whereas disaster recovery prioritizes a documented recovery point and time. The recurring risk here is different: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A facility chooses active-active application sites without verifying data consistency or quorum needs across regions. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy.

C:

This is a continuing control for in-band versus out-of-band management; its underlying principle is: Out-of-band management uses an independent access path that can remain reachable when production data-plane routing fails. The recurring risk here is different: A switch has dual supervisors but shares a single upstream power feed and fabric path with the only data center gateway. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A fabric outage leaves operators unable to reach its network management devices because all management addresses use the affected production VRF. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: A credible single failure cannot remove all network paths despite supervisor redundancy.

Question 226

At a regulated private-cloud campus, a design review reports the following issue: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The maintenance plan must not disrupt unrelated tenants. Which design correction most directly addresses this specific failure or requirement?

  1. Use supported dynamic endpoint selectors with tested precedence rather than relying solely on manually assigned VLANs.
  2. Assign overlapping tenants to independent VRFs or introduce deliberate translation and routed policy.
  3. Define least-privilege EPG contracts with necessary subjects and filters for intended application flows.
  4. Right-size the inference serving tier using representative model size, batch behavior, throughput and latency instead of adopting the training cluster bill of materials.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The relevant failure is: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The technical distinction is: EPG membership and contract policy determine how ACI handles allowed communication; different EPGs can require explicit contracts. The targeted correction is: Define least-privilege EPG contracts with necessary subjects and filters for intended application flows. Before changing the design, check two independent observations. Inspect EPG bindings and effective contract relationships Test one allowed application connection and one forbidden port. Accept the change only if: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This action targets aci microsegmentation attribute selection, where the mechanism is: Attribute-based EPG selection can support workload-aware segmentation where identity and orchestration metadata are reliably maintained. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.

B:

This action targets aci vrf and bridge domain scope, where the mechanism is: Bridge-domain segmentation and VRF routing scope are different; overlapping routing prefixes generally need separate routing contexts or compatible NAT. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.

D:

This action targets training versus inference pod sizing, where the mechanism is: Training emphasizes repeated parallel optimization while inference needs predictable request latency and often a different GPU-memory and throughput balance. That is a separate condition from the problem in this question: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. Even a successful repair of the alternative would not establish the required result: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied. The applicable design change must address the diagnosed mechanism of the stated case, not the neighboring design problem.

Question 227

At a dual-spine infrastructure project, two engineers propose competing diagnoses for this condition: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. Acceptance requires evidence from the running system, not just the saved design. Which pair of observations most directly tests the proposed diagnosis before a change?

  1. Inspect EPG bindings and effective contract relationships; test one allowed application connection and one forbidden port.
  2. Compare VRF and bridge-domain associations; test identical-prefix reachability from each tenant context.
  3. Inspect actual workload attributes and resulting EPG membership; move a test workload and verify contract enforcement follows its intended role.
  4. Profile job communication bytes per training step; measure fabric utilization and collective-operation duration across accelerator nodes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The first observation is: Inspect EPG bindings and effective contract relationships The independent second observation is: Test one allowed application connection and one forbidden port. Together they test the proposed diagnosis of this incident: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The underlying technical principle is: EPG membership and contract policy determine how ACI handles allowed communication; different EPGs can require explicit contracts. If those checks confirm it, the appropriate next action is: Define least-privilege EPG contracts with necessary subjects and filters for intended application flows. The expected measurable result is: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied.

Incorrect Answers

B:

These observations investigate aci vrf and bridge domain scope; they would be useful if the symptoms were: An ACI tenant design creates several bridge domains in one VRF and expects overlapping IP subnets to remain isolated without further design. That alternative rests on the principle: Bridge-domain segmentation and VRF routing scope are different; overlapping routing prefixes generally need separate routing contexts or compatible NAT. The question instead asks for evidence about: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The discriminating observations here are: Inspect EPG bindings and effective contract relationships Test one allowed application connection and one forbidden port.

C:

These observations investigate aci microsegmentation attribute selection; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A security policy groups every virtual machine by static VLAN when workloads are frequently created and moved by orchestration. That alternative rests on the principle: Attribute-based EPG selection can support workload-aware segmentation where identity and orchestration metadata are reliably maintained. The question instead asks for evidence about: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The discriminating observations here are: Inspect EPG bindings and effective contract relationships Test one allowed application connection and one forbidden port.

D:

These observations investigate ai training east-west communication; they would be useful if the symptoms were: A distributed model job scales to more workers but time to train grows because inter-GPU synchronization stalls. That alternative rests on the principle: Collective operations such as all-reduce drive high-volume east-west traffic whose latency and bandwidth matter separately from north-south application traffic. The question instead asks for evidence about: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The discriminating observations here are: Inspect EPG bindings and effective contract relationships Test one allowed application connection and one forbidden port.

Question 228

At a low-latency GPU workload fabric, the design group challenges an assumption behind this issue: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. One component outage must remain inside the agreed availability budget. Which engineering principle best explains the observed behavior?

  1. EPG membership and contract policy determine how ACI handles allowed communication; different EPGs can require explicit contracts.
  2. Bridge-domain segmentation and VRF routing scope are different; overlapping routing prefixes generally need separate routing contexts or compatible NAT.
  3. Attribute-based EPG selection can support workload-aware segmentation where identity and orchestration metadata are reliably maintained.
  4. Collective operations such as all-reduce drive high-volume east-west traffic whose latency and bandwidth matter separately from north-south application traffic.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The controlling technical principle is: EPG membership and contract policy determine how ACI handles allowed communication; different EPGs can require explicit contracts. This matters because the reported design failure is: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The first diagnostic check is: Inspect EPG bindings and effective contract relationships The independent check is: Test one allowed application connection and one forbidden port. These facts support the targeted intervention: Define least-privilege EPG contracts with necessary subjects and filters for intended application flows. Confirm that the resulting design meets this condition: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The offered principle describes aci vrf and bridge domain scope: Bridge-domain segmentation and VRF routing scope are different; overlapping routing prefixes generally need separate routing contexts or compatible NAT. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: An ACI tenant design creates several bridge domains in one VRF and expects overlapping IP subnets to remain isolated without further design. It does not account for the reported failure: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The governing principle in this situation is: EPG membership and contract policy determine how ACI handles allowed communication; different EPGs can require explicit contracts.

C:

The offered principle describes aci microsegmentation attribute selection: Attribute-based EPG selection can support workload-aware segmentation where identity and orchestration metadata are reliably maintained. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A security policy groups every virtual machine by static VLAN when workloads are frequently created and moved by orchestration. It does not account for the reported failure: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The governing principle in this situation is: EPG membership and contract policy determine how ACI handles allowed communication; different EPGs can require explicit contracts.

D:

The offered principle describes ai training east-west communication: Collective operations such as all-reduce drive high-volume east-west traffic whose latency and bandwidth matter separately from north-south application traffic. That is useful for a distinct incident, such as: A distributed model job scales to more workers but time to train grows because inter-GPU synchronization stalls. It does not account for the reported failure: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The governing principle in this situation is: EPG membership and contract policy determine how ACI handles allowed communication; different EPGs can require explicit contracts.

Question 229

At a two-region enterprise VXLAN fabric, a change has been proposed for the following condition: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The architect must preserve the intended failure domains. Which measured result most directly proves the original requirement is satisfied?

  1. Workloads retain the correct security classification after supported mobility.
  2. Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied.
  3. Overlapping workloads do not collide or leak through one routing table.
  4. Adding workers delivers useful training speedup without collective traffic becoming the dominant bottleneck.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The relevant measurable success criterion is: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied. It addresses the original reported defect: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. A saved design or configuration command alone does not establish that outcome. Observe the affected system in two independent ways: Inspect EPG bindings and effective contract relationships Test one allowed application connection and one forbidden port. The correction being evaluated is: Define least-privilege EPG contracts with necessary subjects and filters for intended application flows. The underlying reason that correction matters is: EPG membership and contract policy determine how ACI handles allowed communication; different EPGs can require explicit contracts.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This metric would help validate a correction to aci microsegmentation attribute selection, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: A security policy groups every virtual machine by static VLAN when workloads are frequently created and moved by orchestration. Here the defect to be resolved is: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.

C:

This metric would help validate a correction to aci vrf and bridge domain scope, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: An ACI tenant design creates several bridge domains in one VRF and expects overlapping IP subnets to remain isolated without further design. Here the defect to be resolved is: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.

D:

This metric would help validate a correction to ai training east-west communication, rather than the original reported issue. The other issue is: A distributed model job scales to more workers but time to train grows because inter-GPU synchronization stalls. Here the defect to be resolved is: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The expected measurable outcome for the actual incident is: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied. A positive result for the other service would not prove this requirement is met.

Question 230

At a 60-rack compute cluster, a post-incident design review focuses on preventing: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The team needs a defensible design decision rather than a vendor feature checklist. Which continuing design control best prevents the same problem from recurring?

  1. Validate IP address overlap before approving bridge-domain changes.
  2. Monitor attribute drift and unintended EPG reassignment.
  3. Review contracts when application tiers or ports change.
  4. Document which queues truly require no-drop behavior.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The most relevant ongoing safeguard is: Review contracts when application tiers or ports change. The risk it addresses is: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. This check is tied to the technical principle: EPG membership and contract policy determine how ACI handles allowed communication; different EPGs can require explicit contracts. The immediate correction remains: Define least-privilege EPG contracts with necessary subjects and filters for intended application flows. Periodically validate the safeguard through two different observations. Inspect EPG bindings and effective contract relationships Test one allowed application connection and one forbidden port. The continuing acceptance target is: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is a continuing control for aci vrf and bridge domain scope; its underlying principle is: Bridge-domain segmentation and VRF routing scope are different; overlapping routing prefixes generally need separate routing contexts or compatible NAT. The recurring risk here is different: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: An ACI tenant design creates several bridge domains in one VRF and expects overlapping IP subnets to remain isolated without further design. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied.

B:

This is a continuing control for aci microsegmentation attribute selection; its underlying principle is: Attribute-based EPG selection can support workload-aware segmentation where identity and orchestration metadata are reliably maintained. The recurring risk here is different: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: A security policy groups every virtual machine by static VLAN when workloads are frequently created and moved by orchestration. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied.

D:

This is a continuing control for avoiding global pause for ai traffic; its underlying principle is: Link-wide pause can throttle all traffic classes and is not a substitute for class-scoped priority flow control and congestion feedback. The recurring risk here is different: Two workloads use different ACI EPGs but an architect assumes that automatically permits any traffic between them. The appropriate ongoing control must prevent recurrence of that particular failure, not just the separate issue of: Operators configure IEEE 802.3x global pause for all leaf interfaces to protect one RoCEv2 traffic class. The intended long-term acceptance condition remains: Only approved inter-EPG traffic flows and unauthorized services remain denied.

Designing Cisco Data Center Infrastructure for Traditional and AI Workloads (300-610) Practice Tests