Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 56
Question 550
Following a production change at the Mobile distribution campus, a redistribution route map includes a deny clause followed by a permit clause, and some authorized prefixes never reach the next routing process. The incident is affecting management access; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Provide the required EIGRP seed metric through redistribution or a route map for the intended source.
- Correct the more-specific route or its advertisement if it is unintended; do not only change the aggregate's distance.
- Refine the aggregate or restore specific reachable routes so the advertisement does not imply missing coverage.
- Put the intended permit conditions before the catch-all deny or narrow the deny match.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Put the intended permit conditions before the catch-all deny or narrow the deny match. Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action.
Incorrect Answers
A:Provide the required EIGRP seed metric through redistribution or a route map for the intended source. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (EIGRP redistribution seed metric), where EIGRP redistribution generally needs an appropriate seed metric for external routes. Here the evidence instead concerns route-map permit sequence: Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action.
B:Correct the more-specific route or its advertisement if it is unintended; do not only change the aggregate's distance. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Longest-prefix selection), where A longer matching prefix is selected before administrative distance is compared among equal-length routes. Here the evidence instead concerns route-map permit sequence: Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action.
C:Refine the aggregate or restore specific reachable routes so the advertisement does not imply missing coverage. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Summary route black hole), where An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks. Here the evidence instead concerns route-map permit sequence: Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action.
Question 551
Following a production change at the Mobile distribution campus, a redistribution route map includes a deny clause followed by a permit clause, and some authorized prefixes never reach the next routing process. The incident is affecting management access; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?
- Check resulting redistributed prefixes and route-map matches after refreshing policy application.
- Verify reimported tagged routes are blocked while fresh authorized external prefixes remain visible.
- Probe each component prefix and examine forwarding to ensure the summary does not attract unreachable traffic.
- Use a destination-specific forwarding lookup to confirm which most-specific route is selected.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Check resulting redistributed prefixes and route-map matches after refreshing policy application. Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action.
Incorrect Answers
B:Verify reimported tagged routes are blocked while fresh authorized external prefixes remain visible. This is a validation for another mechanism (Redistribution loop prevention tags), where Consistent route tagging and inbound redistribution filters help prevent feedback loops across routing domains. Here the evidence instead concerns route-map permit sequence: Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action.
C:Probe each component prefix and examine forwarding to ensure the summary does not attract unreachable traffic. This is a validation for another mechanism (Summary route black hole), where An aggregate can intentionally create a discard route and must not promise reachability for withdrawn component networks. Here the evidence instead concerns route-map permit sequence: Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action.
D:Use a destination-specific forwarding lookup to confirm which most-specific route is selected. This is a validation for another mechanism (Longest-prefix selection), where A longer matching prefix is selected before administrative distance is compared among equal-length routes. Here the evidence instead concerns route-map permit sequence: Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action.
Question 552
Following a production change at the Mobile distribution campus, a redistribution route map includes a deny clause followed by a permit clause, and some authorized prefixes never reach the next routing process. The incident is affecting management access; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?
- Restore the previous ordered route-map clauses if the permitted set becomes too broad.
- Remove unsupported multihop changes and restore the original direct-peering source if needed.
- Restore the previous process numbering if migration peers elsewhere are affected.
- Restore earlier external metric policy if traffic shifts to a constrained circuit.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Restore the previous ordered route-map clauses if the permitted set becomes too broad. Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action.
Incorrect Answers
B:Remove unsupported multihop changes and restore the original direct-peering source if needed. This is a rollback for a different component (Loopback-sourced eBGP session), where Default eBGP TTL and packet source are designed for directly connected peers; loopback peering needs explicit settings. Here the evidence instead concerns route-map permit sequence: Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action.
C:Restore the previous process numbering if migration peers elsewhere are affected. This is a rollback for a different component (EIGRP AS mismatch), where EIGRP neighbors for an address family need compatible autonomous-system association and interface settings. Here the evidence instead concerns route-map permit sequence: Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action.
D:Restore earlier external metric policy if traffic shifts to a constrained circuit. This is a rollback for a different component (OSPF external route type), where OSPF E1 considers internal path cost with external cost, while E2 primarily compares the external metric. Here the evidence instead concerns route-map permit sequence: Route maps are processed by ordered sequence; the first matching clause determines the permit or deny action.
Question 553
During a scheduled validation at the Eugene regional hub, an internal BGP neighbor receives prefixes from an edge router but marks the best paths inaccessible. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Inspect the OSPF process router IDs and compare them across the affected area.
- Check BFD session state, neighbor association, timers, and whether both peers support it.
- Inspect the received BGP next-hop address and its reachability in the IGP or VRF.
- Confirm the branch is a leaf and inspect whether its neighbors treat it as an EIGRP stub.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Inspect the received BGP next-hop address and its reachability in the IGP or VRF. An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect the OSPF process router IDs and compare them across the affected area. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (OSPF duplicate router ID), where OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp ibgp next-hop reachability: An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
B:Check BFD session state, neighbor association, timers, and whether both peers support it. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (BFD fast-failure detection), where Bidirectional Forwarding Detection supplies rapid forwarding-path failure detection independent of slow hello timers. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp ibgp next-hop reachability: An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
D:Confirm the branch is a leaf and inspect whether its neighbors treat it as an EIGRP stub. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (EIGRP stub branch), where EIGRP stub limits query scope and is appropriate only where the device is not needed as transit. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp ibgp next-hop reachability: An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
Question 554
During a scheduled validation at the Eugene regional hub, an internal BGP neighbor receives prefixes from an edge router but marks the best paths inaccessible. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Correct the BGP neighbor remote-as and related peer policy for the intended eBGP or iBGP relationship.
- Apply an explicit allowlist prefix policy outbound to the external BGP peer.
- Use next-hop-self at the correct iBGP advertising boundary or repair the actual next-hop reachability.
- Mark the intended iBGP neighbors as route-reflector clients under the correct address family.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Use next-hop-self at the correct iBGP advertising boundary or repair the actual next-hop reachability. An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
Incorrect Answers
A:Correct the BGP neighbor remote-as and related peer policy for the intended eBGP or iBGP relationship. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP peer remote AS), where BGP neighbors must agree on configured peer AS identity and establish a TCP session. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp ibgp next-hop reachability: An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
B:Apply an explicit allowlist prefix policy outbound to the external BGP peer. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP prefix leak prevention), where BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp ibgp next-hop reachability: An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
D:Mark the intended iBGP neighbors as route-reflector clients under the correct address family. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP route reflector clients), where Route reflectors relax iBGP split-horizon for configured clients while using loop-prevention attributes. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp ibgp next-hop reachability: An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
Question 555
During a scheduled validation at the Eugene regional hub, an internal BGP neighbor receives prefixes from an edge router but marks the best paths inaccessible. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Verify the BGP session establishes and receives only authorized prefixes.
- Verify only authorized aggregate prefixes are advertised and the private/internal prefixes are absent.
- Confirm the BGP next hop resolves and received routes become installable in the RIB.
- Verify externally observed paths show the intended extra AS hops without losing prefix reachability.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Confirm the BGP next hop resolves and received routes become installable in the RIB. An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
Incorrect Answers
A:Verify the BGP session establishes and receives only authorized prefixes. This is a validation for another mechanism (BGP peer remote AS), where BGP neighbors must agree on configured peer AS identity and establish a TCP session. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp ibgp next-hop reachability: An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
B:Verify only authorized aggregate prefixes are advertised and the private/internal prefixes are absent. This is a validation for another mechanism (BGP prefix leak prevention), where BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp ibgp next-hop reachability: An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
D:Verify externally observed paths show the intended extra AS hops without losing prefix reachability. This is a validation for another mechanism (BGP inbound traffic engineering), where AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp ibgp next-hop reachability: An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
Question 556
During a scheduled validation at the Eugene regional hub, an internal BGP neighbor receives prefixes from an edge router but marks the best paths inaccessible. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. The attempted fix creates a regression. Which scoped recovery action is most appropriate?
- Remove AS-path prepending if transit providers ignore it or connectivity degrades.
- Restore the last verified neighbor export policy if broad filtering withdraws legitimate service routes.
- Revert the next-hop rewrite if it diverts traffic from the intended external edge.
- Undo reflector-client assignment if it creates an unintended reflection topology.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Revert the next-hop rewrite if it diverts traffic from the intended external edge. An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
Incorrect Answers
A:Remove AS-path prepending if transit providers ignore it or connectivity degrades. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP inbound traffic engineering), where AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp ibgp next-hop reachability: An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
B:Restore the last verified neighbor export policy if broad filtering withdraws legitimate service routes. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP prefix leak prevention), where BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp ibgp next-hop reachability: An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
D:Undo reflector-client assignment if it creates an unintended reflection topology. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP route reflector clients), where Route reflectors relax iBGP split-horizon for configured clients while using loop-prevention attributes. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp ibgp next-hop reachability: An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters.
Question 557
During a scheduled validation at the Wichita manufacturing plant, iPv4 management filtering works, but IPv6 hosts can still reach a router-facing service unexpectedly. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops.
- Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction.
- Inspect DHCPv6 Guard policy role and identify which port is sourcing server replies.
- Read ACL entries in sequence and review hit counts for the relevant source, destination, protocol, and port.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction. IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 traffic-filter placement: IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
C:Inspect DHCPv6 Guard policy role and identify which port is sourcing server replies. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DHCPv6 server guard), where DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 traffic-filter placement: IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
D:Read ACL entries in sequence and review hit counts for the relevant source, destination, protocol, and port. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 traffic-filter placement: IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
Question 558
During a scheduled validation at the Wichita manufacturing plant, iPv4 management filtering works, but IPv6 hosts can still reach a router-facing service unexpectedly. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Correct the scoped TACACS+ command set or method-list binding without granting unrestricted administrative privilege.
- Tie the SSH permit to a correctly defined time range and synchronize device time.
- Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior.
- Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior. IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
Incorrect Answers
A:Correct the scoped TACACS+ command set or method-list binding without granting unrestricted administrative privilege. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (TACACS+ command authorization), where TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 traffic-filter placement: IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
B:Tie the SSH permit to a correctly defined time range and synchronize device time. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Time-based ACL), where Time-based ACL entries depend on correct local time and an actively applied time-range definition. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 traffic-filter placement: IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
D:Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 traffic-filter placement: IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
Question 559
During a scheduled validation at the Wichita manufacturing plant, iPv4 management filtering works, but IPv6 hosts can still reach a router-facing service unexpectedly. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Test the matching IPv6 flows and required neighbor discovery traffic after deployment.
- Confirm permitted commands execute while prohibited configuration commands are still rejected and logged.
- Confirm BGP keepalives and updates remain stable while excess unsolicited control traffic is limited.
- Verify monitoring traffic is permitted and nonapproved sources remain blocked.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Test the matching IPv6 flows and required neighbor discovery traffic after deployment. IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
Incorrect Answers
B:Confirm permitted commands execute while prohibited configuration commands are still rejected and logged. This is a validation for another mechanism (TACACS+ command authorization), where TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 traffic-filter placement: IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
C:Confirm BGP keepalives and updates remain stable while excess unsolicited control traffic is limited. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 traffic-filter placement: IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
D:Verify monitoring traffic is permitted and nonapproved sources remain blocked. This is a validation for another mechanism (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 traffic-filter placement: IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
Question 560
During a scheduled validation at the Wichita manufacturing plant, iPv4 management filtering works, but IPv6 hosts can still reach a router-facing service unexpectedly. Engineers must restore a voice service path without disturbing unrelated production services. The attempted fix creates a regression. Which scoped recovery action is most appropriate?
- Restore prior ACL placement if unrelated production flows become blocked.
- Remove the new IPv6 filter if it unexpectedly prevents necessary IPv6 control-plane exchanges.
- Remove the new exception if it allows unauthorized management probes.
- Remove the maintenance permit if clocks or schedules cannot be trusted.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Remove the new IPv6 filter if it unexpectedly prevents necessary IPv6 control-plane exchanges. IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
Incorrect Answers
A:Restore prior ACL placement if unrelated production flows become blocked. This is a rollback for a different component (Standard IPv4 ACL placement), where Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 traffic-filter placement: IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
C:Remove the new exception if it allows unauthorized management probes. This is a rollback for a different component (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 traffic-filter placement: IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.
D:Remove the maintenance permit if clocks or schedules cannot be trusted. This is a rollback for a different component (Time-based ACL), where Time-based ACL entries depend on correct local time and an actively applied time-range definition. Here the evidence instead concerns ipv6 traffic-filter placement: IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment.