Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 52
Question 510
During a scheduled validation at the Dayton distribution campus, a new control-plane policing policy counts legitimate OSPF hellos as excess unclassified traffic. Engineers must restore a monitored campus segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Enable supported ND inspection and guard policies on the affected access segment with proper trust boundaries.
- Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class.
- Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections.
- Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections. CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
Incorrect Answers
A:Enable supported ND inspection and guard policies on the affected access segment with proper trust boundaries. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 Neighbor Discovery inspection), where IPv6 ND inspection uses neighbor state and filtering to mitigate neighbor-discovery spoofing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
B:Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
D:Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
Question 511
During a scheduled validation at the Dayton distribution campus, a new control-plane policing policy counts legitimate OSPF hellos as excess unclassified traffic. Engineers must restore a monitored campus segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence.
- Confirm permitted commands execute while prohibited configuration commands are still rejected and logged.
- Check authorized encrypted SSH access succeeds and Telnet connection attempts fail.
- Test unroutable spoofed sources and valid externally routed sources with counters.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence. CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
Incorrect Answers
B:Confirm permitted commands execute while prohibited configuration commands are still rejected and logged. This is a validation for another mechanism (TACACS+ command authorization), where TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
C:Check authorized encrypted SSH access succeeds and Telnet connection attempts fail. This is a validation for another mechanism (Router SSH hardened management), where SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
D:Test unroutable spoofed sources and valid externally routed sources with counters. This is a validation for another mechanism (Loose uRPF source validation), where Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
Question 512
During a scheduled validation at the Dayton distribution campus, a new control-plane policing policy counts legitimate OSPF hellos as excess unclassified traffic. Engineers must restore a monitored campus segment without disturbing unrelated production services. The attempted fix creates a regression. Which scoped recovery action is most appropriate?
- Back out an overly restrictive ND policy if it disrupts legitimate neighbor discovery.
- Restore the earlier CoPP class or rate if BGP continues to flap.
- Reinstate the old management exception if remote administration is lost.
- Roll back only the misclassified class if routing adjacency loss persists.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Roll back only the misclassified class if routing adjacency loss persists. CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
Incorrect Answers
A:Back out an overly restrictive ND policy if it disrupts legitimate neighbor discovery. This is a rollback for a different component (IPv6 Neighbor Discovery inspection), where IPv6 ND inspection uses neighbor state and filtering to mitigate neighbor-discovery spoofing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
B:Restore the earlier CoPP class or rate if BGP continues to flap. This is a rollback for a different component (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
C:Reinstate the old management exception if remote administration is lost. This is a rollback for a different component (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
Question 513
Following a production change at the Columbia warehouse network, two devices added from the same template display identical OSPF router IDs, and routing behavior is unstable. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Inspect the OSPF process router IDs and compare them across the affected area.
- Compare OSPF stub flags and area type on every router participating in the area.
- Check the area ID on the actual peering interfaces on both sides.
- Inspect the ABR's area range and confirm the source subnets actually belong to the summarized area.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Inspect the OSPF process router IDs and compare them across the affected area. OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
Incorrect Answers
B:Compare OSPF stub flags and area type on every router participating in the area. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (OSPF stub option mismatch), where Stub-area option consistency is enforced when OSPF neighbors negotiate adjacency. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf duplicate router id: OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
C:Check the area ID on the actual peering interfaces on both sides. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (OSPF area mismatch), where OSPF neighbors must agree on the local link's area ID. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf duplicate router id: OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
D:Inspect the ABR's area range and confirm the source subnets actually belong to the summarized area. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (OSPF interarea summarization), where OSPF interarea summarization is performed at ABRs with an area range for appropriate source routes. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf duplicate router id: OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
Question 514
Following a production change at the Columbia warehouse network, two devices added from the same template display identical OSPF router IDs, and routing behavior is unstable. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Assign a unique stable router ID to the conflicting router and restart the process in a controlled window if necessary.
- Make stub-area settings consistent across the area, including its ABRs.
- Place both ends of the adjacency into the intended same area, leaving other area boundaries untouched.
- Align the effective IP MTU values on both interfaces before considering platform-specific workarounds.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Assign a unique stable router ID to the conflicting router and restart the process in a controlled window if necessary. OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
Incorrect Answers
B:Make stub-area settings consistent across the area, including its ABRs. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (OSPF stub option mismatch), where Stub-area option consistency is enforced when OSPF neighbors negotiate adjacency. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf duplicate router id: OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
C:Place both ends of the adjacency into the intended same area, leaving other area boundaries untouched. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (OSPF area mismatch), where OSPF neighbors must agree on the local link's area ID. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf duplicate router id: OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
D:Align the effective IP MTU values on both interfaces before considering platform-specific workarounds. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (OSPF database exchange MTU), where An MTU mismatch can prevent OSPF database description exchange from completing. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf duplicate router id: OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
Question 515
Following a production change at the Columbia warehouse network, two devices added from the same template display identical OSPF router IDs, and routing behavior is unstable. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?
- Verify neighbors form and the area receives the expected default route instead of external Type 5 LSAs.
- Verify the summarized interarea LSA and the absence of redundant component advertisements downstream.
- Confirm a Type 5 or appropriate Type 7 external LSA represents only the authorized prefix.
- Verify unique IDs in neighbor views and LSDB originators with stable LSA propagation.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Verify unique IDs in neighbor views and LSDB originators with stable LSA propagation. OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
Incorrect Answers
A:Verify neighbors form and the area receives the expected default route instead of external Type 5 LSAs. This is a validation for another mechanism (OSPF stub option mismatch), where Stub-area option consistency is enforced when OSPF neighbors negotiate adjacency. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf duplicate router id: OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
B:Verify the summarized interarea LSA and the absence of redundant component advertisements downstream. This is a validation for another mechanism (OSPF interarea summarization), where OSPF interarea summarization is performed at ABRs with an area range for appropriate source routes. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf duplicate router id: OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
C:Confirm a Type 5 or appropriate Type 7 external LSA represents only the authorized prefix. This is a validation for another mechanism (OSPF classless redistribution), where Redistribution must explicitly cover intended classless networks while avoiding uncontrolled route leakage. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf duplicate router id: OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
Question 516
Following a production change at the Columbia warehouse network, two devices added from the same template display identical OSPF router IDs, and routing behavior is unstable. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?
- Reinstate the former configuration only after selecting a nonconflicting replacement ID.
- Roll back the area-type change across all affected routers if the design requires external LSAs.
- Remove the virtual link after a direct backbone repair, or restore its last known endpoints if the change fails.
- Restore earlier external metric policy if traffic shifts to a constrained circuit.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Reinstate the former configuration only after selecting a nonconflicting replacement ID. OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
Incorrect Answers
B:Roll back the area-type change across all affected routers if the design requires external LSAs. This is a rollback for a different component (OSPF stub option mismatch), where Stub-area option consistency is enforced when OSPF neighbors negotiate adjacency. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf duplicate router id: OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
C:Remove the virtual link after a direct backbone repair, or restore its last known endpoints if the change fails. This is a rollback for a different component (OSPF backbone continuity), where An OSPF virtual link extends backbone connectivity through a suitable transit area; it is not built across a stub area. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf duplicate router id: OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
D:Restore earlier external metric policy if traffic shifts to a constrained circuit. This is a rollback for a different component (OSPF external route type), where OSPF E1 considers internal path cost with external cost, while E2 primarily compares the external metric. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf duplicate router id: OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain.
Question 517
Following a production change at the Aurora remote operations location, spoke-to-spoke traffic continues hairpinning through the hub despite DMVPN phase 3 configuration. The incident is affecting management access; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Compare NHRP authentication strings and registration failure causes at the hub and spoke.
- Compare GRE tunnel keys and tunnel modes between the affected DMVPN endpoints.
- Inspect NHRP redirect generation on the hub and shortcut handling on spokes.
- Check NHRP multicast mapping and the GRE mode used to carry multicast routing hellos.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Inspect NHRP redirect generation on the hub and shortcut handling on spokes. DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
Incorrect Answers
A:Compare NHRP authentication strings and registration failure causes at the hub and spoke. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DMVPN NHRP authentication), where NHRP authentication mismatch can stop a spoke from registering even when tunnel connectivity exists. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn phase 3 shortcut: DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
B:Compare GRE tunnel keys and tunnel modes between the affected DMVPN endpoints. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DMVPN tunnel key consistency), where A GRE tunnel key mismatch can prevent compatible overlay traffic from being accepted. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn phase 3 shortcut: DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
D:Check NHRP multicast mapping and the GRE mode used to carry multicast routing hellos. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DMVPN multicast neighbor discovery), where Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn phase 3 shortcut: DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
Question 518
Following a production change at the Aurora remote operations location, spoke-to-spoke traffic continues hairpinning through the hub despite DMVPN phase 3 configuration. The incident is affecting management access; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Repair the NHRP multicast map or dynamic mapping appropriate to hub/spoke roles.
- Enable the intended hub NHRP redirect and spoke NHRP shortcut behavior with a compatible routing design.
- Use a consistent NHRP network ID and tunnel addressing plan for the intended DMVPN cloud.
- Align the intended NHRP authentication values without disabling authentication globally.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Enable the intended hub NHRP redirect and spoke NHRP shortcut behavior with a compatible routing design. DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
Incorrect Answers
A:Repair the NHRP multicast map or dynamic mapping appropriate to hub/spoke roles. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN multicast neighbor discovery), where Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn phase 3 shortcut: DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
C:Use a consistent NHRP network ID and tunnel addressing plan for the intended DMVPN cloud. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN NHRP network ID), where NHRP network identifiers help distinguish DMVPN clouds and must match the intended overlay design. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn phase 3 shortcut: DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
D:Align the intended NHRP authentication values without disabling authentication globally. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN NHRP authentication), where NHRP authentication mismatch can stop a spoke from registering even when tunnel connectivity exists. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn phase 3 shortcut: DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
Question 519
Following a production change at the Aurora remote operations location, spoke-to-spoke traffic continues hairpinning through the hub despite DMVPN phase 3 configuration. The incident is affecting management access; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?
- Check tunnel counters and NHRP registration after restoring matched encapsulation settings.
- Verify the spoke registers with the intended NHS and can resolve hub tunnel reachability.
- Verify IPsec SAs form and protected DMVPN traffic increments encapsulation/decapsulation counters.
- Verify a spoke obtains a shortcut mapping and subsequent traffic uses a direct spoke-to-spoke tunnel.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Verify a spoke obtains a shortcut mapping and subsequent traffic uses a direct spoke-to-spoke tunnel. DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
Incorrect Answers
A:Check tunnel counters and NHRP registration after restoring matched encapsulation settings. This is a validation for another mechanism (DMVPN tunnel key consistency), where A GRE tunnel key mismatch can prevent compatible overlay traffic from being accepted. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn phase 3 shortcut: DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
B:Verify the spoke registers with the intended NHS and can resolve hub tunnel reachability. This is a validation for another mechanism (DMVPN NHS mapping), where A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn phase 3 shortcut: DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
C:Verify IPsec SAs form and protected DMVPN traffic increments encapsulation/decapsulation counters. This is a validation for another mechanism (DMVPN IPsec protection mismatch), where DMVPN tunnel protection requires compatible IPsec/IKE parameters for a successful protected GRE overlay. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn phase 3 shortcut: DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
Question 520
Following a production change at the Aurora remote operations location, spoke-to-spoke traffic continues hairpinning through the hub despite DMVPN phase 3 configuration. The incident is affecting management access; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?
- Disable the shortcut change if dynamic mappings direct traffic to an untrusted or unreachable NBMA address.
- Restore the former NHS mapping if the hub migration was incomplete.
- Roll back the IPsec proposal atomically on both sides if secure tunnel establishment fails.
- Restore the original network ID if the change merges previously separated DMVPN clouds.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Disable the shortcut change if dynamic mappings direct traffic to an untrusted or unreachable NBMA address. DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
Incorrect Answers
B:Restore the former NHS mapping if the hub migration was incomplete. This is a rollback for a different component (DMVPN NHS mapping), where A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn phase 3 shortcut: DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
C:Roll back the IPsec proposal atomically on both sides if secure tunnel establishment fails. This is a rollback for a different component (DMVPN IPsec protection mismatch), where DMVPN tunnel protection requires compatible IPsec/IKE parameters for a successful protected GRE overlay. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn phase 3 shortcut: DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.
D:Restore the original network ID if the change merges previously separated DMVPN clouds. This is a rollback for a different component (DMVPN NHRP network ID), where NHRP network identifiers help distinguish DMVPN clouds and must match the intended overlay design. Here the evidence instead concerns dmvpn phase 3 shortcut: DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding.