Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 51
Question 500
Following a production change at the Wichita data center, routers in an OSPF stub area repeatedly fail adjacency after one side is configured as a normal area. The incident is affecting a voice service path; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?
- Roll back the area-type change across all affected routers if the design requires external LSAs.
- Restore the previous process numbering if migration peers elsewhere are affected.
- Reinstate the prior specific route advertisement if the change redirects unrelated subnets.
- Undo reflector-client assignment if it creates an unintended reflection topology.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Roll back the area-type change across all affected routers if the design requires external LSAs. Stub-area option consistency is enforced when OSPF neighbors negotiate adjacency.
Incorrect Answers
B:Restore the previous process numbering if migration peers elsewhere are affected. This is a rollback for a different component (EIGRP AS mismatch), where EIGRP neighbors for an address family need compatible autonomous-system association and interface settings. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf stub option mismatch: Stub-area option consistency is enforced when OSPF neighbors negotiate adjacency.
C:Reinstate the prior specific route advertisement if the change redirects unrelated subnets. This is a rollback for a different component (Longest-prefix selection), where A longer matching prefix is selected before administrative distance is compared among equal-length routes. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf stub option mismatch: Stub-area option consistency is enforced when OSPF neighbors negotiate adjacency.
D:Undo reflector-client assignment if it creates an unintended reflection topology. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP route reflector clients), where Route reflectors relax iBGP split-horizon for configured clients while using loop-prevention attributes. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf stub option mismatch: Stub-area option consistency is enforced when OSPF neighbors negotiate adjacency.
Question 501
During a scheduled validation at the Cedar Rapids regional hub, a newly inserted extended ACL permit entry never allows the desired HTTPS flow because an earlier broad deny matches it. Engineers must restore a tenant service without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction.
- Inspect ACL time-range references, active time-range status, and router clock/time zone.
- Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list.
- Read ACL entries in sequence and review hit counts for the relevant source, destination, protocol, and port.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Read ACL entries in sequence and review hit counts for the relevant source, destination, protocol, and port. Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns extended acl first-match semantics: Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
B:Inspect ACL time-range references, active time-range status, and router clock/time zone. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Time-based ACL), where Time-based ACL entries depend on correct local time and an actively applied time-range definition. Here the evidence instead concerns extended acl first-match semantics: Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
C:Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns extended acl first-match semantics: Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
Question 502
During a scheduled validation at the Cedar Rapids regional hub, a newly inserted extended ACL permit entry never allows the desired HTTPS flow because an earlier broad deny matches it. Engineers must restore a tenant service without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit.
- Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds.
- Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior.
- Place the standard ACL nearer the intended destination or use a scoped extended ACL when destination precision is required.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds. Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
Incorrect Answers
A:Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns extended acl first-match semantics: Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
C:Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns extended acl first-match semantics: Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
D:Place the standard ACL nearer the intended destination or use a scoped extended ACL when destination precision is required. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Standard IPv4 ACL placement), where Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering. Here the evidence instead concerns extended acl first-match semantics: Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
Question 503
During a scheduled validation at the Cedar Rapids regional hub, a newly inserted extended ACL permit entry never allows the desired HTTPS flow because an earlier broad deny matches it. Engineers must restore a tenant service without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Confirm BGP keepalives and updates remain stable while excess unsolicited control traffic is limited.
- Test traffic during and after the authorized window and inspect relevant ACL hit counts.
- Confirm a controlled test login uses local authentication only under the designed fallback condition.
- Verify the intended flow matches the new entry and previously denied services remain blocked.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Verify the intended flow matches the new entry and previously denied services remain blocked. Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
Incorrect Answers
A:Confirm BGP keepalives and updates remain stable while excess unsolicited control traffic is limited. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns extended acl first-match semantics: Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
B:Test traffic during and after the authorized window and inspect relevant ACL hit counts. This is a validation for another mechanism (Time-based ACL), where Time-based ACL entries depend on correct local time and an actively applied time-range definition. Here the evidence instead concerns extended acl first-match semantics: Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
C:Confirm a controlled test login uses local authentication only under the designed fallback condition. This is a validation for another mechanism (AAA local user authentication), where A local fallback requires valid local users and an AAA login method list that actually references the local database. Here the evidence instead concerns extended acl first-match semantics: Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
Question 504
During a scheduled validation at the Cedar Rapids regional hub, a newly inserted extended ACL permit entry never allows the desired HTTPS flow because an earlier broad deny matches it. Engineers must restore a tenant service without disturbing unrelated production services. Select TWO actions: one investigation and one targeted remediation that belong together for this incident.
- Read ACL entries in sequence and review hit counts for the relevant source, destination, protocol, and port.
- Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list.
- Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds.
- Place the standard ACL nearer the intended destination or use a scoped extended ACL when destination precision is required.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Read ACL entries in sequence and review hit counts for the relevant source, destination, protocol, and port. Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
C:Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds. Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
Incorrect Answers
B:Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns extended acl first-match semantics: Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
D:Place the standard ACL nearer the intended destination or use a scoped extended ACL when destination precision is required. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Standard IPv4 ACL placement), where Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering. Here the evidence instead concerns extended acl first-match semantics: Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches.
Question 505
During a scheduled validation at the Denver hospital campus, a router ACL permits two known application networks, but new monitoring probes fail despite no explicit deny entry. Engineers must restore management access without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Inspect local username/secret presence and effective AAA method list applied to the VTY lines.
- Check ACL type, source-only matching, direction, and placement relative to branch and destination.
- Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction.
- Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list. IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect local username/secret presence and effective AAA method list applied to the VTY lines. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (AAA local user authentication), where A local fallback requires valid local users and an AAA login method list that actually references the local database. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
B:Check ACL type, source-only matching, direction, and placement relative to branch and destination. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Standard IPv4 ACL placement), where Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
C:Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Question 506
During a scheduled validation at the Denver hospital campus, a router ACL permits two known application networks, but new monitoring probes fail despite no explicit deny entry. Engineers must restore management access without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit.
- Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections.
- Enable IPv6 source guard with accurate address bindings from the permitted learning mechanisms.
- Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit. IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Incorrect Answers
B:Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
C:Enable IPv6 source guard with accurate address bindings from the permitted learning mechanisms. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 source guard), where IPv6 source guard can filter source addresses against approved binding information. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
D:Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Question 507
During a scheduled validation at the Denver hospital campus, a router ACL permits two known application networks, but new monitoring probes fail despite no explicit deny entry. Engineers must restore management access without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Test the blocked source against the target and unrelated destinations to ensure only intended traffic is affected.
- Test the matching IPv6 flows and required neighbor discovery traffic after deployment.
- Verify the intended flow matches the new entry and previously denied services remain blocked.
- Verify monitoring traffic is permitted and nonapproved sources remain blocked.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Verify monitoring traffic is permitted and nonapproved sources remain blocked. IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Incorrect Answers
A:Test the blocked source against the target and unrelated destinations to ensure only intended traffic is affected. This is a validation for another mechanism (Standard IPv4 ACL placement), where Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
B:Test the matching IPv6 flows and required neighbor discovery traffic after deployment. This is a validation for another mechanism (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
C:Verify the intended flow matches the new entry and previously denied services remain blocked. This is a validation for another mechanism (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Question 508
During a scheduled validation at the Denver hospital campus, a router ACL permits two known application networks, but new monitoring probes fail despite no explicit deny entry. Engineers must restore management access without disturbing unrelated production services. Select TWO actions: one investigation and one targeted remediation that belong together for this incident.
- Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit.
- Read ACL entries in sequence and review hit counts for the relevant source, destination, protocol, and port.
- Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior.
- Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit. IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
D:Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list. IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Incorrect Answers
B:Read ACL entries in sequence and review hit counts for the relevant source, destination, protocol, and port. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
C:Apply an appropriately scoped IPv6 access list in the correct direction without relying on IPv4 ACL behavior. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns acl implicit deny: IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement.
Question 509
During a scheduled validation at the Dayton distribution campus, a new control-plane policing policy counts legitimate OSPF hellos as excess unclassified traffic. Engineers must restore a monitored campus segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops.
- Inspect the endpoint's learned IPv6 binding and whether source guard is applied to the untrusted port.
- Check the CoPP class map matching SSH traffic and corresponding exceed/drop counters.
- Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops. CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
Incorrect Answers
B:Inspect the endpoint's learned IPv6 binding and whether source guard is applied to the untrusted port. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 source guard), where IPv6 source guard can filter source addresses against approved binding information. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
C:Check the CoPP class map matching SSH traffic and corresponding exceed/drop counters. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
D:Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
Question 510
During a scheduled validation at the Dayton distribution campus, a new control-plane policing policy counts legitimate OSPF hellos as excess unclassified traffic. Engineers must restore a monitored campus segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Enable supported ND inspection and guard policies on the affected access segment with proper trust boundaries.
- Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class.
- Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections.
- Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections. CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
Incorrect Answers
A:Enable supported ND inspection and guard policies on the affected access segment with proper trust boundaries. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 Neighbor Discovery inspection), where IPv6 ND inspection uses neighbor state and filtering to mitigate neighbor-discovery spoofing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
B:Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.
D:Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.