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Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 47

Question 460

During a scheduled validation at the Roswell branch site, sNMPv3 authentication stops after a router replacement despite reusing the old usernames, and monitoring tools report localized-key mismatch. Engineers must restore a tenant service without disturbing unrelated production services. The attempted fix creates a regression. Which scoped recovery action is most appropriate?

  1. Restore the previous scoped community policy if polling from legitimate collectors breaks.
  2. Restore the earlier engine/credential state if monitoring on the replacement fails.
  3. Disable excessive trap categories if the notifications overwhelm the event collector.
  4. Restore the previous exporter path if exports accidentally reach an external untrusted collector.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Restore the earlier engine/credential state if monitoring on the replacement fails. SNMPv3 localized authentication keys depend on the engine identity, so device replacement can require credential regeneration.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Restore the previous scoped community policy if polling from legitimate collectors breaks. This is a rollback for a different component (SNMPv2c read access), where SNMPv2c community matching and ACL restrictions determine polling access, but v2c itself lacks modern encryption. Here the evidence instead concerns snmpv3 engine identity: SNMPv3 localized authentication keys depend on the engine identity, so device replacement can require credential regeneration.

C:

Disable excessive trap categories if the notifications overwhelm the event collector. This is a rollback for a different component (SNMP traps versus polling), where SNMP traps and informs send asynchronous notifications; polling alone is periodic and can miss brief events. Here the evidence instead concerns snmpv3 engine identity: SNMPv3 localized authentication keys depend on the engine identity, so device replacement can require credential regeneration.

D:

Restore the previous exporter path if exports accidentally reach an external untrusted collector. This is a rollback for a different component (NetFlow exporter destination), where Flow collection and export are distinct: valid local cache entries do not imply successful export transport. Here the evidence instead concerns snmpv3 engine identity: SNMPv3 localized authentication keys depend on the engine identity, so device replacement can require credential regeneration.

Question 461

Following a production change at the Irvine regional hub, after deploying a control-plane policy, BGP sessions repeatedly reset while ordinary data-plane forwarding remains healthy. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?

  1. Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic.
  2. Check the CoPP class map matching SSH traffic and corresponding exceed/drop counters.
  3. Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops.
  4. Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic. CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Check the CoPP class map matching SSH traffic and corresponding exceed/drop counters. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp bgp class treatment: CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

C:

Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns copp bgp class treatment: CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

D:

Inspect the separate IPv6 ACL and IPv6 traffic-filter binding on the intended interface and direction. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 traffic-filter placement), where IPv4 ACLs do not filter IPv6 packets; IPv6 traffic filters require their own attachment and careful ICMPv6 treatment. Here the evidence instead concerns copp bgp class treatment: CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

Question 462

Following a production change at the Irvine regional hub, after deploying a control-plane policy, BGP sessions repeatedly reset while ordinary data-plane forwarding remains healthy. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?

  1. Enable supported ND inspection and guard policies on the affected access segment with proper trust boundaries.
  2. Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access.
  3. Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit.
  4. Require SSH on management lines and disable Telnet while retaining an approved break-glass path.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access. CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Enable supported ND inspection and guard policies on the affected access segment with proper trust boundaries. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 Neighbor Discovery inspection), where IPv6 ND inspection uses neighbor state and filtering to mitigate neighbor-discovery spoofing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp bgp class treatment: CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

C:

Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns copp bgp class treatment: CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

D:

Require SSH on management lines and disable Telnet while retaining an approved break-glass path. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Router SSH hardened management), where SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption. Here the evidence instead concerns copp bgp class treatment: CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

Question 463

Following a production change at the Irvine regional hub, after deploying a control-plane policy, BGP sessions repeatedly reset while ordinary data-plane forwarding remains healthy. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?

  1. Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence.
  2. Confirm BGP keepalives and updates remain stable while excess unsolicited control traffic is limited.
  3. Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters.
  4. Verify authorized source addresses pass and unbound spoofed addresses are dropped.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Confirm BGP keepalives and updates remain stable while excess unsolicited control traffic is limited. CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns copp bgp class treatment: CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

C:

Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp bgp class treatment: CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

D:

Verify authorized source addresses pass and unbound spoofed addresses are dropped. This is a validation for another mechanism (IPv6 source guard), where IPv6 source guard can filter source addresses against approved binding information. Here the evidence instead concerns copp bgp class treatment: CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

Question 464

Following a production change at the Irvine regional hub, after deploying a control-plane policy, BGP sessions repeatedly reset while ordinary data-plane forwarding remains healthy. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. Which TWO complementary steps provide both relevant fault isolation and a controlled correction?

  1. Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops.
  2. Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access.
  3. Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class.
  4. Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic.

Explanation

Correct Answers

B:

Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access. CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

D:

Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic. CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns copp bgp class treatment: CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

C:

Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp bgp class treatment: CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic.

Question 465

Following a production change at the Trenton data center, dMVPN spokes learn remote routes through a hub but cannot use direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding because the advertised next hop always points to the hub. The incident is affecting a tenant service; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?

  1. Inspect the static NHRP map and NHS configuration on the spoke and the hub's tunnel identity.
  2. Check the tunnel source IP/interface, NBMA reachability, and NHRP peer mapping toward the hub.
  3. Inspect the routing protocol's next-hop handling, EIGRP split-horizon, and DMVPN phase architecture.
  4. Compare GRE tunnel keys and tunnel modes between the affected DMVPN endpoints.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Inspect the routing protocol's next-hop handling, EIGRP split-horizon, and DMVPN phase architecture. DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Inspect the static NHRP map and NHS configuration on the spoke and the hub's tunnel identity. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DMVPN NHS mapping), where A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration. Here the evidence instead concerns eigrp on dmvpn hub: DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

B:

Check the tunnel source IP/interface, NBMA reachability, and NHRP peer mapping toward the hub. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DMVPN tunnel source), where DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association. Here the evidence instead concerns eigrp on dmvpn hub: DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

D:

Compare GRE tunnel keys and tunnel modes between the affected DMVPN endpoints. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DMVPN tunnel key consistency), where A GRE tunnel key mismatch can prevent compatible overlay traffic from being accepted. Here the evidence instead concerns eigrp on dmvpn hub: DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

Question 466

Following a production change at the Trenton data center, dMVPN spokes learn remote routes through a hub but cannot use direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding because the advertised next hop always points to the hub. The incident is affecting a tenant service; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?

  1. Apply a routing policy consistent with the chosen DMVPN phase and intended spoke next-hop behavior.
  2. Align supported IPsec proposals and tunnel protection profiles on both endpoints without downgrading policy.
  3. Enable the intended hub NHRP redirect and spoke NHRP shortcut behavior with a compatible routing design.
  4. Bind the tunnel to the correct reachable underlay source and update dependent NBMA mapping as needed.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Apply a routing policy consistent with the chosen DMVPN phase and intended spoke next-hop behavior. DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Align supported IPsec proposals and tunnel protection profiles on both endpoints without downgrading policy. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN IPsec protection mismatch), where DMVPN tunnel protection requires compatible IPsec/IKE parameters for a successful protected GRE overlay. Here the evidence instead concerns eigrp on dmvpn hub: DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

C:

Enable the intended hub NHRP redirect and spoke NHRP shortcut behavior with a compatible routing design. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN phase 3 shortcut), where DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding. Here the evidence instead concerns eigrp on dmvpn hub: DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

D:

Bind the tunnel to the correct reachable underlay source and update dependent NBMA mapping as needed. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN tunnel source), where DMVPN GRE tunnel reachability depends on a working NBMA underlay and correct tunnel source association. Here the evidence instead concerns eigrp on dmvpn hub: DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

Question 467

Following a production change at the Trenton data center, dMVPN spokes learn remote routes through a hub but cannot use direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding because the advertised next hop always points to the hub. The incident is affecting a tenant service; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?

  1. Verify remote routes and NHRP mappings support the planned direct path without looping.
  2. Verify secure IKE and IPsec associations form with the expected peer identity.
  3. Observe multicast routing hello exchange and stable protocol neighbors across the overlay.
  4. Verify a spoke obtains a shortcut mapping and subsequent traffic uses a direct spoke-to-spoke tunnel.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Verify remote routes and NHRP mappings support the planned direct path without looping. DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Verify secure IKE and IPsec associations form with the expected peer identity. This is a validation for another mechanism (IKE peer authentication), where IKE peer authentication is independent of NHRP and must match the correct endpoint identity and credentials. Here the evidence instead concerns eigrp on dmvpn hub: DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

C:

Observe multicast routing hello exchange and stable protocol neighbors across the overlay. This is a validation for another mechanism (DMVPN multicast neighbor discovery), where Dynamic routing across GRE/mGRE requires the overlay to carry its multicast or broadcast control traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns eigrp on dmvpn hub: DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

D:

Verify a spoke obtains a shortcut mapping and subsequent traffic uses a direct spoke-to-spoke tunnel. This is a validation for another mechanism (DMVPN phase 3 shortcut), where DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding. Here the evidence instead concerns eigrp on dmvpn hub: DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

Question 468

Following a production change at the Trenton data center, dMVPN spokes learn remote routes through a hub but cannot use direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding because the advertised next hop always points to the hub. The incident is affecting a tenant service; the response team has a rollback window. Which TWO complementary steps provide both relevant fault isolation and a controlled correction?

  1. Correct the spoke's NHRP next-hop server and hub tunnel-to-NBMA map for its reachable hub.
  2. Inspect the routing protocol's next-hop handling, EIGRP split-horizon, and DMVPN phase architecture.
  3. Inspect NHRP redirect generation on the hub and shortcut handling on spokes.
  4. Apply a routing policy consistent with the chosen DMVPN phase and intended spoke next-hop behavior.

Explanation

Correct Answers

B:

Inspect the routing protocol's next-hop handling, EIGRP split-horizon, and DMVPN phase architecture. DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

D:

Apply a routing policy consistent with the chosen DMVPN phase and intended spoke next-hop behavior. DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Correct the spoke's NHRP next-hop server and hub tunnel-to-NBMA map for its reachable hub. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (DMVPN NHS mapping), where A spoke typically needs valid NHRP hub mappings and an NHS to bootstrap DMVPN registration. Here the evidence instead concerns eigrp on dmvpn hub: DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

C:

Inspect NHRP redirect generation on the hub and shortcut handling on spokes. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (DMVPN phase 3 shortcut), where DMVPN phase 3 uses hub redirects and spoke shortcuts to facilitate direct spoke-to-spoke forwarding. Here the evidence instead concerns eigrp on dmvpn hub: DMVPN routing adjacency, next-hop propagation, and NHRP shortcut operation must be designed together.

Question 469

During a scheduled validation at the Lubbock regional hub, adjacent OSPF routers remain in Down or Init after a template change despite working IPv4 reachability. Engineers must restore a tenant service without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?

  1. Compare interface MTUs and DBD packet handling rather than changing OSPF cost.
  2. Compare effective OSPF hello and dead timers and interface network types on both ends.
  3. Check the area ID on the actual peering interfaces on both sides.
  4. Check ABR topology and ensure the proposed transit area can support an OSPF virtual link.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Compare effective OSPF hello and dead timers and interface network types on both ends. OSPF timer compatibility is necessary for adjacency formation on a common segment.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Compare interface MTUs and DBD packet handling rather than changing OSPF cost. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (OSPF database exchange MTU), where An MTU mismatch can prevent OSPF database description exchange from completing. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf hello and dead timers: OSPF timer compatibility is necessary for adjacency formation on a common segment.

C:

Check the area ID on the actual peering interfaces on both sides. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (OSPF area mismatch), where OSPF neighbors must agree on the local link's area ID. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf hello and dead timers: OSPF timer compatibility is necessary for adjacency formation on a common segment.

D:

Check ABR topology and ensure the proposed transit area can support an OSPF virtual link. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (OSPF backbone continuity), where An OSPF virtual link extends backbone connectivity through a suitable transit area; it is not built across a stub area. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf hello and dead timers: OSPF timer compatibility is necessary for adjacency formation on a common segment.

Question 470

During a scheduled validation at the Lubbock regional hub, adjacent OSPF routers remain in Down or Init after a template change despite working IPv4 reachability. Engineers must restore a tenant service without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?

  1. Make stub-area settings consistent across the area, including its ABRs.
  2. Correct the NSSA ABR translation or external-advertisement policy for the approved prefixes.
  3. Assign a unique stable router ID to the conflicting router and restart the process in a controlled window if necessary.
  4. Align the OSPF timer pair and compatible network type for the shared segment.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Align the OSPF timer pair and compatible network type for the shared segment. OSPF timer compatibility is necessary for adjacency formation on a common segment.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Make stub-area settings consistent across the area, including its ABRs. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (OSPF stub option mismatch), where Stub-area option consistency is enforced when OSPF neighbors negotiate adjacency. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf hello and dead timers: OSPF timer compatibility is necessary for adjacency formation on a common segment.

B:

Correct the NSSA ABR translation or external-advertisement policy for the approved prefixes. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (OSPF NSSA external route translation), where An NSSA supports Type 7 external advertisements that can be translated into Type 5 at an ABR. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf hello and dead timers: OSPF timer compatibility is necessary for adjacency formation on a common segment.

C:

Assign a unique stable router ID to the conflicting router and restart the process in a controlled window if necessary. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (OSPF duplicate router ID), where OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf hello and dead timers: OSPF timer compatibility is necessary for adjacency formation on a common segment.

Implementing Cisco Enterprise Advanced Routing and Services (ENARSI) (300-410) Practice Tests