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Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 22

Question 210

During a scheduled validation at the Roswell branch site, a new eBGP policy inadvertently exports internal-only subnets to an external provider. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?

  1. Apply an explicit allowlist prefix policy outbound to the external BGP peer.
  2. Set a higher local preference for the preferred egress using a scoped inbound policy at the edge.
  3. Configure a consistent loopback update source and sufficient eBGP multihop hop limit.
  4. Prepend the local AS on selected backup advertisements if permitted by upstream routing policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Apply an explicit allowlist prefix policy outbound to the external BGP peer. BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Set a higher local preference for the preferred egress using a scoped inbound policy at the edge. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP outbound path local preference), where Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp prefix leak prevention: BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor.

C:

Configure a consistent loopback update source and sufficient eBGP multihop hop limit. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Loopback-sourced eBGP session), where Default eBGP TTL and packet source are designed for directly connected peers; loopback peering needs explicit settings. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp prefix leak prevention: BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor.

D:

Prepend the local AS on selected backup advertisements if permitted by upstream routing policy. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP inbound traffic engineering), where AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp prefix leak prevention: BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor.

Question 211

During a scheduled validation at the Roswell branch site, a new eBGP policy inadvertently exports internal-only subnets to an external provider. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?

  1. Confirm internal BGP speakers consistently choose the preferred exit while backup remains available.
  2. Confirm the BGP next hop resolves and received routes become installable in the RIB.
  3. Verify the BGP session establishes and receives only authorized prefixes.
  4. Verify only authorized aggregate prefixes are advertised and the private/internal prefixes are absent.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Verify only authorized aggregate prefixes are advertised and the private/internal prefixes are absent. BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Confirm internal BGP speakers consistently choose the preferred exit while backup remains available. This is a validation for another mechanism (BGP outbound path local preference), where Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp prefix leak prevention: BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor.

B:

Confirm the BGP next hop resolves and received routes become installable in the RIB. This is a validation for another mechanism (BGP iBGP next-hop reachability), where An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp prefix leak prevention: BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor.

C:

Verify the BGP session establishes and receives only authorized prefixes. This is a validation for another mechanism (BGP peer remote AS), where BGP neighbors must agree on configured peer AS identity and establish a TCP session. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp prefix leak prevention: BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor.

Question 212

During a scheduled validation at the Roswell branch site, a new eBGP policy inadvertently exports internal-only subnets to an external provider. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. The attempted fix creates a regression. Which scoped recovery action is most appropriate?

  1. Restore the original neighbor statement if the AS migration must be backed out.
  2. Remove AS-path prepending if transit providers ignore it or connectivity degrades.
  3. Revert the local-preference policy if it overloads the selected WAN circuit.
  4. Restore the last verified neighbor export policy if broad filtering withdraws legitimate service routes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Restore the last verified neighbor export policy if broad filtering withdraws legitimate service routes. BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Restore the original neighbor statement if the AS migration must be backed out. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP peer remote AS), where BGP neighbors must agree on configured peer AS identity and establish a TCP session. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp prefix leak prevention: BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor.

B:

Remove AS-path prepending if transit providers ignore it or connectivity degrades. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP inbound traffic engineering), where AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp prefix leak prevention: BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor.

C:

Revert the local-preference policy if it overloads the selected WAN circuit. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP outbound path local preference), where Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp prefix leak prevention: BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor.

Question 213

Following a production change at the Boulder data center, return traffic from the Internet keeps entering the backup edge although the network advertises both paths. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?

  1. Inspect outbound prefix filters and route-map hit counts for unauthorized advertisements.
  2. Inspect local preference distributed in iBGP along with route selection results.
  3. Inspect the received BGP next-hop address and its reachability in the IGP or VRF.
  4. Compare AS paths as seen by external peers and inspect outbound route policy for each eBGP neighbor.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Compare AS paths as seen by external peers and inspect outbound route policy for each eBGP neighbor. AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Inspect outbound prefix filters and route-map hit counts for unauthorized advertisements. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (BGP prefix leak prevention), where BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

B:

Inspect local preference distributed in iBGP along with route selection results. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (BGP outbound path local preference), where Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

C:

Inspect the received BGP next-hop address and its reachability in the IGP or VRF. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (BGP iBGP next-hop reachability), where An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

Question 214

Following a production change at the Boulder data center, return traffic from the Internet keeps entering the backup edge although the network advertises both paths. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?

  1. Configure a consistent loopback update source and sufficient eBGP multihop hop limit.
  2. Prepend the local AS on selected backup advertisements if permitted by upstream routing policy.
  3. Use next-hop-self at the correct iBGP advertising boundary or repair the actual next-hop reachability.
  4. Correct the BGP neighbor remote-as and related peer policy for the intended eBGP or iBGP relationship.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Prepend the local AS on selected backup advertisements if permitted by upstream routing policy. AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure a consistent loopback update source and sufficient eBGP multihop hop limit. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Loopback-sourced eBGP session), where Default eBGP TTL and packet source are designed for directly connected peers; loopback peering needs explicit settings. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

C:

Use next-hop-self at the correct iBGP advertising boundary or repair the actual next-hop reachability. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP iBGP next-hop reachability), where An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

D:

Correct the BGP neighbor remote-as and related peer policy for the intended eBGP or iBGP relationship. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP peer remote AS), where BGP neighbors must agree on configured peer AS identity and establish a TCP session. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

Question 215

Following a production change at the Boulder data center, return traffic from the Internet keeps entering the backup edge although the network advertises both paths. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?

  1. Verify externally observed paths show the intended extra AS hops without losing prefix reachability.
  2. Verify the BGP session establishes and receives only authorized prefixes.
  3. Verify TCP 179 establishment using the loopback source and an Established BGP session.
  4. Confirm internal BGP speakers consistently choose the preferred exit while backup remains available.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Verify externally observed paths show the intended extra AS hops without losing prefix reachability. AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Verify the BGP session establishes and receives only authorized prefixes. This is a validation for another mechanism (BGP peer remote AS), where BGP neighbors must agree on configured peer AS identity and establish a TCP session. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

C:

Verify TCP 179 establishment using the loopback source and an Established BGP session. This is a validation for another mechanism (Loopback-sourced eBGP session), where Default eBGP TTL and packet source are designed for directly connected peers; loopback peering needs explicit settings. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

D:

Confirm internal BGP speakers consistently choose the preferred exit while backup remains available. This is a validation for another mechanism (BGP outbound path local preference), where Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

Question 216

Following a production change at the Boulder data center, return traffic from the Internet keeps entering the backup edge although the network advertises both paths. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?

  1. Restore the last verified neighbor export policy if broad filtering withdraws legitimate service routes.
  2. Undo reflector-client assignment if it creates an unintended reflection topology.
  3. Remove AS-path prepending if transit providers ignore it or connectivity degrades.
  4. Remove unsupported multihop changes and restore the original direct-peering source if needed.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Remove AS-path prepending if transit providers ignore it or connectivity degrades. AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Restore the last verified neighbor export policy if broad filtering withdraws legitimate service routes. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP prefix leak prevention), where BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

B:

Undo reflector-client assignment if it creates an unintended reflection topology. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP route reflector clients), where Route reflectors relax iBGP split-horizon for configured clients while using loop-prevention attributes. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

D:

Remove unsupported multihop changes and restore the original direct-peering source if needed. This is a rollback for a different component (Loopback-sourced eBGP session), where Default eBGP TTL and packet source are designed for directly connected peers; loopback peering needs explicit settings. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp inbound traffic engineering: AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing.

Question 217

Following a production change at the Norman enterprise edge, monitoring shows SSH management packet drops after a control-plane policy change despite free interface bandwidth. The incident is affecting management access; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?

  1. Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic.
  2. Check the CoPP class map matching SSH traffic and corresponding exceed/drop counters.
  3. Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops.
  4. Inspect local username/secret presence and effective AAA method list applied to the VTY lines.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Check the CoPP class map matching SSH traffic and corresponding exceed/drop counters. Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Inspect control-plane class matches and drop/police counters for TCP port 179 and BGP peer traffic. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

C:

Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

D:

Inspect local username/secret presence and effective AAA method list applied to the VTY lines. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (AAA local user authentication), where A local fallback requires valid local users and an AAA login method list that actually references the local database. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

Question 218

Following a production change at the Norman enterprise edge, monitoring shows SSH management packet drops after a control-plane policy change despite free interface bandwidth. The incident is affecting management access; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?

  1. Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class.
  2. Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access.
  3. Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit.
  4. Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Rate-limit management traffic in a dedicated class sized for approved operations rather than the default drop class. Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Adjust the BGP control-plane class and policing rate to preserve trusted peering without unlimited control-plane access. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

C:

Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

D:

Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

Question 219

Following a production change at the Norman enterprise edge, monitoring shows SSH management packet drops after a control-plane policy change despite free interface bandwidth. The incident is affecting management access; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?

  1. Confirm permitted commands execute while prohibited configuration commands are still rejected and logged.
  2. Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters.
  3. Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence.
  4. Confirm BGP keepalives and updates remain stable while excess unsolicited control traffic is limited.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters. Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Confirm permitted commands execute while prohibited configuration commands are still rejected and logged. This is a validation for another mechanism (TACACS+ command authorization), where TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

C:

Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

D:

Confirm BGP keepalives and updates remain stable while excess unsolicited control traffic is limited. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

Question 220

Following a production change at the Norman enterprise edge, monitoring shows SSH management packet drops after a control-plane policy change despite free interface bandwidth. The incident is affecting management access; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?

  1. Restore the earlier CoPP class or rate if BGP continues to flap.
  2. Roll back only the misclassified class if routing adjacency loss persists.
  3. Restore a legitimately trusted uplink role if authorized DHCPv6 replies stop reaching clients.
  4. Reinstate the old management exception if remote administration is lost.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Reinstate the old management exception if remote administration is lost. Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Restore the earlier CoPP class or rate if BGP continues to flap. This is a rollback for a different component (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

B:

Roll back only the misclassified class if routing adjacency loss persists. This is a rollback for a different component (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

C:

Restore a legitimately trusted uplink role if authorized DHCPv6 replies stop reaching clients. This is a rollback for a different component (DHCPv6 server guard), where DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports. Here the evidence instead concerns copp management access: Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing.

Implementing Cisco Enterprise Advanced Routing and Services (ENARSI) (300-410) Practice Tests