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“Monitor plan regressions and security tests” concerns Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Monitor MCP invocation logs and unauthorized action attempts.

“Monitor cross-tenant query anomalies” concerns Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Monitor MCP invocation logs and unauthorized action attempts.

“Monitor masking policy misunderstanding and overprivileged accounts” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Monitor MCP invocation logs and unauthorized action attempts.

“Inspect identity support and SQL principal mapping” concerns Password rotation breaks the app and exposes credentials; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. Inspect DAB role filters and SQL identity context.

“Inspect DAB runtime role mapping, entity actions and authentication” concerns Default or overly broad role mappings permit unintended writes; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. Inspect DAB role filters and SQL identity context.

“Identify tenant key and session identity propagation” concerns Application bugs could read rows belonging to another tenant; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. Inspect DAB role filters and SQL identity context.

“Classify sensitive columns and enforce access according to data policy” concerns Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. Enforce authorization at API and database layers for tenant rows.

“Use managed identity or scoped credential and approved endpoint authorization” concerns Static API keys in scripts are exposed in source control; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. Enforce authorization at API and database layers for tenant rows.

“Map roles to minimum allowed actions and enforce SQL permissions” concerns Default or overly broad role mappings permit unintended writes; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. Enforce authorization at API and database layers for tenant rows.

“Try authorized GET and unauthorized mutation using test tokens” concerns Default or overly broad role mappings permit unintended writes; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. Query fictional cross-tenant records using two roles.

“Insert and query salary using a driver configured with proper keys” concerns Server-side encryption alone leaves plaintext exposed to DB engine; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. Query fictional cross-tenant records using two roles.

“Query the same test rows through separate tenant principals” concerns Application bugs could read rows belonging to another tenant; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. Query fictional cross-tenant records using two roles.

“Masked values appear for restricted users; privileged views honor policy” concerns Regular SELECT reveals sensitive contact details; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. No unauthorized records appear through GraphQL or direct SQL.

“Authorized query works without stored SQL passwords” concerns Password rotation breaks the app and exposes credentials; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. No unauthorized records appear through GraphQL or direct SQL.

“Authorized client decrypts while untrusted SQL session sees ciphertext” concerns Server-side encryption alone leaves plaintext exposed to DB engine; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. No unauthorized records appear through GraphQL or direct SQL.

“Monitor policy changes and cross-tenant access tests” concerns Application bugs could read rows belonging to another tenant; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. Monitor cross-tenant query anomalies.

“Monitor plan regressions and security tests” concerns Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. Monitor cross-tenant query anomalies.

“Monitor API denied requests and role drift” concerns Default or overly broad role mappings permit unintended writes; the reported problem instead is Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions. Monitor cross-tenant query anomalies.

“Review threat model and ability to run queries or export data” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Inventory affected service principals and audit logs.

“Inventory exposed tools and execution principals” concerns An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Inventory affected service principals and audit logs.

“Review audit events and target retention requirements” concerns Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Inventory affected service principals and audit logs.

“Grant SELECT on approved views and remove broad owner membership” concerns Unnecessary DDL rights create serious modification risk; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Revoke exposed credential, rotate it and remove secret from source history/process.

“Restrict MCP tools to metadata-only and remove broad write authority” concerns An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Revoke exposed credential, rotate it and remove secret from source history/process.

“Use managed identity or scoped credential and approved endpoint authorization” concerns Static API keys in scripts are exposed in source control; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Revoke exposed credential, rotate it and remove secret from source history/process.

“Restore encrypted database in DR sandbox using approved key procedure” concerns Missing encryption certificate blocks restoration; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Switch a sandbox service to a newly issued credential.

“Run controlled inference probes against masked fields in a test database” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Switch a sandbox service to a newly issued credential.

“Perform a simulated GRANT and inspect collected audit events” concerns Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Switch a sandbox service to a newly issued credential.

“New approved views accessible while unrelated schemas remain denied” concerns Repeated per-object GRANT updates are error-prone; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Old credential fails and new credential works only for scoped permissions.

“Authorized query works without stored SQL passwords” concerns Password rotation breaks the app and exposes credentials; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Old credential fails and new credential works only for scoped permissions.

“Expected fields are labeled and permissions tested” concerns Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Old credential fails and new credential works only for scoped permissions.

“Monitor audit pipeline gaps and retention policy” concerns Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Monitor anomalous prior token activity.

“Monitor token failures and assigned role drift” concerns Password rotation breaks the app and exposes credentials; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Monitor anomalous prior token activity.

“Monitor masking policy misunderstanding and overprivileged accounts” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is Secrets may have been indexed and copied. Monitor anomalous prior token activity.