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“Monitor cross-tenant query anomalies” concerns Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions; the reported problem instead is Repeated per-object GRANT updates are error-prone. Monitor privilege creep when schema contents change.

“Monitor endpoint calls and credential changes” concerns Static API keys in scripts are exposed in source control; the reported problem instead is Repeated per-object GRANT updates are error-prone. Monitor privilege creep when schema contents change.

“Monitor plan regressions and security tests” concerns Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table; the reported problem instead is Repeated per-object GRANT updates are error-prone. Monitor privilege creep when schema contents change.

“Review effective database roles and required queries” concerns Unnecessary DDL rights create serious modification risk; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Review threat model and ability to run queries or export data.

“Identify threat model and trusted client key access” concerns Server-side encryption alone leaves plaintext exposed to DB engine; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Review threat model and ability to run queries or export data.

“Review endpoint identity options and outbound data classification” concerns Static API keys in scripts are exposed in source control; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Review threat model and ability to run queries or export data.

“Optimize RLS predicate lookup indexes without weakening filtering” concerns Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Combine least-privilege controls, RLS/encryption and masking only as defense in depth.

“Configure Dynamic Data Masking as presentation protection, not data isolation” concerns Regular SELECT reveals sensitive contact details; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Combine least-privilege controls, RLS/encryption and masking only as defense in depth.

“Use supported column-level encryption with appropriate key and certificate lifecycle” concerns Data requires encryption at rest but query-time access is limited; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Combine least-privilege controls, RLS/encryption and masking only as defense in depth.

“Call a disposable database from the Function test identity” concerns Password rotation breaks the app and exposes credentials; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Run controlled inference probes against masked fields in a test database.

“Restore encrypted database in DR sandbox using approved key procedure” concerns Missing encryption certificate blocks restoration; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Run controlled inference probes against masked fields in a test database.

“Run discovery on anonymized fixture with known sensitive fields” concerns Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Run controlled inference probes against masked fields in a test database.

“Old credential fails and new credential works only for scoped permissions” concerns Secrets may have been indexed and copied; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Restricted principals cannot retrieve sensitive raw values through alternate paths.

“Masked values appear for restricted users; privileged views honor policy” concerns Regular SELECT reveals sensitive contact details; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Restricted principals cannot retrieve sensitive raw values through alternate paths.

“Event is preserved and modifications are prevented or detectable” concerns Admins could alter evidence after a security incident; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Restricted principals cannot retrieve sensitive raw values through alternate paths.

“Track audit pipeline gaps and retention policy” addresses the sql auditing sensitive changes situation—existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. The observed failure is: Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Monitor masking policy misunderstanding and overprivileged accounts.

“Monitor retention policy and ingestion outages” concerns Admins could alter evidence after a security incident; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Monitor masking policy misunderstanding and overprivileged accounts.

“Monitor policy changes and cross-tenant access tests” concerns Application bugs could read rows belonging to another tenant; the reported problem instead is Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred. Monitor masking policy misunderstanding and overprivileged accounts.

“Inspect identity support and SQL principal mapping” concerns Password rotation breaks the app and exposes credentials; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Inspect retention settings and writer permissions.

“Review audit events and target retention requirements” concerns Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Inspect retention settings and writer permissions.

“Inspect actual execution plan and predicate function execution” concerns Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Inspect retention settings and writer permissions.

“Enable appropriate SQL auditing for privileged actions and send to governed storage” concerns Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Send audit events to approved immutable or tamper-resistant storage.

“Grant SELECT on approved views and remove broad owner membership” concerns Unnecessary DDL rights create serious modification risk; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Send audit events to approved immutable or tamper-resistant storage.

“Use managed identity or scoped credential and approved endpoint authorization” concerns Static API keys in scripts are exposed in source control; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Send audit events to approved immutable or tamper-resistant storage.

“Perform a simulated GRANT and inspect collected audit events” concerns Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Attempt authorized ingest and blocked rewrite of synthetic audit record.

“Try harmless metadata read and blocked test DELETE” concerns An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Attempt authorized ingest and blocked rewrite of synthetic audit record.

“Benchmark identical queries under an authorized test role” concerns Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Attempt authorized ingest and blocked rewrite of synthetic audit record.

“Restricted principals cannot retrieve sensitive raw values through alternate paths” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Event is preserved and modifications are prevented or detectable.

“Correct tenant isolation persists with reduced query overhead” concerns Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Event is preserved and modifications are prevented or detectable.

“Encrypted data can be recovered by authorized process only” concerns Storage backup compromise could expose plaintext pages; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Event is preserved and modifications are prevented or detectable.

“Track policy changes and cross-tenant access tests” addresses the rls tenant filtering situation—application bugs could read rows belonging to another tenant. The observed failure is: Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Monitor retention policy and ingestion outages.

“Monitor audit pipeline gaps and retention policy” concerns Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Monitor retention policy and ingestion outages.

“Monitor masking policy misunderstanding and overprivileged accounts” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is Admins could alter evidence after a security incident. Monitor retention policy and ingestion outages.