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“Monitor API denied requests and role drift” concerns Default or overly broad role mappings permit unintended writes; the reported problem instead is Key material is distributed to several developer machines. Monitor denied vault calls and impending key expiry.

“Monitor encryption state and key expiry” concerns Storage backup compromise could expose plaintext pages; the reported problem instead is Key material is distributed to several developer machines. Monitor denied vault calls and impending key expiry.

“Monitor endpoint calls and credential changes” concerns Static API keys in scripts are exposed in source control; the reported problem instead is Key material is distributed to several developer machines. Monitor denied vault calls and impending key expiry.

“Inspect existing column masking rules and principal rights” concerns Regular SELECT reveals sensitive contact details; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Scan column patterns and confidentiality labels in an approved process.

“Inspect key hierarchy and permitted decrypting roles” concerns Data requires encryption at rest but query-time access is limited; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Scan column patterns and confidentiality labels in an approved process.

“Review audit events and target retention requirements” concerns Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Scan column patterns and confidentiality labels in an approved process.

“Configure Dynamic Data Masking as presentation protection, not data isolation” concerns Regular SELECT reveals sensitive contact details; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Classify sensitive columns and enforce access according to data policy.

“Map roles to minimum allowed actions and enforce SQL permissions” concerns Default or overly broad role mappings permit unintended writes; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Classify sensitive columns and enforce access according to data policy.

“Enforce authorization at API and database layers for tenant rows” concerns Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Classify sensitive columns and enforce access according to data policy.

“Encrypt/decrypt mock secrets under separate SQL principals” concerns Data requires encryption at rest but query-time access is limited; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Run discovery on anonymized fixture with known sensitive fields.

“Run controlled inference probes against masked fields in a test database” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Run discovery on anonymized fixture with known sensitive fields.

“Perform a simulated GRANT and inspect collected audit events” concerns Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Run discovery on anonymized fixture with known sensitive fields.

“Only authorized role can decrypt and restores retain keys” concerns Data requires encryption at rest but query-time access is limited; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Expected fields are labeled and permissions tested.

“Old credential fails and new credential works only for scoped permissions” concerns Secrets may have been indexed and copied; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Expected fields are labeled and permissions tested.

“Actor, action and timestamp are present and protected from tampering” concerns Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Expected fields are labeled and permissions tested.

“Monitor cross-tenant query anomalies” concerns Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Monitor newly created unclassified columns.

“Monitor audit pipeline gaps and retention policy” concerns Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Monitor newly created unclassified columns.

“Monitor key rotation and decryption failures” concerns Data requires encryption at rest but query-time access is limited; the reported problem instead is Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory. Monitor newly created unclassified columns.

“Inventory affected service principals and audit logs” concerns Secrets may have been indexed and copied; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Inventory exposed tools and execution principals.

“Inspect actual execution plan and predicate function execution” concerns Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Inventory exposed tools and execution principals.

“Review threat model and ability to run queries or export data” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Inventory exposed tools and execution principals.

“Combine least-privilege controls, RLS/encryption and masking only as defense in depth” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Restrict MCP tools to metadata-only and remove broad write authority.

“Revoke exposed credential, rotate it and remove secret from source history/process” concerns Secrets may have been indexed and copied; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Restrict MCP tools to metadata-only and remove broad write authority.

“Grant SELECT on approved views and remove broad owner membership” concerns Unnecessary DDL rights create serious modification risk; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Restrict MCP tools to metadata-only and remove broad write authority.

“Try authorized GET and unauthorized mutation using test tokens” concerns Default or overly broad role mappings permit unintended writes; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Try harmless metadata read and blocked test DELETE.

“Attempt authorized ingest and blocked rewrite of synthetic audit record” concerns Admins could alter evidence after a security incident; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Try harmless metadata read and blocked test DELETE.

“Try allowed view SELECT and prohibited table DROP as test principal” concerns Unnecessary DDL rights create serious modification risk; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Try harmless metadata read and blocked test DELETE.

“Restore succeeds without unprotected key distribution” concerns Missing encryption certificate blocks restoration; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Schema discovery succeeds without mutation capability.

“Correct tenant isolation persists with reduced query overhead” concerns Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Schema discovery succeeds without mutation capability.

“Restricted principals cannot retrieve sensitive raw values through alternate paths” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Schema discovery succeeds without mutation capability.

“Monitor plan regressions and security tests” concerns Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Monitor MCP invocation logs and unauthorized action attempts.

“Monitor cross-tenant query anomalies” concerns Resolver inherits broad SQL user permissions; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Monitor MCP invocation logs and unauthorized action attempts.

“Monitor masking policy misunderstanding and overprivileged accounts” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE. Monitor MCP invocation logs and unauthorized action attempts.