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Google Associate Cloud Engineer Practice Test 75

Question 740

An automated access policy grants every engineer Token Creator on a high-privilege production account for convenience. Which control most directly reduces exposure?

  1. Remove production Token Creator delegation from the staging pipeline and use a separate staging deployment identity.
  2. Disable service-account audit logging and assume the credential issue is resolved.
  3. Limit impersonation to an approved deployment group or workflow and revoke the broad token-generation grant.
  4. Rename the service account but leave the old principal and role bindings unchanged.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Token Creator can mint credentials acting as the target identity, so widespread delegation undermines least privilege.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Deploying a separate workload does not automatically configure the existing feature. The necessary distinction is the permitted service-account delegation.

B:

Changing audit collection cannot grant a denied permission or fix service behavior. The case instead depends on the permitted service-account delegation.

D:

Renaming a resource does not alter the actual effective configuration. It leaves the permitted service-account delegation unaddressed. The appropriate action here is: Limit impersonation to an approved deployment group or workflow and revoke the broad token-generation grant.

Question 741

An administrator runs a production gcloud command with a previously set impersonation flag and accidentally targets a different principal than expected. What preflight should be performed?

  1. Inspect active gcloud identity/impersonation configuration and target project before executing protected commands.
  2. Use approved service-account impersonation for the deployment commands and record the originating caller in audit evidence.
  3. Allow tokens from any issuer without verifying audience, signature or mapped principal.
  4. Issue a long-lived service-account JSON key instead of repairing short-lived workload credentials.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

CLI impersonation settings can persist across commands; verifying the effective principal prevents accidental privileged changes.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Deploying a separate workload does not automatically configure the existing feature. The case instead depends on the workload's intended identity and permissions. The appropriate action here is: Inspect active gcloud identity/impersonation configuration and target project before executing protected commands.

C:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. It leaves the workload's intended identity and permissions unaddressed. The appropriate action here is: Inspect active gcloud identity/impersonation configuration and target project before executing protected commands.

D:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. The specific requirement concerns the workload's intended identity and permissions. The appropriate action here is: Inspect active gcloud identity/impersonation configuration and target project before executing protected commands.

Question 742

A service account is configured to impersonate a target account across projects but a boundary policy prohibits cross-project delegation. What should be reviewed?

  1. Check the effective organization policy and redesign the supported identity binding within approved trust boundaries.
  2. Grant a new billing role instead of adjusting the actual token or impersonation permission.
  3. Issue a long-lived service-account JSON key instead of repairing short-lived workload credentials.
  4. Validate organization constraints and the target account's trust policy before attempting another delegation path.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

IAM token delegation is subject to organization and account-level trust; having roles in one project does not override those boundaries.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. It leaves the correct runtime principal and its bindings unaddressed. The appropriate action here is: Validate organization constraints and the target account's trust policy before attempting another delegation path.

B:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. The specific requirement concerns the correct runtime principal and its bindings. The appropriate action here is: Validate organization constraints and the target account's trust policy before attempting another delegation path.

C:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. The necessary distinction is the correct runtime principal and its bindings. The appropriate action here is: Validate organization constraints and the target account's trust policy before attempting another delegation path.

Question 743

A production deployer accidentally grants Token Creator on a service account to the allAuthenticatedUsers principal. What incident action is needed?

  1. Remove the public delegation grant immediately and assess any minted credentials and audit activity under the account.
  2. Require the separate token-minting permission where direct impersonated credentials are intended; do not confuse actAs with Token Creator.
  3. Allow tokens from any issuer without verifying audience, signature or mapped principal.
  4. Rename the service account but leave the old principal and role bindings unchanged.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Public token minting rights would create severe indirect access to the service account's resources.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. The specific requirement concerns the permitted service-account delegation. The appropriate action here is: Remove the public delegation grant immediately and assess any minted credentials and audit activity under the account.

C:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. The necessary distinction is the permitted service-account delegation. The appropriate action here is: Remove the public delegation grant immediately and assess any minted credentials and audit activity under the account.

D:

Renaming a resource does not alter the actual effective configuration. The case instead depends on the permitted service-account delegation.

Question 744

An operations team rotates the runtime identity of a Cloud Run service but leaves the invoker principal unchanged; requests succeed but downstream storage fails. What should be checked?

  1. Assign the necessary scoped storage role to the newly attached Cloud Run runtime service account.
  2. Grant the supported service-account usage (actAs) permission on that runtime account to the authorized deployer.
  3. Rename the service account but leave the old principal and role bindings unchanged.
  4. Disable service-account audit logging and assume the credential issue is resolved.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The identity running application code is not the identity permitted to invoke the service, and downstream IAM follows the runtime principal.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. The necessary distinction is the correct runtime principal and its bindings. The appropriate action here is: Assign the necessary scoped storage role to the newly attached Cloud Run runtime service account.

C:

Renaming a resource does not alter the actual effective configuration. The case instead depends on the correct runtime principal and its bindings.

D:

Changing audit collection cannot grant a denied permission or fix service behavior. It leaves the correct runtime principal and its bindings unaddressed. The appropriate action here is: Assign the necessary scoped storage role to the newly attached Cloud Run runtime service account.

Question 745

A service account can read private Cloud Storage objects, but an application using the IAM Credentials API fails to create V4 download signed URLs with iam.serviceAccounts.signBlob permission denied. Which capability must the authorized signer receive?

  1. Grant only Cloud Storage object read again; storage.objects.get includes arbitrary service-account cryptographic signing permission.
  2. Grant the signing user the Compute Engine Instance Admin role; VM administration is the role that signs Cloud Storage request blobs.
  3. Grant suitable iam.serviceAccounts.signBlob permission, such as a properly scoped Service Account Token Creator binding on the signer, in addition to necessary object access.
  4. Make the bucket public so signed URLs can be generated without using a signing principal or its permission checks.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Grant suitable iam.serviceAccounts.signBlob permission, such as a properly scoped Service Account Token Creator binding on the signer, in addition to necessary object access. Signed URL generation needs a signing credential or IAM Credentials signBlob authorization. The service account also needs permissions consistent with the URL's operation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Grant only Cloud Storage object read again; storage.objects.get includes arbitrary service-account cryptographic signing permission. Object read allows accessing protected bytes, but it does not authorize signing data as a service account through IAM Credentials.

B:

Grant the signing user the Compute Engine Instance Admin role; VM administration is the role that signs Cloud Storage request blobs. Instance management permissions have no inherent authority to sign blobs with another service-account identity.

D:

Make the bucket public so signed URLs can be generated without using a signing principal or its permission checks. Public access would defeat the private-download use case and does not fix an IAM Credentials signBlob permission error.

Question 746

A security engineer revokes a principal's Token Creator grant after discovering misuse, yet a short-lived access token minted five minutes earlier still succeeds. Which residual-access issue should be considered?

  1. Previously issued bearer tokens can remain usable until their expiration or a supported revocation boundary; prevent further minting and assess immediate containment separately.
  2. IAM removes all previously issued OAuth access tokens from every consumer cache as soon as the Token Creator role binding is deleted.
  3. The token is necessarily a permanent JSON key because short-lived service-account tokens never work after any IAM change.
  4. Changing a Cloud Billing account automatically expires the old service-account token without affecting the resource IAM policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Previously issued bearer tokens can remain usable until their expiration or a supported revocation boundary; prevent further minting and assess immediate containment separately. Removing delegation permission normally blocks future authorized token generation. An already-minted short-lived credential has its own lifetime and may remain valid.

Incorrect Answers

B:

IAM removes all previously issued OAuth access tokens from every consumer cache as soon as the Token Creator role binding is deleted. Role-binding removal is not a guarantee that all existing bearer tokens disappear instantly. Cached credentials must be accounted for during containment.

C:

The token is necessarily a permanent JSON key because short-lived service-account tokens never work after any IAM change. Short-lived tokens have an explicit expiration and are not identical to user-managed JSON private keys. The observation does not prove a key was used.

D:

Changing a Cloud Billing account automatically expires the old service-account token without affecting the resource IAM policy. Billing association does not invalidate an OAuth credential or replace account- and service-specific security response controls.

Question 747

A workload stores one IAM Credentials short-lived OAuth access token in its process configuration and keeps using it for days. Calls begin returning 401 after the token's expiration. What should its client implement?

  1. Increase the Cloud Billing budget; additional spending authorization extends every OAuth token automatically.
  2. Store the same token string in Secret Manager; moving an expired token to a secret makes it valid again.
  3. Grant organization Owner to the caller; Owner changes the expiration encoded in already-issued bearer tokens.
  4. Use supported application default credentials or a token provider that refreshes short-lived credentials before expiration.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Use supported application default credentials or a token provider that refreshes short-lived credentials before expiration. A supported credential provider refreshes access tokens as needed instead of treating one short-lived value as a permanent API key.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Increase the Cloud Billing budget; additional spending authorization extends every OAuth token automatically. Budgets are financial controls and do not change the expiry timestamp or signature of an issued OAuth credential.

B:

Store the same token string in Secret Manager; moving an expired token to a secret makes it valid again. Secure storage reduces exposure of a secret but cannot extend the cryptographic validity of an already expired token.

C:

Grant organization Owner to the caller; Owner changes the expiration encoded in already-issued bearer tokens. New IAM privileges do not rewrite expired token metadata. Excessive grants could also increase risk if the credential is compromised.

Question 748

An operator wants to verify that an identity can access one object without reading production data, but they consider granting Editor temporarily. What safer check exists?

  1. Grant the service account resource access on the dataset separately from permissions controlling who may administer or impersonate that service account.
  2. Use IAM Policy Troubleshooter or an approved limited read test under the actual principal before expanding roles.
  3. Allow tokens from any issuer without verifying audience, signature or mapped principal.
  4. Disable service-account audit logging and assume the credential issue is resolved.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Authorization troubleshooting can evaluate a narrow requested permission rather than broadly elevating the principal.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. The necessary distinction is the workload's intended identity and permissions. The appropriate action here is: Use IAM Policy Troubleshooter or an approved limited read test under the actual principal before expanding roles.

C:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. The case instead depends on the workload's intended identity and permissions. The appropriate action here is: Use IAM Policy Troubleshooter or an approved limited read test under the actual principal before expanding roles.

D:

Changing audit collection cannot grant a denied permission or fix service behavior. It leaves the workload's intended identity and permissions unaddressed.

Question 749

A deployment system obtains a token through two successive service-account delegations, but the second account lacks authority to impersonate the final service account. What must be fixed?

  1. Grant the exact documented token-delegation permission for each authorized hop or simplify the chain to one approved target.
  2. Validate organization constraints and the target account's trust policy before attempting another delegation path.
  3. Allow tokens from any issuer without verifying audience, signature or mapped principal.
  4. Grant a new billing role instead of adjusting the actual token or impersonation permission.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Service-account delegation chains require valid permissions at every step; one valid initial mint does not authorize later hops.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. The case instead depends on the correct runtime principal and its bindings. The appropriate action here is: Grant the exact documented token-delegation permission for each authorized hop or simplify the chain to one approved target.

C:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. It leaves the correct runtime principal and its bindings unaddressed. The appropriate action here is: Grant the exact documented token-delegation permission for each authorized hop or simplify the chain to one approved target.

D:

The suggestion does not establish the required issuer, principal or permission boundary. The specific requirement concerns the correct runtime principal and its bindings. The appropriate action here is: Grant the exact documented token-delegation permission for each authorized hop or simplify the chain to one approved target.

Question 750

A service account no longer used by production can still mint short-lived credentials for a privileged deployment identity because its Token Creator binding remains. What access cleanup is appropriate?

  1. Leave the binding indefinitely because a dormant service account cannot issue credentials once no workload references it.
  2. Remove obsolete impersonation/Token Creator permissions after dependency review and monitor for unexpected future credential-minting attempts.
  3. Grant an additional Basic Owner role to the dormant identity so IAM stops checking the old Token Creator binding.
  4. Rename the account to retired; changing the display label invalidates every service-account delegation grant automatically.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Remove obsolete impersonation/Token Creator permissions after dependency review and monitor for unexpected future credential-minting attempts. Service-account delegation is explicit IAM access. Revoking obsolete grants closes a remaining path to privileged short-lived credentials.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Leave the binding indefinitely because a dormant service account cannot issue credentials once no workload references it. A principal that retains Token Creator may still mint credentials if it can authenticate; being unused operationally does not remove its permissions.

C:

Grant an additional Basic Owner role to the dormant identity so IAM stops checking the old Token Creator binding. Additional Owner access escalates rather than reduces the risk and does not cancel Token Creator authority.

D:

Rename the account to retired; changing the display label invalidates every service-account delegation grant automatically. Display-name changes do not reliably revoke grants to an IAM principal. The role binding itself must be removed or narrowed.

Associate Cloud Engineer Practice Tests