Cisco 350-501 Practice Test 67
Question 660
For an original SPCOR service-provider engineering scenario, consider: A newly delivered PE downloads boot configuration from an unauthenticated HTTP endpoint and accepts an attacker-controlled image. Select TWO complementary steps: the targeted correction and its strongest prechange validation.
- Check: Check bootstrap trust, certificate or signed-image verification, credential issuance, endpoint authorization and failure handling in a spare router lab.
- Check: Verify service certificates, trust chains, SAN validation, gNMI subscription paths and telemetry timestamps over a controlled authorized and unauthorized test.
- Change: Anchor ZTP to verified enrollment and software artifacts with authenticated provisioning endpoints and per-device credential lifecycle.
- Disable image signature checks and publish a shared root password in a world-readable bootstrap URL.
- Change: Represent service intent using supported Cisco NSO models and dry-run transactional changes and validate device diffs and recovery behavior.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets. Acceptance: New devices enroll only with trusted artifacts and unique approved identities, and unexpected bootstrap sources are rejected.
C:Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets. Applied case: A newly delivered PE downloads boot configuration from an unauthenticated HTTP endpoint and accepts an attacker-controlled image.
Incorrect Answers
B:Check: Verify service certificates, trust chains, SAN validation, gNMI subscription paths and telemetry timestamps over a controlled authorized and unauthorized test. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
D:For this select two assessment, the shortcut changes or bypasses the necessary routing, service or operational boundary rather than correcting it. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
E:Change: Represent service intent using supported Cisco NSO models and dry-run transactional changes and validate device diffs and recovery behavior. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
Question 661
A service provider network engineer is reviewing this backbone or customer-service scenario: A fleet's bootstrap process reuses a permanent administrative password embedded in the provisioning script distributed to every device. A proposed shortcut is: Disable image signature checks and publish a shared root password in a world-readable bootstrap URL. What should the service provider engineer recommend as the narrowly scoped correction? Select ONE best answer.
- Keep state in an access-controlled locked backend and review plans and drift against provider-supported network resources before apply.
- Anchor ZTP to verified enrollment and software artifacts with authenticated provisioning endpoints and per-device credential lifecycle.
- Disable image signature checks and publish a shared root password in a world-readable bootstrap URL.
- Use documented SNMP access restrictions and authenticated encrypted SNMPv3 where supported and verify polling and notifications separately.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:This targeted action addresses the observed service-provider control or forwarding gap without discarding necessary controls. The required acceptance condition is: New devices enroll only with trusted artifacts and unique approved identities, and unexpected bootstrap sources are rejected.
Incorrect Answers
A:Keep state in an access-controlled locked backend and review plans and drift against provider-supported network resources before apply. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
C:Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets. Use this instead: Anchor ZTP to verified enrollment and software artifacts with authenticated provisioning endpoints and per-device credential lifecycle.
D:Use documented SNMP access restrictions and authenticated encrypted SNMPv3 where supported and verify polling and notifications separately. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
Question 662
A Cisco service provider design review finds: A fleet's bootstrap process reuses a permanent administrative password embedded in the provisioning script distributed to every device. The team proposes: Anchor ZTP to verified enrollment and software artifacts with authenticated provisioning endpoints and per-device credential lifecycle. Which engineering principle most strongly supports the recommended response? Select ONE best answer.
- NetFlow and IPFIX export summarized flow records whose field templates and sampling rules determine what collectors can reconstruct.
- Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
- gRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
- NETCONF uses modeled XML RPC messages and datastore operations; an active SSH transport or accepted candidate does not necessarily mean a committed change.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Demonstrable success requires: New devices enroll only with trusted artifacts and unique approved identities, and unexpected bootstrap sources are rejected. Applied case: A fleet's bootstrap process reuses a permanent administrative password embedded in the provisioning script distributed to every device.
Incorrect Answers
A:NetFlow and IPFIX export summarized flow records whose field templates and sampling rules determine what collectors can reconstruct. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
C:GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
D:NETCONF uses modeled XML RPC messages and datastore operations; an active SSH transport or accepted candidate does not necessarily mean a committed change. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
Question 663
The service provider operations team has not yet approved a change. Current evidence indicates: A fleet's bootstrap process reuses a permanent administrative password embedded in the provisioning script distributed to every device. Which evidence best tests the technical diagnosis before approving a disruptive change? Select ONE best answer.
- Compare exported templates, sequence counters, sampling rate, collector parsing and independently measured test-flow traffic.
- Check bootstrap trust, certificate or signed-image verification, credential issuance, endpoint authorization and failure handling in a spare router lab.
- Inspect capabilities, URL module prefix, requested HTTP method, Content-Type and returned status with a nonproduction test interface.
- Inspect modeled service inputs, dry-run target diffs, device transaction outcomes and an injected failure during a lab provision.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets. Applied case: A fleet's bootstrap process reuses a permanent administrative password embedded in the provisioning script distributed to every device.
Incorrect Answers
A:Compare exported templates, sequence counters, sampling rate, collector parsing and independently measured test-flow traffic. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
C:Inspect capabilities, URL module prefix, requested HTTP method, Content-Type and returned status with a nonproduction test interface. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
D:Inspect modeled service inputs, dry-run target diffs, device transaction outcomes and an injected failure during a lab provision. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
Question 664
A candidate correction has been tested and the platform team requires a post-change acceptance check. Original problem: A fleet's bootstrap process reuses a permanent administrative password embedded in the provisioning script distributed to every device. The carrier operations owner needs positive and negative tests showing existing customer services remain available. Which acceptance result demonstrates correct service provider forwarding and control behavior without disrupting authorized workflows? Select ONE best answer.
- New devices enroll only with trusted artifacts and unique approved identities, and unexpected bootstrap sources are rejected.
- The service converges consistently or exposes a recoverable failure without silent partial configuration across customers.
- The collector identifies correct source and destination flows with explicit sampling limits and detects exporter or template loss.
- Model-compliant requests accept correct data and reject wrong leaf paths or types without unintended configuration changes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets. The approved implementation step was: Anchor ZTP to verified enrollment and software artifacts with authenticated provisioning endpoints and per-device credential lifecycle.
Incorrect Answers
B:The service converges consistently or exposes a recoverable failure without silent partial configuration across customers. A fleet's bootstrap process reuses a permanent administrative password embedded in the provisioning script distributed to every device.
C:The collector identifies correct source and destination flows with explicit sampling limits and detects exporter or template loss. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
D:Model-compliant requests accept correct data and reject wrong leaf paths or types without unintended configuration changes. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
Question 665
An implementation sign-off request identifies the following problem: A fleet's bootstrap process reuses a permanent administrative password embedded in the provisioning script distributed to every device. Which paired technical change and validation should close the implementation review? Select ONE best answer.
- Change: Configure mutually authenticated TLS and supported gNMI dial-in or dial-out subscription behavior with certificate trust and stable sensor paths. Verify: Verify service certificates, trust chains, SAN validation, gNMI subscription paths and telemetry timestamps over a controlled authorized and unauthorized test.
- Change: Represent service intent using supported Cisco NSO models and dry-run transactional changes and validate device diffs and recovery behavior. Verify: Inspect modeled service inputs, dry-run target diffs, device transaction outcomes and an injected failure during a lab provision.
- Change: Use a verified inventory and idempotent supported network modules with meaningful prechecks, task results and stable desired-state templates. Verify: Run check mode or an isolated deployment twice, comparing targeted hosts, command diff, failed hosts and change counts.
- Change: Anchor ZTP to verified enrollment and software artifacts with authenticated provisioning endpoints and per-device credential lifecycle. Verify: Check bootstrap trust, certificate or signed-image verification, credential issuance, endpoint authorization and failure handling in a spare router lab.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets. The change is successful only when: New devices enroll only with trusted artifacts and unique approved identities, and unexpected bootstrap sources are rejected.
Incorrect Answers
A:Change: Configure mutually authenticated TLS and supported gNMI dial-in or dial-out subscription behavior with certificate trust and stable sensor paths. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
B:Change: Represent service intent using supported Cisco NSO models and dry-run transactional changes and validate device diffs and recovery behavior. A fleet's bootstrap process reuses a permanent administrative password embedded in the provisioning script distributed to every device.
C:Change: Use a verified inventory and idempotent supported network modules with meaningful prechecks, task results and stable desired-state templates. Secure ZTP reduces manual first-boot work while requiring device identity, image integrity and confidentiality for configuration and enrollment secrets.
Question 666
A service provider network engineer is reviewing this backbone or customer-service scenario: A core telemetry collector accepts unauthenticated gNMI streams from any network peer and inserts spoofed interface counters into its assurance dashboard. A proposed shortcut is: Set insecure transport for every telemetry stream and treat any client-supplied device name as trusted authentication. What should the service provider engineer recommend as the narrowly scoped correction? Select ONE best answer.
- Select supported RESTCONF data paths and HTTP operations, preserve YANG schema types and handle documented status and error bodies.
- Configure mutually authenticated TLS and supported gNMI dial-in or dial-out subscription behavior with certificate trust and stable sensor paths.
- Normalize model identifiers, timestamps and collector health across gNMI, flow and management telemetry before declaring a backbone service incident.
- Set insecure transport for every telemetry stream and treat any client-supplied device name as trusted authentication.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The required acceptance condition is: Only authenticated collectors and devices exchange model-consistent telemetry, and certificate rotation can be validated without blind trust bypass. Applied case: A core telemetry collector accepts unauthenticated gNMI streams from any network peer and inserts spoofed interface counters into its assurance dashboard.
Incorrect Answers
A:Select supported RESTCONF data paths and HTTP operations, preserve YANG schema types and handle documented status and error bodies. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
C:Normalize model identifiers, timestamps and collector health across gNMI, flow and management telemetry before declaring a backbone service incident. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
D:That option would set insecure transport for every telemetry stream and treat any client-supplied device name as trusted authentication, but it addresses a different concern. The required acceptance condition is: Only authenticated collectors and devices exchange model-consistent telemetry, and certificate rotation can be validated without blind trust bypass. Set insecure transport for every telemetry stream and treat any client-supplied device name as trusted authentication.
Question 667
A Cisco service provider design review finds: A core telemetry collector accepts unauthenticated gNMI streams from any network peer and inserts spoofed interface counters into its assurance dashboard. The team proposes: Configure mutually authenticated TLS and supported gNMI dial-in or dial-out subscription behavior with certificate trust and stable sensor paths. Which engineering principle most strongly supports the recommended response? Select ONE best answer.
- Ansible hosts and groups determine the execution scope while modules and conditions can converge device configuration without uncontrolled repeated changes.
- NetFlow and IPFIX export summarized flow records whose field templates and sampling rules determine what collectors can reconstruct.
- Automation assurance depends on current trusted data sources and consistent time or interface identities; a collected metric without context can produce a misleading incident.
- gRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Demonstrable success requires: Only authenticated collectors and devices exchange model-consistent telemetry, and certificate rotation can be validated without blind trust bypass. This principle explains the proposed technical approach, which is: Configure mutually authenticated TLS and supported gNMI dial-in or dial-out subscription behavior with certificate trust and stable sensor paths.
Incorrect Answers
A:Ansible hosts and groups determine the execution scope while modules and conditions can converge device configuration without uncontrolled repeated changes. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
B:NetFlow and IPFIX export summarized flow records whose field templates and sampling rules determine what collectors can reconstruct. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
C:Automation assurance depends on current trusted data sources and consistent time or interface identities; a collected metric without context can produce a misleading incident. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
Question 668
The service provider operations team has not yet approved a change. Current evidence indicates: A core telemetry collector accepts unauthenticated gNMI streams from any network peer and inserts spoofed interface counters into its assurance dashboard. Which evidence best tests the technical diagnosis before approving a disruptive change? Select ONE best answer.
- Verify service certificates, trust chains, SAN validation, gNMI subscription paths and telemetry timestamps over a controlled authorized and unauthorized test.
- Compare NETCONF hello capabilities, target datastore, rpc-reply ok or rpc-error and device running configuration after a staged edit.
- Check bootstrap trust, certificate or signed-image verification, credential issuance, endpoint authorization and failure handling in a spare router lab.
- Compare exported templates, sequence counters, sampling rate, collector parsing and independently measured test-flow traffic.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Confirm afterward that: Only authenticated collectors and devices exchange model-consistent telemetry, and certificate rotation can be validated without blind trust bypass. Applied case: A core telemetry collector accepts unauthenticated gNMI streams from any network peer and inserts spoofed interface counters into its assurance dashboard.
Incorrect Answers
B:Compare NETCONF hello capabilities, target datastore, rpc-reply ok or rpc-error and device running configuration after a staged edit. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
C:Check bootstrap trust, certificate or signed-image verification, credential issuance, endpoint authorization and failure handling in a spare router lab. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
D:Compare exported templates, sequence counters, sampling rate, collector parsing and independently measured test-flow traffic. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
Question 669
A candidate correction has been tested and the platform team requires a post-change acceptance check. Original problem: A core telemetry collector accepts unauthenticated gNMI streams from any network peer and inserts spoofed interface counters into its assurance dashboard. The carrier operations owner needs positive and negative tests showing existing customer services remain available. Which acceptance result demonstrates correct service provider forwarding and control behavior without disrupting authorized workflows? Select ONE best answer.
- Read and write requests affect only approved modeled resources and invalid payloads receive specific diagnosable errors.
- Only authenticated collectors and devices exchange model-consistent telemetry, and certificate rotation can be validated without blind trust bypass.
- Reviewed plans converge expected resources without conflicting state writes or unapproved destructive network actions.
- The collector identifies correct source and destination flows with explicit sampling limits and detects exporter or template loss.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The approved implementation step was: Configure mutually authenticated TLS and supported gNMI dial-in or dial-out subscription behavior with certificate trust and stable sensor paths. The result must be validated using the documented device, service or access context.
Incorrect Answers
A:Read and write requests affect only approved modeled resources and invalid payloads receive specific diagnosable errors. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
C:Reviewed plans converge expected resources without conflicting state writes or unapproved destructive network actions. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
D:The collector identifies correct source and destination flows with explicit sampling limits and detects exporter or template loss. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
Question 670
For an original SPCOR service-provider engineering scenario, consider: A core telemetry collector accepts unauthenticated gNMI streams from any network peer and inserts spoofed interface counters into its assurance dashboard. Select TWO complementary steps: the targeted correction and its strongest prechange validation.
- Change: Configure mutually authenticated TLS and supported gNMI dial-in or dial-out subscription behavior with certificate trust and stable sensor paths.
- Set insecure transport for every telemetry stream and treat any client-supplied device name as trusted authentication.
- Check: Check bootstrap trust, certificate or signed-image verification, credential issuance, endpoint authorization and failure handling in a spare router lab.
- Change: Use a verified inventory and idempotent supported network modules with meaningful prechecks, task results and stable desired-state templates.
- Check: Verify service certificates, trust chains, SAN validation, gNMI subscription paths and telemetry timestamps over a controlled authorized and unauthorized test.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Acceptance: Only authenticated collectors and devices exchange model-consistent telemetry, and certificate rotation can be validated without blind trust bypass. Applied case: A core telemetry collector accepts unauthenticated gNMI streams from any network peer and inserts spoofed interface counters into its assurance dashboard.
E:Acceptance: Only authenticated collectors and devices exchange model-consistent telemetry, and certificate rotation can be validated without blind trust bypass. Required intervention: Configure mutually authenticated TLS and supported gNMI dial-in or dial-out subscription behavior with certificate trust and stable sensor paths.
Incorrect Answers
B:That option would set insecure transport for every telemetry stream and treat any client-supplied device name as trusted authentication, but it addresses a different concern. This is a required part of the case-specific plan. gRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
C:Check: Check bootstrap trust, certificate or signed-image verification, credential issuance, endpoint authorization and failure handling in a spare router lab. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.
D:Change: Use a verified inventory and idempotent supported network modules with meaningful prechecks, task results and stable desired-state templates. GRPC carries typed RPC streams, while gNMI supports model-based telemetry and configuration; TLS and mTLS protect and authenticate session peers.