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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 24

Question 230

A controller uses a different RADIUS source interface after failover and one PSN stops recognizing it. The observed failure is: A valid endpoint username cannot compensate for an unknown NAD or mismatched RADIUS secret. What recovery action restores supported network-access behavior?

  1. The supported recovery is to disable all wireless authentication when one controller address changes.
  2. The supported recovery is to register only a friendly controller name while its RADIUS source IP is different.
  3. The supported recovery is to correct NAD registration and source interface then verify one wireless EAP exchange.
  4. The supported recovery is to use the user's password as the WLC-to-ISE RADIUS shared secret.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

RADIUS authentication requires the actual network access device to be recognized and share the expected secret. Recheck wLC RADIUS source address, ISE network device entry, shared-secret validation and live log.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Disable all wireless authentication when one controller address changes. This action does not repair the identified failure. A valid endpoint username cannot compensate for an unknown NAD or mismatched RADIUS secret. Instead, correct NAD registration and source interface then verify one wireless EAP exchange. For the specific situation, a controller uses a different RADIUS source interface after failover and one PSN stops recognizing it.

B:

Register only a friendly controller name while its RADIUS source IP is different. This action does not repair the identified failure. A valid endpoint username cannot compensate for an unknown NAD or mismatched RADIUS secret. Instead, correct NAD registration and source interface then verify one wireless EAP exchange. For the specific situation, a controller uses a different RADIUS source interface after failover and one PSN stops recognizing it.

D:

Use the user's password as the WLC-to-ISE RADIUS shared secret. This action does not repair the identified failure. A valid endpoint username cannot compensate for an unknown NAD or mismatched RADIUS secret. Instead, correct NAD registration and source interface then verify one wireless EAP exchange. For the specific situation, a controller uses a different RADIUS source interface after failover and one PSN stops recognizing it.

Question 231

A corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid. What action addresses this authenticated network-access scenario?

  1. Tell users to accept any EAP server certificate regardless of issuer.
  2. Distribute the trusted EAP server chain and configure matching supplicant identity and EAP-TLS certificate validation.
  3. Assume a client certificate automatically trusts every ISE server certificate.
  4. Use open Wi-Fi as a replacement for corporate EAP-TLS authentication.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Verify the effect through supplicant error, RADIUS EAP exchange, server certificate SAN, trust chain and client certificate. In mutual EAP-TLS, both the client and authenticating server identities must be validated.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This does not implement the required control for Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. Disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services.

C:

Assume a client certificate automatically trusts every ISE server certificate. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. In mutual EAP-TLS, both the client and authenticating server identities must be validated. The relevant evidence is supplicant error, RADIUS EAP exchange, server certificate SAN, trust chain and client certificate. For the specific situation, a corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid.

D:

Disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services. Instead the intended policy action is distribute the trusted EAP server chain and configure matching supplicant identity and EAP-TLS certificate validation.

Question 232

A corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid. What verification should the engineer use before declaring success?

  1. A device hostname alone without the policy result or authenticated source.
  2. A current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment.
  3. Supplicant error, RADIUS EAP exchange, server certificate SAN, trust chain and client certificate.
  4. A browser theme label without a current authorization trace.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

These observations directly establish the result of Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation for the described endpoint or network device. In mutual EAP-TLS, both the client and authenticating server identities must be validated.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This observation cannot verify Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. In mutual EAP-TLS, both the client and authenticating server identities must be validated.

B:

This observation cannot verify Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. Check supplicant error, RADIUS EAP exchange, server certificate SAN, trust chain and client certificate.

D:

This observation cannot verify Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. A browser theme label without a current authorization trace.

Question 233

A corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid. Which underlying service behavior supports the proposed solution?

  1. A successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified.
  2. In mutual EAP-TLS, both the client and authenticating server identities must be validated.
  3. All Cisco ISE administration and policy personas perform exactly the same service.
  4. A policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The supported implementation is to distribute the trusted EAP server chain and configure matching supplicant identity and EAP-TLS certificate validation. For the specific situation, a corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This generalization is not valid for Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. Instead in mutual EAP-TLS, both the client and authenticating server identities must be validated.

C:

This generalization is not valid for Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. Verify the actual state using supplicant error, RADIUS EAP exchange, server certificate SAN, trust chain and client certificate.

D:

This generalization is not valid for Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. For the specific situation, a corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid.

Question 234

A corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Tell users to accept any EAP server certificate regardless of issuer. Why does that proposed shortcut not satisfy the requirement?

  1. A justified least-privilege ACL caused every unrelated network authentication fault.
  2. Disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services.
  3. A correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.
  4. Reading the authentication event report caused the original network access outage.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The shortcut is unsuitable because in mutual EAP-TLS, both the client and authenticating server identities must be validated. For the specific situation, a corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation problem. The relevant risk is that disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services.

C:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation problem. Check supplicant error, RADIUS EAP exchange, server certificate SAN, trust chain and client certificate.

D:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation problem. For the specific situation, a corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid.

Question 235

A corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid. The observed failure is: Disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services. What recovery action restores supported network-access behavior?

  1. Assume a client certificate automatically trusts every ISE server certificate.
  2. Use open Wi-Fi as a replacement for corporate EAP-TLS authentication.
  3. Fix server identity trust and supplicant policy then test approved and rogue endpoints.
  4. Tell users to accept any EAP server certificate regardless of issuer.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

In mutual EAP-TLS, both the client and authenticating server identities must be validated. For the specific situation, a corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Assume a client certificate automatically trusts every ISE server certificate. This action does not repair the identified failure. Disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services. Instead, fix server identity trust and supplicant policy then test approved and rogue endpoints. For the specific situation, a corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid.

B:

Use open Wi-Fi as a replacement for corporate EAP-TLS authentication. This action does not repair the identified failure. Disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services. Instead, fix server identity trust and supplicant policy then test approved and rogue endpoints. For the specific situation, a corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid.

D:

Tell users to accept any EAP server certificate regardless of issuer. This action does not repair the identified failure. Disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services. Instead, fix server identity trust and supplicant policy then test approved and rogue endpoints. For the specific situation, a corporate Wi-Fi client rejects an ISE EAP server certificate although its user certificate is valid.

Question 236

A wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust. What is the BEST supported ISE implementation or corrective action?

  1. In this case, assume a client certificate automatically trusts every ISE server certificate.
  2. In this case, use open Wi-Fi as a replacement for corporate EAP-TLS authentication.
  3. In this case, tell users to accept any EAP server certificate regardless of issuer.
  4. In this case, distribute the trusted EAP server chain and configure matching supplicant identity and EAP-TLS certificate validation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Verify the effect through supplicant error, RADIUS EAP exchange, server certificate SAN, trust chain and client certificate. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Assume a client certificate automatically trusts every ISE server certificate. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. In mutual EAP-TLS, both the client and authenticating server identities must be validated. The relevant evidence is supplicant error, RADIUS EAP exchange, server certificate SAN, trust chain and client certificate. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

B:

Disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

C:

This does not implement the required control for Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

Question 237

A wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust. Which evidence BEST verifies the intended operational outcome?

  1. The supporting evidence is a switch interface description without any live AAA request or response.
  2. The supporting evidence is a device hostname alone without the policy result or authenticated source.
  3. The supporting evidence is a current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment.
  4. The supporting evidence is supplicant error, RADIUS EAP exchange, server certificate SAN, trust chain and client certificate.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

These observations directly establish the result of Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation for the described endpoint or network device. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This observation cannot verify Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

B:

This observation cannot verify Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. A device hostname alone without the policy result or authenticated source.

C:

This observation cannot verify Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. A current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment.

Question 238

A wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust. Which technical principle BEST explains the required decision?

  1. The governing principle is that a policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state.
  2. The governing principle is that a successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified.
  3. The governing principle is that every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications.
  4. The governing principle is that in mutual EAP-TLS, both the client and authenticating server identities must be validated.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The supported implementation is to distribute the trusted EAP server chain and configure matching supplicant identity and EAP-TLS certificate validation. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This generalization is not valid for Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

B:

This generalization is not valid for Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. A successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified.

C:

This generalization is not valid for Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation. Every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications.

Question 239

A wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Tell users to accept any EAP server certificate regardless of issuer. What material risk or failure follows from that shortcut?

  1. The material consequence is that reading the authentication event report caused the original network access outage.
  2. The material consequence is that the only result is an unrelated portal background color change.
  3. The material consequence is that a correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.
  4. The material consequence is that disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The shortcut is unsuitable because in mutual EAP-TLS, both the client and authenticating server identities must be validated. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation problem. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

B:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation problem. The only result is an unrelated portal background color change.

C:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the Wireless EAP TLS exchange certificate validation problem. A correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.

Question 240

A wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust. The observed failure is: Disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services. Which controlled recovery BEST restores the intended state?

  1. The supported recovery is to use open Wi-Fi as a replacement for corporate EAP-TLS authentication.
  2. The supported recovery is to fix server identity trust and supplicant policy then test approved and rogue endpoints.
  3. The supported recovery is to tell users to accept any EAP server certificate regardless of issuer.
  4. The supported recovery is to assume a client certificate automatically trusts every ISE server certificate.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

In mutual EAP-TLS, both the client and authenticating server identities must be validated. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use open Wi-Fi as a replacement for corporate EAP-TLS authentication. This action does not repair the identified failure. Disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services. Instead, fix server identity trust and supplicant policy then test approved and rogue endpoints. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

C:

Tell users to accept any EAP server certificate regardless of issuer. This action does not repair the identified failure. Disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services. Instead, fix server identity trust and supplicant policy then test approved and rogue endpoints. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

D:

Assume a client certificate automatically trusts every ISE server certificate. This action does not repair the identified failure. Disabling server certificate checks exposes clients to rogue authentication services. Instead, fix server identity trust and supplicant policy then test approved and rogue endpoints. For the specific situation, a wireless EAP-TLS deployment works on some laptops but others lack the enterprise issuing CA trust.

Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE) (300-715) Practice Tests