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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 20

Question 190

A selected MFA identity provider times out and ISE policy must not silently permit high-risk access. The observed failure is: Fail-open behavior under provider outage can negate a network access MFA requirement. What recovery action restores supported network-access behavior?

  1. The supported recovery is to assume the wireless SSID text itself activates multifactor verification.
  2. The supported recovery is to treat a username and password as proof of a separate MFA factor.
  3. The supported recovery is to disable all authentication when the challenge page renders incorrectly.
  4. The supported recovery is to repair supported MFA integration and verify success, rejection and timeout outcomes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A first-factor directory lookup does not inherently prove the second factor was satisfied. For the specific situation, a selected MFA identity provider times out and ISE policy must not silently permit high-risk access.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Assume the wireless SSID text itself activates multifactor verification. This action does not repair the identified failure. Fail-open behavior under provider outage can negate a network access MFA requirement. Instead, repair supported MFA integration and verify success, rejection and timeout outcomes. For the specific situation, a selected MFA identity provider times out and ISE policy must not silently permit high-risk access.

B:

Treat a username and password as proof of a separate MFA factor. This action does not repair the identified failure. Fail-open behavior under provider outage can negate a network access MFA requirement. Instead, repair supported MFA integration and verify success, rejection and timeout outcomes. For the specific situation, a selected MFA identity provider times out and ISE policy must not silently permit high-risk access.

C:

Disable all authentication when the challenge page renders incorrectly. This action does not repair the identified failure. Fail-open behavior under provider outage can negate a network access MFA requirement. Instead, repair supported MFA integration and verify success, rejection and timeout outcomes. For the specific situation, a selected MFA identity provider times out and ISE policy must not silently permit high-risk access.

Question 191

A stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation. What action addresses this authenticated network-access scenario?

  1. Assume a current certificate date guarantees it was never revoked.
  2. Publish the CA private key to speed certificate validation.
  3. Use the switch management hostname as certificate serial revocation proof.
  4. Configure supported CRL or OCSP checking and reachability for issuer certificates according to security policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Verify the effect through oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This does not implement the required control for Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. Skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate.

B:

Publish the CA private key to speed certificate validation. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. Certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust. The relevant evidence is oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

C:

Skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

Question 192

A stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation. What verification should the engineer use before declaring success?

  1. A successful ICMP echo that does not test the required identity-service workflow.
  2. OCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail.
  3. A browser theme label without a current authorization trace.
  4. An old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

These observations directly establish the result of Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access for the described endpoint or network device. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A successful ICMP echo that does not test the required identity-service workflow. This observation cannot verify Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. Check oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail. Certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

C:

A browser theme label without a current authorization trace. This observation cannot verify Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. Check oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail. Certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

D:

An old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence. This observation cannot verify Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. Check oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail. Certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

Question 193

A stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation. Which underlying service behavior supports the proposed solution?

  1. All Cisco ISE administration and policy personas perform exactly the same service.
  2. A captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling.
  3. A MAC address is a cryptographic proof of endpoint device ownership.
  4. Certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The supported implementation is to configure supported CRL or OCSP checking and reachability for issuer certificates according to security policy. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This generalization is not valid for Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

B:

This generalization is not valid for Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. Instead certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust.

C:

This generalization is not valid for Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. Verify the actual state using oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail.

Question 194

A stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Assume a current certificate date guarantees it was never revoked. Why does that proposed shortcut not satisfy the requirement?

  1. Accurate device accounting automatically created every earlier failed EAP exchange.
  2. Inspecting a correct endpoint certificate generated the original directory outage.
  3. A justified least-privilege ACL caused every unrelated network authentication fault.
  4. Skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The shortcut is unsuitable because certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access problem. The relevant risk is that skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate.

B:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access problem. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

C:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access problem. Check oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail.

Question 195

A stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation. The observed failure is: Skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate. What recovery action restores supported network-access behavior?

  1. Publish the CA private key to speed certificate validation.
  2. Use the switch management hostname as certificate serial revocation proof.
  3. Repair responder path or revoke the compromised identity and retest a known certificate.
  4. Assume a current certificate date guarantees it was never revoked.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Recheck oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Publish the CA private key to speed certificate validation. This action does not repair the identified failure. Skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate. Instead, repair responder path or revoke the compromised identity and retest a known certificate. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

B:

Use the switch management hostname as certificate serial revocation proof. This action does not repair the identified failure. Skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate. Instead, repair responder path or revoke the compromised identity and retest a known certificate. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

D:

Assume a current certificate date guarantees it was never revoked. This action does not repair the identified failure. Skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate. Instead, repair responder path or revoke the compromised identity and retest a known certificate. For the specific situation, a stolen laptop certificate remains otherwise valid and must be rejected after revocation.

Question 196

A RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status. What is the BEST supported ISE implementation or corrective action?

  1. In this case, publish the CA private key to speed certificate validation.
  2. In this case, use the switch management hostname as certificate serial revocation proof.
  3. In this case, assume a current certificate date guarantees it was never revoked.
  4. In this case, configure supported CRL or OCSP checking and reachability for issuer certificates according to security policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Verify the effect through oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Publish the CA private key to speed certificate validation. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. Certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust. The relevant evidence is oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

B:

Skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

C:

This does not implement the required control for Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

Question 197

A RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status. Which evidence BEST verifies the intended operational outcome?

  1. The supporting evidence is a device hostname alone without the policy result or authenticated source.
  2. The supporting evidence is a successful ICMP echo that does not test the required identity-service workflow.
  3. The supporting evidence is oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail.
  4. The supporting evidence is a browser theme label without a current authorization trace.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

These observations directly establish the result of Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access for the described endpoint or network device. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A device hostname alone without the policy result or authenticated source. This observation cannot verify Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. Check oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail. Certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

B:

A successful ICMP echo that does not test the required identity-service workflow. This observation cannot verify Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. Check oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail. Certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

D:

A browser theme label without a current authorization trace. This observation cannot verify Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. Check oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail. Certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

Question 198

A RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status. Which technical principle BEST explains the required decision?

  1. The governing principle is that a MAC address is a cryptographic proof of endpoint device ownership.
  2. The governing principle is that certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust.
  3. The governing principle is that all Cisco ISE administration and policy personas perform exactly the same service.
  4. The governing principle is that a policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The supported implementation is to configure supported CRL or OCSP checking and reachability for issuer certificates according to security policy. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This generalization is not valid for Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

C:

This generalization is not valid for Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. All Cisco ISE administration and policy personas perform exactly the same service.

D:

This generalization is not valid for Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access. A policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state.

Question 199

A RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Assume a current certificate date guarantees it was never revoked. What material risk or failure follows from that shortcut?

  1. The material consequence is that skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate.
  2. The material consequence is that a justified least-privilege ACL caused every unrelated network authentication fault.
  3. The material consequence is that a correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.
  4. The material consequence is that inspecting a correct endpoint certificate generated the original directory outage.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The shortcut is unsuitable because certificate expiration and revocation status are distinct parts of PKI-based access trust. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access problem. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

C:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access problem. A correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.

D:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the Certificate revocation check for EAP TLS access problem. Inspecting a correct endpoint certificate generated the original directory outage.

Question 200

A RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status. The observed failure is: Skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate. Which controlled recovery BEST restores the intended state?

  1. The supported recovery is to repair responder path or revoke the compromised identity and retest a known certificate.
  2. The supported recovery is to use the switch management hostname as certificate serial revocation proof.
  3. The supported recovery is to assume a current certificate date guarantees it was never revoked.
  4. The supported recovery is to publish the CA private key to speed certificate validation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Recheck oCSP or CRL response, certificate serial, chain trust, responder connectivity and RADIUS failure detail. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Use the switch management hostname as certificate serial revocation proof. This action does not repair the identified failure. Skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate. Instead, repair responder path or revoke the compromised identity and retest a known certificate. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

C:

Assume a current certificate date guarantees it was never revoked. This action does not repair the identified failure. Skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate. Instead, repair responder path or revoke the compromised identity and retest a known certificate. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

D:

Publish the CA private key to speed certificate validation. This action does not repair the identified failure. Skipping required revocation assessment can let compromised but unexpired credentials authenticate. Instead, repair responder path or revoke the compromised identity and retest a known certificate. For the specific situation, a RADIUS EAP-TLS request fails when ISE cannot retrieve relevant certificate revocation status.

Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE) (300-715) Practice Tests