Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 115
Question 1140
An administrator migrates from an old TACACS server and forgets to match shared secrets on routers and ISE. The observed failure is: A correct employee password cannot make an unrecognized device a trusted TACACS client. Which remediation resolves the underlying fault while maintaining policy?
- The supported recovery is to repair device registration and secret alignment then test login and command authorization.
- The supported recovery is to disable shared-secret checks throughout device administration.
- The supported recovery is to use the logged-in employee password as the TACACS device shared secret.
- The supported recovery is to register only the switch hostname while its actual client source IP differs.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:TACACS+ requires a recognized client and shared secret consistent with both the device and server. Recheck tACACS source IP, ISE network device object, shared secret verification, TCP connection and live authentication result.
Incorrect Answers
B:Disable shared-secret checks throughout device administration. This action does not repair the identified failure. A correct employee password cannot make an unrecognized device a trusted TACACS client. Instead, repair device registration and secret alignment then test login and command authorization. For the specific situation, an administrator migrates from an old TACACS server and forgets to match shared secrets on routers and ISE.
C:Use the logged-in employee password as the TACACS device shared secret. This action does not repair the identified failure. A correct employee password cannot make an unrecognized device a trusted TACACS client. Instead, repair device registration and secret alignment then test login and command authorization. For the specific situation, an administrator migrates from an old TACACS server and forgets to match shared secrets on routers and ISE.
D:Register only the switch hostname while its actual client source IP differs. This action does not repair the identified failure. A correct employee password cannot make an unrecognized device a trusted TACACS client. Instead, repair device registration and secret alignment then test login and command authorization. For the specific situation, an administrator migrates from an old TACACS server and forgets to match shared secrets on routers and ISE.
Question 1141
A router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store. Which administrator action is appropriate for this ISE access-control problem?
- Build precise TACACS device-admin policy sets selecting the appropriate identity source and authorization conditions.
- Authenticate every network operator through an unrestricted shared local account.
- Assume a successful LDAP connection automatically selects the right TACACS policy.
- Use only a VLAN number to decide permitted CLI command privileges.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Verify the effect through tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
Incorrect Answers
B:An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role. This does not implement the required control for TACACS policy set identity source matching.
C:Assume a successful LDAP connection automatically selects the right TACACS policy. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. TACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. The relevant evidence is tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
D:An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
Question 1142
A router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store. Which collected records establish that the ISE decision actually took effect?
- TACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result.
- A switch interface description without any live AAA request or response.
- An old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence.
- A current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:These observations directly establish the result of TACACS policy set identity source matching for the described endpoint or network device. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
Incorrect Answers
B:A switch interface description without any live AAA request or response. This observation cannot verify TACACS policy set identity source matching. Check tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. TACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
C:An old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence. This observation cannot verify TACACS policy set identity source matching. Check tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. TACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
D:A current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment. This observation cannot verify TACACS policy set identity source matching. Check tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. TACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
Question 1143
A router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store. Which statement about the relevant technology is correct?
- A captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling.
- TACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges.
- A successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified.
- Every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The supported implementation is to build precise TACACS device-admin policy sets selecting the appropriate identity source and authorization conditions. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
Incorrect Answers
A:A captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling. This generalization is not valid for TACACS policy set identity source matching. Instead tACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. Verify the actual state using tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
C:A successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified. This generalization is not valid for TACACS policy set identity source matching. Instead tACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. Verify the actual state using tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
D:Every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications. This generalization is not valid for TACACS policy set identity source matching. Instead tACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. Verify the actual state using tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
Question 1144
A router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Authenticate every network operator through an unrestricted shared local account. What specific security or operational failure should be anticipated?
- An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role.
- Reading the authentication event report caused the original network access outage.
- The only result is an unrelated portal background color change.
- Accurate device accounting automatically created every earlier failed EAP exchange.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The shortcut is unsuitable because tACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
Incorrect Answers
B:This unrelated assertion does not explain the TACACS policy set identity source matching problem. The relevant risk is that an overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role.
C:This unrelated assertion does not explain the TACACS policy set identity source matching problem. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
D:This unrelated assertion does not explain the TACACS policy set identity source matching problem. Check tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result.
Question 1145
A router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store. The observed failure is: An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role. Which remediation resolves the underlying fault while maintaining policy?
- Assume a successful LDAP connection automatically selects the right TACACS policy.
- Use only a VLAN number to decide permitted CLI command privileges.
- Correct policy conditions and test authorized operators from the intended directory groups.
- Authenticate every network operator through an unrestricted shared local account.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:This restores the intended operational behavior for TACACS policy set identity source matching.
Incorrect Answers
A:Assume a successful LDAP connection automatically selects the right TACACS policy. This action does not repair the identified failure. An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role. Instead, correct policy conditions and test authorized operators from the intended directory groups. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
B:Use only a VLAN number to decide permitted CLI command privileges. This action does not repair the identified failure. An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role. Instead, correct policy conditions and test authorized operators from the intended directory groups. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
D:Authenticate every network operator through an unrestricted shared local account. This action does not repair the identified failure. An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role. Instead, correct policy conditions and test authorized operators from the intended directory groups. For the specific situation, a router administrator from Active Directory is rejected because the device-admin policy uses an unrelated internal identity store.
Question 1146
Two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule. What action addresses this authenticated network-access scenario?
- In this case, assume a successful LDAP connection automatically selects the right TACACS policy.
- In this case, use only a VLAN number to decide permitted CLI command privileges.
- In this case, build precise TACACS device-admin policy sets selecting the appropriate identity source and authorization conditions.
- In this case, authenticate every network operator through an unrestricted shared local account.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Verify the effect through tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
Incorrect Answers
A:Assume a successful LDAP connection automatically selects the right TACACS policy. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. TACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. The relevant evidence is tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
B:An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
D:An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role. Use the supported approach: build precise TACACS device-admin policy sets selecting the appropriate identity source and authorization conditions.
Question 1147
Two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule. What verification should the engineer use before declaring success?
- The supporting evidence is a successful ICMP echo that does not test the required identity-service workflow.
- The supporting evidence is a switch interface description without any live AAA request or response.
- The supporting evidence is tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result.
- The supporting evidence is an old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:These observations directly establish the result of TACACS policy set identity source matching for the described endpoint or network device. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
Incorrect Answers
A:A successful ICMP echo that does not test the required identity-service workflow. This observation cannot verify TACACS policy set identity source matching. Check tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. TACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
B:A switch interface description without any live AAA request or response. This observation cannot verify TACACS policy set identity source matching. Check tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. TACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
D:An old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence. This observation cannot verify TACACS policy set identity source matching. Check tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. TACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
Question 1148
Two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule. Which underlying service behavior supports the proposed solution?
- The governing principle is that every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications.
- The governing principle is that a captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling.
- The governing principle is that a MAC address is a cryptographic proof of endpoint device ownership.
- The governing principle is that tACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The supported implementation is to build precise TACACS device-admin policy sets selecting the appropriate identity source and authorization conditions. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
Incorrect Answers
A:Every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications. This generalization is not valid for TACACS policy set identity source matching. Instead tACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. Verify the actual state using tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
B:A captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling. This generalization is not valid for TACACS policy set identity source matching. Instead tACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. Verify the actual state using tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
C:A MAC address is a cryptographic proof of endpoint device ownership. This generalization is not valid for TACACS policy set identity source matching. Instead tACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. Verify the actual state using tACACS selected policy, authenticated identity source, AD group, requested service and authorization result. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
Question 1149
Two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Authenticate every network operator through an unrestricted shared local account. Why does that proposed shortcut not satisfy the requirement?
- The material consequence is that accurate device accounting automatically created every earlier failed EAP exchange.
- The material consequence is that an overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role.
- The material consequence is that inspecting a correct endpoint certificate generated the original directory outage.
- The material consequence is that the only result is an unrelated portal background color change.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The shortcut is unsuitable because tACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
Incorrect Answers
A:This unrelated assertion does not explain the TACACS policy set identity source matching problem. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
C:This unrelated assertion does not explain the TACACS policy set identity source matching problem. Inspecting a correct endpoint certificate generated the original directory outage.
D:This unrelated assertion does not explain the TACACS policy set identity source matching problem. The only result is an unrelated portal background color change.
Question 1150
Two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule. The observed failure is: An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role. What recovery action restores supported network-access behavior?
- The supported recovery is to use only a VLAN number to decide permitted CLI command privileges.
- The supported recovery is to authenticate every network operator through an unrestricted shared local account.
- The supported recovery is to correct policy conditions and test authorized operators from the intended directory groups.
- The supported recovery is to assume a successful LDAP connection automatically selects the right TACACS policy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:TACACS device-admin policy selects both identity validation and role-based command privileges.
Incorrect Answers
A:Use only a VLAN number to decide permitted CLI command privileges. This action does not repair the identified failure. An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role. Instead, correct policy conditions and test authorized operators from the intended directory groups. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
B:Authenticate every network operator through an unrestricted shared local account. This action does not repair the identified failure. An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role. Instead, correct policy conditions and test authorized operators from the intended directory groups. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.
D:Assume a successful LDAP connection automatically selects the right TACACS policy. This action does not repair the identified failure. An overly broad policy can grant administrative commands outside the intended job role. Instead, correct policy conditions and test authorized operators from the intended directory groups. For the specific situation, two departments use different device admin rights but every TACACS login matches a broad catch-all rule.