cert
cert-1
cert-2

Pass Cisco 300-420 Exam in First Attempt Guaranteed!

Get 100% Latest Exam Questions, Accurate & Verified Answers to Pass the Actual Exam!
30 Days Free Updates, Instant Download!

cert-5
cert-6
300-420 Exam - Verified By Experts
300-420 Premium Bundle
$29.98

300-420 Premium Bundle

$79.99
$109.97
  • Premium File 416 Questions & Answers. Last update: Nov 10, 2026
  • Training Course 75 Video Lectures
  • Study Guide 751 Pages
 
$109.97
$79.99
accept 33 downloads in last 7 days
block-screenshots
Purchase Cisco 300-420 Exam Training Products Individually
Cisco 300-420 Premium File
Premium File 416 Q&A
$76.99$69.99
Cisco 300-420 Video Training Course
Training Course 75 Lectures
$21.99 $19.99
Cisco 300-420 PDF Study Guide
Study Guide 751 Pages
$21.99 $19.99
Cisco 300-420 Practice Test 50

Question 490

A large enterprise wants group-based encryption across a trusted routed core instead of building pairwise tunnels. The observed fault is: Using one unprotected group key server as the sole control point can disrupt rekey and encrypted communication. What action most directly restores and validates the intended state?

  1. The controlled recovery is to deploy redundant key management and verify rekeys and routed group traffic.
  2. The controlled recovery is to assume GETVPN key exchange automatically handles arbitrary unrelated public Internet peers.
  3. The controlled recovery is to require full-mesh pairwise GRE tunnels and call that a GETVPN group encryption design.
  4. The controlled recovery is to expose group keys in a shared configuration repository for convenience.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

GETVPN can encrypt group-member traffic while preserving original IP packet routing without ordinary point-to-point tunnel overlays. Relevant evidence includes key server redundancy, group membership, key distribution, crypto policy and WAN routing tests.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Assume GETVPN key exchange automatically handles arbitrary unrelated public Internet peers. Using one unprotected group key server as the sole control point can disrupt rekey and encrypted communication. Use the controlled remediation: deploy redundant key management and verify rekeys and routed group traffic.

C:

Require full-mesh pairwise GRE tunnels and call that a GETVPN group encryption design. Using one unprotected group key server as the sole control point can disrupt rekey and encrypted communication. Use the controlled remediation: deploy redundant key management and verify rekeys and routed group traffic.

D:

Expose group keys in a shared configuration repository for convenience. Using one unprotected group key server as the sole control point can disrupt rekey and encrypted communication. Use the controlled remediation: deploy redundant key management and verify rekeys and routed group traffic.

Question 491

A regional headquarters has two Internet circuits delivered through the same provider router and physical conduit. What is the most defensible configuration decision?

  1. Use diverse WAN providers, physically separate local loops and independent provider demarcation when justified.
  2. Buy two circuits over the same last-mile fiber and claim complete physical diversity.
  3. Use two VLAN tags on one single modem as proof of independent providers.
  4. Assume redundant CE router power supplies prevent external carrier outages.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Confirm the result using carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results. True multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. This change targets the wrong mechanism for Dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity.

C:

Use two VLAN tags on one single modem as proof of independent providers. True multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits. Instead inspect carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results.

D:

Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Assume redundant CE router power supplies prevent external carrier outages.

Question 492

A regional headquarters has two Internet circuits delivered through the same provider router and physical conduit. Which evidence BEST confirms the actual technical behavior?

  1. A feature-license screenshot without the required design or acceptance tests.
  2. A marketing claim without measured routing, capacity or failure-domain evidence.
  3. Carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results.
  4. A hostname inventory without effective configuration or operational measurements.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The intended procedure is use diverse WAN providers, physically separate local loops and independent provider demarcation when justified. True multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This observation alone cannot establish dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity. The decisive evidence instead includes carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results.

B:

This observation alone cannot establish dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity. True multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits.

D:

This observation alone cannot establish dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity. A hostname inventory without effective configuration or operational measurements.

Question 493

A regional headquarters has two Internet circuits delivered through the same provider router and physical conduit. What networking or enterprise network design concept best explains this scenario?

  1. Any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site.
  2. Encryption and segmentation are identical mechanisms and can replace each other.
  3. Cloud connectivity automatically removes any requirement for routing or policy.
  4. True multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Confirm it with carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results. This is why the appropriate action is use diverse WAN providers, physically separate local loops and independent provider demarcation when justified.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site. This is an incorrect generalization for dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity. The relevant rule is true multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits. Verify using carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results.

B:

Encryption and segmentation are identical mechanisms and can replace each other. This is an incorrect generalization for dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity. The relevant rule is true multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits. Verify using carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results. In this case, a regional headquarters has two Internet circuits delivered through the same provider router and physical conduit.

C:

Cloud connectivity automatically removes any requirement for routing or policy. This is an incorrect generalization for dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity. The relevant rule is true multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits. Verify using carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results.

Question 494

A regional headquarters has two Internet circuits delivered through the same provider router and physical conduit. Suppose the operator instead makes this incorrect change: Buy two circuits over the same last-mile fiber and claim complete physical diversity. Which resulting fault should the reviewer identify?

  1. The only issue is an inaccurate hostname while traffic paths are unaffected.
  2. Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident.
  3. A healthy unrelated system proves the intended failure domain is protected.
  4. The failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The right response is use diverse WAN providers, physically separate local loops and independent provider demarcation when justified. This explains why the proposed shortcut does not solve dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The only issue is an inaccurate hostname while traffic paths are unaffected. The actual failure is two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Check carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results. In this case, a regional headquarters has two Internet circuits delivered through the same provider router and physical conduit.

C:

A healthy unrelated system proves the intended failure domain is protected. The actual failure is two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Check carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results. In this case, a regional headquarters has two Internet circuits delivered through the same provider router and physical conduit.

D:

The failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless. The actual failure is two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Check carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results. In this case, a regional headquarters has two Internet circuits delivered through the same provider router and physical conduit.

Question 495

A regional headquarters has two Internet circuits delivered through the same provider router and physical conduit. The observed fault is: Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. How should the issue be corrected and verified?

  1. Use two VLAN tags on one single modem as proof of independent providers.
  2. Assume redundant CE router power supplies prevent external carrier outages.
  3. Audit and diversify actual WAN delivery paths then simulate one carrier or conduit failure.
  4. Buy two circuits over the same last-mile fiber and claim complete physical diversity.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Relevant evidence includes carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results. True multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use two VLAN tags on one single modem as proof of independent providers. Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Use the controlled remediation: audit and diversify actual WAN delivery paths then simulate one carrier or conduit failure.

B:

Assume redundant CE router power supplies prevent external carrier outages. Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Use the controlled remediation: audit and diversify actual WAN delivery paths then simulate one carrier or conduit failure.

D:

Buy two circuits over the same last-mile fiber and claim complete physical diversity. Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Use the controlled remediation: audit and diversify actual WAN delivery paths then simulate one carrier or conduit failure. In this case, a regional headquarters has two Internet circuits delivered through the same provider router and physical conduit.

Question 496

An enterprise design requires WAN availability after one last-mile cable cut and a single carrier maintenance outage. What is the BEST supported implementation or corrective action?

  1. For this enterprise design, the architect should use diverse WAN providers, physically separate local loops and independent provider demarcation when justified.
  2. For this enterprise design, the architect should use two VLAN tags on one single modem as proof of independent providers.
  3. For this enterprise design, the architect should assume redundant CE router power supplies prevent external carrier outages.
  4. For this enterprise design, the architect should buy two circuits over the same last-mile fiber and claim complete physical diversity.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Confirm the result using carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results. This is the specific corrective action for Dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Use two VLAN tags on one single modem as proof of independent providers. True multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits. Instead inspect carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results.

C:

Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. In this case, an enterprise design requires WAN availability after one last-mile cable cut and a single carrier maintenance outage.

D:

Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. The relevant action is use diverse WAN providers, physically separate local loops and independent provider demarcation when justified.

Question 497

An enterprise design requires WAN availability after one last-mile cable cut and a single carrier maintenance outage. What should the operator inspect to verify the result?

  1. Inspect the following evidence: an old network diagram with no current route, policy, or redundancy state.
  2. Inspect the following evidence: a feature-license screenshot without the required design or acceptance tests.
  3. Inspect the following evidence: carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results.
  4. Inspect the following evidence: a marketing claim without measured routing, capacity or failure-domain evidence.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The intended procedure is use diverse WAN providers, physically separate local loops and independent provider demarcation when justified. This evidence observes the actual dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity mechanism and its result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This observation alone cannot establish dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity. In this case, an enterprise design requires WAN availability after one last-mile cable cut and a single carrier maintenance outage.

B:

This observation alone cannot establish dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity. A feature-license screenshot without the required design or acceptance tests.

D:

This observation alone cannot establish dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity. A marketing claim without measured routing, capacity or failure-domain evidence.

Question 498

An enterprise design requires WAN availability after one last-mile cable cut and a single carrier maintenance outage. Which technical statement is MOST accurate for this situation?

  1. The relevant principle is that cloud connectivity automatically removes any requirement for routing or policy.
  2. The relevant principle is that true multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits.
  3. The relevant principle is that any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site.
  4. The relevant principle is that a longer IP prefix is always less specific than the default route.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Confirm it with carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results. In this case, an enterprise design requires WAN availability after one last-mile cable cut and a single carrier maintenance outage.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Cloud connectivity automatically removes any requirement for routing or policy. This is an incorrect generalization for dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity. The relevant rule is true multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits. Verify using carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results.

C:

Any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site. This is an incorrect generalization for dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity. The relevant rule is true multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits. Verify using carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results.

D:

A longer IP prefix is always less specific than the default route. This is an incorrect generalization for dual-provider WAN failure-domain diversity. The relevant rule is true multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits. Verify using carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results.

Question 499

An enterprise design requires WAN availability after one last-mile cable cut and a single carrier maintenance outage. Suppose the operator instead makes this incorrect change: Buy two circuits over the same last-mile fiber and claim complete physical diversity. What weakness does the mistaken approach introduce?

  1. The resulting technical fault is that the failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless.
  2. The resulting technical fault is that collecting telemetry originally caused the missing route or service outage.
  3. The resulting technical fault is that a healthy unrelated system proves the intended failure domain is protected.
  4. The resulting technical fault is that two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The right response is use diverse WAN providers, physically separate local loops and independent provider demarcation when justified. True multihoming depends on independent failure domains, not just counting circuits.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless. The actual failure is two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Check carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results. In this case, an enterprise design requires WAN availability after one last-mile cable cut and a single carrier maintenance outage.

B:

Collecting telemetry originally caused the missing route or service outage. The actual failure is two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Check carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results.

C:

A healthy unrelated system proves the intended failure domain is protected. The actual failure is two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Check carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results. In this case, an enterprise design requires WAN availability after one last-mile cable cut and a single carrier maintenance outage.

Question 500

An enterprise design requires WAN availability after one last-mile cable cut and a single carrier maintenance outage. The observed fault is: Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Which recovery is BEST once this fault is identified?

  1. The controlled recovery is to assume redundant CE router power supplies prevent external carrier outages.
  2. The controlled recovery is to buy two circuits over the same last-mile fiber and claim complete physical diversity.
  3. The controlled recovery is to use two VLAN tags on one single modem as proof of independent providers.
  4. The controlled recovery is to audit and diversify actual WAN delivery paths then simulate one carrier or conduit failure.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Relevant evidence includes carrier IDs, path and conduit maps, diverse POPs, BGP adjacency and failure test results. This corrects the described failure and provides a verifiable outcome.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Assume redundant CE router power supplies prevent external carrier outages. Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Use the controlled remediation: audit and diversify actual WAN delivery paths then simulate one carrier or conduit failure.

B:

Buy two circuits over the same last-mile fiber and claim complete physical diversity. Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Use the controlled remediation: audit and diversify actual WAN delivery paths then simulate one carrier or conduit failure. In this case, an enterprise design requires WAN availability after one last-mile cable cut and a single carrier maintenance outage.

C:

Use two VLAN tags on one single modem as proof of independent providers. Two labeled circuits that share a duct or provider POP can fail together under a single incident. Use the controlled remediation: audit and diversify actual WAN delivery paths then simulate one carrier or conduit failure.

Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD) (300-420) Practice Tests