Cisco 300-420 Practice Test 35
Question 340
A university assigns address blocks per building and needs route stability during local link flaps. The observed fault is: Advertising an aggregate covering another campus block can misroute traffic across the wrong distribution. Which recovery is BEST once this fault is identified?
- The controlled recovery is to correct the prefix plan and summary then test both included and excluded destinations.
- The controlled recovery is to use spanning-tree root priority as a substitute for routed summarization.
- The controlled recovery is to aggregate the entire campus address range behind each individual distribution switch.
- The controlled recovery is to advertise a summary without verifying every owned subnet and null or discard handling.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Routing summarization limits churn propagation and core table detail when addresses align to stable topology. This corrects the described failure and provides a verifiable outcome.
Incorrect Answers
B:Use spanning-tree root priority as a substitute for routed summarization. Advertising an aggregate covering another campus block can misroute traffic across the wrong distribution. Use the controlled remediation: correct the prefix plan and summary then test both included and excluded destinations.
C:Aggregate the entire campus address range behind each individual distribution switch. Advertising an aggregate covering another campus block can misroute traffic across the wrong distribution. Use the controlled remediation: correct the prefix plan and summary then test both included and excluded destinations.
D:Advertise a summary without verifying every owned subnet and null or discard handling. Advertising an aggregate covering another campus block can misroute traffic across the wrong distribution. Use the controlled remediation: correct the prefix plan and summary then test both included and excluded destinations.
Question 341
A corporate campus must separate research and guest routing despite reusing similar VLAN names. Which enterprise design procedure best meets this requirement?
- Put every segment into the global route table and rely only on VLAN names for IP separation.
- Leak every route between guest and production VRFs to simplify reachability.
- Create distinct VRF routing tables and controlled route leaking only for explicitly shared services.
- Assume an access-port VLAN ID automatically creates a different IP routing instance.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:A VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision. This is the specific corrective action for Campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. The relevant action is create distinct VRF routing tables and controlled route leaking only for explicitly shared services.
B:Leak every route between guest and production VRFs to simplify reachability. A VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision. Instead inspect vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
D:Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Assume an access-port VLAN ID automatically creates a different IP routing instance.
Question 342
A corporate campus must separate research and guest routing despite reusing similar VLAN names. Which evidence best distinguishes the intended state from a superficial indicator?
- VRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
- A feature-license screenshot without the required design or acceptance tests.
- A marketing claim without measured routing, capacity or failure-domain evidence.
- A hostname inventory without effective configuration or operational measurements.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The intended procedure is create distinct VRF routing tables and controlled route leaking only for explicitly shared services. This evidence observes the actual campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation mechanism and its result.
Incorrect Answers
B:This observation alone cannot establish campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. The decisive evidence instead includes vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
C:This observation alone cannot establish campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. A VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision.
D:This observation alone cannot establish campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. A hostname inventory without effective configuration or operational measurements.
Question 343
A corporate campus must separate research and guest routing despite reusing similar VLAN names. Which underlying principle explains the correct decision?
- Any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site.
- Encryption and segmentation are identical mechanisms and can replace each other.
- Cloud connectivity automatically removes any requirement for routing or policy.
- A VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:This is why the appropriate action is create distinct VRF routing tables and controlled route leaking only for explicitly shared services. Confirm it with vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
Incorrect Answers
A:Any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site. This is an incorrect generalization for campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. The relevant rule is a VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision. Verify using vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
B:Encryption and segmentation are identical mechanisms and can replace each other. This is an incorrect generalization for campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. The relevant rule is a VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision. Verify using vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
C:Cloud connectivity automatically removes any requirement for routing or policy. This is an incorrect generalization for campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. The relevant rule is a VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision. Verify using vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
Question 344
A corporate campus must separate research and guest routing despite reusing similar VLAN names. Suppose the operator instead makes this incorrect change: Put every segment into the global route table and rely only on VLAN names for IP separation. What is the most material consequence of that mistake?
- The only issue is an inaccurate hostname while traffic paths are unaffected.
- Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable.
- A healthy unrelated system proves the intended failure domain is protected.
- The failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:This explains why the proposed shortcut does not solve campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. The right response is create distinct VRF routing tables and controlled route leaking only for explicitly shared services.
Incorrect Answers
A:The only issue is an inaccurate hostname while traffic paths are unaffected. The actual failure is placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Check vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
C:A healthy unrelated system proves the intended failure domain is protected. The actual failure is placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Check vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
D:The failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless. The actual failure is placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Check vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
Question 345
A corporate campus must separate research and guest routing despite reusing similar VLAN names. The observed fault is: Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Which controlled remediation should be used?
- Build and verify isolated VRF tables then narrowly permit shared service routes.
- Leak every route between guest and production VRFs to simplify reachability.
- Assume an access-port VLAN ID automatically creates a different IP routing instance.
- Put every segment into the global route table and rely only on VLAN names for IP separation.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:A VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision. This corrects the described failure and provides a verifiable outcome.
Incorrect Answers
B:Leak every route between guest and production VRFs to simplify reachability. Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Use the controlled remediation: build and verify isolated VRF tables then narrowly permit shared service routes.
C:Assume an access-port VLAN ID automatically creates a different IP routing instance. Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Use the controlled remediation: build and verify isolated VRF tables then narrowly permit shared service routes.
D:Put every segment into the global route table and rely only on VLAN names for IP separation. Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Use the controlled remediation: build and verify isolated VRF tables then narrowly permit shared service routes.
Question 346
A shared distribution layer serves regulated and ordinary traffic that must not exchange IP routes implicitly. What is the most defensible configuration decision?
- For this enterprise design, the architect should leak every route between guest and production VRFs to simplify reachability.
- For this enterprise design, the architect should assume an access-port VLAN ID automatically creates a different IP routing instance.
- For this enterprise design, the architect should create distinct VRF routing tables and controlled route leaking only for explicitly shared services.
- For this enterprise design, the architect should put every segment into the global route table and rely only on VLAN names for IP separation.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:A VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision. Confirm the result using vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
Incorrect Answers
A:Leak every route between guest and production VRFs to simplify reachability. A VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision. Instead inspect vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
B:Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable.
D:Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. This change targets the wrong mechanism for Campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation.
Question 347
A shared distribution layer serves regulated and ordinary traffic that must not exchange IP routes implicitly. Which evidence BEST confirms the actual technical behavior?
- Inspect the following evidence: an old network diagram with no current route, policy, or redundancy state.
- Inspect the following evidence: a feature-license screenshot without the required design or acceptance tests.
- Inspect the following evidence: vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
- Inspect the following evidence: a marketing claim without measured routing, capacity or failure-domain evidence.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The intended procedure is create distinct VRF routing tables and controlled route leaking only for explicitly shared services. A VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision.
Incorrect Answers
A:This observation alone cannot establish campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. In this case, a shared distribution layer serves regulated and ordinary traffic that must not exchange IP routes implicitly.
B:This observation alone cannot establish campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. A feature-license screenshot without the required design or acceptance tests.
D:This observation alone cannot establish campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. A marketing claim without measured routing, capacity or failure-domain evidence.
Question 348
A shared distribution layer serves regulated and ordinary traffic that must not exchange IP routes implicitly. What networking or enterprise network design concept best explains this scenario?
- The relevant principle is that cloud connectivity automatically removes any requirement for routing or policy.
- The relevant principle is that any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site.
- The relevant principle is that a VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision.
- The relevant principle is that a longer IP prefix is always less specific than the default route.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:This is why the appropriate action is create distinct VRF routing tables and controlled route leaking only for explicitly shared services.
Incorrect Answers
A:Cloud connectivity automatically removes any requirement for routing or policy. This is an incorrect generalization for campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. The relevant rule is a VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision. Verify using vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
B:Any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site. This is an incorrect generalization for campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. The relevant rule is a VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision. Verify using vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
D:A longer IP prefix is always less specific than the default route. This is an incorrect generalization for campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. The relevant rule is a VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision. Verify using vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
Question 349
A shared distribution layer serves regulated and ordinary traffic that must not exchange IP routes implicitly. Suppose the operator instead makes this incorrect change: Put every segment into the global route table and rely only on VLAN names for IP separation. Which resulting fault should the reviewer identify?
- The resulting technical fault is that the failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless.
- The resulting technical fault is that collecting telemetry originally caused the missing route or service outage.
- The resulting technical fault is that a healthy unrelated system proves the intended failure domain is protected.
- The resulting technical fault is that placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:This explains why the proposed shortcut does not solve campus VRF segmentation for tenant isolation. A VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision.
Incorrect Answers
A:The failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless. The actual failure is placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Check vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
B:Collecting telemetry originally caused the missing route or service outage. The actual failure is placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Check vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
C:A healthy unrelated system proves the intended failure domain is protected. The actual failure is placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Check vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
Question 350
A shared distribution layer serves regulated and ordinary traffic that must not exchange IP routes implicitly. The observed fault is: Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. How should the issue be corrected and verified?
- The controlled recovery is to assume an access-port VLAN ID automatically creates a different IP routing instance.
- The controlled recovery is to put every segment into the global route table and rely only on VLAN names for IP separation.
- The controlled recovery is to leak every route between guest and production VRFs to simplify reachability.
- The controlled recovery is to build and verify isolated VRF tables then narrowly permit shared service routes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:A VRF separates Layer 3 routing contexts and selective route leaking is an explicit trust-boundary decision. Relevant evidence includes vRF membership, per-VRF RIB, route targets or leaking rules and isolation tests.
Incorrect Answers
A:Assume an access-port VLAN ID automatically creates a different IP routing instance. Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Use the controlled remediation: build and verify isolated VRF tables then narrowly permit shared service routes.
B:Put every segment into the global route table and rely only on VLAN names for IP separation. Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Use the controlled remediation: build and verify isolated VRF tables then narrowly permit shared service routes.
C:Leak every route between guest and production VRFs to simplify reachability. Placing all segments in a shared global table can let unintended tenant prefixes become reachable. Use the controlled remediation: build and verify isolated VRF tables then narrowly permit shared service routes.