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Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 74

Question 730

During a scheduled validation at the Berkeley manufacturing plant, two border routers learn the same prefix, but most internal routers prefer the wrong upstream exit. Engineers must restore a customer routing segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?

  1. Set a higher local preference for the preferred egress using a scoped inbound policy at the edge.
  2. Configure a consistent loopback update source and sufficient eBGP multihop hop limit.
  3. Use next-hop-self at the correct iBGP advertising boundary or repair the actual next-hop reachability.
  4. Correct the BGP neighbor remote-as and related peer policy for the intended eBGP or iBGP relationship.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Set a higher local preference for the preferred egress using a scoped inbound policy at the edge. Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Configure a consistent loopback update source and sufficient eBGP multihop hop limit. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Loopback-sourced eBGP session), where Default eBGP TTL and packet source are designed for directly connected peers; loopback peering needs explicit settings. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.

C:

Use next-hop-self at the correct iBGP advertising boundary or repair the actual next-hop reachability. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP iBGP next-hop reachability), where An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.

D:

Correct the BGP neighbor remote-as and related peer policy for the intended eBGP or iBGP relationship. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP peer remote AS), where BGP neighbors must agree on configured peer AS identity and establish a TCP session. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.

Question 731

During a scheduled validation at the Berkeley manufacturing plant, two border routers learn the same prefix, but most internal routers prefer the wrong upstream exit. Engineers must restore a customer routing segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?

  1. Verify unique IDs in neighbor views and LSDB originators with stable LSA propagation.
  2. Confirm internal BGP speakers consistently choose the preferred exit while backup remains available.
  3. Confirm only the shared-services prefix is reachable between VRFs and other tenant prefixes remain isolated.
  4. Test router-originated packets separately from transit packets and compare next-hop selection.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Confirm internal BGP speakers consistently choose the preferred exit while backup remains available. Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Verify unique IDs in neighbor views and LSDB originators with stable LSA propagation. This is a validation for another mechanism (OSPF duplicate router ID), where OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.

C:

Confirm only the shared-services prefix is reachable between VRFs and other tenant prefixes remain isolated. This is a validation for another mechanism (VRF-Lite controlled route leaking), where VRF separation is intentional; route exchange between VRFs must be explicit and constrained. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.

D:

Test router-originated packets separately from transit packets and compare next-hop selection. This is a validation for another mechanism (Locally generated PBR), where Transit PBR on an interface does not automatically change forwarding of locally originated packets. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.

Question 732

During a scheduled validation at the Berkeley manufacturing plant, two border routers learn the same prefix, but most internal routers prefer the wrong upstream exit. Engineers must restore a customer routing segment without disturbing unrelated production services. The attempted fix creates a regression. Which scoped recovery action is most appropriate?

  1. Revert the next-hop rewrite if it diverts traffic from the intended external edge.
  2. Remove AS-path prepending if transit providers ignore it or connectivity degrades.
  3. Restore the last verified neighbor export policy if broad filtering withdraws legitimate service routes.
  4. Revert the local-preference policy if it overloads the selected WAN circuit.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Revert the local-preference policy if it overloads the selected WAN circuit. Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Revert the next-hop rewrite if it diverts traffic from the intended external edge. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP iBGP next-hop reachability), where An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.

B:

Remove AS-path prepending if transit providers ignore it or connectivity degrades. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP inbound traffic engineering), where AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.

C:

Restore the last verified neighbor export policy if broad filtering withdraws legitimate service routes. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP prefix leak prevention), where BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor. Here the evidence instead concerns bgp outbound path local preference: Within an AS, higher BGP local preference normally wins before AS-path length and MED.

Question 733

Following a production change at the Frisco manufacturing plant, a new control-plane policing policy counts legitimate OSPF hellos as excess unclassified traffic. The incident is affecting a business-critical application; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?

  1. Inspect IPv6 ND inspection logs and source validation against learned neighbor bindings.
  2. Inspect local username/secret presence and effective AAA method list applied to the VTY lines.
  3. Inspect AAA command-authorization method lists, server response attributes, and privilege level for the operator.
  4. Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Inspect the applied control-plane policy and classify actual OSPF packet counters versus default-class drops. CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Inspect IPv6 ND inspection logs and source validation against learned neighbor bindings. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 Neighbor Discovery inspection), where IPv6 ND inspection uses neighbor state and filtering to mitigate neighbor-discovery spoofing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

B:

Inspect local username/secret presence and effective AAA method list applied to the VTY lines. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (AAA local user authentication), where A local fallback requires valid local users and an AAA login method list that actually references the local database. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

C:

Inspect AAA command-authorization method lists, server response attributes, and privilege level for the operator. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (TACACS+ command authorization), where TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

Question 734

Following a production change at the Frisco manufacturing plant, a new control-plane policing policy counts legitimate OSPF hellos as excess unclassified traffic. The incident is affecting a business-critical application; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?

  1. Place the standard ACL nearer the intended destination or use a scoped extended ACL when destination precision is required.
  2. Use a policy or feasible uRPF mode appropriate for intentional asymmetry, or correct source routing where possible.
  3. Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections.
  4. Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections. CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Place the standard ACL nearer the intended destination or use a scoped extended ACL when destination precision is required. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Standard IPv4 ACL placement), where Standard IPv4 ACLs match source addresses, so placement can cause unintended broad filtering. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

B:

Use a policy or feasible uRPF mode appropriate for intentional asymmetry, or correct source routing where possible. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Strict uRPF asymmetric routing), where Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

D:

Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

Question 735

Following a production change at the Frisco manufacturing plant, a new control-plane policing policy counts legitimate OSPF hellos as excess unclassified traffic. The incident is affecting a business-critical application; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?

  1. Test traffic during and after the authorized window and inspect relevant ACL hit counts.
  2. Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence.
  3. Confirm BGP keepalives and updates remain stable while excess unsolicited control traffic is limited.
  4. Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence. CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Test traffic during and after the authorized window and inspect relevant ACL hit counts. This is a validation for another mechanism (Time-based ACL), where Time-based ACL entries depend on correct local time and an actively applied time-range definition. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

C:

Confirm BGP keepalives and updates remain stable while excess unsolicited control traffic is limited. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

D:

Test authorized SSH sessions and a bounded excess-load probe while observing CoPP counters. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

Question 736

Following a production change at the Frisco manufacturing plant, a new control-plane policing policy counts legitimate OSPF hellos as excess unclassified traffic. The incident is affecting a business-critical application; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?

  1. Roll back only the misclassified class if routing adjacency loss persists.
  2. Restore the earlier CoPP class or rate if BGP continues to flap.
  3. Reinstate the old management exception if remote administration is lost.
  4. Remove the new exception if it allows unauthorized management probes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Roll back only the misclassified class if routing adjacency loss persists. CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Restore the earlier CoPP class or rate if BGP continues to flap. This is a rollback for a different component (CoPP BGP class treatment), where CoPP can protect the route processor but over-restrictive classes can starve essential routing protocol traffic. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

C:

Reinstate the old management exception if remote administration is lost. This is a rollback for a different component (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

D:

Remove the new exception if it allows unauthorized management probes. This is a rollback for a different component (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns copp misclassification: CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU.

Question 737

During a scheduled validation at the Spokane branch site, telnet management is still reachable on a production router after a security baseline requiring encrypted administration. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?

  1. Check whether the IPv6 binding table reflects the host's current VLAN, port and address.
  2. Check the CoPP class map matching SSH traffic and corresponding exceed/drop counters.
  3. Inspect ACL time-range references, active time-range status, and router clock/time zone.
  4. Inspect VTY transport modes, SSH readiness, and AAA bindings for authorized administrators.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Inspect VTY transport modes, SSH readiness, and AAA bindings for authorized administrators. SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Check whether the IPv6 binding table reflects the host's current VLAN, port and address. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 address binding table), where Several IPv6 first-hop security features rely on accurate host address and port bindings. Here the evidence instead concerns router ssh hardened management: SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

B:

Check the CoPP class map matching SSH traffic and corresponding exceed/drop counters. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (CoPP management access), where Management packets destined to the router's CPU are subject to control-plane policing. Here the evidence instead concerns router ssh hardened management: SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

C:

Inspect ACL time-range references, active time-range status, and router clock/time zone. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Time-based ACL), where Time-based ACL entries depend on correct local time and an actively applied time-range definition. Here the evidence instead concerns router ssh hardened management: SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

Question 738

During a scheduled validation at the Spokane branch site, telnet management is still reachable on a production router after a security baseline requiring encrypted administration. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?

  1. Enable IPv6 source guard with accurate address bindings from the permitted learning mechanisms.
  2. Require SSH on management lines and disable Telnet while retaining an approved break-glass path.
  3. Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds.
  4. Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Require SSH on management lines and disable Telnet while retaining an approved break-glass path. SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Enable IPv6 source guard with accurate address bindings from the permitted learning mechanisms. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 source guard), where IPv6 source guard can filter source addresses against approved binding information. Here the evidence instead concerns router ssh hardened management: SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

C:

Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns router ssh hardened management: SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

D:

Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns router ssh hardened management: SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

Question 739

During a scheduled validation at the Spokane branch site, telnet management is still reachable on a production router after a security baseline requiring encrypted administration. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?

  1. Verify clients retain legitimate DHCPv6 configuration and reject responses from the unauthorized access port.
  2. Check authorized encrypted SSH access succeeds and Telnet connection attempts fail.
  3. Send test RAs from both authorized and unauthorized ports and verify only the authorized default gateway is learned.
  4. Test unroutable spoofed sources and valid externally routed sources with counters.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Check authorized encrypted SSH access succeeds and Telnet connection attempts fail. SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Verify clients retain legitimate DHCPv6 configuration and reject responses from the unauthorized access port. This is a validation for another mechanism (DHCPv6 server guard), where DHCPv6 Guard helps prevent rogue DHCPv6 server messages from untrusted switch ports. Here the evidence instead concerns router ssh hardened management: SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

C:

Send test RAs from both authorized and unauthorized ports and verify only the authorized default gateway is learned. This is a validation for another mechanism (IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard), where RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments. Here the evidence instead concerns router ssh hardened management: SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

D:

Test unroutable spoofed sources and valid externally routed sources with counters. This is a validation for another mechanism (Loose uRPF source validation), where Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface. Here the evidence instead concerns router ssh hardened management: SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

Question 740

During a scheduled validation at the Spokane branch site, telnet management is still reachable on a production router after a security baseline requiring encrypted administration. Engineers must restore a business-critical application without disturbing unrelated production services. The attempted fix creates a regression. Which scoped recovery action is most appropriate?

  1. Revert transport restriction only under controlled emergency access if SSH setup breaks all management.
  2. Remove the maintenance permit if clocks or schedules cannot be trusted.
  3. Restore the former ACL order if the specific permit unintentionally opens additional sources.
  4. Back out an overly restrictive ND policy if it disrupts legitimate neighbor discovery.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Revert transport restriction only under controlled emergency access if SSH setup breaks all management. SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Remove the maintenance permit if clocks or schedules cannot be trusted. This is a rollback for a different component (Time-based ACL), where Time-based ACL entries depend on correct local time and an actively applied time-range definition. Here the evidence instead concerns router ssh hardened management: SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

C:

Restore the former ACL order if the specific permit unintentionally opens additional sources. This is a rollback for a different component (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns router ssh hardened management: SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

D:

Back out an overly restrictive ND policy if it disrupts legitimate neighbor discovery. This is a rollback for a different component (IPv6 Neighbor Discovery inspection), where IPv6 ND inspection uses neighbor state and filtering to mitigate neighbor-discovery spoofing. Here the evidence instead concerns router ssh hardened management: SSH provides encrypted remote CLI transport; Telnet sends sessions without encryption.

Implementing Cisco Enterprise Advanced Routing and Services (ENARSI) (300-410) Practice Tests