Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 69
Question 680
Following a production change at the Huntsville branch site, user traffic matches an ingress PBR policy, but router-originated diagnostic packets do not use the same alternate next hop. The incident is affecting a customer routing segment; the response team has a rollback window. The new configuration worsens service. Which controlled rollback should the team perform?
- Reinstate the former configuration only after selecting a nonconflicting replacement ID.
- Revert the next-hop rewrite if it diverts traffic from the intended external edge.
- Restore the original neighbor statement if the AS migration must be backed out.
- Remove the local policy if control or management plane traffic is misdirected.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Remove the local policy if control or management plane traffic is misdirected. Transit PBR on an interface does not automatically change forwarding of locally originated packets.
Incorrect Answers
A:Reinstate the former configuration only after selecting a nonconflicting replacement ID. This is a rollback for a different component (OSPF duplicate router ID), where OSPF uses router IDs as unique LSA originator identities within the routing domain. Here the evidence instead concerns locally generated pbr: Transit PBR on an interface does not automatically change forwarding of locally originated packets.
B:Revert the next-hop rewrite if it diverts traffic from the intended external edge. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP iBGP next-hop reachability), where An iBGP speaker commonly preserves next-hop attributes unless explicitly changed, so next-hop resolution matters. Here the evidence instead concerns locally generated pbr: Transit PBR on an interface does not automatically change forwarding of locally originated packets.
C:Restore the original neighbor statement if the AS migration must be backed out. This is a rollback for a different component (BGP peer remote AS), where BGP neighbors must agree on configured peer AS identity and establish a TCP session. Here the evidence instead concerns locally generated pbr: Transit PBR on an interface does not automatically change forwarding of locally originated packets.
Question 681
Following a production change at the Lincoln warehouse network, an edge interface receives forged packets from unrouted source networks and a loose reverse-path check has not been enabled. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode.
- Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list.
- Inspect uRPF drop counters and the reverse lookup's selected egress interface for the source address.
- Identify the ingress port carrying unauthorized Router Advertisements and inspect RA Guard trust role.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode. Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Incorrect Answers
B:Inspect applied ACL permit scope and the implicit deny at the end of the list. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
C:Inspect uRPF drop counters and the reverse lookup's selected egress interface for the source address. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Strict uRPF asymmetric routing), where Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
D:Identify the ingress port carrying unauthorized Router Advertisements and inspect RA Guard trust role. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard), where RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Question 682
Following a production change at the Lincoln warehouse network, an edge interface receives forged packets from unrouted source networks and a loose reverse-path check has not been enabled. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Refresh supported binding learning or correct static bindings before enforcing dependent guard policies.
- Enable appropriate source-reachability validation with an explicit exception policy if required by design.
- Use a policy or feasible uRPF mode appropriate for intentional asymmetry, or correct source routing where possible.
- Configure a controlled local fallback method for server unavailability on the intended lines.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Enable appropriate source-reachability validation with an explicit exception policy if required by design. Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Incorrect Answers
A:Refresh supported binding learning or correct static bindings before enforcing dependent guard policies. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (IPv6 address binding table), where Several IPv6 first-hop security features rely on accurate host address and port bindings. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
C:Use a policy or feasible uRPF mode appropriate for intentional asymmetry, or correct source routing where possible. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Strict uRPF asymmetric routing), where Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
D:Configure a controlled local fallback method for server unavailability on the intended lines. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (RADIUS AAA fallback), where AAA method lists try subsequent methods for server errors, not necessarily for a definitive authentication rejection. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Question 683
Following a production change at the Lincoln warehouse network, an edge interface receives forged packets from unrouted source networks and a loose reverse-path check has not been enabled. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. Which verification result would provide the most relevant acceptance evidence?
- Test unroutable spoofed sources and valid externally routed sources with counters.
- Confirm permitted commands execute while prohibited configuration commands are still rejected and logged.
- Send test RAs from both authorized and unauthorized ports and verify only the authorized default gateway is learned.
- Validate known legitimate asymmetric flows pass while spoofed invalid-source packets remain denied.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Test unroutable spoofed sources and valid externally routed sources with counters. Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Incorrect Answers
B:Confirm permitted commands execute while prohibited configuration commands are still rejected and logged. This is a validation for another mechanism (TACACS+ command authorization), where TACACS+ can authorize individual CLI commands separately from successful login authentication. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
C:Send test RAs from both authorized and unauthorized ports and verify only the authorized default gateway is learned. This is a validation for another mechanism (IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard), where RA Guard controls where IPv6 Router Advertisements are accepted on Layer 2 access segments. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
D:Validate known legitimate asymmetric flows pass while spoofed invalid-source packets remain denied. This is a validation for another mechanism (Strict uRPF asymmetric routing), where Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Question 684
Following a production change at the Lincoln warehouse network, an edge interface receives forged packets from unrouted source networks and a loose reverse-path check has not been enabled. The incident is affecting remote-site route stability; the response team has a rollback window. Which TWO complementary steps provide both relevant fault isolation and a controlled correction?
- Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode.
- Inspect uRPF drop counters and the reverse lookup's selected egress interface for the source address.
- Enable appropriate source-reachability validation with an explicit exception policy if required by design.
- Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode. Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
C:Enable appropriate source-reachability validation with an explicit exception policy if required by design. Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Incorrect Answers
B:Inspect uRPF drop counters and the reverse lookup's selected egress interface for the source address. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Strict uRPF asymmetric routing), where Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
D:Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Question 685
During a scheduled validation at the Portland branch site, an edge interface receives forged packets from unrouted source networks and a loose reverse-path check has not been enabled. Engineers must restore a customer routing segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Which investigation should be prioritized before the engineer modifies configuration?
- Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode.
- Inspect local username/secret presence and effective AAA method list applied to the VTY lines.
- Inspect uRPF drop counters and the reverse lookup's selected egress interface for the source address.
- Inspect IPv6 ND inspection logs and source validation against learned neighbor bindings.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode. Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Incorrect Answers
B:Inspect local username/secret presence and effective AAA method list applied to the VTY lines. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (AAA local user authentication), where A local fallback requires valid local users and an AAA login method list that actually references the local database. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
C:Inspect uRPF drop counters and the reverse lookup's selected egress interface for the source address. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Strict uRPF asymmetric routing), where Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
D:Inspect IPv6 ND inspection logs and source validation against learned neighbor bindings. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (IPv6 Neighbor Discovery inspection), where IPv6 ND inspection uses neighbor state and filtering to mitigate neighbor-discovery spoofing. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Question 686
During a scheduled validation at the Portland branch site, an edge interface receives forged packets from unrouted source networks and a loose reverse-path check has not been enabled. Engineers must restore a customer routing segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Which targeted configuration or policy correction best resolves the described fault?
- Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit.
- Enable appropriate source-reachability validation with an explicit exception policy if required by design.
- Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections.
- Use a policy or feasible uRPF mode appropriate for intentional asymmetry, or correct source routing where possible.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Enable appropriate source-reachability validation with an explicit exception policy if required by design. Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Incorrect Answers
A:Add a narrowly scoped monitoring permit before the implicit deny instead of inserting a general any-any permit. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (ACL implicit deny), where IP access lists implicitly deny traffic that matches no explicit permit statement. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
C:Update the protocol-specific control-plane class match and rate without weakening unrelated protections. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
D:Use a policy or feasible uRPF mode appropriate for intentional asymmetry, or correct source routing where possible. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Strict uRPF asymmetric routing), where Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Question 687
During a scheduled validation at the Portland branch site, an edge interface receives forged packets from unrouted source networks and a loose reverse-path check has not been enabled. Engineers must restore a customer routing segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Which post-change check most directly establishes that the repair is correct?
- Validate known legitimate asymmetric flows pass while spoofed invalid-source packets remain denied.
- Verify the intended flow matches the new entry and previously denied services remain blocked.
- Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence.
- Test unroutable spoofed sources and valid externally routed sources with counters.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Test unroutable spoofed sources and valid externally routed sources with counters. Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Incorrect Answers
A:Validate known legitimate asymmetric flows pass while spoofed invalid-source packets remain denied. This is a validation for another mechanism (Strict uRPF asymmetric routing), where Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
B:Verify the intended flow matches the new entry and previously denied services remain blocked. This is a validation for another mechanism (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
C:Verify stable OSPF adjacencies and acceptable class counters during convergence. This is a validation for another mechanism (CoPP misclassification), where CoPP class maps and their policing rates determine which control-plane packets are forwarded to the CPU. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Question 688
During a scheduled validation at the Portland branch site, an edge interface receives forged packets from unrouted source networks and a loose reverse-path check has not been enabled. Engineers must restore a customer routing segment without disturbing unrelated production services. Select TWO actions: one investigation and one targeted remediation that belong together for this incident.
- Enable appropriate source-reachability validation with an explicit exception policy if required by design.
- Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode.
- Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds.
- Inspect uRPF drop counters and the reverse lookup's selected egress interface for the source address.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Enable appropriate source-reachability validation with an explicit exception policy if required by design. Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
B:Inspect reverse-route availability for packet source prefixes and the configured uRPF mode. Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Incorrect Answers
C:Move the specific desired permit above the broader deny while preserving least-privilege bounds. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (Extended ACL first-match semantics), where Extended ACL processing stops on the first matching entry, followed by an implicit deny if none matches. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
D:Inspect uRPF drop counters and the reverse lookup's selected egress interface for the source address. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (Strict uRPF asymmetric routing), where Strict uRPF can reject a packet when the best reverse route points to an interface other than its ingress. Here the evidence instead concerns loose urpf source validation: Loose uRPF primarily verifies that some acceptable reverse route exists instead of demanding the same ingress interface.
Question 689
Following a production change at the Cedar Rapids service-provider handoff, two OSPF routers remain in ExStart or Exchange after an interface MTU increase on only one side. The incident is affecting a tenant service; the response team has a rollback window. Which observation is the strongest first diagnostic check for this symptom?
- Check the area ID on the actual peering interfaces on both sides.
- Compare external LSA metric types E1/E2 and internal cost to each ASBR.
- Check ABR topology and ensure the proposed transit area can support an OSPF virtual link.
- Compare interface MTUs and DBD packet handling rather than changing OSPF cost.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Compare interface MTUs and DBD packet handling rather than changing OSPF cost. An MTU mismatch can prevent OSPF database description exchange from completing.
Incorrect Answers
A:Check the area ID on the actual peering interfaces on both sides. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (OSPF area mismatch), where OSPF neighbors must agree on the local link's area ID. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf database exchange mtu: An MTU mismatch can prevent OSPF database description exchange from completing.
B:Compare external LSA metric types E1/E2 and internal cost to each ASBR. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (OSPF external route type), where OSPF E1 considers internal path cost with external cost, while E2 primarily compares the external metric. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf database exchange mtu: An MTU mismatch can prevent OSPF database description exchange from completing.
C:Check ABR topology and ensure the proposed transit area can support an OSPF virtual link. This is an investigation for a different failure condition (OSPF backbone continuity), where An OSPF virtual link extends backbone connectivity through a suitable transit area; it is not built across a stub area. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf database exchange mtu: An MTU mismatch can prevent OSPF database description exchange from completing.
Question 690
Following a production change at the Cedar Rapids service-provider handoff, two OSPF routers remain in ExStart or Exchange after an interface MTU increase on only one side. The incident is affecting a tenant service; the response team has a rollback window. What change best addresses the root mechanism without unnecessarily changing other paths?
- Apply an explicit allowlist prefix policy outbound to the external BGP peer.
- Align the effective IP MTU values on both interfaces before considering platform-specific workarounds.
- Prepend the local AS on selected backup advertisements if permitted by upstream routing policy.
- Correct the NSSA ABR translation or external-advertisement policy for the approved prefixes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Align the effective IP MTU values on both interfaces before considering platform-specific workarounds. An MTU mismatch can prevent OSPF database description exchange from completing.
Incorrect Answers
A:Apply an explicit allowlist prefix policy outbound to the external BGP peer. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP prefix leak prevention), where BGP outbound prefix policies are the control point for which routes are advertised to an external neighbor. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf database exchange mtu: An MTU mismatch can prevent OSPF database description exchange from completing.
C:Prepend the local AS on selected backup advertisements if permitted by upstream routing policy. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (BGP inbound traffic engineering), where AS-path prepending can make an advertised path less attractive to remote BGP networks, but cannot guarantee inbound routing. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf database exchange mtu: An MTU mismatch can prevent OSPF database description exchange from completing.
D:Correct the NSSA ABR translation or external-advertisement policy for the approved prefixes. This is a configuration change for a different root cause (OSPF NSSA external route translation), where An NSSA supports Type 7 external advertisements that can be translated into Type 5 at an ABR. Here the evidence instead concerns ospf database exchange mtu: An MTU mismatch can prevent OSPF database description exchange from completing.