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This is the already implemented original solution: Apply and govern Power BI sensitivity labels with supported protection behavior. Sensitivity labels communicate and can enforce data-handling restrictions through integrated systems. It does not itself solve the new requirement.

This remains unsuitable for the original situation: Naming conventions do not invoke the governed sensitivity-label system. It also does not meet the changed need.

This observes the original approach but is not an additional action: The item displays the intended sensitivity label under policy.

Broad Admin access is unnecessary for ordinary report editing. The proposed shortcut 'Promote every report editor to Admin permanently' fails the documented need.

This addresses a separate source situation: A report author wants a colleague to create new reports from a shared semantic model. It does not directly satisfy this case's priority.

This might be appropriate after a different requirement arises: A Contributor is delegated temporary publication responsibility. It is not the best initial response to the stated case.

Product familiarity is not evidence of suitability. The actual defect in this proposal is: Broad Admin access is unnecessary for ordinary report editing.

This is reasoning supporting the preferred solution 'Assign Members or Admins to those responsible for app publication, and Contributors only where appropriate', but it does not directly name the defect in the proposed shortcut.

This addresses a different case: A report author wants a colleague to create new reports from a shared semantic model. It is not the specific defect in 'Promote every report editor to Admin permanently'.

Approval of a proposed design is not evidence of working behavior. The required observation is: Role tests show editors can change reports but only approved staff manage the app.

A future test is not yet observed operational evidence. The verification must establish: Role tests show editors can change reports but only approved staff manage the app.

This belongs to a different case: A report author wants a colleague to create new reports from a shared semantic model. It does not validate the current change.

This observes the original approach but is not an additional action: Role tests show editors can change reports but only approved staff manage the app.

This is the already implemented original solution: Assign Members or Admins to those responsible for app publication, and Contributors only where appropriate. Workspace role levels govern editing and certain publication/management capabilities. It does not itself solve the new requirement.

This remains unsuitable for the original situation: Broad Admin access is unnecessary for ordinary report editing. It also does not meet the changed need.

This might be appropriate after a different requirement arises: A regulator requires a controlled evidence export. It is not the best initial response to the stated case.

Viewing summarized data does not automatically grant unrestricted raw extraction. The proposed shortcut 'Assume a visible chart means raw row export is always permitted' fails the documented need.

This addresses a separate source situation: A national sales team must see only rows where Region equals the viewing user's assigned region. It does not directly satisfy this case's priority.

Product familiarity is not evidence of suitability. The actual defect in this proposal is: Viewing summarized data does not automatically grant unrestricted raw extraction.

This addresses a different case: A national sales team must see only rows where Region equals the viewing user's assigned region. It is not the specific defect in 'Assume a visible chart means raw row export is always permitted'.

This is reasoning supporting the preferred solution 'Test effective item permissions, RLS, sensitivity policies, and export settings together', but it does not directly name the defect in the proposed shortcut.

A future test is not yet observed operational evidence. The verification must establish: A guest can view approved aggregates but cannot export prohibited detail.

This belongs to a different case: A national sales team must see only rows where Region equals the viewing user's assigned region. It does not validate the current change.

Approval of a proposed design is not evidence of working behavior. The required observation is: A guest can view approved aggregates but cannot export prohibited detail.

This is the already implemented original solution: Test effective item permissions, RLS, sensitivity policies, and export settings together. Report viewing and underlying-data export have separate permission and governance controls. It does not itself solve the new requirement.

This remains unsuitable for the original situation: Viewing summarized data does not automatically grant unrestricted raw extraction. It also does not meet the changed need.

This observes the original approach but is not an additional action: A guest can view approved aggregates but cannot export prohibited detail.

Row filtering by itself does not conceal a column from permitted rows. The proposed shortcut 'Use only RLS EmployeeID filters and claim the Salary column cannot be discovered' fails the documented need.

This addresses a separate source situation: A finance workspace uses Contributors to edit reports but should reserve app publication to fewer trusted staff. It does not directly satisfy this case's priority. In the current question, this comparison is made against: A financial model has a salary column that must be hidden from certain roles, not just filtered by employee row. Which approach BEST meets the stated Microsoft Power BI requirement?

This might be appropriate after a different requirement arises: HR authorizes one role to read the salary field. It is not the best initial response to the stated case.

Product familiarity is not evidence of suitability. The actual defect in this proposal is: Row filtering by itself does not conceal a column from permitted rows.

This is reasoning supporting the preferred solution 'Consider object-level security for sensitive columns in supported models', but it does not directly name the defect in the proposed shortcut.

This addresses a different case: A finance workspace uses Contributors to edit reports but should reserve app publication to fewer trusted staff. It is not the specific defect in 'Use only RLS EmployeeID filters and claim the Salary column cannot be discovered'.