HP HPE7-A01 Practice Test 45
Question 440
An access VLAN is marked passive but administrators expect OSPF to build an adjacency to the downstream routed switch. If the revised setting disrupts users, which controlled rollback would be most relevant?
- Reinstate the previous mutually valid authentication key under the change plan until coordinated rotation is complete.
- Withdraw the offending external advertisement and restore the prior filtered redistribution policy for the affected campus deployment.
- Undo erroneous passive settings on designated transit interfaces and retain passive protection on client VLANs.
- Reinstate the prior accepted cost values if the updated metric diverts traffic unexpectedly.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Undo erroneous passive settings on designated transit interfaces and retain passive protection on client VLANs. A passive OSPF interface advertises its connected prefix without initiating neighbor exchange, making interface role critical. The focused rollback restores a known safe baseline before another change attempt. The decision applies to the described ospf passive interface policy situation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Reinstate the previous mutually valid authentication key under the change plan until coordinated rotation is complete. This instead concerns ospf authentication mismatch. Routing protocol authentication must agree between neighbors; a mismatched secret prevents trusted control-plane exchange. It would not safely roll back the relevant failed change. The immediate problem concerns ospf passive interface policy.
B:Withdraw the offending external advertisement and restore the prior filtered redistribution policy for the affected campus deployment. This instead concerns ospf route redistribution and loops. Redistribution moves routes between origins; without scope and loop controls, connectivity can change across many sites at once. It would not safely roll back the relevant failed change. The immediate problem concerns ospf passive interface policy.
D:Reinstate the prior accepted cost values if the updated metric diverts traffic unexpectedly. This instead concerns ospf path cost preference. OSPF route cost influences path selection among eligible OSPF paths; it must reflect planned traffic engineering rather than simply interface link state. It would not safely roll back the relevant failed change. The immediate problem concerns ospf passive interface policy.
Question 441
A network operator rotates OSPF authentication keys on one core device only, and its adjacency drops while IP reachability remains. Which investigation would best isolate the immediate network dependency?
- Inspect redistribution policy, route tags, imported prefix filters and the resulting external LSA path.
- Inspect effective OSPF interface costs and the selected path in each relevant routing table.
- Inspect OSPF authentication mode, key IDs and error logs on both ends of the adjacency.
- Inspect BGP peer IP reachability, local and remote AS configuration and session error state.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Inspect OSPF authentication mode, key IDs and error logs on both ends of the adjacency. Routing protocol authentication must agree between neighbors; a mismatched secret prevents trusted control-plane exchange. The evidence check isolates the relevant prerequisite before a disruptive change. The decision applies to the described ospf authentication mismatch situation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect redistribution policy, route tags, imported prefix filters and the resulting external LSA path. This instead concerns ospf route redistribution and loops. Redistribution moves routes between origins; without scope and loop controls, connectivity can change across many sites at once. It does not isolate the cause of the stated incident. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
B:Inspect effective OSPF interface costs and the selected path in each relevant routing table. This instead concerns ospf path cost preference. OSPF route cost influences path selection among eligible OSPF paths; it must reflect planned traffic engineering rather than simply interface link state. It does not isolate the cause of the stated incident. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
D:Inspect BGP peer IP reachability, local and remote AS configuration and session error state. This instead concerns bgp neighbor asn and tcp session. BGP peering requires correctly matched autonomous-system expectations and a reachable session path; routes cannot exchange without a valid peer. It does not isolate the cause of the stated incident. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
Question 442
A network operator rotates OSPF authentication keys on one core device only, and its adjacency drops while IP reachability remains. Which specific corrective design step best meets the stated campus requirement?
- Limit redistribution to approved prefixes and use loop-prevention tags or filtering where the topology requires them.
- Apply matching approved OSPF authentication parameters and key rotation to both routing peers.
- Set intentional supported OSPF costs consistent with design and bandwidth expectations.
- Correct the configured neighbor AS or intended local routing instance under the approved peering agreement.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Apply matching approved OSPF authentication parameters and key rotation to both routing peers. Routing protocol authentication must agree between neighbors; a mismatched secret prevents trusted control-plane exchange. The proposed configuration targets the stated dependency without broadening unrelated access. The decision applies to the described ospf authentication mismatch situation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Limit redistribution to approved prefixes and use loop-prevention tags or filtering where the topology requires them. This instead concerns ospf route redistribution and loops. Redistribution moves routes between origins; without scope and loop controls, connectivity can change across many sites at once. It would not implement the specifically required change. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
C:Set intentional supported OSPF costs consistent with design and bandwidth expectations. This instead concerns ospf path cost preference. OSPF route cost influences path selection among eligible OSPF paths; it must reflect planned traffic engineering rather than simply interface link state. It would not implement the specifically required change. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
D:Correct the configured neighbor AS or intended local routing instance under the approved peering agreement. This instead concerns bgp neighbor asn and tcp session. BGP peering requires correctly matched autonomous-system expectations and a reachable session path; routes cannot exchange without a valid peer. It would not implement the specifically required change. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
Question 443
A network operator rotates OSPF authentication keys on one core device only, and its adjacency drops while IP reachability remains. Following a targeted change, which acceptance test would most directly demonstrate success?
- Verify the OSPF neighbor rebuilds to Full with no new authentication failure events.
- Verify only authorized external routes are advertised and preferred next hops remain stable at a remote peer.
- Verify the primary next hop is selected while the backup becomes active after a controlled primary failure.
- Confirm BGP Established state and receipt of the expected authorized prefixes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Verify the OSPF neighbor rebuilds to Full with no new authentication failure events. Routing protocol authentication must agree between neighbors; a mismatched secret prevents trusted control-plane exchange. The result tests actual working behavior, not merely a saved configuration. The decision applies to the described ospf authentication mismatch situation.
Incorrect Answers
B:Verify only authorized external routes are advertised and preferred next hops remain stable at a remote peer. This instead concerns ospf route redistribution and loops. Redistribution moves routes between origins; without scope and loop controls, connectivity can change across many sites at once. It would not establish that this function actually works. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
C:Verify the primary next hop is selected while the backup becomes active after a controlled primary failure. This instead concerns ospf path cost preference. OSPF route cost influences path selection among eligible OSPF paths; it must reflect planned traffic engineering rather than simply interface link state. It would not establish that this function actually works. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
D:Confirm BGP Established state and receipt of the expected authorized prefixes. This instead concerns bgp neighbor asn and tcp session. BGP peering requires correctly matched autonomous-system expectations and a reachable session path; routes cannot exchange without a valid peer. It would not establish that this function actually works. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
Question 444
A network operator rotates OSPF authentication keys on one core device only, and its adjacency drops while IP reachability remains. The change fails acceptance. What is the safest targeted restoration action?
- Withdraw the offending external advertisement and restore the prior filtered redistribution policy.
- Restore the prior accepted cost values if the updated metric diverts traffic unexpectedly.
- Restore the previous valid ASN and peer address if the revised neighbor relationship cannot establish.
- Restore the previous mutually valid authentication key under the change plan until coordinated rotation is complete.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Restore the previous mutually valid authentication key under the change plan until coordinated rotation is complete. Routing protocol authentication must agree between neighbors; a mismatched secret prevents trusted control-plane exchange. The focused rollback restores a known safe baseline before another change attempt. The decision applies to the described ospf authentication mismatch situation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Withdraw the offending external advertisement and restore the prior filtered redistribution policy. This instead concerns ospf route redistribution and loops. Redistribution moves routes between origins; without scope and loop controls, connectivity can change across many sites at once. It would not safely roll back the relevant failed change. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
B:Restore the prior accepted cost values if the updated metric diverts traffic unexpectedly. This instead concerns ospf path cost preference. OSPF route cost influences path selection among eligible OSPF paths; it must reflect planned traffic engineering rather than simply interface link state. It would not safely roll back the relevant failed change. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
C:Restore the previous valid ASN and peer address if the revised neighbor relationship cannot establish. This instead concerns bgp neighbor asn and tcp session. BGP peering requires correctly matched autonomous-system expectations and a reachable session path; routes cannot exchange without a valid peer. It would not safely roll back the relevant failed change. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
Question 445
A branch routed interface reports OSPF authentication failures after a scheduled key change did not reach the peer. Before implementing a remedy, what should the engineer check first?
- Review redistribution policy, route tags, imported prefix filters and the resulting external LSA path.
- Review effective OSPF interface costs and the selected path in each relevant routing table.
- Review OSPF authentication mode, key IDs and error logs on both ends of the adjacency.
- Review BGP peer IP reachability, local and remote AS configuration and session error state.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Review OSPF authentication mode, key IDs and error logs on both ends of the adjacency. Routing protocol authentication must agree between neighbors; a mismatched secret prevents trusted control-plane exchange. The evidence check isolates the relevant prerequisite before a disruptive change. The decision applies to the described ospf authentication mismatch situation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Review redistribution policy, route tags, imported prefix filters and the resulting external LSA path. This instead concerns ospf route redistribution and loops. Redistribution moves routes between origins; without scope and loop controls, connectivity can change across many sites at once. It does not isolate the cause of the stated incident. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
B:Review effective OSPF interface costs and the selected path in each relevant routing table. This instead concerns ospf path cost preference. OSPF route cost influences path selection among eligible OSPF paths; it must reflect planned traffic engineering rather than simply interface link state. It does not isolate the cause of the stated incident. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
D:Review BGP peer IP reachability, local and remote AS configuration and session error state. This instead concerns bgp neighbor asn and tcp session. BGP peering requires correctly matched autonomous-system expectations and a reachable session path; routes cannot exchange without a valid peer. It does not isolate the cause of the stated incident. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
Question 446
A branch routed interface reports OSPF authentication failures after a scheduled key change did not reach the peer. The review requires TWO complementary actions: one diagnostic check and one controlled configuration remedy. Select TWO actions that together meet those requirements.
- Review redistribution policy, route tags, imported prefix filters and the resulting external LSA path.
- Review OSPF authentication mode, key IDs and error logs on both ends of the adjacency.
- Apply intentional supported OSPF costs consistent with design and bandwidth expectations.
- Enforce matching approved OSPF authentication parameters and key rotation to both routing peers.
Explanation
Correct Answers
B:Review OSPF authentication mode, key IDs and error logs on both ends of the adjacency. Routing protocol authentication must agree between neighbors; a mismatched secret prevents trusted control-plane exchange. This is the required diagnosis or controlled remedy; the other keyed action supplies the complementary role. The decision applies to the described ospf authentication mismatch situation.
D:Enforce matching approved OSPF authentication parameters and key rotation to both routing peers. Routing protocol authentication must agree between neighbors; a mismatched secret prevents trusted control-plane exchange. This is the required diagnosis or controlled remedy; the other keyed action supplies the complementary role. The decision applies to the described ospf authentication mismatch situation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Review redistribution policy, route tags, imported prefix filters and the resulting external LSA path. This instead concerns ospf route redistribution and loops. Redistribution moves routes between origins; without scope and loop controls, connectivity can change across many sites at once. It is not one of the requested paired diagnosis and configuration actions. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
C:Apply intentional supported OSPF costs consistent with design and bandwidth expectations. This instead concerns ospf path cost preference. OSPF route cost influences path selection among eligible OSPF paths; it must reflect planned traffic engineering rather than simply interface link state. It is not one of the requested paired diagnosis and configuration actions. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
Question 447
A branch routed interface reports OSPF authentication failures after a scheduled key change did not reach the peer. A deployment job reports success. Which observed result would actually validate the affected service?
- Confirm the OSPF neighbor rebuilds to Full with no new authentication failure events.
- Confirm only authorized external routes are advertised and preferred next hops remain stable at a remote peer.
- Confirm the primary next hop is selected while the backup becomes active after a controlled primary failure.
- Verify BGP Established state and receipt of the expected authorized prefixes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Confirm the OSPF neighbor rebuilds to Full with no new authentication failure events. Routing protocol authentication must agree between neighbors; a mismatched secret prevents trusted control-plane exchange. The result tests actual working behavior, not merely a saved configuration. The decision applies to the described ospf authentication mismatch situation.
Incorrect Answers
B:Confirm only authorized external routes are advertised and preferred next hops remain stable at a remote peer. This instead concerns ospf route redistribution and loops. Redistribution moves routes between origins; without scope and loop controls, connectivity can change across many sites at once. It would not establish that this function actually works. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
C:Confirm the primary next hop is selected while the backup becomes active after a controlled primary failure. This instead concerns ospf path cost preference. OSPF route cost influences path selection among eligible OSPF paths; it must reflect planned traffic engineering rather than simply interface link state. It would not establish that this function actually works. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
D:Verify BGP Established state and receipt of the expected authorized prefixes. This instead concerns bgp neighbor asn and tcp session. BGP peering requires correctly matched autonomous-system expectations and a reachable session path; routes cannot exchange without a valid peer. It would not establish that this function actually works. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
Question 448
A branch routed interface reports OSPF authentication failures after a scheduled key change did not reach the peer. If the revised setting disrupts users, which controlled rollback would be most relevant?
- Withdraw the offending external advertisement and restore the prior filtered redistribution policy for the affected campus deployment.
- Reinstate the prior accepted cost values if the updated metric diverts traffic unexpectedly.
- Reinstate the previous valid ASN and peer address if the revised neighbor relationship cannot establish.
- Reinstate the previous mutually valid authentication key under the change plan until coordinated rotation is complete.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Reinstate the previous mutually valid authentication key under the change plan until coordinated rotation is complete. Routing protocol authentication must agree between neighbors; a mismatched secret prevents trusted control-plane exchange. The focused rollback restores a known safe baseline before another change attempt. The decision applies to the described ospf authentication mismatch situation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Withdraw the offending external advertisement and restore the prior filtered redistribution policy for the affected campus deployment. This instead concerns ospf route redistribution and loops. Redistribution moves routes between origins; without scope and loop controls, connectivity can change across many sites at once. It would not safely roll back the relevant failed change. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
B:Reinstate the prior accepted cost values if the updated metric diverts traffic unexpectedly. This instead concerns ospf path cost preference. OSPF route cost influences path selection among eligible OSPF paths; it must reflect planned traffic engineering rather than simply interface link state. It would not safely roll back the relevant failed change. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
C:Reinstate the previous valid ASN and peer address if the revised neighbor relationship cannot establish. This instead concerns bgp neighbor asn and tcp session. BGP peering requires correctly matched autonomous-system expectations and a reachable session path; routes cannot exchange without a valid peer. It would not safely roll back the relevant failed change. The immediate problem concerns ospf authentication mismatch.
Question 449
A campus core redistributes static routes into OSPF but an unintended default route propagates to every branch. Which investigation would best isolate the immediate network dependency?
- Inspect effective OSPF interface costs and the selected path in each relevant routing table.
- Inspect BGP peer IP reachability, local and remote AS configuration and session error state.
- Inspect advertised-routes output, prefix-list or route-map matches and the exact remote peer policy.
- Inspect redistribution policy, route tags, imported prefix filters and the resulting external LSA path.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Inspect redistribution policy, route tags, imported prefix filters and the resulting external LSA path. Redistribution moves routes between origins; without scope and loop controls, connectivity can change across many sites at once. The evidence check isolates the relevant prerequisite before a disruptive change. The decision applies to the described ospf route redistribution and loops situation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Inspect effective OSPF interface costs and the selected path in each relevant routing table. This instead concerns ospf path cost preference. OSPF route cost influences path selection among eligible OSPF paths; it must reflect planned traffic engineering rather than simply interface link state. It does not isolate the cause of the stated incident. The immediate problem concerns ospf route redistribution and loops.
B:Inspect BGP peer IP reachability, local and remote AS configuration and session error state. This instead concerns bgp neighbor asn and tcp session. BGP peering requires correctly matched autonomous-system expectations and a reachable session path; routes cannot exchange without a valid peer. It does not isolate the cause of the stated incident. The immediate problem concerns ospf route redistribution and loops.
C:Inspect advertised-routes output, prefix-list or route-map matches and the exact remote peer policy. This instead concerns bgp prefix filtering outbound. BGP route advertisements require explicit filtering because a functioning neighbor session does not prove prefix-sharing authorization. It does not isolate the cause of the stated incident. The immediate problem concerns ospf route redistribution and loops.
Question 450
A campus core redistributes static routes into OSPF but an unintended default route propagates to every branch. Which specific corrective design step best meets the stated campus requirement?
- Set intentional supported OSPF costs consistent with design and bandwidth expectations.
- Correct the configured neighbor AS or intended local routing instance under the approved peering agreement.
- Limit redistribution to approved prefixes and use loop-prevention tags or filtering where the topology requires them.
- Constrain outbound BGP advertisement to approved prefixes and route-map matches for that peer.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Limit redistribution to approved prefixes and use loop-prevention tags or filtering where the topology requires them. Redistribution moves routes between origins; without scope and loop controls, connectivity can change across many sites at once. The proposed configuration targets the stated dependency without broadening unrelated access. The decision applies to the described ospf route redistribution and loops situation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Set intentional supported OSPF costs consistent with design and bandwidth expectations. This instead concerns ospf path cost preference. OSPF route cost influences path selection among eligible OSPF paths; it must reflect planned traffic engineering rather than simply interface link state. It would not implement the specifically required change. The immediate problem concerns ospf route redistribution and loops.
B:Correct the configured neighbor AS or intended local routing instance under the approved peering agreement. This instead concerns bgp neighbor asn and tcp session. BGP peering requires correctly matched autonomous-system expectations and a reachable session path; routes cannot exchange without a valid peer. It would not implement the specifically required change. The immediate problem concerns ospf route redistribution and loops.
D:Constrain outbound BGP advertisement to approved prefixes and route-map matches for that peer. This instead concerns bgp prefix filtering outbound. BGP route advertisements require explicit filtering because a functioning neighbor session does not prove prefix-sharing authorization. It would not implement the specifically required change. The immediate problem concerns ospf route redistribution and loops.