Question 760
A new application signature begins flagging internal update traffic as anonymization software, and administrators need packet and signature context before adding an exception. Which FortiOS 7.6 configuration or corrective action is MOST appropriate?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Investigate FortiOS application detection logs and signature revisions before creating narrowly scoped exclusions, ensuring legitimate traffic and policy intent remain visible. This directly addresses the FortiOS configuration or response required by the case. A single application signature hit may be insufficient to prove a user deliberately launched that program; classification and encrypted traffic can be imperfect. Verify with: Review application log signature name, action, profile override, FortiGuard signature version, client flow, SSL inspection and change history. Scenario: A new application signature begins flagging internal update traffic as anonymization software, and administrators need packet and signature context before adding an exception.
Incorrect Answers
Attach a current FortiGate application control profile to the correct matching firewall policy and assess SSL inspection requirements for applications that use encrypted or unusual ports. This addresses Application control signature matching and required visibility, but not the principal task of the described flow. Application detection is not identical to TCP service-port matching; encrypted or evasive traffic can require additional visibility and signature coverage. The better fit is: Investigate FortiOS application detection logs and signature revisions before creating narrowly scoped exclusions, ensuring legitimate traffic and policy intent remain visible. Scenario: A new application signature begins flagging internal update traffic as anonymization software, and administrators need packet and signature context before adding an exception.
Identify TLS protocol, hostname, certificate-chain, revocation and mutual-TLS failures separately from FortiGate firewall policy denies during outbound inspection troubleshooting. This addresses TLS and mutual-certificate handshake fault isolation, but not the principal task of the described flow. A passed TCP handshake does not prove a successful TLS handshake, and deep inspection can alter observed certificate chains or interfere with application client certificates. The better fit is: Investigate FortiOS application detection logs and signature revisions before creating narrowly scoped exclusions, ensuring legitimate traffic and policy intent remain visible. Scenario: A new application signature begins flagging internal update traffic as anonymization software, and administrators need packet and signature context before adding an exception.
Build a FortiGate intrusion prevention sensor using supported signature filters, action overrides and protected-application context, then attach it to the correct policy. This addresses IPS signature filters, severity and policy actions, but not the principal task of the described flow. Signature severity alone does not guarantee relevance; a disabled or monitor-only IPS rule may log threats without blocking, and encrypted payloads need appropriate inspection. The better fit is: Investigate FortiOS application detection logs and signature revisions before creating narrowly scoped exclusions, ensuring legitimate traffic and policy intent remain visible. Scenario: A new application signature begins flagging internal update traffic as anonymization software, and administrators need packet and signature context before adding an exception.