Pass Cisco 350-701 Exam in First Attempt Guaranteed!

Use Cisco Duo SSO and Adaptive Access to apply policy based on user group, application sensitivity, location or risk, and device health where supported. This response applies to Duo Adaptive Access and SSO context, not the controlling requirement in this case. Single sign-on simplifies authentication flow but does not mean every connected application should share identical authorization and risk policy. For this scenario, the targeted action is: Use MAC Authentication Bypass only for supported non-802.1X devices with restricted roles and inventory-backed policy. Situation: A medical device uses MAB but receives an unrestricted production VLAN because a default authorization rule is too broad.

Separate employee, guest, and personally owned device onboarding through Cisco ISE identity and authorization policies matched to legitimate use. This response applies to Cisco ISE guest and BYOD identity policies, not the controlling requirement in this case. Guest access and BYOD onboarding are authorization workflows, not a grant of permanent trusted access merely because a device connects to Wi-Fi. For this scenario, the targeted action is: Use MAC Authentication Bypass only for supported non-802.1X devices with restricted roles and inventory-backed policy. Situation: A medical device uses MAB but receives an unrestricted production VLAN because a default authorization rule is too broad.

Configure network access device 802.1X to use Cisco ISE RADIUS decisions and verify supplicant, authenticator, and server roles. This response applies to 802.1X port-based access with Cisco ISE, not the controlling requirement in this case. In 802.1X the endpoint supplicant communicates through an authenticator to a back-end authentication server; access policy follows AAA results. For this scenario, the targeted action is: Use MAC Authentication Bypass only for supported non-802.1X devices with restricted roles and inventory-backed policy. Situation: A medical device uses MAB but receives an unrestricted production VLAN because a default authorization rule is too broad.

Inspect server certificate SAN, chain trust, expiry and revocation status, negotiated protocol, and handshake errors. This step could matter for TLS certificate authentication and PKI but is not part of the required complementary pair for this case. The paired steps are: Evaluate identity, device posture, resource context, and least privilege per session rather than granting broad trust by physical network location. and Inspect sign-in strength, device compliance, resource policy, segmentation, session risk, and reevaluation triggers. Situation: An employee's risk score changes mid-session but the old network allowlist still grants full access indefinitely.

A permitted read returns validated records while unauthorized writes and non-success responses never masquerade as completed changes. This step could matter for Authenticated security API requests but is not part of the required complementary pair for this case. The paired steps are: Evaluate identity, device posture, resource context, and least privilege per session rather than granting broad trust by physical network location. and Inspect sign-in strength, device compliance, resource policy, segmentation, session risk, and reevaluation triggers. Situation: An employee's risk score changes mid-session but the old network allowlist still grants full access indefinitely.

Curate indicators with source confidence, freshness, context, and expiration before distributing to enforcement and investigation tools. This step could matter for Threat intelligence indicator lifecycle but is not part of the required complementary pair for this case. The paired steps are: Evaluate identity, device posture, resource context, and least privilege per session rather than granting broad trust by physical network location. and Inspect sign-in strength, device compliance, resource policy, segmentation, session risk, and reevaluation triggers. Situation: An employee's risk score changes mid-session but the old network allowlist still grants full access indefinitely.

Inspect supported kernel/runtime versions, telemetry capture points, performance overhead, event schemas, and control ownership. This step could matter for eBPF security telemetry scope but is not part of the required complementary pair for this case. The paired steps are: Combine dependency, container, and code security checks with change approval and deployment rollback across a DevSecOps pipeline. and Inspect dependency scan outputs, container registry status, build provenance, release gates, and remediation ownership. Situation: A security team receives a production incident after an unreviewed container image bypassed staging tests.

Require IaC templates to pass secrets, policy, and network exposure scanning before deployment and document authorized exceptions. This step could matter for Infrastructure as Code security gate but is not part of the required complementary pair for this case. The paired steps are: Combine dependency, container, and code security checks with change approval and deployment rollback across a DevSecOps pipeline. and Inspect dependency scan outputs, container registry status, build provenance, release gates, and remediation ownership. Situation: A security team receives a production incident after an unreviewed container image bypassed staging tests.

A changed unsigned image or privileged unexpected workload is blocked from the approved deployment process. This step could matter for Container workload identity and image governance but is not part of the required complementary pair for this case. The paired steps are: Combine dependency, container, and code security checks with change approval and deployment rollback across a DevSecOps pipeline. and Inspect dependency scan outputs, container registry status, build provenance, release gates, and remediation ownership. Situation: A security team receives a production incident after an unreviewed container image bypassed staging tests.

Configuration findings map to auditable benchmark controls and critical deviations are corrected without assuming every default is compliant. This outcome tests CIS device configuration baseline assessment and is not sufficient proof of the stated requirement. Here the relevant validation is: A simulated sensor failure follows the approved availability policy and exploit test traffic is blocked only when inspection is actually inline. Situation: Two security appliances are configured for high availability yet the passive link never carries inspected traffic on failover.

An unauthorized small switch cannot flood excessive MAC identities or form an unintended Layer 2 loop without detection. This outcome tests Layer 2 port hardening and storm control and is not sufficient proof of the stated requirement. Here the relevant validation is: A simulated sensor failure follows the approved availability policy and exploit test traffic is blocked only when inspection is actually inline. Situation: Two security appliances are configured for high availability yet the passive link never carries inspected traffic on failover.

Compromising one application tier does not grant unrestricted lateral access to adjacent protected workloads. This outcome tests North south versus east west segmentation and is not sufficient proof of the stated requirement. Here the relevant validation is: A simulated sensor failure follows the approved availability policy and exploit test traffic is blocked only when inspection is actually inline. Situation: Two security appliances are configured for high availability yet the passive link never carries inspected traffic on failover.

A test high-confidence threat generates one attributable case and a documented approved response without duplicate unsafe playbook actions. This outcome tests Splunk event orchestration and response workflows and is not sufficient proof of the stated requirement. Here the relevant validation is: A staged exfiltration simulation is distinguished from legitimate DNS traffic and the responsible endpoint is investigated. Situation: A workstation sends thousands of long random-looking DNS queries to one newly registered external domain.

An unauthorized sensitive export is detected and blocked or escalated while approved business uploads remain permitted. This outcome tests HTTPS and cloud-storage exfiltration containment and is not sufficient proof of the stated requirement. Here the relevant validation is: A staged exfiltration simulation is distinguished from legitimate DNS traffic and the responsible endpoint is investigated. Situation: A workstation sends thousands of long random-looking DNS queries to one newly registered external domain.

A linked multi-source incident supports proportional containment with evidence from affected devices and services. This outcome tests Cisco XDR cross-source incident correlation and is not sufficient proof of the stated requirement. Here the relevant validation is: A staged exfiltration simulation is distinguished from legitimate DNS traffic and the responsible endpoint is investigated. Situation: A workstation sends thousands of long random-looking DNS queries to one newly registered external domain.

Inspect business assets and trust boundaries, control coverage, failure paths, enforcement logs, and incident recovery dependencies. This evidence addresses Defense in depth and Cisco SAFE; it would not establish the primary issue here. The diagnostic evidence needed for this scenario is: Inspect site prefix growth, routing requirements, traffic selectors, tunnel-interface support, and failover paths. Situation: A branch deploys a virtual tunnel interface but forgets to advertise a newly added application network.

Inspect IKE proposal mismatches, pre-shared or certificate identity, UDP 500 or 4500 reachability, NAT detection, and phase negotiation logs. This evidence addresses IPsec IKE and NAT traversal; it would not establish the primary issue here. The diagnostic evidence needed for this scenario is: Inspect site prefix growth, routing requirements, traffic selectors, tunnel-interface support, and failover paths. Situation: A branch deploys a virtual tunnel interface but forgets to advertise a newly added application network.

Inspect client connection logs, authentication flow, posture result, assigned routes, certificate policy, and headend access control. This evidence addresses Remote access VPN client controls; it would not establish the primary issue here. The diagnostic evidence needed for this scenario is: Inspect site prefix growth, routing requirements, traffic selectors, tunnel-interface support, and failover paths. Situation: A branch deploys a virtual tunnel interface but forgets to advertise a newly added application network.

Correlate Investigate domain information with DNS activity, source endpoint, time range, and threat intelligence before escalating. This response applies to Investigate infrastructure attribution and false positives, not the controlling requirement in this case. Domain attribution may involve shared infrastructure and dynamic resolution; a risky domain does not imply every neighbor on the IP is malicious. For this scenario, the targeted action is: Select SSE for cloud-delivered security functions and account for SD-WAN or network connectivity when describing a complete SASE deployment. Situation: A retailer buys cloud web filtering and assumes it has automatically replaced every branch WAN router.

Direct relevant internet and private application traffic through supported cloud security enforcement with explicit user and device context. This response applies to Remote identity and traffic steering in SSE, not the controlling requirement in this case. A cloud security point of presence enforces policies only for the traffic and identities actually steered to it; the product name alone does not guarantee coverage. For this scenario, the targeted action is: Select SSE for cloud-delivered security functions and account for SD-WAN or network connectivity when describing a complete SASE deployment. Situation: A retailer buys cloud web filtering and assumes it has automatically replaced every branch WAN router.

Apply internet security controls with an authorized TLS inspection strategy and define exceptions for sensitive or unsupported applications. This response applies to HTTPS and SaaS internet inspection tradeoff, not the controlling requirement in this case. HTTPS inspection enables deeper policy evaluation on permitted traffic but requires trust deployment, privacy governance, and compatibility testing. For this scenario, the targeted action is: Select SSE for cloud-delivered security functions and account for SD-WAN or network connectivity when describing a complete SASE deployment. Situation: A retailer buys cloud web filtering and assumes it has automatically replaced every branch WAN router.

Use TACACS+ to centralize device administrator identity and command authorization with accountable audit trails. This response applies to TACACS+ administration authorization, not the controlling requirement in this case. TACACS+ commonly separates authentication, authorization, and accounting for network device administration; user authentication alone does not grant every command. For this scenario, the targeted action is: Deploy stateful inspection at defined trust boundaries and enable intrusion inspection on traffic paths where attack detection and blocking are required. Situation: A branch places a passive sensor on a mirrored port but expects it to terminate malicious sessions automatically.

Choose a supported inline security deployment that matches failure-mode and uptime requirements while retaining explicit intrusion policy enforcement. This response applies to Inline IPS availability and bypass behavior, not the controlling requirement in this case. Inline IPS can interrupt malicious traffic but insertion into a critical path requires planned high availability and transparent failure decisions. For this scenario, the targeted action is: Deploy stateful inspection at defined trust boundaries and enable intrusion inspection on traffic paths where attack detection and blocking are required. Situation: A branch places a passive sensor on a mirrored port but expects it to terminate malicious sessions automatically.

Trace FTD VPN encryption/decryption counters, routes, NAT exemptions, and ACL matching when IKE is up but applications fail. This response applies to FTD VPN up but no protected data, not the controlling requirement in this case. IKE-up status validates part of the control plane; the protected data plane requires matching routes, selectors, and NAT behavior. For this scenario, the targeted action is: Deploy stateful inspection at defined trust boundaries and enable intrusion inspection on traffic paths where attack detection and blocking are required. Situation: A branch places a passive sensor on a mirrored port but expects it to terminate malicious sessions automatically.

A supported supplicant joins the assigned network only after successful authentication and policy assignment. This outcome tests 802.1X port-based access with Cisco ISE and is not sufficient proof of the stated requirement. Here the relevant validation is: An enrolled printer communicates only with approved print services while an unknown MAC does not gain employee privileges. Situation: An attacker changes a laptop MAC address to imitate a registered printer and attempts to reach finance servers.

A staged exfiltration simulation is distinguished from legitimate DNS traffic and the responsible endpoint is investigated. This outcome tests DNS tunneling exfiltration detection and is not sufficient proof of the stated requirement. Here the relevant validation is: An enrolled printer communicates only with approved print services while an unknown MAC does not gain employee privileges. Situation: An attacker changes a laptop MAC address to imitate a registered printer and attempts to reach finance servers.

A riskier session receives a stronger verification or denial decision without blocking routine authorized access unnecessarily. This outcome tests Duo Adaptive Access and SSO context and is not sufficient proof of the stated requirement. Here the relevant validation is: An enrolled printer communicates only with approved print services while an unknown MAC does not gain employee privileges. Situation: An attacker changes a laptop MAC address to imitate a registered printer and attempts to reach finance servers.

Tampered artifacts fail integrity verification and long-lived confidential workflows have a documented algorithm migration path. This outcome tests Cryptographic hashes and post-quantum planning and is not sufficient proof of the stated requirement. Here the relevant validation is: New approved networks traverse the intended secured virtual tunnel without proliferating inconsistent policy selectors. Situation: A policy-based tunnel permits one subnet pair while administrators expect all branch routing to traverse it.

Confirmed malicious indicators are shared and acted upon while expired or disputed indicators no longer cause unjustified blocking. This outcome tests Threat intelligence indicator lifecycle and is not sufficient proof of the stated requirement. Here the relevant validation is: New approved networks traverse the intended secured virtual tunnel without proliferating inconsistent policy selectors. Situation: A policy-based tunnel permits one subnet pair while administrators expect all branch routing to traverse it.

Authorized managed devices establish intended access while untrusted endpoints or excluded networks cannot bypass remote-access policy. This outcome tests Remote access VPN client controls and is not sufficient proof of the stated requirement. Here the relevant validation is: New approved networks traverse the intended secured virtual tunnel without proliferating inconsistent policy selectors. Situation: A policy-based tunnel permits one subnet pair while administrators expect all branch routing to traverse it.

Compare running Cisco IOS XE or Secure Firewall settings to an applicable CIS benchmark, document justified exceptions, and remediate deviations. This response applies to CIS device configuration baseline assessment, not the controlling requirement in this case. Security benchmarks are version-specific prescriptive baselines; blindly applying all recommendations without operational review can disrupt required services. For this scenario, the targeted action is: Correlate encrypted flow characteristics with endpoint, DNS, and identity context rather than assuming encrypted payloads are visible to ordinary sensors. Situation: A device sends frequent small HTTPS bursts to a suspicious host while TLS decryption is prohibited by company privacy policy.

Diagnose VPN setup failures in phase order by comparing peer reachability, authentication identities, and mutually supported IKE and IPsec proposals. This response applies to FTD IKE negotiation failure isolation, not the controlling requirement in this case. Tunnel establishment progresses through distinct authentication and negotiation stages; changing unrelated firewall rules cannot fix mismatched proposals. For this scenario, the targeted action is: Correlate encrypted flow characteristics with endpoint, DNS, and identity context rather than assuming encrypted payloads are visible to ordinary sensors. Situation: A device sends frequent small HTTPS bursts to a suspicious host while TLS decryption is prohibited by company privacy policy.

Collect and analyze flow-level metadata to identify communication patterns and suspicious volume while acknowledging payload visibility limits. This response applies to NetFlow and telemetry flow analysis, not the controlling requirement in this case. Flow telemetry summarizes communicating endpoints and counters; packet payload inspection requires different data sources. For this scenario, the targeted action is: Correlate encrypted flow characteristics with endpoint, DNS, and identity context rather than assuming encrypted payloads are visible to ordinary sensors. Situation: A device sends frequent small HTTPS bursts to a suspicious host while TLS decryption is prohibited by company privacy policy.