Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 94
Question 930
A personal device owner needs to change a device's description without gaining global ISE administrator privileges. The observed failure is: Incorrect ownership mapping can hide or expose device registrations to the wrong person. How should the administrator correct and verify this failure?
- The supported recovery is to disable owner scope so every employee can modify all registered devices.
- The supported recovery is to grant every BYOD user global ISE administrator to edit one phone.
- The supported recovery is to assume an endpoint nickname is a verified ownership claim.
- The supported recovery is to correct ownership and portal authorization then test intended and forbidden device visibility.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:My Devices provides scoped self-service for employee-owned endpoints rather than full system management. For the specific situation, a personal device owner needs to change a device's description without gaining global ISE administrator privileges.
Incorrect Answers
A:Disable owner scope so every employee can modify all registered devices. This action does not repair the identified failure. Incorrect ownership mapping can hide or expose device registrations to the wrong person. Instead, correct ownership and portal authorization then test intended and forbidden device visibility. For the specific situation, a personal device owner needs to change a device's description without gaining global ISE administrator privileges.
B:Grant every BYOD user global ISE administrator to edit one phone. This action does not repair the identified failure. Incorrect ownership mapping can hide or expose device registrations to the wrong person. Instead, correct ownership and portal authorization then test intended and forbidden device visibility. For the specific situation, a personal device owner needs to change a device's description without gaining global ISE administrator privileges.
C:Assume an endpoint nickname is a verified ownership claim. This action does not repair the identified failure. Incorrect ownership mapping can hide or expose device registrations to the wrong person. Instead, correct ownership and portal authorization then test intended and forbidden device visibility. For the specific situation, a personal device owner needs to change a device's description without gaining global ISE administrator privileges.
Question 931
An employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication. Which configuration decision most directly satisfies the requirement?
- Assume changing the device nickname to stolen prevents RADIUS access.
- Delete every employee account to disable one lost phone.
- Mark the personal endpoint lost or stolen through approved My Devices or administrator block-list workflow and verify network denial.
- Treat the phone's last GPS location as proof its certificate was revoked.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Verify the effect through my Devices status, Blocked List group, CoA, certificate status and failed subsequent access. Device block status and network reauthorization can restrict an enrolled device after loss.
Incorrect Answers
A:This does not implement the required control for BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. Leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials.
B:Delete every employee account to disable one lost phone. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. Device block status and network reauthorization can restrict an enrolled device after loss. The relevant evidence is my Devices status, Blocked List group, CoA, certificate status and failed subsequent access. For the specific situation, an employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication.
D:Leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials. Instead the intended policy action is mark the personal endpoint lost or stolen through approved My Devices or administrator block-list workflow and verify network denial.
Question 932
An employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication. What observations most directly test this network-access condition?
- My Devices status, Blocked List group, CoA, certificate status and failed subsequent access.
- A switch interface description without any live AAA request or response.
- An old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence.
- A current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:These observations directly establish the result of BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action for the described endpoint or network device. Device block status and network reauthorization can restrict an enrolled device after loss.
Incorrect Answers
B:This observation cannot verify BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. Device block status and network reauthorization can restrict an enrolled device after loss.
C:This observation cannot verify BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. Check my Devices status, Blocked List group, CoA, certificate status and failed subsequent access.
D:This observation cannot verify BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. For the specific situation, an employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication.
Question 933
An employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication. What principle of ISE authentication and authorization explains this case?
- Device block status and network reauthorization can restrict an enrolled device after loss.
- A captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling.
- A successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified.
- Every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The supported implementation is to mark the personal endpoint lost or stolen through approved My Devices or administrator block-list workflow and verify network denial. For the specific situation, an employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication.
Incorrect Answers
B:This generalization is not valid for BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. Instead device block status and network reauthorization can restrict an enrolled device after loss.
C:This generalization is not valid for BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. Verify the actual state using my Devices status, Blocked List group, CoA, certificate status and failed subsequent access.
D:This generalization is not valid for BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. Every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications.
Question 934
An employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Assume changing the device nickname to stolen prevents RADIUS access. Which negative consequence BEST explains the shortcut’s flaw?
- Reading the authentication event report caused the original network access outage.
- Leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials.
- The only result is an unrelated portal background color change.
- Accurate device accounting automatically created every earlier failed EAP exchange.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The shortcut is unsuitable because device block status and network reauthorization can restrict an enrolled device after loss. For the specific situation, an employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication.
Incorrect Answers
A:This unrelated assertion does not explain the BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action problem. The relevant risk is that leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials.
C:This unrelated assertion does not explain the BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action problem. Check my Devices status, Blocked List group, CoA, certificate status and failed subsequent access.
D:This unrelated assertion does not explain the BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action problem. For the specific situation, an employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication.
Question 935
An employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication. The observed failure is: Leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials. How should the administrator correct and verify this failure?
- Delete every employee account to disable one lost phone.
- Treat the phone's last GPS location as proof its certificate was revoked.
- Apply the lost-device controls and verify active and new sessions are blocked.
- Assume changing the device nickname to stolen prevents RADIUS access.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Device block status and network reauthorization can restrict an enrolled device after loss. For the specific situation, an employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication.
Incorrect Answers
A:Delete every employee account to disable one lost phone. This action does not repair the identified failure. Leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials. Instead, apply the lost-device controls and verify active and new sessions are blocked. For the specific situation, an employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication.
B:Treat the phone's last GPS location as proof its certificate was revoked. This action does not repair the identified failure. Leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials. Instead, apply the lost-device controls and verify active and new sessions are blocked. For the specific situation, an employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication.
D:Assume changing the device nickname to stolen prevents RADIUS access. This action does not repair the identified failure. Leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials. Instead, apply the lost-device controls and verify active and new sessions are blocked. For the specific situation, an employee reports a stolen personal phone still capable of network EAP-TLS authentication.
Question 936
Security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage. Which administrator action is appropriate for this ISE access-control problem?
- In this case, delete every employee account to disable one lost phone.
- In this case, treat the phone's last GPS location as proof its certificate was revoked.
- In this case, mark the personal endpoint lost or stolen through approved My Devices or administrator block-list workflow and verify network denial.
- In this case, assume changing the device nickname to stolen prevents RADIUS access.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Verify the effect through my Devices status, Blocked List group, CoA, certificate status and failed subsequent access. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
Incorrect Answers
A:Delete every employee account to disable one lost phone. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. Device block status and network reauthorization can restrict an enrolled device after loss. The relevant evidence is my Devices status, Blocked List group, CoA, certificate status and failed subsequent access. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
B:Leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
D:This does not implement the required control for BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
Question 937
Security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage. Which collected records establish that the ISE decision actually took effect?
- The supporting evidence is a successful ICMP echo that does not test the required identity-service workflow.
- The supporting evidence is a switch interface description without any live AAA request or response.
- The supporting evidence is my Devices status, Blocked List group, CoA, certificate status and failed subsequent access.
- The supporting evidence is an old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:These observations directly establish the result of BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action for the described endpoint or network device. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
Incorrect Answers
A:This observation cannot verify BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
B:This observation cannot verify BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. A switch interface description without any live AAA request or response.
D:This observation cannot verify BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. An old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence.
Question 938
Security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage. Which statement about the relevant technology is correct?
- The governing principle is that every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications.
- The governing principle is that device block status and network reauthorization can restrict an enrolled device after loss.
- The governing principle is that a captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling.
- The governing principle is that a MAC address is a cryptographic proof of endpoint device ownership.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The supported implementation is to mark the personal endpoint lost or stolen through approved My Devices or administrator block-list workflow and verify network denial. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
Incorrect Answers
A:This generalization is not valid for BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
C:This generalization is not valid for BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. A captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling.
D:This generalization is not valid for BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action. A MAC address is a cryptographic proof of endpoint device ownership.
Question 939
Security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Assume changing the device nickname to stolen prevents RADIUS access. What specific security or operational failure should be anticipated?
- The material consequence is that accurate device accounting automatically created every earlier failed EAP exchange.
- The material consequence is that leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials.
- The material consequence is that inspecting a correct endpoint certificate generated the original directory outage.
- The material consequence is that the only result is an unrelated portal background color change.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The shortcut is unsuitable because device block status and network reauthorization can restrict an enrolled device after loss. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
Incorrect Answers
A:This unrelated assertion does not explain the BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action problem. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
C:This unrelated assertion does not explain the BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action problem. Inspecting a correct endpoint certificate generated the original directory outage.
D:This unrelated assertion does not explain the BYOD lost or stolen device blocked-list action problem. The only result is an unrelated portal background color change.
Question 940
Security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage. The observed failure is: Leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials. Which remediation resolves the underlying fault while maintaining policy?
- The supported recovery is to treat the phone's last GPS location as proof its certificate was revoked.
- The supported recovery is to assume changing the device nickname to stolen prevents RADIUS access.
- The supported recovery is to delete every employee account to disable one lost phone.
- The supported recovery is to apply the lost-device controls and verify active and new sessions are blocked.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Device block status and network reauthorization can restrict an enrolled device after loss. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
Incorrect Answers
A:Treat the phone's last GPS location as proof its certificate was revoked. This action does not repair the identified failure. Leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials. Instead, apply the lost-device controls and verify active and new sessions are blocked. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
B:Assume changing the device nickname to stolen prevents RADIUS access. This action does not repair the identified failure. Leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials. Instead, apply the lost-device controls and verify active and new sessions are blocked. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.
C:Delete every employee account to disable one lost phone. This action does not repair the identified failure. Leaving a stolen endpoint in a trusted identity group can permit reuse of its credentials. Instead, apply the lost-device controls and verify active and new sessions are blocked. For the specific situation, security staff need immediate user-driven blocking while retaining forensic evidence and account linkage.