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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 90

Question 890

A new device certificate contains a shared generic username and authentication policy cannot establish unique owner. The observed failure is: Duplicate or improperly mapped certificate subjects can assign access to an unintended account. How should the administrator correct and verify this failure?

  1. The supported recovery is to fix template identity fields and reissue certificates then verify expected account and device mapping.
  2. The supported recovery is to ignore user-to-device association because TLS is encrypted.
  3. The supported recovery is to assign every personal device the same shared certificate username.
  4. The supported recovery is to use only the certificate's friendly local nickname as identity evidence.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Recheck issued certificate subject and SAN, mapped user, endpoint record, authentication detail and authorization group. For the specific situation, a new device certificate contains a shared generic username and authentication policy cannot establish unique owner.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Ignore user-to-device association because TLS is encrypted. This action does not repair the identified failure. Duplicate or improperly mapped certificate subjects can assign access to an unintended account. Instead, fix template identity fields and reissue certificates then verify expected account and device mapping. For the specific situation, a new device certificate contains a shared generic username and authentication policy cannot establish unique owner.

C:

Assign every personal device the same shared certificate username. This action does not repair the identified failure. Duplicate or improperly mapped certificate subjects can assign access to an unintended account. Instead, fix template identity fields and reissue certificates then verify expected account and device mapping. For the specific situation, a new device certificate contains a shared generic username and authentication policy cannot establish unique owner.

D:

Use only the certificate's friendly local nickname as identity evidence. This action does not repair the identified failure. Duplicate or improperly mapped certificate subjects can assign access to an unintended account. Instead, fix template identity fields and reissue certificates then verify expected account and device mapping. For the specific situation, a new device certificate contains a shared generic username and authentication policy cannot establish unique owner.

Question 891

A newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi. Which configuration decision most directly satisfies the requirement?

  1. Tell users to accept any EAP certificate warning on corporate Wi-Fi.
  2. Deliver a pinned or explicitly trusted ISE EAP server identity and the appropriate issuing CA chain in the BYOD profile.
  3. Assume the client-issued certificate automatically validates the ISE server's hostname.
  4. Replace trusted-server validation with a visible SSID name alone.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This does not implement the required control for BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. Disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure.

C:

Assume the client-issued certificate automatically validates the ISE server's hostname. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. Mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. The relevant evidence is supplicant trusted server names, installed CA roots, server certificate, EAP exchange and network selection. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

D:

Disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

Question 892

A newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi. What observations most directly test this network-access condition?

  1. A device hostname alone without the policy result or authenticated source.
  2. Supplicant trusted server names, installed CA roots, server certificate, EAP exchange and network selection.
  3. A current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment.
  4. A browser theme label without a current authorization trace.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. These observations directly establish the result of BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust for the described endpoint or network device.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This observation cannot verify BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. Mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential.

C:

This observation cannot verify BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

D:

This observation cannot verify BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. Check supplicant trusted server names, installed CA roots, server certificate, EAP exchange and network selection.

Question 893

A newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi. What principle of ISE authentication and authorization explains this case?

  1. A successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified.
  2. All Cisco ISE administration and policy personas perform exactly the same service.
  3. A policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state.
  4. Mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The supported implementation is to deliver a pinned or explicitly trusted ISE EAP server identity and the appropriate issuing CA chain in the BYOD profile. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified. This generalization is not valid for BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. Instead mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. Verify the actual state using supplicant trusted server names, installed CA roots, server certificate, EAP exchange and network selection. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

B:

All Cisco ISE administration and policy personas perform exactly the same service. This generalization is not valid for BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. Instead mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. Verify the actual state using supplicant trusted server names, installed CA roots, server certificate, EAP exchange and network selection. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

C:

A policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state. This generalization is not valid for BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. Instead mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. Verify the actual state using supplicant trusted server names, installed CA roots, server certificate, EAP exchange and network selection. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

Question 894

A newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Tell users to accept any EAP certificate warning on corporate Wi-Fi. Which negative consequence BEST explains the shortcut’s flaw?

  1. A justified least-privilege ACL caused every unrelated network authentication fault.
  2. Disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure.
  3. A correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.
  4. Reading the authentication event report caused the original network access outage.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The shortcut is unsuitable because mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust problem. The relevant risk is that disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure.

C:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust problem. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

D:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust problem. Check supplicant trusted server names, installed CA roots, server certificate, EAP exchange and network selection.

Question 895

A newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi. The observed failure is: Disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure. How should the administrator correct and verify this failure?

  1. Correct trust and server identity settings and test approved and unapproved authentication servers.
  2. Assume the client-issued certificate automatically validates the ISE server's hostname.
  3. Replace trusted-server validation with a visible SSID name alone.
  4. Tell users to accept any EAP certificate warning on corporate Wi-Fi.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. This restores the intended operational behavior for BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Assume the client-issued certificate automatically validates the ISE server's hostname. This action does not repair the identified failure. Disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure. Instead, correct trust and server identity settings and test approved and unapproved authentication servers. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

C:

Replace trusted-server validation with a visible SSID name alone. This action does not repair the identified failure. Disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure. Instead, correct trust and server identity settings and test approved and unapproved authentication servers. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

D:

Tell users to accept any EAP certificate warning on corporate Wi-Fi. This action does not repair the identified failure. Disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure. Instead, correct trust and server identity settings and test approved and unapproved authentication servers. For the specific situation, a newly enrolled iOS device has a valid client certificate but refuses the ISE EAP server presented by Wi-Fi.

Question 896

A supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication. Which administrator action is appropriate for this ISE access-control problem?

  1. In this case, assume the client-issued certificate automatically validates the ISE server's hostname.
  2. In this case, replace trusted-server validation with a visible SSID name alone.
  3. In this case, deliver a pinned or explicitly trusted ISE EAP server identity and the appropriate issuing CA chain in the BYOD profile.
  4. In this case, tell users to accept any EAP certificate warning on corporate Wi-Fi.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. For the specific situation, a supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Assume the client-issued certificate automatically validates the ISE server's hostname. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. Mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. The relevant evidence is supplicant trusted server names, installed CA roots, server certificate, EAP exchange and network selection. For the specific situation, a supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication.

B:

Disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure. For the specific situation, a supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication.

D:

This does not implement the required control for BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. For the specific situation, a supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication.

Question 897

A supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication. Which collected records establish that the ISE decision actually took effect?

  1. The supporting evidence is a switch interface description without any live AAA request or response.
  2. The supporting evidence is a device hostname alone without the policy result or authenticated source.
  3. The supporting evidence is a current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment.
  4. The supporting evidence is supplicant trusted server names, installed CA roots, server certificate, EAP exchange and network selection.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. Supplicant trusted server names, installed CA roots, server certificate, EAP exchange and network selection.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This observation cannot verify BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. For the specific situation, a supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication.

B:

This observation cannot verify BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. A device hostname alone without the policy result or authenticated source.

C:

This observation cannot verify BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. A current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment.

Question 898

A supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication. Which statement about the relevant technology is correct?

  1. The governing principle is that a policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state.
  2. The governing principle is that mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential.
  3. The governing principle is that a successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified.
  4. The governing principle is that every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The supported implementation is to deliver a pinned or explicitly trusted ISE EAP server identity and the appropriate issuing CA chain in the BYOD profile. For the specific situation, a supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This generalization is not valid for BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. Instead mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential.

C:

This generalization is not valid for BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. For the specific situation, a supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication.

D:

This generalization is not valid for BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust. Verify the actual state using supplicant trusted server names, installed CA roots, server certificate, EAP exchange and network selection.

Question 899

A supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Tell users to accept any EAP certificate warning on corporate Wi-Fi. What specific security or operational failure should be anticipated?

  1. The material consequence is that disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure.
  2. The material consequence is that reading the authentication event report caused the original network access outage.
  3. The material consequence is that the only result is an unrelated portal background color change.
  4. The material consequence is that a correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The shortcut is unsuitable because mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. For the specific situation, a supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust problem. For the specific situation, a supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication.

C:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust problem. The only result is an unrelated portal background color change.

D:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the BYOD EAP TLS server certificate trust problem. A correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.

Question 900

A supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication. The observed failure is: Disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure. Which remediation resolves the underlying fault while maintaining policy?

  1. The supported recovery is to replace trusted-server validation with a visible SSID name alone.
  2. The supported recovery is to tell users to accept any EAP certificate warning on corporate Wi-Fi.
  3. The supported recovery is to assume the client-issued certificate automatically validates the ISE server's hostname.
  4. The supported recovery is to correct trust and server identity settings and test approved and unapproved authentication servers.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Mutual EAP-TLS requires validation of the legitimate server as well as a valid client credential. Recheck supplicant trusted server names, installed CA roots, server certificate, EAP exchange and network selection.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Replace trusted-server validation with a visible SSID name alone. This action does not repair the identified failure. Disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure. Instead, correct trust and server identity settings and test approved and unapproved authentication servers. For the specific situation, a supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication.

B:

Tell users to accept any EAP certificate warning on corporate Wi-Fi. This action does not repair the identified failure. Disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure. Instead, correct trust and server identity settings and test approved and unapproved authentication servers. For the specific situation, a supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication.

C:

Assume the client-issued certificate automatically validates the ISE server's hostname. This action does not repair the identified failure. Disabling server validation can permit credential disclosure or authentication with rogue infrastructure. Instead, correct trust and server identity settings and test approved and unapproved authentication servers. For the specific situation, a supplicant profile trusts too many root authorities and users can be exposed to lookalike network authentication.

Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE) (300-715) Practice Tests