Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 77
Question 760
An engineer creates a restricted medical endpoint group yet devices keep receiving the default MAB permit. The observed failure is: A broad prior permit can shadow a restricted group condition and overgrant access. Which controlled recovery BEST restores the intended state?
- The supported recovery is to ignore live session authorization after moving an identity group.
- The supported recovery is to assume an endpoint group's display name automatically inserts an ACL into the switch.
- The supported recovery is to make every unknown endpoint match a broad guest permit with internal access.
- The supported recovery is to fix group and condition precedence then reauthorize and confirm restricted resources.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:This restores the intended operational behavior for Endpoint identity group move and policy precedence. For the specific situation, an engineer creates a restricted medical endpoint group yet devices keep receiving the default MAB permit.
Incorrect Answers
A:Ignore live session authorization after moving an identity group. This action does not repair the identified failure. A broad prior permit can shadow a restricted group condition and overgrant access. Instead, fix group and condition precedence then reauthorize and confirm restricted resources. For the specific situation, an engineer creates a restricted medical endpoint group yet devices keep receiving the default MAB permit.
B:Assume an endpoint group's display name automatically inserts an ACL into the switch. This action does not repair the identified failure. A broad prior permit can shadow a restricted group condition and overgrant access. Instead, fix group and condition precedence then reauthorize and confirm restricted resources. For the specific situation, an engineer creates a restricted medical endpoint group yet devices keep receiving the default MAB permit.
C:Make every unknown endpoint match a broad guest permit with internal access. This action does not repair the identified failure. A broad prior permit can shadow a restricted group condition and overgrant access. Instead, fix group and condition precedence then reauthorize and confirm restricted resources. For the specific situation, an engineer creates a restricted medical endpoint group yet devices keep receiving the default MAB permit.
Question 761
A retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile. What is the BEST supported ISE implementation or corrective action?
- Treat yesterday's MAC profile as perpetual proof of the same physical hardware.
- Configure supported endpoint attribute aging and reconciliation against current observed sources.
- Disable all endpoint discovery because the inventory database contains entries.
- Grant permanent administrator permissions to avoid profile aging.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Verify the effect through endpoint first and last seen, profiling attribute timestamps, purge rules and new session observations. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
Incorrect Answers
A:This does not implement the required control for Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
C:Disable all endpoint discovery because the inventory database contains entries. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. Stale cached endpoint attributes can remain after physical device identity or placement changes. The relevant evidence is endpoint first and last seen, profiling attribute timestamps, purge rules and new session observations. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
D:Grant permanent administrator permissions to avoid profile aging. This leaves the original requirement unresolved. Retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices. Instead the intended policy action is configure supported endpoint attribute aging and reconciliation against current observed sources. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
Question 762
A retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile. Which evidence BEST verifies the intended operational outcome?
- A successful ICMP echo that does not test the required identity-service workflow.
- Endpoint first and last seen, profiling attribute timestamps, purge rules and new session observations.
- A browser theme label without a current authorization trace.
- An old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:These observations directly establish the result of Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data for the described endpoint or network device. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
Incorrect Answers
A:This observation cannot verify Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. Stale cached endpoint attributes can remain after physical device identity or placement changes.
C:This observation cannot verify Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
D:This observation cannot verify Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. Check endpoint first and last seen, profiling attribute timestamps, purge rules and new session observations.
Question 763
A retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile. Which technical principle BEST explains the required decision?
- All Cisco ISE administration and policy personas perform exactly the same service.
- A captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling.
- A MAC address is a cryptographic proof of endpoint device ownership.
- Stale cached endpoint attributes can remain after physical device identity or placement changes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The supported implementation is to configure supported endpoint attribute aging and reconciliation against current observed sources. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
Incorrect Answers
A:This generalization is not valid for Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. Instead stale cached endpoint attributes can remain after physical device identity or placement changes.
B:This generalization is not valid for Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
C:This generalization is not valid for Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. Verify the actual state using endpoint first and last seen, profiling attribute timestamps, purge rules and new session observations.
Question 764
A retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Treat yesterday's MAC profile as perpetual proof of the same physical hardware. What material risk or failure follows from that shortcut?
- Accurate device accounting automatically created every earlier failed EAP exchange.
- Inspecting a correct endpoint certificate generated the original directory outage.
- Retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices.
- A justified least-privilege ACL caused every unrelated network authentication fault.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The shortcut is unsuitable because stale cached endpoint attributes can remain after physical device identity or placement changes. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
Incorrect Answers
A:This unrelated assertion does not explain the Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data problem. The relevant risk is that retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices.
B:This unrelated assertion does not explain the Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data problem. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
D:This unrelated assertion does not explain the Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data problem. Check endpoint first and last seen, profiling attribute timestamps, purge rules and new session observations.
Question 765
A retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile. The observed failure is: Retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices. Which controlled recovery BEST restores the intended state?
- Disable all endpoint discovery because the inventory database contains entries.
- Expire or correct stale attributes and reprofile from current evidence before applying access.
- Grant permanent administrator permissions to avoid profile aging.
- Treat yesterday's MAC profile as perpetual proof of the same physical hardware.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Recheck endpoint first and last seen, profiling attribute timestamps, purge rules and new session observations. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
Incorrect Answers
A:Disable all endpoint discovery because the inventory database contains entries. This action does not repair the identified failure. Retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices. Instead, expire or correct stale attributes and reprofile from current evidence before applying access. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
C:Grant permanent administrator permissions to avoid profile aging. This action does not repair the identified failure. Retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices. Instead, expire or correct stale attributes and reprofile from current evidence before applying access. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
D:Treat yesterday's MAC profile as perpetual proof of the same physical hardware. This action does not repair the identified failure. Retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices. Instead, expire or correct stale attributes and reprofile from current evidence before applying access. For the specific situation, a retired phone MAC is reused by an unrelated device but ISE retains its old high-trust profile.
Question 766
Device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization. Which configuration decision most directly satisfies the requirement?
- In this case, disable all endpoint discovery because the inventory database contains entries.
- In this case, grant permanent administrator permissions to avoid profile aging.
- In this case, treat yesterday's MAC profile as perpetual proof of the same physical hardware.
- In this case, configure supported endpoint attribute aging and reconciliation against current observed sources.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Verify the effect through endpoint first and last seen, profiling attribute timestamps, purge rules and new session observations. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
Incorrect Answers
A:Disable all endpoint discovery because the inventory database contains entries. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. Stale cached endpoint attributes can remain after physical device identity or placement changes. The relevant evidence is endpoint first and last seen, profiling attribute timestamps, purge rules and new session observations. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
B:Grant permanent administrator permissions to avoid profile aging. This leaves the original requirement unresolved. Retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices. Instead the intended policy action is configure supported endpoint attribute aging and reconciliation against current observed sources. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
C:This does not implement the required control for Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
Question 767
Device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization. What observations most directly test this network-access condition?
- The supporting evidence is endpoint first and last seen, profiling attribute timestamps, purge rules and new session observations.
- The supporting evidence is a device hostname alone without the policy result or authenticated source.
- The supporting evidence is a successful ICMP echo that does not test the required identity-service workflow.
- The supporting evidence is a browser theme label without a current authorization trace.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:These observations directly establish the result of Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data for the described endpoint or network device. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
Incorrect Answers
B:This observation cannot verify Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
C:This observation cannot verify Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. A successful ICMP echo that does not test the required identity-service workflow.
D:This observation cannot verify Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. A browser theme label without a current authorization trace.
Question 768
Device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization. What principle of ISE authentication and authorization explains this case?
- The governing principle is that a MAC address is a cryptographic proof of endpoint device ownership.
- The governing principle is that all Cisco ISE administration and policy personas perform exactly the same service.
- The governing principle is that a policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state.
- The governing principle is that stale cached endpoint attributes can remain after physical device identity or placement changes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The supported implementation is to configure supported endpoint attribute aging and reconciliation against current observed sources. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
Incorrect Answers
A:This generalization is not valid for Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
B:This generalization is not valid for Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. All Cisco ISE administration and policy personas perform exactly the same service.
C:This generalization is not valid for Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data. A policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state.
Question 769
Device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Treat yesterday's MAC profile as perpetual proof of the same physical hardware. Which negative consequence BEST explains the shortcut’s flaw?
- The material consequence is that a justified least-privilege ACL caused every unrelated network authentication fault.
- The material consequence is that a correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.
- The material consequence is that retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices.
- The material consequence is that inspecting a correct endpoint certificate generated the original directory outage.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The shortcut is unsuitable because stale cached endpoint attributes can remain after physical device identity or placement changes. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
Incorrect Answers
A:This unrelated assertion does not explain the Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data problem. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
B:This unrelated assertion does not explain the Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data problem. A correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.
D:This unrelated assertion does not explain the Endpoint attribute aging and stale profiling data problem. Inspecting a correct endpoint certificate generated the original directory outage.
Question 770
Device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization. The observed failure is: Retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices. How should the administrator correct and verify this failure?
- The supported recovery is to grant permanent administrator permissions to avoid profile aging.
- The supported recovery is to treat yesterday's MAC profile as perpetual proof of the same physical hardware.
- The supported recovery is to disable all endpoint discovery because the inventory database contains entries.
- The supported recovery is to expire or correct stale attributes and reprofile from current evidence before applying access.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Recheck endpoint first and last seen, profiling attribute timestamps, purge rules and new session observations. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
Incorrect Answers
A:Grant permanent administrator permissions to avoid profile aging. This action does not repair the identified failure. Retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices. Instead, expire or correct stale attributes and reprofile from current evidence before applying access. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
B:Treat yesterday's MAC profile as perpetual proof of the same physical hardware. This action does not repair the identified failure. Retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices. Instead, expire or correct stale attributes and reprofile from current evidence before applying access. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.
C:Disable all endpoint discovery because the inventory database contains entries. This action does not repair the identified failure. Retaining old high-trust profiles may incorrectly admit replacement or spoofed devices. Instead, expire or correct stale attributes and reprofile from current evidence before applying access. For the specific situation, device profiling records survive long after a switch replacement and mislead authorization.