Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 37
Question 360
A network team creates SGT labels but does not bind a suitable Security Group ACL enforcement policy. The observed failure is: Tags alone do not filter traffic unless the policy is distributed and enforced. Which controlled recovery BEST restores the intended state?
- The supported recovery is to repair matrix policy or device enforcement and test representative source-destination role pairs.
- The supported recovery is to use an untrusted user-chosen tag as the sole authorization proof.
- The supported recovery is to assume assigning source SGT immediately blocks every destination by default.
- The supported recovery is to publish an SGACL name without any actual permit or deny rules.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:This restores the intended operational behavior for SGT to SGACL role-based enforcement matrix. For the specific situation, a network team creates SGT labels but does not bind a suitable Security Group ACL enforcement policy.
Incorrect Answers
B:Use an untrusted user-chosen tag as the sole authorization proof. This action does not repair the identified failure. Tags alone do not filter traffic unless the policy is distributed and enforced. Instead, repair matrix policy or device enforcement and test representative source-destination role pairs. For the specific situation, a network team creates SGT labels but does not bind a suitable Security Group ACL enforcement policy.
C:Assume assigning source SGT immediately blocks every destination by default. This action does not repair the identified failure. Tags alone do not filter traffic unless the policy is distributed and enforced. Instead, repair matrix policy or device enforcement and test representative source-destination role pairs. For the specific situation, a network team creates SGT labels but does not bind a suitable Security Group ACL enforcement policy.
D:Publish an SGACL name without any actual permit or deny rules. This action does not repair the identified failure. Tags alone do not filter traffic unless the policy is distributed and enforced. Instead, repair matrix policy or device enforcement and test representative source-destination role pairs. For the specific situation, a network team creates SGT labels but does not bind a suitable Security Group ACL enforcement policy.
Question 361
A TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags. What is the BEST supported ISE implementation or corrective action?
- Assume unsupported switches transport inline SGT without configuration.
- Choose supported inline SGT transport or SXP IP-SGT binding exchange to reach eligible enforcement points.
- Use DNS TXT records as a replacement for SXP exchange.
- Disable encryption everywhere because SXP peer is disconnected.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
Incorrect Answers
A:An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective. This does not implement the required control for SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging.
C:SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function.
D:An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
Question 362
A TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags. Which evidence BEST verifies the intended operational outcome?
- SXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination.
- A switch interface description without any live AAA request or response.
- An old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence.
- A current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:These observations directly establish the result of SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging for the described endpoint or network device. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
Incorrect Answers
B:A switch interface description without any live AAA request or response. This observation cannot verify SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging. Check sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination. SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
C:An old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence. This observation cannot verify SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging. Check sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination. SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
D:A current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment. This observation cannot verify SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging. Check sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination. SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
Question 363
A TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags. Which technical principle BEST explains the required decision?
- A captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling.
- A successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified.
- Every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications.
- SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The supported implementation is to choose supported inline SGT transport or SXP IP-SGT binding exchange to reach eligible enforcement points. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
Incorrect Answers
A:A captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling. This generalization is not valid for SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging. Instead sGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. Verify the actual state using sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
B:A successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified. This generalization is not valid for SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging. Instead sGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. Verify the actual state using sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
C:Every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications. This generalization is not valid for SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging. Instead sGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. Verify the actual state using sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
Question 364
A TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Assume unsupported switches transport inline SGT without configuration. What material risk or failure follows from that shortcut?
- Reading the authentication event report caused the original network access outage.
- The only result is an unrelated portal background color change.
- Accurate device accounting automatically created every earlier failed EAP exchange.
- An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The shortcut is unsuitable because sGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
Incorrect Answers
A:This unrelated assertion does not explain the SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging problem. The relevant risk is that an absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective.
B:This unrelated assertion does not explain the SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging problem. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
C:This unrelated assertion does not explain the SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging problem. Check sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination.
Question 365
A TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags. The observed failure is: An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective. Which controlled recovery BEST restores the intended state?
- Use DNS TXT records as a replacement for SXP exchange.
- Repair SXP mappings or inline propagation and verify source classification at the enforcing device.
- Disable encryption everywhere because SXP peer is disconnected.
- Assume unsupported switches transport inline SGT without configuration.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. This restores the intended operational behavior for SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging.
Incorrect Answers
A:Use DNS TXT records as a replacement for SXP exchange. This action does not repair the identified failure. An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective. Instead, repair SXP mappings or inline propagation and verify source classification at the enforcing device. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
C:Disable encryption everywhere because SXP peer is disconnected. This action does not repair the identified failure. An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective. Instead, repair SXP mappings or inline propagation and verify source classification at the enforcing device. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
D:Assume unsupported switches transport inline SGT without configuration. This action does not repair the identified failure. An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective. Instead, repair SXP mappings or inline propagation and verify source classification at the enforcing device. For the specific situation, a TrustSec-capable distribution switch receives identity information but a legacy segment cannot carry inline tags.
Question 366
A role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT. Which configuration decision most directly satisfies the requirement?
- In this case, use DNS TXT records as a replacement for SXP exchange.
- In this case, choose supported inline SGT transport or SXP IP-SGT binding exchange to reach eligible enforcement points.
- In this case, disable encryption everywhere because SXP peer is disconnected.
- In this case, assume unsupported switches transport inline SGT without configuration.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
Incorrect Answers
A:SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. The relevant evidence is sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination.
C:An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
D:An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective. Use the supported approach: choose supported inline SGT transport or SXP IP-SGT binding exchange to reach eligible enforcement points.
Question 367
A role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT. What observations most directly test this network-access condition?
- The supporting evidence is a successful ICMP echo that does not test the required identity-service workflow.
- The supporting evidence is sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination.
- The supporting evidence is a switch interface description without any live AAA request or response.
- The supporting evidence is an old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:These observations directly establish the result of SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging for the described endpoint or network device. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
Incorrect Answers
A:A successful ICMP echo that does not test the required identity-service workflow. This observation cannot verify SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging. Check sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination. SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
C:A switch interface description without any live AAA request or response. This observation cannot verify SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging. Check sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination. SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
D:An old diagram with no RADIUS, TACACS+ or endpoint-session evidence. This observation cannot verify SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging. Check sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination. SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
Question 368
A role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT. What principle of ISE authentication and authorization explains this case?
- The governing principle is that every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications.
- The governing principle is that a captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling.
- The governing principle is that sGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments.
- The governing principle is that a MAC address is a cryptographic proof of endpoint device ownership.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The supported implementation is to choose supported inline SGT transport or SXP IP-SGT binding exchange to reach eligible enforcement points. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
Incorrect Answers
A:Every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications. This generalization is not valid for SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging. Instead sGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. Verify the actual state using sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
B:A captive portal page automatically changes network authorization on every active NAD session without signaling. This generalization is not valid for SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging. Instead sGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. Verify the actual state using sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
D:A MAC address is a cryptographic proof of endpoint device ownership. This generalization is not valid for SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging. Instead sGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. Verify the actual state using sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
Question 369
A role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Assume unsupported switches transport inline SGT without configuration. Which negative consequence BEST explains the shortcut’s flaw?
- The material consequence is that accurate device accounting automatically created every earlier failed EAP exchange.
- The material consequence is that inspecting a correct endpoint certificate generated the original directory outage.
- The material consequence is that an absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective.
- The material consequence is that the only result is an unrelated portal background color change.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The shortcut is unsuitable because sGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
Incorrect Answers
A:This unrelated assertion does not explain the SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging problem. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
B:This unrelated assertion does not explain the SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging problem. Inspecting a correct endpoint certificate generated the original directory outage.
D:This unrelated assertion does not explain the SGT propagation using SXP versus inline tagging problem. The only result is an unrelated portal background color change.
Question 370
A role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT. The observed failure is: An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective. How should the administrator correct and verify this failure?
- The supported recovery is to repair SXP mappings or inline propagation and verify source classification at the enforcing device.
- The supported recovery is to disable encryption everywhere because SXP peer is disconnected.
- The supported recovery is to assume unsupported switches transport inline SGT without configuration.
- The supported recovery is to use DNS TXT records as a replacement for SXP exchange.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:SGT metadata can propagate inline where supported or through SXP mappings for compatible network segments. Recheck sXP peer state, IP-to-SGT mappings, inline tag counters and policy match at the destination.
Incorrect Answers
B:Disable encryption everywhere because SXP peer is disconnected. This action does not repair the identified failure. An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective. Instead, repair SXP mappings or inline propagation and verify source classification at the enforcing device. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
C:Assume unsupported switches transport inline SGT without configuration. This action does not repair the identified failure. An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective. Instead, repair SXP mappings or inline propagation and verify source classification at the enforcing device. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.
D:Use DNS TXT records as a replacement for SXP exchange. This action does not repair the identified failure. An absent source classification at enforcement can make a correct SGACL ineffective. Instead, repair SXP mappings or inline propagation and verify source classification at the enforcing device. For the specific situation, a role-based policy fails because the enforcement switch has no mapping for a source IP and SGT.