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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 120

Question 1190

A network team needs command logs that connect a human operator with a target switch and timestamp. The observed failure is: Without command records, a successful AAA login cannot demonstrate who performed a particular change. What recovery action restores supported network-access behavior?

  1. The supported recovery is to use the router hostname alone as the complete human audit identity.
  2. The supported recovery is to assume a saved login event lists every command later executed.
  3. The supported recovery is to repair device and ISE accounting integration and generate one controlled show and configuration event.
  4. The supported recovery is to delete all network device accounting to reduce report volume.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Command accounting establishes a reviewable trail of device administrator actions when properly configured. For the specific situation, a network team needs command logs that connect a human operator with a target switch and timestamp.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use the router hostname alone as the complete human audit identity. This action does not repair the identified failure. Without command records, a successful AAA login cannot demonstrate who performed a particular change. Instead, repair device and ISE accounting integration and generate one controlled show and configuration event. For the specific situation, a network team needs command logs that connect a human operator with a target switch and timestamp.

B:

Assume a saved login event lists every command later executed. This action does not repair the identified failure. Without command records, a successful AAA login cannot demonstrate who performed a particular change. Instead, repair device and ISE accounting integration and generate one controlled show and configuration event. For the specific situation, a network team needs command logs that connect a human operator with a target switch and timestamp.

D:

Delete all network device accounting to reduce report volume. This action does not repair the identified failure. Without command records, a successful AAA login cannot demonstrate who performed a particular change. Instead, repair device and ISE accounting integration and generate one controlled show and configuration event. For the specific situation, a network team needs command logs that connect a human operator with a target switch and timestamp.

Question 1191

An access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary. What action addresses this authenticated network-access scenario?

  1. Use a shared permanent unlogged local admin account for routine operations.
  2. Assume creating a second PSN automatically updates all switch TACACS destinations.
  3. Configure redundant TACACS servers and a documented least-privilege emergency fallback for true AAA unavailability.
  4. Disable TACACS permanently because one primary node failed during maintenance.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This is the targeted action for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This does not implement the required control for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

B:

Assume creating a second PSN automatically updates all switch TACACS destinations. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. Device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations. The relevant evidence is tACACS server priority, TCP reachability, timeout, fallback activation and emergency-account audit. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

D:

A broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

Question 1192

An access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary. What verification should the engineer use before declaring success?

  1. A device hostname alone without the policy result or authenticated source.
  2. TACACS server priority, TCP reachability, timeout, fallback activation and emergency-account audit.
  3. A current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment.
  4. A browser theme label without a current authorization trace.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

These observations directly establish the result of TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access for the described endpoint or network device. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This observation cannot verify TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. Device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations.

C:

This observation cannot verify TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

D:

This observation cannot verify TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. Check tACACS server priority, TCP reachability, timeout, fallback activation and emergency-account audit.

Question 1193

An access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary. Which underlying service behavior supports the proposed solution?

  1. Device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations.
  2. A successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified.
  3. All Cisco ISE administration and policy personas perform exactly the same service.
  4. A policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is the governing technical behavior for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified. This generalization is not valid for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. Instead device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations. Verify the actual state using tACACS server priority, TCP reachability, timeout, fallback activation and emergency-account audit. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

C:

All Cisco ISE administration and policy personas perform exactly the same service. This generalization is not valid for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. Instead device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations. Verify the actual state using tACACS server priority, TCP reachability, timeout, fallback activation and emergency-account audit. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

D:

A policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state. This generalization is not valid for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. Instead device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations. Verify the actual state using tACACS server priority, TCP reachability, timeout, fallback activation and emergency-account audit. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

Question 1194

An access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Use a shared permanent unlogged local admin account for routine operations. Why does that proposed shortcut not satisfy the requirement?

  1. A justified least-privilege ACL caused every unrelated network authentication fault.
  2. A broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy.
  3. A correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.
  4. Reading the authentication event report caused the original network access outage.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The shortcut is unsuitable because device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access problem. The relevant risk is that a broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy.

C:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access problem. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

D:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access problem. Check tACACS server priority, TCP reachability, timeout, fallback activation and emergency-account audit.

Question 1195

An access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary. The observed failure is: A broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy. What recovery action restores supported network-access behavior?

  1. Repair server group and test primary failure plus authorized emergency access under supervision.
  2. Assume creating a second PSN automatically updates all switch TACACS destinations.
  3. Disable TACACS permanently because one primary node failed during maintenance.
  4. Use a shared permanent unlogged local admin account for routine operations.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This restores the intended operational behavior for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Assume creating a second PSN automatically updates all switch TACACS destinations. This action does not repair the identified failure. A broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy. Instead, repair server group and test primary failure plus authorized emergency access under supervision. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

C:

Disable TACACS permanently because one primary node failed during maintenance. This action does not repair the identified failure. A broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy. Instead, repair server group and test primary failure plus authorized emergency access under supervision. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

D:

Use a shared permanent unlogged local admin account for routine operations. This action does not repair the identified failure. A broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy. Instead, repair server group and test primary failure plus authorized emergency access under supervision. For the specific situation, an access switch has two TACACS PSNs but its server group still targets only the disabled primary.

Question 1196

An isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account. What is the BEST supported ISE implementation or corrective action?

  1. In this case, configure redundant TACACS servers and a documented least-privilege emergency fallback for true AAA unavailability.
  2. In this case, assume creating a second PSN automatically updates all switch TACACS destinations.
  3. In this case, disable TACACS permanently because one primary node failed during maintenance.
  4. In this case, use a shared permanent unlogged local admin account for routine operations.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is the targeted action for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Assume creating a second PSN automatically updates all switch TACACS destinations. This alternative overlooks a required prerequisite or targets the wrong function. Device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations. The relevant evidence is tACACS server priority, TCP reachability, timeout, fallback activation and emergency-account audit. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

C:

A broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

D:

This does not implement the required control for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

Question 1197

An isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account. Which evidence BEST verifies the intended operational outcome?

  1. The supporting evidence is tACACS server priority, TCP reachability, timeout, fallback activation and emergency-account audit.
  2. The supporting evidence is a switch interface description without any live AAA request or response.
  3. The supporting evidence is a device hostname alone without the policy result or authenticated source.
  4. The supporting evidence is a current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

These observations directly establish the result of TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access for the described endpoint or network device. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This observation cannot verify TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

C:

This observation cannot verify TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. A device hostname alone without the policy result or authenticated source.

D:

This observation cannot verify TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. A current login screenshot from a completely unrelated ISE deployment.

Question 1198

An isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account. Which technical principle BEST explains the required decision?

  1. The governing principle is that device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations.
  2. The governing principle is that a policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state.
  3. The governing principle is that a successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified.
  4. The governing principle is that every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is the governing technical behavior for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A policy display name alone is the complete source of enforcement state. This generalization is not valid for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. Instead device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations. Verify the actual state using tACACS server priority, TCP reachability, timeout, fallback activation and emergency-account audit. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

C:

A successful switch port link signal always proves the device identity and policy were verified. This generalization is not valid for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. Instead device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations. Verify the actual state using tACACS server priority, TCP reachability, timeout, fallback activation and emergency-account audit. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

D:

Every RADIUS Access-Accept grants unrestricted access to all applications. This generalization is not valid for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. Instead device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations. Verify the actual state using tACACS server priority, TCP reachability, timeout, fallback activation and emergency-account audit. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

Question 1199

An isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account. An operator proposes the following incorrect shortcut: Use a shared permanent unlogged local admin account for routine operations. What material risk or failure follows from that shortcut?

  1. The material consequence is that a broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy.
  2. The material consequence is that reading the authentication event report caused the original network access outage.
  3. The material consequence is that the only result is an unrelated portal background color change.
  4. The material consequence is that a correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The shortcut is unsuitable because device-admin resiliency depends on reachable AAA endpoints plus carefully bounded emergency operations. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access problem. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

C:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access problem. The only result is an unrelated portal background color change.

D:

This unrelated assertion does not explain the TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access problem. A correctly recorded TACACS command audit caused the preceding security violation.

Question 1200

An isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account. The observed failure is: A broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy. Which controlled recovery BEST restores the intended state?

  1. The supported recovery is to disable TACACS permanently because one primary node failed during maintenance.
  2. The supported recovery is to use a shared permanent unlogged local admin account for routine operations.
  3. The supported recovery is to repair server group and test primary failure plus authorized emergency access under supervision.
  4. The supported recovery is to assume creating a second PSN automatically updates all switch TACACS destinations.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This restores the intended operational behavior for TACACS primary secondary node failover and local emergency access. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Disable TACACS permanently because one primary node failed during maintenance. This action does not repair the identified failure. A broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy. Instead, repair server group and test primary failure plus authorized emergency access under supervision. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

B:

Use a shared permanent unlogged local admin account for routine operations. This action does not repair the identified failure. A broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy. Instead, repair server group and test primary failure plus authorized emergency access under supervision. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

D:

Assume creating a second PSN automatically updates all switch TACACS destinations. This action does not repair the identified failure. A broad unconditional local fallback may undermine centralized command authorization even when ISE is healthy. Instead, repair server group and test primary failure plus authorized emergency access under supervision. For the specific situation, an isolated campus loses PSN connectivity and must use a tightly controlled, auditable local break-glass account.

Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE) (300-715) Practice Tests