Cisco 300-420 Practice Test 68
Question 670
A large campus must limit administrative sessions to approved jump hosts and monitor account activity centrally. The observed fault is: An unrestricted management network lets compromised endpoints attempt privileged device access. How should the issue be corrected and verified?
- The controlled recovery is to assume data-plane application firewall rules automatically cover all out-of-band device consoles.
- The controlled recovery is to implement scoped management separation and verify approved jump host access plus denied user sources.
- The controlled recovery is to expose SSH and HTTPS management ports to every guest VLAN without source restrictions.
- The controlled recovery is to treat a login banner alone as network-level management isolation.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Relevant evidence includes management VRF routes, permitted source tests, TACACS or RADIUS logs and unauthorized probes. This corrects the described failure and provides a verifiable outcome.
Incorrect Answers
A:Assume data-plane application firewall rules automatically cover all out-of-band device consoles. An unrestricted management network lets compromised endpoints attempt privileged device access. Use the controlled remediation: implement scoped management separation and verify approved jump host access plus denied user sources.
C:Expose SSH and HTTPS management ports to every guest VLAN without source restrictions. An unrestricted management network lets compromised endpoints attempt privileged device access. Use the controlled remediation: implement scoped management separation and verify approved jump host access plus denied user sources.
D:Treat a login banner alone as network-level management isolation. An unrestricted management network lets compromised endpoints attempt privileged device access. Use the controlled remediation: implement scoped management separation and verify approved jump host access plus denied user sources.
Question 671
A burst of unsolicited traffic to router CPU reduces routing protocol stability even though transit ASIC forwarding still has capacity. Which operator action most directly resolves this condition?
- Design a control-plane protection policy with measured class-specific policing and protocol allowances.
- Block all routing control packets to the CPU and assume neighbors remain established.
- Use only egress data queue shaping as complete protection for router-local exceptions.
- Assume high interface throughput proves every CPU-bound packet class is harmless.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. This is the specific corrective action for Control-plane policing for routing and management traffic.
Incorrect Answers
B:Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. This change targets the wrong mechanism for Control-plane policing for routing and management traffic.
C:Use only egress data queue shaping as complete protection for router-local exceptions. Control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. Instead inspect cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
D:Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols.
Question 672
A burst of unsolicited traffic to router CPU reduces routing protocol stability even though transit ASIC forwarding still has capacity. Which collection of observations most directly tests the suspected cause?
- CPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
- A marketing claim without measured routing, capacity or failure-domain evidence.
- An old network diagram with no current route, policy, or redundancy state.
- A feature-license screenshot without the required design or acceptance tests.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. This evidence observes the actual control-plane policing for routing and management traffic mechanism and its result.
Incorrect Answers
B:This observation alone cannot establish control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. Control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS.
C:This observation alone cannot establish control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. The decisive evidence instead includes cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
D:This observation alone cannot establish control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. A feature-license screenshot without the required design or acceptance tests.
Question 673
A burst of unsolicited traffic to router CPU reduces routing protocol stability even though transit ASIC forwarding still has capacity. Which system behavior underlies the appropriate response?
- A longer IP prefix is always less specific than the default route.
- Cloud connectivity automatically removes any requirement for routing or policy.
- Control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS.
- Any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:This is why the appropriate action is design a control-plane protection policy with measured class-specific policing and protocol allowances. Confirm it with cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
Incorrect Answers
A:A longer IP prefix is always less specific than the default route. This is an incorrect generalization for control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. The relevant rule is control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. Verify using cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
B:Cloud connectivity automatically removes any requirement for routing or policy. This is an incorrect generalization for control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. The relevant rule is control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. Verify using cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
D:Any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site. This is an incorrect generalization for control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. The relevant rule is control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. Verify using cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
Question 674
A burst of unsolicited traffic to router CPU reduces routing protocol stability even though transit ASIC forwarding still has capacity. Suppose the operator instead makes this incorrect change: Block all routing control packets to the CPU and assume neighbors remain established. Which failure or risk follows from this shortcut?
- A healthy unrelated system proves the intended failure domain is protected.
- Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols.
- The failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless.
- Collecting telemetry originally caused the missing route or service outage.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:This explains why the proposed shortcut does not solve control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. Control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS.
Incorrect Answers
A:A healthy unrelated system proves the intended failure domain is protected. The actual failure is overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Check cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
C:The failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless. The actual failure is overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Check cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
D:Collecting telemetry originally caused the missing route or service outage. The actual failure is overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Check cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
Question 675
A burst of unsolicited traffic to router CPU reduces routing protocol stability even though transit ASIC forwarding still has capacity. The observed fault is: Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. What action most directly restores and validates the intended state?
- Use only egress data queue shaping as complete protection for router-local exceptions.
- Tune control-plane thresholds and verify intended routing and admin protocols under stress.
- Assume high interface throughput proves every CPU-bound packet class is harmless.
- Block all routing control packets to the CPU and assume neighbors remain established.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. This corrects the described failure and provides a verifiable outcome.
Incorrect Answers
A:Use only egress data queue shaping as complete protection for router-local exceptions. Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Use the controlled remediation: tune control-plane thresholds and verify intended routing and admin protocols under stress.
C:Assume high interface throughput proves every CPU-bound packet class is harmless. Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Use the controlled remediation: tune control-plane thresholds and verify intended routing and admin protocols under stress.
D:Block all routing control packets to the CPU and assume neighbors remain established. Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Use the controlled remediation: tune control-plane thresholds and verify intended routing and admin protocols under stress.
Question 676
A core switch must protect BGP and management processing from untrusted high-rate packets without dropping legitimate protocol control. Which enterprise design procedure best meets this requirement?
- For this enterprise design, the architect should design a control-plane protection policy with measured class-specific policing and protocol allowances.
- For this enterprise design, the architect should use only egress data queue shaping as complete protection for router-local exceptions.
- For this enterprise design, the architect should assume high interface throughput proves every CPU-bound packet class is harmless.
- For this enterprise design, the architect should block all routing control packets to the CPU and assume neighbors remain established.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. Confirm the result using cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
Incorrect Answers
B:Use only egress data queue shaping as complete protection for router-local exceptions. Control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. Instead inspect cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
C:Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols.
D:Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. The relevant action is design a control-plane protection policy with measured class-specific policing and protocol allowances.
Question 677
A core switch must protect BGP and management processing from untrusted high-rate packets without dropping legitimate protocol control. Which evidence best distinguishes the intended state from a superficial indicator?
- Inspect the following evidence: one successful ping to an unrelated test host without a path or failover test.
- Inspect the following evidence: a marketing claim without measured routing, capacity or failure-domain evidence.
- Inspect the following evidence: cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
- Inspect the following evidence: an old network diagram with no current route, policy, or redundancy state.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. The intended procedure is design a control-plane protection policy with measured class-specific policing and protocol allowances.
Incorrect Answers
A:This observation alone cannot establish control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. One successful ping to an unrelated test host without a path or failover test.
B:This observation alone cannot establish control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. A marketing claim without measured routing, capacity or failure-domain evidence.
D:This observation alone cannot establish control-plane policing for routing and management traffic.
Question 678
A core switch must protect BGP and management processing from untrusted high-rate packets without dropping legitimate protocol control. Which underlying principle explains the correct decision?
- The relevant principle is that any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site.
- The relevant principle is that a longer IP prefix is always less specific than the default route.
- The relevant principle is that control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS.
- The relevant principle is that an operational up state alone proves every security and design objective is met.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:This is why the appropriate action is design a control-plane protection policy with measured class-specific policing and protocol allowances.
Incorrect Answers
A:Any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site. This is an incorrect generalization for control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. The relevant rule is control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. Verify using cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
B:A longer IP prefix is always less specific than the default route. This is an incorrect generalization for control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. The relevant rule is control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. Verify using cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
D:An operational up state alone proves every security and design objective is met. This is an incorrect generalization for control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. The relevant rule is control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. Verify using cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
Question 679
A core switch must protect BGP and management processing from untrusted high-rate packets without dropping legitimate protocol control. Suppose the operator instead makes this incorrect change: Block all routing control packets to the CPU and assume neighbors remain established. What is the most material consequence of that mistake?
- The resulting technical fault is that collecting telemetry originally caused the missing route or service outage.
- The resulting technical fault is that overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols.
- The resulting technical fault is that a correct change-control review makes all WAN carriers fail simultaneously.
- The resulting technical fault is that the failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:This explains why the proposed shortcut does not solve control-plane policing for routing and management traffic. The right response is design a control-plane protection policy with measured class-specific policing and protocol allowances.
Incorrect Answers
A:Collecting telemetry originally caused the missing route or service outage. The actual failure is overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Check cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
C:A correct change-control review makes all WAN carriers fail simultaneously. The actual failure is overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Check cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
D:The failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless. The actual failure is overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Check cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
Question 680
A core switch must protect BGP and management processing from untrusted high-rate packets without dropping legitimate protocol control. The observed fault is: Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Which controlled remediation should be used?
- The controlled recovery is to assume high interface throughput proves every CPU-bound packet class is harmless.
- The controlled recovery is to block all routing control packets to the CPU and assume neighbors remain established.
- The controlled recovery is to use only egress data queue shaping as complete protection for router-local exceptions.
- The controlled recovery is to tune control-plane thresholds and verify intended routing and admin protocols under stress.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Control-plane policing limits classes of traffic destined to the router CPU without being identical to ordinary egress data QoS. Relevant evidence includes cPU-bound punt rates, CoPP class counters, protocol neighbor stability and permitted management tests.
Incorrect Answers
A:Assume high interface throughput proves every CPU-bound packet class is harmless. Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Use the controlled remediation: tune control-plane thresholds and verify intended routing and admin protocols under stress.
B:Block all routing control packets to the CPU and assume neighbors remain established. Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Use the controlled remediation: tune control-plane thresholds and verify intended routing and admin protocols under stress.
C:Use only egress data queue shaping as complete protection for router-local exceptions. Overly permissive control-plane handling can permit saturation while overly restrictive policing can break control protocols. Use the controlled remediation: tune control-plane thresholds and verify intended routing and admin protocols under stress.