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Cisco 300-420 Practice Test 13

Question 120

A large enterprise expands its core and iBGP update distribution no longer scales as a full mesh. The observed fault is: Using a single route reflector for every site creates an avoidable control-plane failure point. Which controlled remediation should be used?

  1. The controlled recovery is to assume eBGP external AS numbers replace all internal route reflection planning.
  2. The controlled recovery is to use only one reflector with no backup despite high availability requirements.
  3. The controlled recovery is to deploy diverse route reflectors and verify client reachability after an RR outage.
  4. The controlled recovery is to require every router to peer with every other without checking scale.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Relevant evidence includes iBGP peering topology, cluster IDs, route propagation, RR redundancy and failure tests. This corrects the described failure and provides a verifiable outcome.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Assume eBGP external AS numbers replace all internal route reflection planning. Using a single route reflector for every site creates an avoidable control-plane failure point. Use the controlled remediation: deploy diverse route reflectors and verify client reachability after an RR outage.

B:

Use only one reflector with no backup despite high availability requirements. Using a single route reflector for every site creates an avoidable control-plane failure point. Use the controlled remediation: deploy diverse route reflectors and verify client reachability after an RR outage.

D:

Require every router to peer with every other without checking scale. Using a single route reflector for every site creates an avoidable control-plane failure point. Use the controlled remediation: deploy diverse route reflectors and verify client reachability after an RR outage.

Question 121

An Internet edge accidentally advertises an internal RFC1918 summary to an external provider. What is the BEST supported implementation or corrective action?

  1. Advertise the entire IGP table to every ISP without an approved prefix policy.
  2. Apply explicit BGP export allowlists with maximum-prefix and route-policy validation at each external boundary.
  3. Use inbound firewall ACLs as a complete substitute for BGP export filters.
  4. Assume an established BGP session proves announcements are correctly scoped.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. Confirm the result using advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. This change targets the wrong mechanism for BGP outbound prefix filtering design.

C:

Use inbound firewall ACLs as a complete substitute for BGP export filters. BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. Instead inspect advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

D:

A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Assume an established BGP session proves announcements are correctly scoped.

Question 122

An Internet edge accidentally advertises an internal RFC1918 summary to an external provider. What should the operator inspect to verify the result?

  1. A marketing claim without measured routing, capacity or failure-domain evidence.
  2. An old network diagram with no current route, policy, or redundancy state.
  3. Advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.
  4. A feature-license screenshot without the required design or acceptance tests.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. This evidence observes the actual BGP outbound prefix filtering design mechanism and its result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This observation alone cannot establish BGP outbound prefix filtering design. The decisive evidence instead includes advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

B:

This observation alone cannot establish BGP outbound prefix filtering design. BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary.

D:

This observation alone cannot establish BGP outbound prefix filtering design. A feature-license screenshot without the required design or acceptance tests.

Question 123

An Internet edge accidentally advertises an internal RFC1918 summary to an external provider. Which technical statement is MOST accurate for this situation?

  1. A longer IP prefix is always less specific than the default route.
  2. Cloud connectivity automatically removes any requirement for routing or policy.
  3. Any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site.
  4. BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Confirm it with advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit. This is why the appropriate action is apply explicit BGP export allowlists with maximum-prefix and route-policy validation at each external boundary.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A longer IP prefix is always less specific than the default route. This is an incorrect generalization for BGP outbound prefix filtering design. The relevant rule is BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. Verify using advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

B:

Cloud connectivity automatically removes any requirement for routing or policy. This is an incorrect generalization for BGP outbound prefix filtering design. The relevant rule is BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. Verify using advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

C:

Any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site. This is an incorrect generalization for BGP outbound prefix filtering design. The relevant rule is BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. Verify using advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

Question 124

An Internet edge accidentally advertises an internal RFC1918 summary to an external provider. Suppose the operator instead makes this incorrect change: Advertise the entire IGP table to every ISP without an approved prefix policy. What weakness does the mistaken approach introduce?

  1. A healthy unrelated system proves the intended failure domain is protected.
  2. A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit.
  3. The failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless.
  4. Collecting telemetry originally caused the missing route or service outage.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. This explains why the proposed shortcut does not solve BGP outbound prefix filtering design.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A healthy unrelated system proves the intended failure domain is protected. The actual failure is a permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Check advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

C:

The failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless. The actual failure is a permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Check advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

D:

Collecting telemetry originally caused the missing route or service outage. The actual failure is a permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Check advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

Question 125

An Internet edge accidentally advertises an internal RFC1918 summary to an external provider. The observed fault is: A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Which recovery is BEST once this fault is identified?

  1. Use inbound firewall ACLs as a complete substitute for BGP export filters.
  2. Assume an established BGP session proves announcements are correctly scoped.
  3. Constrain exports and test allowed and denied prefixes with the upstream peer.
  4. Advertise the entire IGP table to every ISP without an approved prefix policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. Relevant evidence includes advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use inbound firewall ACLs as a complete substitute for BGP export filters. A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Use the controlled remediation: constrain exports and test allowed and denied prefixes with the upstream peer.

B:

Assume an established BGP session proves announcements are correctly scoped. A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Use the controlled remediation: constrain exports and test allowed and denied prefixes with the upstream peer.

D:

Advertise the entire IGP table to every ISP without an approved prefix policy. A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Use the controlled remediation: constrain exports and test allowed and denied prefixes with the upstream peer.

Question 126

A multihomed enterprise must announce only authorized owned public prefixes to upstream ASNs. Which operator action most directly resolves this condition?

  1. For this enterprise design, the architect should use inbound firewall ACLs as a complete substitute for BGP export filters.
  2. For this enterprise design, the architect should apply explicit BGP export allowlists with maximum-prefix and route-policy validation at each external boundary.
  3. For this enterprise design, the architect should assume an established BGP session proves announcements are correctly scoped.
  4. For this enterprise design, the architect should advertise the entire IGP table to every ISP without an approved prefix policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. This is the specific corrective action for BGP outbound prefix filtering design.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use inbound firewall ACLs as a complete substitute for BGP export filters. BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. Instead inspect advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

C:

A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit.

D:

A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. The relevant action is apply explicit BGP export allowlists with maximum-prefix and route-policy validation at each external boundary.

Question 127

A multihomed enterprise must announce only authorized owned public prefixes to upstream ASNs. Which collection of observations most directly tests the suspected cause?

  1. Inspect the following evidence: one successful ping to an unrelated test host without a path or failover test.
  2. Inspect the following evidence: a marketing claim without measured routing, capacity or failure-domain evidence.
  3. Inspect the following evidence: advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.
  4. Inspect the following evidence: an old network diagram with no current route, policy, or redundancy state.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. The intended procedure is apply explicit BGP export allowlists with maximum-prefix and route-policy validation at each external boundary.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This observation alone cannot establish BGP outbound prefix filtering design. One successful ping to an unrelated test host without a path or failover test.

B:

This observation alone cannot establish BGP outbound prefix filtering design. A marketing claim without measured routing, capacity or failure-domain evidence.

D:

This observation alone cannot establish BGP outbound prefix filtering design. In this case, a multihomed enterprise must announce only authorized owned public prefixes to upstream ASNs.

Question 128

A multihomed enterprise must announce only authorized owned public prefixes to upstream ASNs. Which system behavior underlies the appropriate response?

  1. The relevant principle is that any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site.
  2. The relevant principle is that a longer IP prefix is always less specific than the default route.
  3. The relevant principle is that an operational up state alone proves every security and design objective is met.
  4. The relevant principle is that BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Confirm it with advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Any single device automatically guarantees high availability for every site. This is an incorrect generalization for BGP outbound prefix filtering design. The relevant rule is BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. Verify using advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

B:

A longer IP prefix is always less specific than the default route. This is an incorrect generalization for BGP outbound prefix filtering design. The relevant rule is BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. Verify using advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

C:

An operational up state alone proves every security and design objective is met. This is an incorrect generalization for BGP outbound prefix filtering design. The relevant rule is BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. Verify using advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

Question 129

A multihomed enterprise must announce only authorized owned public prefixes to upstream ASNs. Suppose the operator instead makes this incorrect change: Advertise the entire IGP table to every ISP without an approved prefix policy. Which failure or risk follows from this shortcut?

  1. The resulting technical fault is that collecting telemetry originally caused the missing route or service outage.
  2. The resulting technical fault is that a correct change-control review makes all WAN carriers fail simultaneously.
  3. The resulting technical fault is that the failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless.
  4. The resulting technical fault is that a permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. The right response is apply explicit BGP export allowlists with maximum-prefix and route-policy validation at each external boundary.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Collecting telemetry originally caused the missing route or service outage. The actual failure is a permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Check advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

B:

A correct change-control review makes all WAN carriers fail simultaneously. The actual failure is a permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Check advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

C:

The failure is entirely cosmetic because all control-plane changes are harmless. The actual failure is a permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Check advertised-routes view, prefix list or route map, peer received routes and change audit.

Question 130

A multihomed enterprise must announce only authorized owned public prefixes to upstream ASNs. The observed fault is: A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. What action most directly restores and validates the intended state?

  1. The controlled recovery is to assume an established BGP session proves announcements are correctly scoped.
  2. The controlled recovery is to constrain exports and test allowed and denied prefixes with the upstream peer.
  3. The controlled recovery is to advertise the entire IGP table to every ISP without an approved prefix policy.
  4. The controlled recovery is to use inbound firewall ACLs as a complete substitute for BGP export filters.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

BGP outbound route filtering controls which selected prefixes can be advertised beyond an administrative boundary. This corrects the described failure and provides a verifiable outcome.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Assume an established BGP session proves announcements are correctly scoped. A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Use the controlled remediation: constrain exports and test allowed and denied prefixes with the upstream peer.

C:

Advertise the entire IGP table to every ISP without an approved prefix policy. A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Use the controlled remediation: constrain exports and test allowed and denied prefixes with the upstream peer.

D:

Use inbound firewall ACLs as a complete substitute for BGP export filters. A permissive export policy can leak internal networks and trigger provider filtering or accidental transit. Use the controlled remediation: constrain exports and test allowed and denied prefixes with the upstream peer.

Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD) (300-420) Practice Tests