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Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Test 35

Question 340

The team adopts this approach: Implement supported OAuth token revocation and application disconnect handling for authorized users. The original project scenario is: A partner wants users to revoke a connected app's access without changing their Salesforce password. Which verification outcome best demonstrates that it worked?

  1. Revoked tokens can no longer be used for Salesforce API calls after the expected invalidation.
  2. Stolen raw backups do not expose reusable token strings, and an incident can invalidate issued tokens.
  3. Engineers can investigate failed requests without retaining secrets in permanent logs.
  4. The application renews access only for current approved users and destroys tokens at session termination.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Best. The verification target is: Revoked tokens can no longer be used for Salesforce API calls after the expected invalidation. It tests whether the chosen approach—Implement supported OAuth token revocation and application disconnect handling for authorized users.—actually resolves the specific finding: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: An external reporting client stores OAuth access tokens in a database without encryption. Its relevant condition is: Tokens can be stolen from backups and used until expiry even if a password is changed. The present case instead turns on: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens. The direct answer here is: Revoked tokens can no longer be used for Salesforce API calls after the expected invalidation.

C:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: An integration logs full Authorization headers to simplify debugging of API failures. Its relevant condition is: Archived logs retain usable bearer tokens after normal application traffic has ended. The present case instead turns on: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens. The direct answer here is: Revoked tokens can no longer be used for Salesforce API calls after the expected invalidation.

D:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A web application uses Salesforce OAuth refresh tokens to maintain approved user sessions. Its relevant condition is: The app lacks a plan for secure refresh-token storage, rotation policy and account offboarding. The present case instead turns on: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens. The direct answer here is: Revoked tokens can no longer be used for Salesforce API calls after the expected invalidation.

Question 341

A project manager declines to address this finding: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens. The related project is: A partner wants users to revoke a connected app's access without changing their Salesforce password. Which consequence most directly follows?

  1. A deleted employee's refresh token silently recreates API access for months.
  2. Policy changes block new consent while previously issued bearer tokens continue to work.
  3. OAuth login CSRF links a victim session to an attacker's authorization result.
  4. A disconnected partner continues syncing data through an unrevoked refresh token.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Best. The most direct failure is: A disconnected partner continues syncing data through an unrevoked refresh token. It is a consequence of the documented condition: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens. A mitigation is: Implement supported OAuth token revocation and application disconnect handling for authorized users.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A web application uses Salesforce OAuth refresh tokens to maintain approved user sessions. Its relevant condition is: The app lacks a plan for secure refresh-token storage, rotation policy and account offboarding. The present case instead turns on: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens. The direct answer here is: A disconnected partner continues syncing data through an unrevoked refresh token.

B:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A security response team revokes a malicious connected app but sees continued API activity afterward. Its relevant condition is: The org has not confirmed whether tokens and application sessions were actually invalidated. The present case instead turns on: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens. The direct answer here is: A disconnected partner continues syncing data through an unrevoked refresh token.

C:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: An API client uses OAuth authorization codes but omits the state parameter. Its relevant condition is: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The present case instead turns on: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens. The direct answer here is: A disconnected partner continues syncing data through an unrevoked refresh token.

Question 342

Salesforce and its partners face the following situation: A developer includes client secrets in front-end JavaScript for a customer self-service portal. The integration review notes: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. Which architectural step should take priority?

  1. Move confidential app credentials to a trusted backend and select PKCE for public clients.
  2. Apply minimum refresh scope, protected storage, token lifecycle management and revocation on logout.
  3. Revoke outstanding grants or tokens, inspect active sessions and correlate subsequent API events.
  4. Treat bearer tokens as credentials, protect storage, minimize lifetime and enable token revocation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Best. The most direct action is to move confidential app credentials to a trusted backend and select PKCE for public clients. It is supported by the specific finding that Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The expected acceptance evidence is: The browser performs its supported login flow without exposing shared secrets in delivered code.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A web application uses Salesforce OAuth refresh tokens to maintain approved user sessions. Its relevant condition is: The app lacks a plan for secure refresh-token storage, rotation policy and account offboarding. The present case instead turns on: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The direct answer here is: Move confidential app credentials to a trusted backend and select PKCE for public clients.

C:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A security response team revokes a malicious connected app but sees continued API activity afterward. Its relevant condition is: The org has not confirmed whether tokens and application sessions were actually invalidated. The present case instead turns on: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The direct answer here is: Move confidential app credentials to a trusted backend and select PKCE for public clients.

D:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: An external reporting client stores OAuth access tokens in a database without encryption. Its relevant condition is: Tokens can be stolen from backups and used until expiry even if a password is changed. The present case instead turns on: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The direct answer here is: Move confidential app credentials to a trusted backend and select PKCE for public clients.

Question 343

An implementation team investigates this scenario: A developer includes client secrets in front-end JavaScript for a customer self-service portal. Which finding would most directly justify a change to the integration architecture?

  1. Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device.
  2. The org has not confirmed whether tokens and application sessions were actually invalidated.
  3. The app lacks a plan for secure refresh-token storage, rotation policy and account offboarding.
  4. An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Best. The decisive observation is: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. This is why the design response should be: Move confidential app credentials to a trusted backend and select PKCE for public clients.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A security response team revokes a malicious connected app but sees continued API activity afterward. Its relevant condition is: The org has not confirmed whether tokens and application sessions were actually invalidated. The present case instead turns on: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The direct answer here is: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device.

C:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A web application uses Salesforce OAuth refresh tokens to maintain approved user sessions. Its relevant condition is: The app lacks a plan for secure refresh-token storage, rotation policy and account offboarding. The present case instead turns on: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The direct answer here is: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device.

D:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: An API client uses OAuth authorization codes but omits the state parameter. Its relevant condition is: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The present case instead turns on: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The direct answer here is: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device.

Question 344

A solution review asks whether this control is effective: Move confidential app credentials to a trusted backend and select PKCE for public clients. The business setting is: A developer includes client secrets in front-end JavaScript for a customer self-service portal. What should a demonstrable successful outcome be?

  1. Engineers can investigate failed requests without retaining secrets in permanent logs.
  2. Revoked tokens can no longer be used for Salesforce API calls after the expected invalidation.
  3. All identified app access paths are closed and follow-up events confirm containment.
  4. The browser performs its supported login flow without exposing shared secrets in delivered code.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Best. The verification target is: The browser performs its supported login flow without exposing shared secrets in delivered code. It tests whether the chosen approach—Move confidential app credentials to a trusted backend and select PKCE for public clients.—actually resolves the specific finding: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: An integration logs full Authorization headers to simplify debugging of API failures. Its relevant condition is: Archived logs retain usable bearer tokens after normal application traffic has ended. The present case instead turns on: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The direct answer here is: The browser performs its supported login flow without exposing shared secrets in delivered code.

B:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A partner wants users to revoke a connected app's access without changing their Salesforce password. Its relevant condition is: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens. The present case instead turns on: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The direct answer here is: The browser performs its supported login flow without exposing shared secrets in delivered code.

C:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A security response team revokes a malicious connected app but sees continued API activity afterward. Its relevant condition is: The org has not confirmed whether tokens and application sessions were actually invalidated. The present case instead turns on: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The direct answer here is: The browser performs its supported login flow without exposing shared secrets in delivered code.

Question 345

A Salesforce integration initiative faces this situation: A developer includes client secrets in front-end JavaScript for a customer self-service portal. The critical observation is: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. What failure is most likely if it is ignored?

  1. A disconnected partner continues syncing data through an unrevoked refresh token.
  2. A person with log-view permission can replay tokens to access Salesforce records.
  3. A correctly signed JWT is reused against an unapproved token endpoint.
  4. One copied JavaScript bundle exposes the application credential for all customers.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Best. The most direct failure is: One copied JavaScript bundle exposes the application credential for all customers. It is a consequence of the documented condition: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. A mitigation is: Move confidential app credentials to a trusted backend and select PKCE for public clients.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A partner wants users to revoke a connected app's access without changing their Salesforce password. Its relevant condition is: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens. The present case instead turns on: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The direct answer here is: One copied JavaScript bundle exposes the application credential for all customers.

B:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: An integration logs full Authorization headers to simplify debugging of API failures. Its relevant condition is: Archived logs retain usable bearer tokens after normal application traffic has ended. The present case instead turns on: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The direct answer here is: One copied JavaScript bundle exposes the application credential for all customers.

C:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A backend integration sends a signed JWT to obtain a Salesforce access token. Its relevant condition is: The JWT has the correct private key but an audience string for a different Salesforce login host. The present case instead turns on: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The direct answer here is: One copied JavaScript bundle exposes the application credential for all customers.

Question 346

Salesforce and its partners face the following situation: An API client uses OAuth authorization codes but omits the state parameter. The integration review notes: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. Which architectural step should take priority?

  1. Implement supported OAuth token revocation and application disconnect handling for authorized users.
  2. Set issuer, subject, audience, expiry and signature according to the registered target authorization server.
  3. Bind login initiation to the callback using state and appropriate PKCE or anti-forgery validation.
  4. Move confidential app credentials to a trusted backend and select PKCE for public clients.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Best. The most direct action is to bind login initiation to the callback using state and appropriate PKCE or anti-forgery validation. It is supported by the specific finding that An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The expected acceptance evidence is: Only authorization responses associated with the expected initiating browser are accepted.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A partner wants users to revoke a connected app's access without changing their Salesforce password. Its relevant condition is: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens. The present case instead turns on: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The direct answer here is: Bind login initiation to the callback using state and appropriate PKCE or anti-forgery validation.

B:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A backend integration sends a signed JWT to obtain a Salesforce access token. Its relevant condition is: The JWT has the correct private key but an audience string for a different Salesforce login host. The present case instead turns on: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The direct answer here is: Bind login initiation to the callback using state and appropriate PKCE or anti-forgery validation.

D:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A developer includes client secrets in front-end JavaScript for a customer self-service portal. Its relevant condition is: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The present case instead turns on: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The direct answer here is: Bind login initiation to the callback using state and appropriate PKCE or anti-forgery validation.

Question 347

An implementation team investigates this scenario: An API client uses OAuth authorization codes but omits the state parameter. Which finding would most directly justify a change to the integration architecture?

  1. The org has not confirmed whether tokens and application sessions were actually invalidated.
  2. Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device.
  3. An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction.
  4. The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Best. The decisive observation is: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. This is why the design response should be: Bind login initiation to the callback using state and appropriate PKCE or anti-forgery validation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A security response team revokes a malicious connected app but sees continued API activity afterward. Its relevant condition is: The org has not confirmed whether tokens and application sessions were actually invalidated. The present case instead turns on: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The direct answer here is: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction.

B:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A developer includes client secrets in front-end JavaScript for a customer self-service portal. Its relevant condition is: Anyone loading the page can inspect the embedded secret and use it from another device. The present case instead turns on: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The direct answer here is: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction.

D:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A partner wants users to revoke a connected app's access without changing their Salesforce password. Its relevant condition is: The existing design assumes deleting a browser cookie also cancels OAuth refresh tokens. The present case instead turns on: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The direct answer here is: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction.

Question 348

A solution review asks whether this control is effective: Bind login initiation to the callback using state and appropriate PKCE or anti-forgery validation. The business setting is: An API client uses OAuth authorization codes but omits the state parameter. What should a demonstrable successful outcome be?

  1. The application renews access only for current approved users and destroys tokens at session termination.
  2. Engineers can investigate failed requests without retaining secrets in permanent logs.
  3. Stolen raw backups do not expose reusable token strings, and an incident can invalidate issued tokens.
  4. Only authorization responses associated with the expected initiating browser are accepted.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Best. The verification target is: Only authorization responses associated with the expected initiating browser are accepted. It tests whether the chosen approach—Bind login initiation to the callback using state and appropriate PKCE or anti-forgery validation.—actually resolves the specific finding: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A web application uses Salesforce OAuth refresh tokens to maintain approved user sessions. Its relevant condition is: The app lacks a plan for secure refresh-token storage, rotation policy and account offboarding. The present case instead turns on: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The direct answer here is: Only authorization responses associated with the expected initiating browser are accepted.

B:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: An integration logs full Authorization headers to simplify debugging of API failures. Its relevant condition is: Archived logs retain usable bearer tokens after normal application traffic has ended. The present case instead turns on: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The direct answer here is: Only authorization responses associated with the expected initiating browser are accepted.

C:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: An external reporting client stores OAuth access tokens in a database without encryption. Its relevant condition is: Tokens can be stolen from backups and used until expiry even if a password is changed. The present case instead turns on: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The direct answer here is: Only authorization responses associated with the expected initiating browser are accepted.

Question 349

A Salesforce integration initiative faces this situation: An API client uses OAuth authorization codes but omits the state parameter. The critical observation is: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. What failure is most likely if it is ignored?

  1. OAuth login CSRF links a victim session to an attacker's authorization result.
  2. Long-lived bearer tokens become a direct route to CRM API data without password verification.
  3. A correctly signed JWT is reused against an unapproved token endpoint.
  4. Policy changes block new consent while previously issued bearer tokens continue to work.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Best. The most direct failure is: OAuth login CSRF links a victim session to an attacker's authorization result. It is a consequence of the documented condition: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. A mitigation is: Bind login initiation to the callback using state and appropriate PKCE or anti-forgery validation.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: An external reporting client stores OAuth access tokens in a database without encryption. Its relevant condition is: Tokens can be stolen from backups and used until expiry even if a password is changed. The present case instead turns on: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The direct answer here is: OAuth login CSRF links a victim session to an attacker's authorization result.

C:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A backend integration sends a signed JWT to obtain a Salesforce access token. Its relevant condition is: The JWT has the correct private key but an audience string for a different Salesforce login host. The present case instead turns on: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The direct answer here is: OAuth login CSRF links a victim session to an attacker's authorization result.

D:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A security response team revokes a malicious connected app but sees continued API activity afterward. Its relevant condition is: The org has not confirmed whether tokens and application sessions were actually invalidated. The present case instead turns on: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The direct answer here is: OAuth login CSRF links a victim session to an attacker's authorization result.

Question 350

An architecture board reviews a proposed Salesforce integration. Context: An integration logs full Authorization headers to simplify debugging of API failures. Finding: Archived logs retain usable bearer tokens after normal application traffic has ended. Which decision best resolves the concern?

  1. Bind login initiation to the callback using state and appropriate PKCE or anti-forgery validation.
  2. Set issuer, subject, audience, expiry and signature according to the registered target authorization server.
  3. Redact authentication headers and retain only safe correlation data with controlled diagnostic access.
  4. Apply minimum refresh scope, protected storage, token lifecycle management and revocation on logout.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Best. The most direct action is to redact authentication headers and retain only safe correlation data with controlled diagnostic access. It is supported by the specific finding that Archived logs retain usable bearer tokens after normal application traffic has ended. The expected acceptance evidence is: Engineers can investigate failed requests without retaining secrets in permanent logs.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: An API client uses OAuth authorization codes but omits the state parameter. Its relevant condition is: An attacker may trick a browser into completing an unrelated authorization transaction. The present case instead turns on: Archived logs retain usable bearer tokens after normal application traffic has ended. The direct answer here is: Redact authentication headers and retain only safe correlation data with controlled diagnostic access.

B:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A backend integration sends a signed JWT to obtain a Salesforce access token. Its relevant condition is: The JWT has the correct private key but an audience string for a different Salesforce login host. The present case instead turns on: Archived logs retain usable bearer tokens after normal application traffic has ended. The direct answer here is: Redact authentication headers and retain only safe correlation data with controlled diagnostic access.

D:

Not best for this scenario. This option is associated with a different requirement within the same syllabus objective: A web application uses Salesforce OAuth refresh tokens to maintain approved user sessions. Its relevant condition is: The app lacks a plan for secure refresh-token storage, rotation policy and account offboarding. The present case instead turns on: Archived logs retain usable bearer tokens after normal application traffic has ended. The direct answer here is: Redact authentication headers and retain only safe correlation data with controlled diagnostic access.

Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Tests