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Review Defender Threat Intelligence indicator reputation, sightings, and associated campaigns. This is an investigation step for defender threat intelligence indicators, where analysts need context on an emerging malicious domain that appears in tenant telemetry. This case instead reports that the SOC needs to accelerate repetitive Defender incident investigation while retaining oversight. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use automated investigation appropriately and review response outcomes at this decision stage.

Review alert rule conditions and associated evidence before creating an exclusion. This is an investigation step for alert tuning and suppression controls, where an approved benign administration tool creates repeated Defender alerts and distracts the SOC. This case instead reports that the SOC needs to accelerate repetitive Defender incident investigation while retaining oversight. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use automated investigation appropriately and review response outcomes at this decision stage.

Check available Defender XDR advanced hunting tables and event coverage for the target window. This is an investigation step for advanced hunting across signals, where a SOC needs to search raw event records for a particular suspicious process and user timeline. This case instead reports that the SOC needs to accelerate repetitive Defender incident investigation while retaining oversight. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use automated investigation appropriately and review response outcomes at this decision stage.

Review SSPR authentication methods and number-of-methods-required policy. This is an investigation step for sspr verification method requirements, where password resets must require an approved number of identity verification methods. This case instead reports that a new employee cannot register strong authentication methods because no usable method is yet available. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to bootstrap an approved strong authentication method without permanent insecure credentials at this decision stage.

Inspect applicable Conditional Access policies and effective MFA grant controls on admin sign-ins. This is an investigation step for conditional access mfa policy targeting, where admins need MFA enforced centrally for a privileged access cohort. This case instead reports that a new employee cannot register strong authentication methods because no usable method is yet available. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to bootstrap an approved strong authentication method without permanent insecure credentials at this decision stage.

Inspect authentication methods policy targeting and existing passkey or FIDO2 registration. This is an investigation step for passkey and authentication methods policy, where security wants approved phishing-resistant sign-in methods for administrators. This case instead reports that a new employee cannot register strong authentication methods because no usable method is yet available. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to bootstrap an approved strong authentication method without permanent insecure credentials at this decision stage.

Review Password Protection policy and custom banned-password terms. This is an investigation step for microsoft entra password protection, where users repeatedly choose organization-specific easy-to-guess passwords despite conventional complexity checks. This case instead reports that admins need MFA enforced centrally for a privileged access cohort. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use Conditional Access for policy-based MFA requirements at this decision stage.

Review Conditional Access grant settings and available phishing-resistant authentication strength methods. This is an investigation step for authentication strength requirement, where privileged administrators must use phishing-resistant MFA instead of any two factors. This case instead reports that admins need MFA enforced centrally for a privileged access cohort. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use Conditional Access for policy-based MFA requirements at this decision stage.

Inspect Entra SSPR enablement scope and selected user groups. This is an investigation step for sspr policy targeting, where a subset of employees should be permitted to reset their passwords without helpdesk tickets. This case instead reports that admins need MFA enforced centrally for a privileged access cohort. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use Conditional Access for policy-based MFA requirements at this decision stage.

Confirm synchronized users can authenticate using the intended cloud authentication method. This is an acceptance testing step for password hash synchronization, where hybrid users need cloud authentication with resilience when on-premises authentication servers are unavailable. This case instead reports that a hybrid organization requires supported on-premises AD DS synchronization features managed by a dedicated sync server. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to maintain supported directory synchronization between AD DS and Entra ID at this decision stage.

Confirm in-scope identities provision correctly and out-of-scope objects remain excluded. This is an acceptance testing step for microsoft entra cloud sync provisioning, where several locations need resilient agent-based identity provisioning without a dedicated central sync engine. This case instead reports that a hybrid organization requires supported on-premises AD DS synchronization features managed by a dedicated sync server. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to maintain supported directory synchronization between AD DS and Entra ID at this decision stage.

Confirm intended users synchronize while excluded test objects do not. This is an acceptance testing step for directory synchronization scoping, where only selected departments should be synchronized from on-premises AD DS to Microsoft Entra. This case instead reports that a hybrid organization requires supported on-premises AD DS synchronization features managed by a dedicated sync server. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to maintain supported directory synchronization between AD DS and Entra ID at this decision stage.

Review Microsoft 365 network connectivity insights for the affected location and network path. This is an investigation step for network connectivity insights, where remote users have poor Microsoft 365 connectivity in one branch office. This case instead reports that users should sign in with a recently verified organization domain instead of the initial onmicrosoft.com suffix. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to adopt the new user principal name suffix without breaking existing identity mappings at this decision stage.

Query public MX answers from multiple DNS resolvers to identify the active inbound destination. This is an investigation step for exchange online mx cutover, where a verified Microsoft 365 domain has working accounts but incoming messages still reach a former mail provider. This case instead reports that users should sign in with a recently verified organization domain instead of the initial onmicrosoft.com suffix. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to adopt the new user principal name suffix without breaking existing identity mappings at this decision stage.

Correlate outage start times and affected workloads with Service health incidents and advisories. This is an investigation step for microsoft 365 service health incident, where users report service failures across several departments despite healthy local networks. This case instead reports that users should sign in with a recently verified organization domain instead of the initial onmicrosoft.com suffix. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to adopt the new user principal name suffix without breaking existing identity mappings at this decision stage.

Review restricted entities details, outbound spam alerts, and sign-in evidence. This is an investigation step for restricted entities response, where an email sender is prevented from sending because outbound abuse controls have restricted the entity. This case instead reports that a compromised mailbox is sending a high volume of unsolicited external mail. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to reduce abusive outbound email and investigate the source account at this decision stage.

Review Safe Links policy targeting, URL protection behavior, and affected messages. This is an investigation step for safe links time-of-click protection, where users receive messages containing destinations that may become malicious after delivery. This case instead reports that a compromised mailbox is sending a high volume of unsolicited external mail. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to reduce abusive outbound email and investigate the source account at this decision stage.

Use Threat Explorer to filter matching messages, recipients, and threat verdicts. This is an investigation step for threat explorer mail investigation, where security needs to locate every recipient of a suspected phishing campaign and examine message verdicts. This case instead reports that a compromised mailbox is sending a high volume of unsolicited external mail. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to reduce abusive outbound email and investigate the source account at this decision stage.

Review Defender Threat Intelligence indicator reputation, sightings, and associated campaigns. This is an investigation step for defender threat intelligence indicators, where analysts need context on an emerging malicious domain that appears in tenant telemetry. This case instead reports that security receives an incident containing correlated suspicious mail, sign-in, and device events. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to investigate one cross-workload incident coherently at this decision stage.

Check available Defender XDR advanced hunting tables and event coverage for the target window. This is an investigation step for advanced hunting across signals, where a SOC needs to search raw event records for a particular suspicious process and user timeline. This case instead reports that security receives an incident containing correlated suspicious mail, sign-in, and device events. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to investigate one cross-workload incident coherently at this decision stage.

Inspect exposure initiative findings and the affected critical assets. This is an investigation step for security exposure management initiatives, where the organization wants risk-based visibility into exposure that spans assets and attack paths. This case instead reports that security receives an incident containing correlated suspicious mail, sign-in, and device events. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to investigate one cross-workload incident coherently at this decision stage.

Monitor use of unsanctioned cloud applications and emerging high-risk apps. This is an ongoing assurance step for unsanctioned app risk classification, where a large file-sharing service appears in Cloud Discovery but has not been risk reviewed. This case instead reports that analysts need Microsoft 365 activity and file visibility through Defender for Cloud Apps. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to connect supported cloud app activity data to Defender for Cloud Apps at this decision stage.

Monitor cloud app activity patterns associated with suspicious mass sharing. This is an ongoing assurance step for cloud apps activity log review, where a cloud security analyst must trace a user's unusual sharing behavior in connected applications. This case instead reports that analysts need Microsoft 365 activity and file visibility through Defender for Cloud Apps. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to connect supported cloud app activity data to Defender for Cloud Apps at this decision stage.

Monitor Cloud Discovery data freshness and new app detection rates. This is an ongoing assurance step for cloud discovery log integration, where the organization needs to identify unsanctioned SaaS usage across the workforce. This case instead reports that analysts need Microsoft 365 activity and file visibility through Defender for Cloud Apps. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to connect supported cloud app activity data to Defender for Cloud Apps at this decision stage.

Review Safe Links policy targeting, URL protection behavior, and affected messages. This is an investigation step for safe links time-of-click protection, where users receive messages containing destinations that may become malicious after delivery. This case instead reports that the helpdesk needs to determine which quarantined messages users may preview or release. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to set appropriate user handling permissions for quarantined content at this decision stage.

Inspect anti-phishing impersonation policy configuration and message authentication evidence. This is an investigation step for anti-phishing impersonation protection, where attackers send messages that mimic an executive's display name while using unauthorized sender identities. This case instead reports that the helpdesk needs to determine which quarantined messages users may preview or release. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to set appropriate user handling permissions for quarantined content at this decision stage.

Inspect outbound anti-spam policy and unusual outbound sending activity. This is an investigation step for outbound spam protection, where a compromised mailbox is sending a high volume of unsolicited external mail. This case instead reports that the helpdesk needs to determine which quarantined messages users may preview or release. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to set appropriate user handling permissions for quarantined content at this decision stage.

Track script execution logs and failed Microsoft Graph user operations. This is an ongoing assurance step for bulk user administration with graph powershell, where human resources provides a large validated staff roster requiring repeatable account updates. This case instead reports that several support agents need to manage one common support address without sharing a password. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to provide delegated access to a shared mailbox at this decision stage.

Monitor group-based licensing processing errors and license capacity. This is an ongoing assurance step for group-based licensing, where hundreds of users need Microsoft 365 service licenses according to department membership. This case instead reports that several support agents need to manage one common support address without sharing a password. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to provide delegated access to a shared mailbox at this decision stage.

Review guest sign-in activity and external-access expiry or access reviews. This is an ongoing assurance step for external guest collaboration, where an approved contractor requires collaboration on selected tenant resources without a regular employee account. This case instead reports that several support agents need to manage one common support address without sharing a password. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to provide delegated access to a shared mailbox at this decision stage.

Inspect the SKU's service plans and the affected user's direct and inherited license assignments. This is an investigation step for license service-plan control, where users need core Microsoft 365 services but one licensed service plan must remain disabled for a cohort. This case instead reports that a cross-functional team needs shared group conversations and files with self-service collaboration. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use the collaboration features of a Microsoft 365 Group at this decision stage.

Review shared mailbox delegation and current common-address access patterns. This is an investigation step for shared mailbox management, where several support agents need to manage one common support address without sharing a password. This case instead reports that a cross-functional team needs shared group conversations and files with self-service collaboration. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use the collaboration features of a Microsoft 365 Group at this decision stage.

Inspect application role assignments and candidate Microsoft Entra security groups. This is an investigation step for security group permission targeting, where application access must be granted to a controlled group of staff, without a collaboration mailbox. This case instead reports that a cross-functional team needs shared group conversations and files with self-service collaboration. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use the collaboration features of a Microsoft 365 Group at this decision stage.