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Configure or tune Defender for Cloud Apps anomaly detection policies for the supported scenario. This is a solution design step for cloud apps anomaly detection policy, where security needs automated detection of unusual cloud application behavior across accounts. The current case instead reports that a large file-sharing service appears in Cloud Discovery but has not been risk reviewed. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to assess and govern shadow IT apps based on risk and usage at this decision stage.

Configure a Defender for Cloud Apps file policy for the specified risky sharing pattern. This is a solution design step for defender for cloud apps file policies, where security wants alerts when a connected cloud app exposes sensitive files through overly broad sharing. The current case instead reports that a large file-sharing service appears in Cloud Discovery but has not been risk reviewed. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to assess and govern shadow IT apps based on risk and usage at this decision stage.

Configure the supported Microsoft 365 app connector in Defender for Cloud Apps. This is a solution design step for defender for cloud apps app connector, where analysts need Microsoft 365 activity and file visibility through Defender for Cloud Apps. The current case instead reports that a large file-sharing service appears in Cloud Discovery but has not been risk reviewed. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to assess and govern shadow IT apps based on risk and usage at this decision stage.

Confirm address book lookup resolves the supplier to the external email address. This is an acceptance testing step for exchange online mail contact, where a supplier needs to appear in the organization address book but must not have a mailbox or tenant sign-in. This case instead reports that human resources provides a large validated staff roster requiring repeatable account updates. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to automate supported user changes with auditable commands at this decision stage.

Confirm a fresh interactive sign-in attempt to the disabled account fails as expected. This is an acceptance testing step for cloud user account sign-in control, where an employee has left the company but their account still permits Microsoft 365 interactive sign-in. This case instead reports that human resources provides a large validated staff roster requiring repeatable account updates. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to automate supported user changes with auditable commands at this decision stage.

Confirm members receive the intended entitlement and an out-of-scope user does not. This is an acceptance testing step for security group permission targeting, where application access must be granted to a controlled group of staff, without a collaboration mailbox. This case instead reports that human resources provides a large validated staff roster requiring repeatable account updates. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to automate supported user changes with auditable commands at this decision stage.

Confirm suspicious attachments receive the expected Safe Attachments verdict or handling. This is an acceptance testing step for safe attachments detonation, where unknown malicious attachments evade signature-only filtering in business email. The current case instead reports that security needs to locate every recipient of a suspected phishing campaign and examine message verdicts. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to investigate affected messages and delivery outcomes at this decision stage.

Confirm simulation reports and training assignments reflect the approved campaign. This is an acceptance testing step for attack simulation training campaign, where security awareness owners want to evaluate susceptibility to phishing using approved practice messages. The current case instead reports that security needs to locate every recipient of a suspected phishing campaign and examine message verdicts. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to investigate affected messages and delivery outcomes at this decision stage.

Confirm allowed user actions match the policy and disallowed release paths remain blocked. This is an acceptance testing step for quarantine policy permissions, where the helpdesk needs to determine which quarantined messages users may preview or release. The current case instead reports that security needs to locate every recipient of a suspected phishing campaign and examine message verdicts. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to investigate affected messages and delivery outcomes at this decision stage.

Check available Defender XDR advanced hunting tables and event coverage for the target window. This is an investigation step for advanced hunting across signals, where a SOC needs to search raw event records for a particular suspicious process and user timeline. The current case instead reports that an incident responder needs to reconstruct the order of an account compromise and device activity. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to build an evidence-backed incident timeline at this decision stage.

Inspect exposure initiative findings and the affected critical assets. This is an investigation step for security exposure management initiatives, where the organization wants risk-based visibility into exposure that spans assets and attack paths. The current case instead reports that an incident responder needs to reconstruct the order of an account compromise and device activity. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to build an evidence-backed incident timeline at this decision stage.

Review alert rule conditions and associated evidence before creating an exclusion. This is an investigation step for alert tuning and suppression controls, where an approved benign administration tool creates repeated Defender alerts and distracts the SOC. The current case instead reports that an incident responder needs to reconstruct the order of an account compromise and device activity. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to build an evidence-backed incident timeline at this decision stage.

Set the draft Conditional Access policy to Report-only before production enforcement. This is a solution design step for conditional access report-only evaluation, where security wants to assess a new Conditional Access requirement without interrupting users. The current case instead reports that a user identity has evidence of compromise beyond one isolated authentication attempt. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to trigger appropriate user-risk remediation rather than just reviewing individual sign-ins at this decision stage.

Configure a Conditional Access grant control requiring the device to be marked compliant. This is a solution design step for conditional access compliant-device grant, where a confidential application must be available only from Intune-compliant devices. The current case instead reports that a user identity has evidence of compromise beyond one isolated authentication attempt. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to trigger appropriate user-risk remediation rather than just reviewing individual sign-ins at this decision stage.

Scope the Conditional Access policy to the selected finance application. This is a solution design step for conditional access application targeting, where a high-value finance application needs stronger sign-in controls than ordinary collaboration apps. The current case instead reports that a user identity has evidence of compromise beyond one isolated authentication attempt. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to trigger appropriate user-risk remediation rather than just reviewing individual sign-ins at this decision stage.

Inspect active and eligible Microsoft Entra role assignments and activation requirements. This is an investigation step for privileged identity management just-in-time, where high-impact administrator roles should be activated only when needed with approval. The current case instead reports that a regional support team must manage only a subset of users across locations. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to scope delegated user administration by administrative unit at this decision stage.

Inspect Defender XDR RBAC permissions and analyst role needs. This is an investigation step for defender xdr least-privilege access, where sOC analysts need incident triage rights without unrelated tenant administration. The current case instead reports that a regional support team must manage only a subset of users across locations. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to scope delegated user administration by administrative unit at this decision stage.

Review Microsoft Purview role groups and permitted investigation actions. This is an investigation step for microsoft purview role groups, where compliance analysts require access to approved investigations but not universal compliance configuration. The current case instead reports that a regional support team must manage only a subset of users across locations. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to scope delegated user administration by administrative unit at this decision stage.

Review disabled-account sign-in attempts and downstream access revocation. This is an ongoing assurance step for cloud user account sign-in control, where an employee has left the company but their account still permits Microsoft 365 interactive sign-in. This case instead reports that human resources provides a large validated staff roster requiring repeatable account updates. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to automate supported user changes with auditable commands at this decision stage.

Track group membership and effective access for authorization changes. This is an ongoing assurance step for security group permission targeting, where application access must be granted to a controlled group of staff, without a collaboration mailbox. This case instead reports that human resources provides a large validated staff roster requiring repeatable account updates. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to automate supported user changes with auditable commands at this decision stage.

Review external mail-contact changes and stale contact details. This is an ongoing assurance step for exchange online mail contact, where a supplier needs to appear in the organization address book but must not have a mailbox or tenant sign-in. This case instead reports that human resources provides a large validated staff roster requiring repeatable account updates. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to automate supported user changes with auditable commands at this decision stage.

Review alert rule conditions and associated evidence before creating an exclusion. This is an investigation step for alert tuning and suppression controls, where an approved benign administration tool creates repeated Defender alerts and distracts the SOC. This case instead reports that an incident responder needs to reconstruct the order of an account compromise and device activity. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to build an evidence-backed incident timeline at this decision stage.

Check available Defender XDR advanced hunting tables and event coverage for the target window. This is an investigation step for advanced hunting across signals, where a SOC needs to search raw event records for a particular suspicious process and user timeline. This case instead reports that an incident responder needs to reconstruct the order of an account compromise and device activity. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to build an evidence-backed incident timeline at this decision stage.

Inspect exposure initiative findings and the affected critical assets. This is an investigation step for security exposure management initiatives, where the organization wants risk-based visibility into exposure that spans assets and attack paths. This case instead reports that an incident responder needs to reconstruct the order of an account compromise and device activity. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to build an evidence-backed incident timeline at this decision stage.

Monitor discrepancies between simulated policy applicability and actual sign-in logs. This is an ongoing assurance step for conditional access what if testing, where a complex combination of policies makes it unclear which controls apply to a prospective user sign-in. This case instead reports that security requires additional controls for sign-ins outside approved company network locations. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use trustworthy network-location context in Conditional Access at this decision stage.

Monitor risky-user state changes and remediation events. This is an ongoing assurance step for identity protection user risk remediation, where a user identity has evidence of compromise beyond one isolated authentication attempt. This case instead reports that security requires additional controls for sign-ins outside approved company network locations. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use trustworthy network-location context in Conditional Access at this decision stage.

Monitor access denials tied to device compliance and health reporting. This is an ongoing assurance step for conditional access compliant-device grant, where a confidential application must be available only from Intune-compliant devices. This case instead reports that security requires additional controls for sign-ins outside approved company network locations. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use trustworthy network-location context in Conditional Access at this decision stage.

Confirm members receive the intended entitlement and an out-of-scope user does not. This is an acceptance testing step for security group permission targeting, where application access must be granted to a controlled group of staff, without a collaboration mailbox. The current case instead reports that a cross-functional team needs shared group conversations and files with self-service collaboration. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use the collaboration features of a Microsoft 365 Group at this decision stage.

Confirm approved delegates can access and send appropriately, while outsiders cannot. This is an acceptance testing step for shared mailbox management, where several support agents need to manage one common support address without sharing a password. The current case instead reports that a cross-functional team needs shared group conversations and files with self-service collaboration. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use the collaboration features of a Microsoft 365 Group at this decision stage.

Verify the required service remains available and the excluded service plan is disabled. This is an acceptance testing step for license service-plan control, where users need core Microsoft 365 services but one licensed service plan must remain disabled for a cohort. The current case instead reports that a cross-functional team needs shared group conversations and files with self-service collaboration. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use the collaboration features of a Microsoft 365 Group at this decision stage.

Confirm protected resources appear in backup coverage and a supported restore test succeeds. This is an acceptance testing step for microsoft 365 backup configuration, where critical Exchange Online and OneDrive content needs a defined operational backup and recovery plan. The current case instead reports that the operations team learns about Microsoft 365 outages only when users open tickets. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to receive service incident notifications proactively at this decision stage.

Compare branch connectivity insights and real client experience before and after the change. This is an acceptance testing step for network connectivity insights, where remote users have poor Microsoft 365 connectivity in one branch office. The current case instead reports that the operations team learns about Microsoft 365 outages only when users open tickets. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to receive service incident notifications proactively at this decision stage.

Verify pilot users sign in with their intended new UPN and continue accessing assigned applications. This is an acceptance testing step for custom sign-in suffix rollout, where users should sign in with a recently verified organization domain instead of the initial onmicrosoft.com suffix. The current case instead reports that the operations team learns about Microsoft 365 outages only when users open tickets. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to receive service incident notifications proactively at this decision stage.