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Deploy Microsoft Entra Cloud Sync agents and configure the appropriate provisioning configuration. This is a solution design step for microsoft entra cloud sync provisioning, where several locations need resilient agent-based identity provisioning without a dedicated central sync engine. This case instead reports that a hybrid organization requires supported on-premises AD DS synchronization features managed by a dedicated sync server. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to maintain supported directory synchronization between AD DS and Entra ID at this decision stage.

Enable or retain supported password hash synchronization for the hybrid identity deployment. This is a solution design step for password hash synchronization, where hybrid users need cloud authentication with resilience when on-premises authentication servers are unavailable. This case instead reports that a hybrid organization requires supported on-premises AD DS synchronization features managed by a dedicated sync server. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to maintain supported directory synchronization between AD DS and Entra ID at this decision stage.

Configure supported directory synchronization filtering for only the intended identities. This is a solution design step for directory synchronization scoping, where only selected departments should be synchronized from on-premises AD DS to Microsoft Entra. This case instead reports that a hybrid organization requires supported on-premises AD DS synchronization features managed by a dedicated sync server. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to maintain supported directory synchronization between AD DS and Entra ID at this decision stage.

Configure quarantine policies for allowed end-user actions and administrator-controlled release. This is a solution design step for quarantine policy permissions, where the helpdesk needs to determine which quarantined messages users may preview or release. The current case instead reports that inbound email contains attachments with known malware signatures. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to apply malware filtering policy rather than relying only on user reports at this decision stage.

Create an authorized Attack simulation training simulation with appropriate user training. This is a solution design step for attack simulation training campaign, where security awareness owners want to evaluate susceptibility to phishing using approved practice messages. The current case instead reports that inbound email contains attachments with known malware signatures. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to apply malware filtering policy rather than relying only on user reports at this decision stage.

Configure outbound anti-spam protections and investigate the suspected sender compromise. This is a solution design step for outbound spam protection, where a compromised mailbox is sending a high volume of unsolicited external mail. The current case instead reports that inbound email contains attachments with known malware signatures. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to apply malware filtering policy rather than relying only on user reports at this decision stage.

Use Microsoft 365 Service health incident details to guide operational response and communication. This is a solution design step for microsoft 365 service health incident, where users report service failures across several departments despite healthy local networks. The current case instead reports that the company legal name and support contact shown in Microsoft 365 tenant information are outdated. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to update customer-facing and tenant administrative organization information at this decision stage.

Create Microsoft 365 Backup protection policies for the supported target workloads. This is a solution design step for microsoft 365 backup configuration, where critical Exchange Online and OneDrive content needs a defined operational backup and recovery plan. The current case instead reports that the company legal name and support contact shown in Microsoft 365 tenant information are outdated. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to update customer-facing and tenant administrative organization information at this decision stage.

Investigate location-specific recommendations using Microsoft 365 network connectivity insights. This is a solution design step for network connectivity insights, where remote users have poor Microsoft 365 connectivity in one branch office. The current case instead reports that the company legal name and support contact shown in Microsoft 365 tenant information are outdated. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to update customer-facing and tenant administrative organization information at this decision stage.

Check external collaboration settings and existing guest invitations for the contractor. This is an investigation step for external guest collaboration, where an approved contractor requires collaboration on selected tenant resources without a regular employee account. The current case instead reports that an employee has left the company but their account still permits Microsoft 365 interactive sign-in. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to prevent future interactive sign-ins while preserving required investigation and retention paths at this decision stage.

Inspect whether existing Microsoft 365 Groups already support the team's collaboration needs. This is an investigation step for microsoft 365 group workspace collaboration, where a cross-functional team needs shared group conversations and files with self-service collaboration. The current case instead reports that an employee has left the company but their account still permits Microsoft 365 interactive sign-in. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to prevent future interactive sign-ins while preserving required investigation and retention paths at this decision stage.

Check the existing group type and whether access controls require a security principal. This is an investigation step for mail-enabled security group, where a compliance committee needs a single email address and a permission-assignable membership. The current case instead reports that an employee has left the company but their account still permits Microsoft 365 interactive sign-in. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to prevent future interactive sign-ins while preserving required investigation and retention paths at this decision stage.

Review applicable retention label definitions, publication, and item classification. This is an investigation step for retention labels for individual items, where records officers must retain selected contract documents for a defined period based on content classification. The current case instead reports that highly confidential finance files need persistent content protection after being shared. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to protect approved document content through a sensitivity label at this decision stage.

Review Purview sensitivity label policy publication and target user or group scope. This is an investigation step for sensitivity label publication policy, where a sensitivity label exists but employees do not see it in supported Office labeling interfaces. The current case instead reports that highly confidential finance files need persistent content protection after being shared. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to protect approved document content through a sensitivity label at this decision stage.

Review current Microsoft Purview retention policies and location scopes. This is an investigation step for broad microsoft 365 retention policy, where the organization needs a broad baseline retention setting for a defined workload location. The current case instead reports that highly confidential finance files need persistent content protection after being shared. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to protect approved document content through a sensitivity label at this decision stage.

Review anomaly detection policy scope, alert confidence, and activity evidence. This is an investigation step for cloud apps anomaly detection policy, where security needs automated detection of unusual cloud application behavior across accounts. The current case instead reports that a large file-sharing service appears in Cloud Discovery but has not been risk reviewed. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to assess and govern shadow IT apps based on risk and usage at this decision stage.

Review file policy scope, sharing exposure conditions, and connected app permissions. This is an investigation step for defender for cloud apps file policies, where security wants alerts when a connected cloud app exposes sensitive files through overly broad sharing. The current case instead reports that a large file-sharing service appears in Cloud Discovery but has not been risk reviewed. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to assess and govern shadow IT apps based on risk and usage at this decision stage.

Review app connector configuration, permissions, and connection health. This is an investigation step for defender for cloud apps app connector, where analysts need Microsoft 365 activity and file visibility through Defender for Cloud Apps. The current case instead reports that a large file-sharing service appears in Cloud Discovery but has not been risk reviewed. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to assess and govern shadow IT apps based on risk and usage at this decision stage.

Assign shared-mailbox permissions to two pilot agents without sharing mailbox credentials. This is a controlled implementation step for shared mailbox management, where several support agents need to manage one common support address without sharing a password. The current case instead reports that a cross-functional team needs shared group conversations and files with self-service collaboration. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use the collaboration features of a Microsoft 365 Group at this decision stage.

Pilot the adjusted license service-plan selection with one noncritical user group. This is a controlled implementation step for license service-plan control, where users need core Microsoft 365 services but one licensed service plan must remain disabled for a cohort. The current case instead reports that a cross-functional team needs shared group conversations and files with self-service collaboration. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use the collaboration features of a Microsoft 365 Group at this decision stage.

Assign a pilot security group to the supported resource permission and test with two identities. This is a controlled implementation step for security group permission targeting, where application access must be granted to a controlled group of staff, without a collaboration mailbox. The current case instead reports that a cross-functional team needs shared group conversations and files with self-service collaboration. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use the collaboration features of a Microsoft 365 Group at this decision stage.

Review PIM activation logs, approval events, and standing privileged assignments. This is an ongoing assurance step for privileged identity management just-in-time, where high-impact administrator roles should be activated only when needed with approval. This case instead reports that a regional support team must manage only a subset of users across locations. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to scope delegated user administration by administrative unit at this decision stage.

Audit Defender XDR permission changes and sensitive analyst actions. This is an ongoing assurance step for defender xdr least-privilege access, where sOC analysts need incident triage rights without unrelated tenant administration. This case instead reports that a regional support team must manage only a subset of users across locations. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to scope delegated user administration by administrative unit at this decision stage.

Review Purview role-group membership and audit logs for privileged compliance actions. This is an ongoing assurance step for microsoft purview role groups, where compliance analysts require access to approved investigations but not universal compliance configuration. This case instead reports that a regional support team must manage only a subset of users across locations. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to scope delegated user administration by administrative unit at this decision stage.

Pilot the control using one compliant managed device and one noncompliant device. This is a controlled implementation step for conditional access compliant-device grant, where a confidential application must be available only from Intune-compliant devices. The current case instead reports that a user identity has evidence of compromise beyond one isolated authentication attempt. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to trigger appropriate user-risk remediation rather than just reviewing individual sign-ins at this decision stage.

Pilot the report-only policy against a representative group and analyze expected failures. This is a controlled implementation step for conditional access report-only evaluation, where security wants to assess a new Conditional Access requirement without interrupting users. The current case instead reports that a user identity has evidence of compromise beyond one isolated authentication attempt. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to trigger appropriate user-risk remediation rather than just reviewing individual sign-ins at this decision stage.

Pilot a policy scoped to the finance app before including other sensitive applications. This is a controlled implementation step for conditional access application targeting, where a high-value finance application needs stronger sign-in controls than ordinary collaboration apps. The current case instead reports that a user identity has evidence of compromise beyond one isolated authentication attempt. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to trigger appropriate user-risk remediation rather than just reviewing individual sign-ins at this decision stage.

Review vulnerable software inventory, affected device exposure, and security recommendations. This is an investigation step for defender vulnerability management prioritization, where security must prioritize endpoint software exposure across a large workstation fleet. The current case instead reports that the SOC needs consistent endpoint detection configuration across a managed device population. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to apply supported Defender endpoint settings through the appropriate management path at this decision stage.

Review ASR rule applicability, audit events, and potential business-process exceptions. This is an investigation step for attack surface reduction rule deployment, where commodity malware uses suspicious script and Office child-process behavior on managed endpoints. The current case instead reports that the SOC needs consistent endpoint detection configuration across a managed device population. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to apply supported Defender endpoint settings through the appropriate management path at this decision stage.

Check device onboarding state, deployment method, and sensor health. This is an investigation step for defender for endpoint onboarding, where several managed Windows devices are missing from the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint device inventory. The current case instead reports that the SOC needs consistent endpoint detection configuration across a managed device population. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to apply supported Defender endpoint settings through the appropriate management path at this decision stage.

Inspect SSPR writeback configuration and eligible on-premises connector agents. This is an investigation step for sspr on-premises password writeback, where a synchronized employee resets their cloud password successfully but cannot use the new password against on-premises resources. This case instead reports that only selected departments should be synchronized from on-premises AD DS to Microsoft Entra. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to restrict synchronized identity scope without deleting unrelated users at this decision stage.

Inspect the sourceAnchor and synchronization mapping for the affected user attribute. This is an investigation step for source-of-authority for synchronized attributes, where a synchronized employee display name keeps reverting after cloud-side edits. This case instead reports that only selected departments should be synchronized from on-premises AD DS to Microsoft Entra. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to restrict synchronized identity scope without deleting unrelated users at this decision stage.

Review the Connect Sync scheduler, connectors, and current directory synchronization topology. This is an investigation step for microsoft entra connect sync topology, where a hybrid organization requires supported on-premises AD DS synchronization features managed by a dedicated sync server. This case instead reports that only selected departments should be synchronized from on-premises AD DS to Microsoft Entra. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to restrict synchronized identity scope without deleting unrelated users at this decision stage.