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Pilot discovery collection for one network segment or endpoint ring. This is a controlled implementation step for cloud discovery log integration, where the organization needs to identify unsanctioned SaaS usage across the workforce. This case instead reports that a cloud security analyst must trace a user's unusual sharing behavior in connected applications. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to locate relevant activity events for a cloud user at this decision stage.

Pilot the sanctioned/unsanctioned governance process on a reviewed app. This is a controlled implementation step for unsanctioned app risk classification, where a large file-sharing service appears in Cloud Discovery but has not been risk reviewed. This case instead reports that a cloud security analyst must trace a user's unusual sharing behavior in connected applications. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to locate relevant activity events for a cloud user at this decision stage.

Pilot the file policy on test files with known safe and unsafe sharing settings. This is a controlled implementation step for defender for cloud apps file policies, where security wants alerts when a connected cloud app exposes sensitive files through overly broad sharing. This case instead reports that a cloud security analyst must trace a user's unusual sharing behavior in connected applications. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to locate relevant activity events for a cloud user at this decision stage.

Change the attribute for a pilot synchronized account in the appropriate on-premises source. This is a controlled implementation step for source-of-authority for synchronized attributes, where a synchronized employee display name keeps reverting after cloud-side edits. This case instead reports that several locations need resilient agent-based identity provisioning without a dedicated central sync engine. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use Microsoft Entra Cloud Sync for a supported provisioning scenario at this decision stage.

Pilot a password reset for one eligible synchronized account using the writeback path. This is a controlled implementation step for sspr on-premises password writeback, where a synchronized employee resets their cloud password successfully but cannot use the new password against on-premises resources. This case instead reports that several locations need resilient agent-based identity provisioning without a dedicated central sync engine. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use Microsoft Entra Cloud Sync for a supported provisioning scenario at this decision stage.

Enable health collection on an approved connector and validate alert visibility. This is a controlled implementation step for entra connect health monitoring, where the hybrid identity team notices authentication and synchronization outages only after end users report problems. This case instead reports that several locations need resilient agent-based identity provisioning without a dedicated central sync engine. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to use Microsoft Entra Cloud Sync for a supported provisioning scenario at this decision stage.

Inspect Conditional Access target resource assignments and the finance app service principal. This is an investigation step for conditional access application targeting, where a high-value finance application needs stronger sign-in controls than ordinary collaboration apps. The current case instead reports that an all-users Conditional Access change could lock out administrators during identity outages. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to maintain controlled emergency recovery access during Conditional Access deployment at this decision stage.

Review Conditional Access grant requirements and device compliance claims on sign-in records. This is an investigation step for conditional access compliant-device grant, where a confidential application must be available only from Intune-compliant devices. The current case instead reports that an all-users Conditional Access change could lock out administrators during identity outages. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to maintain controlled emergency recovery access during Conditional Access deployment at this decision stage.

Inspect current Conditional Access assignments and simulate the user/resource conditions with What If. This is an investigation step for conditional access what if testing, where a complex combination of policies makes it unclear which controls apply to a prospective user sign-in. The current case instead reports that an all-users Conditional Access change could lock out administrators during identity outages. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to maintain controlled emergency recovery access during Conditional Access deployment at this decision stage.

Monitor group-based licensing processing errors and license capacity. This is an ongoing assurance step for group-based licensing, where hundreds of users need Microsoft 365 service licenses according to department membership. The current case instead reports that a supplier needs to appear in the organization address book but must not have a mailbox or tenant sign-in. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to represent the supplier as a mail contact rather than a licensed mailbox user at this decision stage.

Review Microsoft 365 Group ownership, membership changes, and orphaned groups. This is an ongoing assurance step for microsoft 365 group workspace collaboration, where a cross-functional team needs shared group conversations and files with self-service collaboration. The current case instead reports that a supplier needs to appear in the organization address book but must not have a mailbox or tenant sign-in. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to represent the supplier as a mail contact rather than a licensed mailbox user at this decision stage.

Review membership changes and permission scopes on the mail-enabled security group. This is an ongoing assurance step for mail-enabled security group, where a compliance committee needs a single email address and a permission-assignable membership. The current case instead reports that a supplier needs to appear in the organization address book but must not have a mailbox or tenant sign-in. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to represent the supplier as a mail contact rather than a licensed mailbox user at this decision stage.

Pilot SSPR with a test group that has completed required authentication-method registration. This is a controlled implementation step for sspr policy targeting, where a subset of employees should be permitted to reset their passwords without helpdesk tickets. The current case instead reports that a user reports an MFA-related sign-in failure to Microsoft 365. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to identify the actual sign-in policy or authentication factor causing the block at this decision stage.

Pilot the stronger grant requirement with registered phishing-resistant test identities. This is a controlled implementation step for authentication strength requirement, where privileged administrators must use phishing-resistant MFA instead of any two factors. The current case instead reports that a user reports an MFA-related sign-in failure to Microsoft 365. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to identify the actual sign-in policy or authentication factor causing the block at this decision stage.

Pilot the Temporary Access Pass registration flow with one controlled onboarding identity. This is a controlled implementation step for temporary access pass bootstrap, where a new employee cannot register strong authentication methods because no usable method is yet available. The current case instead reports that a user reports an MFA-related sign-in failure to Microsoft 365. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to identify the actual sign-in policy or authentication factor causing the block at this decision stage.

Configure a Defender for Cloud Apps file policy for the specified risky sharing pattern. This is a solution design step for defender for cloud apps file policies, where security wants alerts when a connected cloud app exposes sensitive files through overly broad sharing. The current case instead reports that the organization needs to identify unsanctioned SaaS usage across the workforce. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to gain usage visibility into shadow IT applications at this decision stage.

Configure or tune Defender for Cloud Apps anomaly detection policies for the supported scenario. This is a solution design step for cloud apps anomaly detection policy, where security needs automated detection of unusual cloud application behavior across accounts. The current case instead reports that the organization needs to identify unsanctioned SaaS usage across the workforce. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to gain usage visibility into shadow IT applications at this decision stage.

Classify the risky app as unsanctioned where supported and coordinate controls. This is a solution design step for unsanctioned app risk classification, where a large file-sharing service appears in Cloud Discovery but has not been risk reviewed. The current case instead reports that the organization needs to identify unsanctioned SaaS usage across the workforce. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to gain usage visibility into shadow IT applications at this decision stage.

Monitor sign-in risk detections and remediation outcomes. This is an ongoing assurance step for identity protection sign-in risk, where security wants stronger access controls when an individual sign-in exhibits suspicious signals. This case instead reports that a complex combination of policies makes it unclear which controls apply to a prospective user sign-in. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to predict policy applicability for a specified sign-in scenario at this decision stage.

Review finance app sign-in policy applicability and unintended extra targets. This is an ongoing assurance step for conditional access application targeting, where a high-value finance application needs stronger sign-in controls than ordinary collaboration apps. This case instead reports that a complex combination of policies makes it unclear which controls apply to a prospective user sign-in. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to predict policy applicability for a specified sign-in scenario at this decision stage.

Monitor report-only success, user action required, and failure classifications. This is an ongoing assurance step for conditional access report-only evaluation, where security wants to assess a new Conditional Access requirement without interrupting users. This case instead reports that a complex combination of policies makes it unclear which controls apply to a prospective user sign-in. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to predict policy applicability for a specified sign-in scenario at this decision stage.

Review Temporary Access Pass issuance, use, and expiration events. This is an ongoing assurance step for temporary access pass bootstrap, where a new employee cannot register strong authentication methods because no usable method is yet available. The current case instead reports that security wants approved phishing-resistant sign-in methods for administrators. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to enable a supported phishing-resistant authentication method for targeted users at this decision stage.

Monitor SSPR registration and reset success rates for the targeted group. This is an ongoing assurance step for sspr policy targeting, where a subset of employees should be permitted to reset their passwords without helpdesk tickets. The current case instead reports that security wants approved phishing-resistant sign-in methods for administrators. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to enable a supported phishing-resistant authentication method for targeted users at this decision stage.

Review password protection audit or enforcement events and rejected weak password trends. This is an ongoing assurance step for microsoft entra password protection, where users repeatedly choose organization-specific easy-to-guess passwords despite conventional complexity checks. The current case instead reports that security wants approved phishing-resistant sign-in methods for administrators. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to enable a supported phishing-resistant authentication method for targeted users at this decision stage.

Update a small pilot identity set and test authentication before a bulk suffix migration. This is a controlled implementation step for custom sign-in suffix rollout, where users should sign in with a recently verified organization domain instead of the initial onmicrosoft.com suffix. The current case instead reports that the operations team learns about Microsoft 365 outages only when users open tickets. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to receive service incident notifications proactively at this decision stage.

Pilot a recommended egress or DNS-path improvement at the impacted branch before region-wide rollout. This is a controlled implementation step for network connectivity insights, where remote users have poor Microsoft 365 connectivity in one branch office. The current case instead reports that the operations team learns about Microsoft 365 outages only when users open tickets. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to receive service incident notifications proactively at this decision stage.

Apply protection first to a controlled eligible resource subset and check recovery readiness. This is a controlled implementation step for microsoft 365 backup configuration, where critical Exchange Online and OneDrive content needs a defined operational backup and recovery plan. The current case instead reports that the operations team learns about Microsoft 365 outages only when users open tickets. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to receive service incident notifications proactively at this decision stage.

Inspect incident automated investigation status, supporting evidence, and pending actions. This is an investigation step for automated incident investigation, where the SOC needs to accelerate repetitive Defender incident investigation while retaining oversight. The current case instead reports that the organization wants risk-based visibility into exposure that spans assets and attack paths. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to prioritize risk remediation using exposure context at this decision stage.

Inspect incident evidence, alert timestamps, and related user/device activities. This is an investigation step for incident evidence timeline, where an incident responder needs to reconstruct the order of an account compromise and device activity. The current case instead reports that the organization wants risk-based visibility into exposure that spans assets and attack paths. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to prioritize risk remediation using exposure context at this decision stage.

Review the unified incident's alerts, affected assets, and related entities in Defender XDR. This is an investigation step for unified defender xdr incident triage, where security receives an incident containing correlated suspicious mail, sign-in, and device events. The current case instead reports that the organization wants risk-based visibility into exposure that spans assets and attack paths. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to prioritize risk remediation using exposure context at this decision stage.

Review Purview role-group membership and audit logs for privileged compliance actions. This is an ongoing assurance step for microsoft purview role groups, where compliance analysts require access to approved investigations but not universal compliance configuration. The current case instead reports that a regional support team must manage only a subset of users across locations. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to scope delegated user administration by administrative unit at this decision stage.

Review PIM activation logs, approval events, and standing privileged assignments. This is an ongoing assurance step for privileged identity management just-in-time, where high-impact administrator roles should be activated only when needed with approval. The current case instead reports that a regional support team must manage only a subset of users across locations. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to scope delegated user administration by administrative unit at this decision stage.

Audit Defender XDR permission changes and sensitive analyst actions. This is an ongoing assurance step for defender xdr least-privilege access, where sOC analysts need incident triage rights without unrelated tenant administration. The current case instead reports that a regional support team must manage only a subset of users across locations. It does not directly demonstrate the required outcome to scope delegated user administration by administrative unit at this decision stage.