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“Monitor grants and privileged role membership” concerns Unnecessary DDL rights create serious modification risk; the reported problem instead is Password rotation breaks the app and exposes credentials. Monitor token failures and assigned role drift.

“Monitor anomalous prior token activity” concerns Secrets may have been indexed and copied; the reported problem instead is Password rotation breaks the app and exposes credentials. Monitor token failures and assigned role drift.

“Monitor API denied requests and role drift” concerns Default or overly broad role mappings permit unintended writes; the reported problem instead is Password rotation breaks the app and exposes credentials. Monitor token failures and assigned role drift.

“Inventory affected service principals and audit logs” concerns Secrets may have been indexed and copied; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Review audit events and target retention requirements.

“Inspect retention settings and writer permissions” concerns Admins could alter evidence after a security incident; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Review audit events and target retention requirements.

“Review platform TDE state and key custody requirements” concerns Storage backup compromise could expose plaintext pages; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Review audit events and target retention requirements.

“Map roles to minimum allowed actions and enforce SQL permissions” concerns Default or overly broad role mappings permit unintended writes; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Enable appropriate SQL auditing for privileged actions and send to governed storage.

“Send audit events to approved immutable or tamper-resistant storage” concerns Admins could alter evidence after a security incident; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Enable appropriate SQL auditing for privileged actions and send to governed storage.

“Enable supported transparent data encryption and govern key backups” concerns Storage backup compromise could expose plaintext pages; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Enable appropriate SQL auditing for privileged actions and send to governed storage.

“Run controlled inference probes against masked fields in a test database” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Perform a simulated GRANT and inspect collected audit events.

“Attempt authorized ingest and blocked rewrite of synthetic audit record” concerns Admins could alter evidence after a security incident; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Perform a simulated GRANT and inspect collected audit events.

“Switch a sandbox service to a newly issued credential” concerns Secrets may have been indexed and copied; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Perform a simulated GRANT and inspect collected audit events.

“Old credential fails and new credential works only for scoped permissions” concerns Secrets may have been indexed and copied; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Actor, action and timestamp are present and protected from tampering.

“Restricted principals cannot retrieve sensitive raw values through alternate paths” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Actor, action and timestamp are present and protected from tampering.

“Expected fields are labeled and permissions tested” concerns Teams cannot apply proper controls without data inventory; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Actor, action and timestamp are present and protected from tampering.

“Monitor policy changes and cross-tenant access tests” concerns Application bugs could read rows belonging to another tenant; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Monitor audit pipeline gaps and retention policy.

“Monitor masking policy misunderstanding and overprivileged accounts” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is Existing logs cannot identify actor and changed object. Monitor audit pipeline gaps and retention policy.

CPU and query response time describe database performance and do not establish whether role-change audit records were emitted, ingested or retained. Audit pipeline and retention checks in B directly satisfy the evidentiary requirement.

“Inventory exposed tools and execution principals” concerns An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Inspect actual execution plan and predicate function execution.

“Inspect identity support and SQL principal mapping” concerns Password rotation breaks the app and exposes credentials; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Inspect actual execution plan and predicate function execution.

“Inspect retention settings and writer permissions” concerns Admins could alter evidence after a security incident; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Inspect actual execution plan and predicate function execution.

“Combine least-privilege controls, RLS/encryption and masking only as defense in depth” concerns Masking is not a substitute for authorization and can be inferred; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Optimize RLS predicate lookup indexes without weakening filtering.

“Use a Row-Level Security predicate and security policy for tenant boundaries” concerns Application bugs could read rows belonging to another tenant; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Optimize RLS predicate lookup indexes without weakening filtering.

“Send audit events to approved immutable or tamper-resistant storage” concerns Admins could alter evidence after a security incident; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Optimize RLS predicate lookup indexes without weakening filtering.

“Query the same test rows through separate tenant principals” concerns Application bugs could read rows belonging to another tenant; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Benchmark identical queries under an authorized test role.

“Try authorized GET and unauthorized mutation using test tokens” concerns Default or overly broad role mappings permit unintended writes; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Benchmark identical queries under an authorized test role.

“Attempt authorized ingest and blocked rewrite of synthetic audit record” concerns Admins could alter evidence after a security incident; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Benchmark identical queries under an authorized test role.

“Each session sees only authorized tenant rows even on broad SELECT” concerns Application bugs could read rows belonging to another tenant; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Correct tenant isolation persists with reduced query overhead.

“Event is preserved and modifications are prevented or detectable” concerns Admins could alter evidence after a security incident; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Correct tenant isolation persists with reduced query overhead.

“Authorized query works without stored SQL passwords” concerns Password rotation breaks the app and exposes credentials; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Correct tenant isolation persists with reduced query overhead.

“Monitor retention policy and ingestion outages” concerns Admins could alter evidence after a security incident; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Monitor plan regressions and security tests.

“Monitor MCP invocation logs and unauthorized action attempts” concerns An AI agent only needs metadata yet can invoke DELETE; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Monitor plan regressions and security tests.

“Monitor policy changes and cross-tenant access tests” concerns Application bugs could read rows belonging to another tenant; the reported problem instead is Security predicates join an unindexed tenant mapping table. Monitor plan regressions and security tests.