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CompTIA N10-009 Practice Test 55

Question 540

The original case was: A switch's MAC address table fills with thousands of spoofed sources and frames begin flooding unexpected ports. The requirement then changes: A separate attack forges ARP replies to redirect a victim's local gateway traffic. Which revised action BEST meets this new condition?

  1. Increase DNS cache TTL and expect the switch MAC table to stop overflowing.
  2. Recognize MAC flooding and use port security, monitoring and appropriate limits.
  3. Apply dynamic ARP inspection and DHCP-snooping-based validation where supported.
  4. Controlled unauthorized MAC churn triggers port-limit protection or alerting.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

ARP spoofing abuses address mapping and needs integrity checks for ARP traffic. The revised requirement is: A separate attack forges ARP replies to redirect a victim's local gateway traffic. The appropriate action is: Apply dynamic ARP inspection and DHCP-snooping-based validation where supported.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Name caching does not constrain forged source MAC learning. It remains inappropriate in the revised context.

B:

This is the original control. CAM exhaustion may cause unknown unicast flooding that exposes traffic. It does not directly satisfy the revised requirement: A separate attack forges ARP replies to redirect a victim's local gateway traffic.

D:

Controlled unauthorized MAC churn triggers port-limit protection or alerting. The current requirement is: A separate attack forges ARP replies to redirect a victim's local gateway traffic.

Question 541

An attacker sends forged ARP replies so hosts send default-gateway frames to the attacker's MAC. Which action MOST directly meets the stated networking requirement?

  1. Use secure resolver controls and DNSSEC validation where applicable.
  2. Assume TLS certificates alone correct the host's poisoned ARP cache.
  3. Enable DHCP snooping or comparable server-authority enforcement on untrusted switch ports.
  4. Use validated ARP inspection and trustworthy ARP/DHCP binding controls.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

ARP poisoning can impersonate the gateway and redirect local layer-2 traffic. This specifically resolves: An attacker sends forged ARP replies so hosts send default-gateway frames to the attacker's MAC.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This action responds to a later condition: Attackers instead forge DNS answers for a commonly used application name. DNS spoofing targets name resolution rather than ARP address mapping.

B:

TLS may protect sessions but does not repair forged local gateway mapping. The suggested approach is: Assume TLS certificates alone correct the host's poisoned ARP cache.

C:

This addresses another problem in objective 4.2: A new unauthorized DHCP service starts leasing the wrong default gateway to office endpoints.

Question 542

An attacker sends forged ARP replies so hosts send default-gateway frames to the attacker's MAC. A colleague instead suggests: Assume TLS certificates alone correct the host's poisoned ARP cache. Which finding MOST specifically explains why that suggestion is unsuitable?

  1. TLS may protect sessions but does not repair forged local gateway mapping.
  2. Unrestricted DHCP server responses allow untrusted devices to issue leases.
  3. DNS spoofing targets name resolution rather than ARP address mapping.
  4. ARP poisoning can impersonate the gateway and redirect local layer-2 traffic.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

TLS may protect sessions but does not repair forged local gateway mapping. This flaw directly concerns the proposed action: Assume TLS certificates alone correct the host's poisoned ARP cache.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This flaw concerns a different case in objective 4.2: A new unauthorized DHCP service starts leasing the wrong default gateway to office endpoints. The current rejected proposal is: Assume TLS certificates alone correct the host's poisoned ARP cache.

C:

This rationale belongs to a later changed condition: Attackers instead forge DNS answers for a commonly used application name.

D:

This explains why the recommended control works: Use validated ARP inspection and trustworthy ARP/DHCP binding controls.

Question 543

An attacker sends forged ARP replies so hosts send default-gateway frames to the attacker's MAC. After applying the solution 'Use validated ARP inspection and trustworthy ARP/DHCP binding controls.', which observation MOST directly proves that the requirement was met?

  1. Suspicious ARP packets are rejected and victim gateway mappings remain correct.
  2. Reported test messages are blocked or escalated and stolen passwords cannot bypass MFA.
  3. Approval is recorded for 'Use validated ARP inspection and trustworthy ARP/DHCP binding controls.' but no operational validation is performed.
  4. A rogue reply is dropped and legitimate clients obtain the approved gateway.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Suspicious ARP packets are rejected and victim gateway mappings remain correct. It tests the intended outcome because arp poisoning can impersonate the gateway and redirect local layer-2 traffic.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This test addresses a separate problem: An attacker sends a malicious link impersonating the service desk to obtain network-admin credentials.

C:

The missing direct test is: Suspicious ARP packets are rejected and victim gateway mappings remain correct.

D:

This observation is for a different condition: A new unauthorized DHCP service starts leasing the wrong default gateway to office endpoints. It does not directly test the target outcome: An attacker sends forged ARP replies so hosts send default-gateway frames to the attacker's MAC.

Question 544

The original case was: An attacker sends forged ARP replies so hosts send default-gateway frames to the attacker's MAC. The requirement then changes: Attackers instead forge DNS answers for a commonly used application name. Which revised action BEST meets this new condition?

  1. Assume TLS certificates alone correct the host's poisoned ARP cache.
  2. Use validated ARP inspection and trustworthy ARP/DHCP binding controls.
  3. Use secure resolver controls and DNSSEC validation where applicable.
  4. Suspicious ARP packets are rejected and victim gateway mappings remain correct.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

DNS spoofing targets name resolution rather than ARP address mapping. The revised requirement is: Attackers instead forge DNS answers for a commonly used application name. The appropriate action is: Use secure resolver controls and DNSSEC validation where applicable.

Incorrect Answers

A:

TLS may protect sessions but does not repair forged local gateway mapping. It remains inappropriate in the revised context.

B:

This is the original control. ARP poisoning can impersonate the gateway and redirect local layer-2 traffic. It does not directly satisfy the revised requirement: Attackers instead forge DNS answers for a commonly used application name.

D:

Suspicious ARP packets are rejected and victim gateway mappings remain correct. The current requirement is: Attackers instead forge DNS answers for a commonly used application name.

Question 545

Employees connect to a wireless hotspot that copies the legitimate company SSID and presents a fake login screen. Which action MOST directly meets the stated networking requirement?

  1. Investigate an evil-twin access point and enforce validated enterprise wireless identity checks.
  2. Enforce DHCP snooping and authorized server port policy.
  3. Tell employees that matching the SSID string alone proves AP legitimacy.
  4. Treat it as phishing and use user training, phishing-resistant authentication and reporting.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A counterfeit AP can lure clients into credential interception or traffic interception. This specifically resolves: Employees connect to a wireless hotspot that copies the legitimate company SSID and presents a fake login screen.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This action responds to a later condition: An attacker physically plugs in a rogue DHCP server to the access LAN. Rogue DHCP alters addressing and is not solved by SSID validation alone.

C:

SSIDs can be copied and do not by themselves authenticate the access point. The suggested approach is: Tell employees that matching the SSID string alone proves AP legitimacy.

D:

This addresses another problem in objective 4.2: An attacker sends a malicious link impersonating the service desk to obtain network-admin credentials.

Question 546

Employees connect to a wireless hotspot that copies the legitimate company SSID and presents a fake login screen. A colleague instead suggests: Tell employees that matching the SSID string alone proves AP legitimacy. Which finding MOST specifically explains why that suggestion is unsuitable?

  1. Logos and display names can be forged easily.
  2. Rogue DHCP alters addressing and is not solved by SSID validation alone.
  3. A counterfeit AP can lure clients into credential interception or traffic interception.
  4. SSIDs can be copied and do not by themselves authenticate the access point.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

SSIDs can be copied and do not by themselves authenticate the access point. This flaw directly concerns the proposed action: Tell employees that matching the SSID string alone proves AP legitimacy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This flaw concerns a different case in objective 4.2: An attacker sends a malicious link impersonating the service desk to obtain network-admin credentials. The current rejected proposal is: Tell employees that matching the SSID string alone proves AP legitimacy.

B:

This rationale belongs to a later changed condition: An attacker physically plugs in a rogue DHCP server to the access LAN.

C:

This explains why the recommended control works: Investigate an evil-twin access point and enforce validated enterprise wireless identity checks.

Question 547

Employees connect to a wireless hotspot that copies the legitimate company SSID and presents a fake login screen. After applying the solution 'Investigate an evil-twin access point and enforce validated enterprise wireless identity checks.', which observation MOST directly proves that the requirement was met?

  1. A rogue AP is identified by RF/BSSID evidence and devices reject unauthorized server certificates.
  2. Access control logs and guard observations expose unauthorized follower attempts.
  3. Reported test messages are blocked or escalated and stolen passwords cannot bypass MFA.
  4. Approval is recorded for 'Investigate an evil-twin access point and enforce validated enterprise wireless identity checks.' but no operational validation is performed.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A rogue AP is identified by RF/BSSID evidence and devices reject unauthorized server certificates. It tests the intended outcome because a counterfeit ap can lure clients into credential interception or traffic interception.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This test addresses a separate problem: A malicious visitor follows an authorized employee through a secure office door without using a badge.

C:

This observation is for a different condition: An attacker sends a malicious link impersonating the service desk to obtain network-admin credentials. It does not directly test the target outcome: Employees connect to a wireless hotspot that copies the legitimate company SSID and presents a fake login screen.

D:

The missing direct test is: A rogue AP is identified by RF/BSSID evidence and devices reject unauthorized server certificates.

Question 548

The original case was: Employees connect to a wireless hotspot that copies the legitimate company SSID and presents a fake login screen. The requirement then changes: An attacker physically plugs in a rogue DHCP server to the access LAN. Which revised action BEST meets this new condition?

  1. Investigate an evil-twin access point and enforce validated enterprise wireless identity checks.
  2. Tell employees that matching the SSID string alone proves AP legitimacy.
  3. Enforce DHCP snooping and authorized server port policy.
  4. A rogue AP is identified by RF/BSSID evidence and devices reject unauthorized server certificates.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Rogue DHCP alters addressing and is not solved by SSID validation alone. The revised requirement is: An attacker physically plugs in a rogue DHCP server to the access LAN. The appropriate action is: Enforce DHCP snooping and authorized server port policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is the original control. A counterfeit AP can lure clients into credential interception or traffic interception. It does not directly satisfy the revised requirement: An attacker physically plugs in a rogue DHCP server to the access LAN.

B:

SSIDs can be copied and do not by themselves authenticate the access point. It remains inappropriate in the revised context.

D:

A rogue AP is identified by RF/BSSID evidence and devices reject unauthorized server certificates. The current requirement is: An attacker physically plugs in a rogue DHCP server to the access LAN.

Question 549

A new unauthorized DHCP service starts leasing the wrong default gateway to office endpoints. Which action MOST directly meets the stated networking requirement?

  1. Identify tailgating and enforce monitored access with visitor challenge procedures.
  2. Enable DHCP snooping or comparable server-authority enforcement on untrusted switch ports.
  3. Let every access port send authoritative DHCP replies without source checks.
  4. Use approved WLAN identity validation and rogue AP detection.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Rogue DHCP can redirect clients to malicious routes or break connectivity. This specifically resolves: A new unauthorized DHCP service starts leasing the wrong default gateway to office endpoints.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This addresses another problem in objective 4.2: A malicious visitor follows an authorized employee through a secure office door without using a badge.

C:

Unrestricted DHCP server responses allow untrusted devices to issue leases. The suggested approach is: Let every access port send authoritative DHCP replies without source checks.

D:

This action responds to a later condition: The attacker uses a counterfeit corporate Wi-Fi access point instead. Wireless impersonation needs RF and authentication controls.

Question 550

A new unauthorized DHCP service starts leasing the wrong default gateway to office endpoints. Which TWO entries together specify the appropriate corrective measure AND the strongest direct evidence that it works? (Select TWO.)

  1. Identify tailgating and enforce monitored access with visitor challenge procedures.
  2. Let every access port send authoritative DHCP replies without source checks.
  3. Use approved WLAN identity validation and rogue AP detection.
  4. Enable DHCP snooping or comparable server-authority enforcement on untrusted switch ports.
  5. A rogue reply is dropped and legitimate clients obtain the approved gateway.

Explanation

Correct Answers

D:

Correct control. Rogue DHCP can redirect clients to malicious routes or break connectivity. It addresses the present requirement: A new unauthorized DHCP service starts leasing the wrong default gateway to office endpoints.

E:

Correct verification. A rogue reply is dropped and legitimate clients obtain the approved gateway. This demonstrates the outcome expected from: Enable DHCP snooping or comparable server-authority enforcement on untrusted switch ports.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This control fits another scenario in objective 4.2: A malicious visitor follows an authorized employee through a secure office door without using a badge. It does not directly verify or implement the present issue.

B:

Incorrect control. Unrestricted DHCP server responses allow untrusted devices to issue leases. The inappropriate proposal is: Let every access port send authoritative DHCP replies without source checks.

C:

This is a response to a different later requirement: The attacker uses a counterfeit corporate Wi-Fi access point instead. Wireless impersonation needs RF and authentication controls. It is not the original control-and-evidence pair.

CompTIA Network+ (N10-009) Practice Tests